








The State of Peacebuilding in Africa
“On the 50th anniversary of the Organization of African States (OAU) in 2013
the Africa Union (the OAU reborn) pledged itself to creating a conflict-free
Africa. That aspiration still remains unrealized, and this study explains why. In
looking back at the past 50 years of the continent’s history it identifies why Africa
is still conflict—prone; in looking to its future it explains what still needs to be
done to redeem the AU’s pledge. Written by practitioners as well as academics
this is an important work that is constructive in its recommendations, and written
in an authoritative and engaging style. This study doesn’t pull its punches.
It also carries a warning by its editors that good intentions are not enough;
unfortunately, they are all too often supported by unintended consequences.”
—Professor Christopher Coker, Director, London School of Economics, IDEAS
“‘The State of Peacebuilding in Africa’ is a sophisticated tour de force of recent
scholarship on the conceptual, practical and regional aspects of peacebuilding and
peacemaking across contemporary Africa. The volume adroitly questions tradi-
tional approaches to peacebuilding in the complex and evolving milieu within
which African countries operate, and offers a fresh look at how the economic,
social, political and cultural factors interact in complex emergencies. The authors
use a range of thematic angles and case-study examples to explore and articu-
late innovative, evidence-driven options for policy wonks and policy makers. This
book will bring as much richness to the classroom and project whiteboard, as it
would to boardroom.”
—Raymond Gilpin, Ph.D., Chief Economist and Head of Strategy, Regional
Bureau for Africa, UNDP New York
“Far from a period in which narrations of conflict and peacebuilding in Africa
were done predominantly by distant spectators and ‘beholders of peace’, this
book signals a shift by projecting African-led ideas. Not only does it bring authen-
tically African voices to the fore, it offers African peacebuilding perspectives in
a global context. It also privileges first-hand accounts of policy practitioners as
well as experts that have engaged meaningfully with peacebuilding processes and
activities on the ground in Africa. The editors succeed in connecting the world
of academia with that of policy and practice; and they offer a useful model of
collaboration among authors from the global North and South while maintaining
the prominence of the African accounts at the core of the book. This is a bold
attempt to shift perspectives of peacebuilding in Africa from those that are based
on the gaze of distant actors to those which reflect the worldviews of the real
‘owners of peace’.”
—Professor Funmi Olonisakin, Vice President & Vice-Principal International
Professor of Security, Leadership & Development, King’s College London
and Advisory Group of Experts, for the Review of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Architecture (2015)
“Thorough, informative, insightful, and inspiring, this important collection
brings together an impressive and diverse set of authors to reflect upon the
progress that has been made in peacebuilding in Africa and the challenges that
remain. The authors provide an incisive analysis of existing tensions, such as the
mismatch between pan African ideals of self-reliance and the continent’s heavy
dependence on external funding, but they also offer practical and timely sugges-
tions on how to improve peacebuilding approaches and practices. This book will
be essential reading for policymakers and students interested in efforts to support
and uphold peace on the continent.”
—Devon E. A. Curtis, Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics
and International Studies, University of Cambridge
and a Fellow of Emmanuel College
“Drawing on the experiences and expertise of established Africanists, The State
of Peacebuilding in Africa delves eloquently into 30-year peacebuilding experi-
ence in Africa exploring peacebuilding in transition in Africa; appropriate strate-
gies and tools; regional and international dimensions; and country/region case
studies before shedding important lights on key lessons and recommendations.
The editors do an outstanding job of fleshing out the conceptual, methodological
and paradigmatic issues in the face of complex conflict, peace and security chal-
lenges in Africa, while the contributors deliver well-rounded and mature contri-
butions. This book offers timely and stimulating perspectives on the quest for
peace in Africa. It presents compelling new insights on the important, yet some-
times overlooked, symbiotic relationships among peace, security and develop-
ment. The State of Peacebuilding in Africa provides scholars, policymakers, and
other stakeholders studying and working on African issues with innovative solu-
tions, strategies, knowledge, insights and analyses to support decision-making on
how best African leaders should embark on peacebuilding on their continent.”
—Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Ph.D., Independent Scholar, and former Professor,
Civil-Military Relations, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
“Very few books provide as broad and deep a set of reflections and considerations
regarding peacebuilding in Africa, as this volume. The issues and case studies
covered here offer much for the future of policymaking in this area.”
—David J. Hornsby, Associate Vice President of Teaching and Learning and
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The birth year of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1963, is
often considered Africa’s year of independence. But political freedom did
not mean freedom from the repression and violence which had charac-
terized the colonial period. Wars and conflicts have scarred the continent
since independence. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, they became
more complex and widespread. And so, too, did the international efforts
to restore and (re) build peace in Africa. Countries worst affected by
violence and conflict included Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan/South Sudan, Central African
Republic, Mali, and Libya. In recent years, the quest for sustainable peace
in Africa has taken on a new urgency, as instability and insecurity continue
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to negatively impact the lives of millions of Africans and hinder the conti-
nent’s economic growth and development. This book joins the quest for
peace by examining 30 years of peacebuilding in Africa, highlighting key
lessons learned and offering some recommendations for making peace
stick.
In 2013, the Heads of State and Governments of the African Union
(AU) signed the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. To mark a half-
century since the formation of the OAU, forerunner to the AU, leaders
committed to work for peace and prosperity and end strife on the
continent by 2020.
Our determination to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, to make
peace a reality for all our people, and to rid the continent of wars,
civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters, and violent
conflicts, and to prevent genocide, We pledge not to bequeath the burden
of conflicts to the next generation of Africans, and undertake to end all
wars in Africa by 2020.1
Presumably, none of the signatories genuinely believed that such an ambi-
tious target could be achieved within seven years. In the period since the
founding of the OAU, more than half of African states experienced some
form of major conflict. Many of those states had reverted to war after
periods of relative peace. The signatories knew that. Most were in their
60s or older in 2013; they had lived through some of Africa’s bleakest
times. Today, the continent cannot be described as “conflict-free.”
At the same time, Africa has progressed further down the path of peace
than is typically portrayed. State fragility remains an endemic problem
across the continent, but incidents of mass violence are increasingly rare.
This is in no small part due to African states shedding the tactics of their
former colonial masters and taking ownership of the problems within their
own borders. As one of our contributors observes, Africa has
…exhibited a notable readiness to assume the tasks of crisis management
and engage in mutual cooperation between states to rebuild stability,
through diplomacy, negotiation and the deployment of intervention forces
and peacekeepers. The continent’s capacity for common action is one of
its greatest strengths.2
To add weight to the AU’s Solemn Declaration, its leaders adopted the
“Silencing the Guns” initiative, one of the flagship projects of the wider
developmental blueprint “Agenda 2063.” The campaign seeks to make
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2020 a year of action and mobilization, inspiring all stakeholders to
prioritize efforts on peace and effective socio-economic development.
By fitting coincidence, this book is published in the same year—a year
which will be forever linked not (seemingly) with peace and security but,
instead, the COVID-19 pandemic, which has disrupted life in previously
unthinkable ways across all continents. The quest to silence the guns, and
build peace and security in Africa, will continue long after this pandemic
passes. We hope that this book’s insights and lessons will make a small
contribution to that goal.
The State of Peacebuilding in Africa
The State of Peacebuilding in Africa looks back on over 30 years of key
experiences across numerous aspects of peacebuilding and highlights key
lessons learned that could be used to entrench sustainable peace on the
continent.
Building on the research and activities of the Southern Voices Network
for Peacebuilding (SVNP)3—a continent-wide network of 22 African civil
society, policy, research, and academic organizations that works with the
Wilson Center’s Africa Program to bring African knowledge, analyses, and
perspectives to U.S., African, and international policy on peacebuilding in
Africa—this volume brings together the work of distinguished African and
international practitioners, scholars, and decision makers.
Peacebuilding is a complex and multifaceted endeavor, consisting of
many different elements. While some elements are not covered as fully as
others, most of the core themes are included in this book: conflict preven-
tion and early warning systems; mediation and conflict management;
post-conflict reconstruction; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion (DDR); human rights and justice; and the role of women, religion,
humanitarianism, grassroots organizations, and regional and continental
bodies. The thematic chapters are complemented by six country and
region case studies on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Sudan/South Sudan, Mozambique, and the Sahel/Mali.
The chapter authors were given a common template to work from and
asked to address three main questions in the peacebuilding realm in Africa
since the end of the Cold War: What changes have occurred in thinking
and practice at the thematic or country level? What have been the key
lessons learned (good and bad) and best practices to emerge from them?
And, what are the top policy options or recommendations you would
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put forward to policymakers and practitioners working on this aspect of
peacebuilding?
In some respects, of course, this is well-trodden territory. The fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989 coincided with changing dynamics of conflict
across the world, not least in Africa. A rich literature on peacebuilding
arose in this new era—as much out of hope that historic fault-lines might
be bridged as fear that states were not equipped to deal with the new
threats to peace and stability. The colossal challenges and failings of
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia (Srebrenica), led to the landmark “Report of
the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (informally known as
the Brahimi Report), published in 2000, which outlined the need for
enhancing the UN’s capacity to undertake a wide variety of missions. It
was followed five years later by the UN Secretary-General’s Report “In
Larger Freedom,” which emphasized the synergistic relationship of devel-
opment, security, and human rights in building peace. More recently,
the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was
convened in 2014 by the then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. His thor-
ough review of UN peace operations and the emerging needs of the
future, published the following year, popularized the idea of “the primacy
of politics.” By which the report meant not that UN missions could end
conflict and build peace alone, but that their success rested on being part
of a “viable process.” Many of the themes addressed in this volume can
be understood as key parts of such a process.
With ever-deeper attention given to conflict resolution by the UN,
governments, and the academic community, robust debates have arisen
over what terms and definitions fit realities on the ground best. This is
not merely an academic concern: the lack of a common vocabulary can
fatally undermine peace missions. Where there is vagueness and confusion
over terms, one of the book’s contributors writes, contrasting interpreta-
tions of mandates by different national contingents in peace operations
can always arise.
The concept of “peacebuilding” has been, to say the least, vari-
ously defined. For some, it is one of several distinct activities including:
conflict prevention and mediation (e.g., early warning and urgent diplo-
matic measures); peacemaking (e.g., high-level envoys and summits);
peace enforcement (e.g., violent and nonviolent coercive measures), and
post-conflict reconstruction (including justice, institution-building, and
economic development). All of which, in their own way, contribute to
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international peace and security. And then there are peacekeepers, who
are increasingly mandated—or at least find themselves working—across
different realms: protecting civilians, delivering humanitarian assistance,
helping to restore the rule of law, even engaging in de facto recon-
struction and state-building. Others use the term “peacebuilding” in an
instrumental sense: the means to institutionalize peace, and remove the
root causes of conflict.
For the purposes of this volume, peacebuilding is understood in a
broad sense, an umbrella term that encompasses the activities highlighted
above and some others. If a more precise definition is required, perhaps
it is worth recalling another important UN document, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali’s Agenda for Peace published in 1992, which describes the concept
of peacebuilding as
the construction of a new environment… which seeks to avoid the break-
down of peaceful conditions. [Only] sustained, cooperative work to deal
with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can
place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is
to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence.4
With a lens on Africa, this definition provides a reasonably accurate frame
for the book.
In a growing and increasingly globalized literature on peacebuilding,
what sets this volume apart from most others is the amalgam: of contrib-
utors from the grassroots and academia, from the practitioner and
policymaking worlds; of African and non-African voices. There is richness
to this mix. While this book, and the Southern Voices Network for Peace-
building, the initiative that gave rise to it, privileges African voices, it also
includes leading thinkers from outside the continent who have studied
and interrogated peacebuilding, and helped shape peacebuilding policies
and concepts in Africa.
Key Issues and Themes in Peacebuilding in Africa
One of the contributors, Ibrahim Gambari, a Nigerian former military
leader and scholar-diplomat, brings a wealth of high-level experience
outside Africa—as a UN Special Envoy to conflict-scarred states like
Cyprus and Myanmar—to his reflection on how to build sustainable peace
in his home continent. Others, like former government minister Betty
8 T. MCNAMEE AND M. MUYANGWA
Bigombe, draw on years as a mediator in her native Uganda—experi-
ence that included face-to-face negotiations with Joseph Kony and his
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)—together with time spent at think tanks
and the World Bank to explain why policies on the reintegration of
ex-combatants into communities need a rethink. Vera Songwe, current
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UNECA) and a leading African economist and banking executive,
draws on the lessons learned from World War One and Two to argue
for earlier sequencing of economic development within peacebuilding
frameworks, and for revisiting the role of multilateral institutions.
Readers of this volume will invariably pick up on certain issues that
percolate across the thematic chapters and case studies. As you progress
through The State of Peacebuilding in Africa, these are some of the
recurrent themes that we think merit closer scrutiny.
1. Frameworks. Frequently peacebuilding frameworks are out of sync
with realities and needs on the ground. Too often this is due to too
numerous, various, and uncoordinated—however well-meaning—
“partners.” Nor do “one-size-fits-all” approaches work; context
matters. Post-conflict reconstruction approaches tend to focus on
rebuilding the state while neglecting the reconstruction and healing
of the people traumatized by conflict. Both are necessary.
2. Mandates and Missions. Overloaded mandates—often a laundry list
of tasks without commensurate resources in terms of personnel,
finances, or logistics—compromise peacebuilding outcomes. Addi-
tionally, the growing number of blurred missions—e.g., between
humanitarian missions and military peace support operations—is
problematic.
3. Funding. Being overly reliant on external/non-African donors to
fund peacebuilding renders key programs vulnerable and unsustain-
able, as resources are often short-term while peacebuilding needs are
long term in nature.
4. Civil Society, Grassroots, and Elites. Wars are ended by elites; peace
is built and sustained at the grassroots. Peace Agreements and peace-
building efforts need to better reflect that reality, including on
matters of transitional justice and on the role played by religion and
local infrastructures for peace in African societies. Simply put, local
ownership matters and is key to building peace.
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5. Women’s Voices. Peace cannot be realized or sustained if women’s
voices are not included in peacebuilding processes or if issues of
sexual and gender-based violence are not addressed within peace-
building efforts.
6. Youth. Despite recurrent claims to the contrary by leaders and medi-
ators, young Africans are regularly excluded from peace processes. It
is still common for youth to be perceived as potentially dangerous
“factors” in peacebuilding, easily manipulated to further one or
other side’s interests. In reality, young people have agency and are
not monolithic actors. They have tremendous potential for driving
positive change in Africa where, not infrequently, stale gerontocra-
cies dominate. That soon a quarter of the young people in the world
will be African amplifies the need to reimagine the role of youth in
peacebuilding.
7. Institutions matter: International, African Union, and Regional
Economic Communities. Peacebuilding achievements should be
recognized and built upon. In some cases, core institutions need
to revisit their dogmatic approach to peacebuilding. In other cases,
the right institutions and processes are in, or being put in place; they
just need to be more effective and realized.
8. Expectations. Peacebuilding is a long-term process, subject to rever-
sals. Potential points of failure are numerous. Too often populations
are promised miracles and panaceas. When these do not materi-
alize, resentment can fuel a return to war. Similarly, the international
community often expects a sustainable peace but is usually unable or
unwilling to make the long-term investment necessary to transform
conflict-prone societies.
Organization of the Book
This book is divided into four parts: (i) peacebuilding in transition in
Africa; (ii) strategies and tools; (iii) regional and international dimensions;
and (iv) country/region case studies.
Part I focuses on the evolution of peacebuilding and begins with a
reflection by Paul Williams on more than fifty peace operations deployed
to nearly twenty African countries during the twenty-first century. He
outlines why peace operations need to be part of a viable strategy of
conflict resolution and explains what happens when means and ends
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are not aligned. Of particular note is his warning that a numbers-
centric approach to force generation in peace operations is far less
effective than a capabilities and effects-based approach. Vera Songwe
looks at the economic dimension of peacebuilding reflecting on the fail-
ures and successes of international organizations during the first half of
the 20th century. She questions the established approach of engaging
in economic development only after peace has been restored. This
approach, she argues, condemns peacebuilding to failure even before it
has started. Ludovic Lado examines a vital but under-appreciated factor
in the success or failure of peacebuilding: religion. Against a complex
and evolving religious landscape, where Christianity and Islam coexist
alongside African traditional religions, Lado explores the intersection of
secular and faith-based processes of peacebuilding, with particular refer-
ence to the marginalized role of Muslim-based initiatives. In her chapter
on the social imperatives of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion (DDR), Betty Bigombe draws heavily on her leadership experience
of DDR initiatives in Uganda and Burundi, highlighting the myriad
ways in which greater attention to war’s forgotten noncombatants is
essential to heal societies, foster reconstruction and development, and
prevent a recurrence of conflict. Similarly, drawing on his own vast
experience of UN-led peacekeeping operations in Africa, Ibrahim Wani
discusses missions’ engagement on issues related to human rights and
the protection of civilians. He argues that insufficient political support
and overloaded peacekeeping mandates have led to a situation in which
human rights and the protection of civilians are not prioritized as highly
as they should be. It is thus essential, Wani observes, for the UN and
its member states to move beyond rhetoric to genuine implementation of
the HIPPO framework.
The chapters in Part II explore some of the main tools and strate-
gies used in African peacebuilding. Lisa Sharland provides a seemingly
obvious but necessary reminder: peacebuilding is less likely to succeed
without the participation and consideration of women. In a detailed
review of two contrasting cases, Liberia and South Sudan, she reveals
some of the challenges and opportunities that UN engagement has
offered in terms of advancing equality and women’s security in each
country. As overlooked as women, historically, local peace commit-
tees have made enormous contributions to peacebuilding in Africa, as
Fritz Nganje explains. His chapter charts the recent “local turn” which
has given rise to diverse forms of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives.
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Returning to DDR, Anatole Ayissi finds that in the vast majority of
Africa’s conflict-affected societies, reintegration remains the Achilles Heel
of DDR programs; only a minority of ex-combatants are sustainably rein-
tegrated into their communities. He calls for a strengthening of Africa’s
ownership of DDR programs, endowing regional institutions with more
capacity, expertise, and resources. The thorny subject of African elec-
tions is the focus of Franklin Oduro’s chapter. He explains why elections,
particularly ones that transition societies from autocracy to democracy, are
one of the central pillars of peacebuilding in Africa. His chapter concludes
with some provisional ideas for mitigating the “winner-takes-all” ethos
and other potential triggers for election-related violence in Africa. The
last chapter of Part II assesses the contribution of early warning systems
to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with reference to
the experience of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP).
The authors Chukwuemeka Eze and Osei Baffour Frimpong argue that
WANEP’s work on early warning—and conflict-related early warning
systems in general—will not be able to fulfill its potential without reforms
in the areas of funding, partnerships with civil society organizations, and
closing the chasm between early warning and early response.
Part III highlights the varied regional and international dimensions
to African peacebuilding. Gilbert Khadiagala commends the African
Union for the significant strides the organization has made in building
norms around peace, security, stability, and governance, but warns of
tremendous obstacles to realizing the vision and objectives articulated
in its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy.
He urges national ownership of peacebuilding as well as a deepening
and advancing of normative frameworks among various stakeholders.
At the Regional Economic Community (REC)-level, the role of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) in attempting to lay
the groundwork for peaceful transformation in its region is the subject
of Dimpho Deleglise’s chapter. In reviewing the cases of SADC mediation
and involvement in Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe, she explains
why the organization has been singularly unable to fulfill its long-term
agenda for sustainable peace. Phil Clark examines the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC) and its intersections with two widespread domestic
conflict resolution processes in Africa: national amnesties and peace nego-
tiations. In doing so, he connects to two overarching scholarly and policy
debates, namely the appropriateness and legality of amnesties as opposed
to prosecutions for suspected perpetrators of international crimes, and
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the “peace versus justice” debate over whether the threat of prosecu-
tion imperils peace negotiations that involve high-level atrocity suspects.
A practitioner’s perspective on the changing role of humanitarian organi-
zations in Africa’s conflict zones is provided by Jens Pedersen. He traces
how humanitarianism has become a highly contested space on the battle-
field, where principles of humanitarian relief have been undermined by the
major powers and the UN in their pursuit of ostensibly noble objectives.
A different kind of firsthand perspective is offered by Ibrahim Gambari.
His focus is the prevention and mediation of conflicts, drawing on his
experience as a senior UN envoy to several conflict zones around the
world. His is a global view on lessons learned for peacebuilding in Africa
against the backdrop of fundamental shifts in the nature of conflict since
the end of the Cold War.
Part IV of the book captures some of the above peacebuilding themes
in several country and region studies. Rachel Sweet tackles one of the
continent’s most complex and conflict-prone states, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in a comparative look at two major interven-
tion attempts of the UN Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Reublic
of the Congo (MONUSCO) in different theaters of conflict in North
Kivu: one that was seen as a success (against the M23 rebellion, 2012–
2013), and the other a failure (against the Allied Democratic Forces
[ADF] rebellion, 2014–present). In his detailed account of Mozam-
bique’s decades-long, often fraught peacebuilding journey, Alex Vines
examines the diverse initiatives—from financial and diplomatic to the
contribution of church-based mediation and grassroots initiatives for
justice and reconciliation—that brought the ruling FRELIMO party and
RENAMO to a negotiated settlement, against a backdrop of changing
regional and international dynamics. Adekeye Adebajo sets out in his
chapter to solve a mystery: why has Sierra Leone remained relatively
stable 14 years after peacekeepers left the country in 2006, and 18 years
after the end of a devastating 11-year civil war in which an estimated
70,000 people died? In doing so, he explains, Sierra Leone has defied
the fate of so many fragile and conflict-prone states. The main depar-
ture point of Jok Maduk Jok’ s chapter on Sudan/South Sudan is that,
common to most protracted conflicts that relapse into war, there was a
profound disconnect between elites and local communities in the once-
unified Sudan and subsequently in the two separate countries. Drawing
heavily on the apparent failures of the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment (CPA), he asserts that African conflict resolution and peacebuilding
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relies too heavily on political agreements between politico-military elites.
Terence McNamee outlines why Rwanda, a relatively unknown country
until 1994, divides opinion among scholars and commentators as perhaps
no other state in Africa, if not the world, does. Is it a development success,
rising from the ashes of mass ethnic slaughter? Or a case of autocratic
recidivism, masked by a bogus narrative of national unity? This chapter
tries to find a balance in Rwanda’s highly contested peacebuilding journey.
The last chapter, by Paul Melly, tracks the evolution of local and interna-
tional efforts to contain the multifaceted threats to peace and security in
the Sahel—threats that have become more serious over the past 15 years,
despite a steady reinforcement of the national, regional, and international
campaign to stabilize the region.
It is our hope that in addressing peacebuilding in Africa from such
varying angles and perspectives, this book surfaces insights and lessons





2. See Paul Melly, Chapter 22 in this book.
3. The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding was established in 2011,
and is generously funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. More
information about the SVNP can be found here: https://www.wilsoncen
ter.org/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding.
4. See A/47/277-S/24111 June 17, 1992, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping’, the Report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the
Security Council on January 31, 1992.
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CHAPTER 2




This chapter reflects on the experiences of more than fifty peace oper-
ations deployed in Africa during the twenty-first century in order to
identify some of the most important generic lessons and potential new
approaches that have emerged. These peace operations varied across
several dimensions with each mission operating in a distinct set of circum-
stances to achieve a unique set of mandated tasks. Consequently, any
attempt to draw generic lessons without a concomitant focus on mission-
specific lessons should not be treated as definitive. Nevertheless, there is
some value in trying to move beyond mission-specific analysis and draw
broader conclusions, as this chapter seeks to do.
For the purposes of this chapter, I define peace operations broadly
as the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (troops, military
observers/experts, and police), with or without a United Nations (UN)
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mandate, but with an explicit mandate to assist in the prevention of
armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to
observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements;
or enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security
Council in order to build stable peace.1 This excludes what the UN
calls “special political missions” as well as “collective defense operations”
(such as the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006) and humani-
tarian military interventions (such as the NATO-led operation in Libya in
2011).
This chapter starts by providing an overview of the main trends in
peace operations in Africa focusing on the record number of missions
and peacekeepers deployed; the wide range of mandated tasks given
to them; the prominence of civilian protection issues; the intensifying
debates over the use of force; and the rise of “partnership peacekeeping.”
The second section summarizes the major generic lessons that can be
identified from these operations. These include the need to ensure peace
operations are part of a viable political strategy aimed at conflict resolu-
tion; that means and ends are in tune; that a capabilities and effects-based
approach to force generation is superior to a numbers-centric approach;
and maintaining legitimacy among key international and local audi-
ences can significantly enhance the prospects for success. The concluding
section offers six recommendations for improving the performance of
peace operations in these areas.
Trends in Peace Operations in Africa
Africa has witnessed more than 50 peace operations during the twenty-
first century.2 Several major trends have emerged: the number of peace-
keepers, missions, and budgets has increased significantly with African
states and the African Union (AU) playing increasingly important roles
but the UN remaining the single most prominent actor; most missions
have been given extremely wide-ranging and complex mandates; civilian
protection has often risen to prominence among these tasks; disagreement
persists over when peacekeepers should use military force; and “partner-
ship peacekeeping” has become the norm in the continent. Each of these
characteristics will be discussed more fully below.
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Record Levels
First, the twenty-first century has witnessed significant growth in the
number, size, and cost of peace operations in Africa (see Fig. 2.1). Since
2002, there have been at least 14 missions across the continent in each
calendar year. By the end of 2016, there were over 115,000 uniformed
peacekeepers in Africa: over 80,000 from the UN (see Fig. 2.2); over
20,000 from the AU; and approximately another 15,000 in regional and
other operations. More than 11,000 were police officers. These figures
do not include the estimated 15,500 additional civilian personnel in UN
and AU peace operations. The cost of these operations reflects the fact
that many of these personnel have deployed into often difficult, remote
terrain and are required to come with large numbers of vehicles and other
major equipment items and life support systems.
While the UN has deployed the most peacekeepers, there has been
a major increase in the number of African personnel in these missions
(nearly half of all UN uniformed peacekeepers are African), as well as
a growing number of missions led or authorized by African regional
Fig. 2.1 Number and types of peace operations in Africa, 1988–2016 (Source
Adapted and updated from Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Trends in
Peace Operations, 1947–2013,” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Koops et al. [Oxford University Press, 2015])
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Fig. 2.2 UN uniformed personnel worldwide and in Africa 1990–2019 (Source
Adapted by author)
organizations. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Africa’s regional economic
communities (RECs) deployed most missions. Since 2004, however, the
AU has played the central role, authorizing the deployment of approx-
imately 70,000 uniformed peacekeepers in 12 missions (see Fig. 2.3).3
However, there were three important caveats to this trend. First, these
deployments required considerable external assistance. Second, the AU
Fig. 2.3 Uniformed personnel deployed by African Union member states
in UN and AU missions (31 July annual) (Source Providing for peace-
keeping database, November 1990–present, International Peace Institute and
George Washington University, http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/con
tributions, and author’s calculations)
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struggled to deploy sufficient numbers of police and other civilian experts
on its missions. And, since 2003, the majority of African peacekeepers
came from roughly one-fifth of the AU’s members, particularly Burundi,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa,
Tanzania, and Uganda.
Wide-Ranging Mandates
The second major trend has been the growing list of mandated tasks
given to peace operations in Africa, which range from observing ceasefires;
protecting humanitarian relief supplies; supporting disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs; strengthening the rule of
law and public security; supporting weak governments, including through
extending state authority and security sector reform (SSR); protecting
civilians and electoral processes; stabilization; counterinsurgency; to war-
fighting. Importantly, each set of tasks generally requires different force
requirements, capabilities, and training, but this has not always been
catered for during the force generation process. There was also a notable
expansion in the importance placed on having police officers deploy in
these missions to perform a variety of tasks related to strengthening the
rule of law and public security.
Put bluntly, most peace operations in twenty-first century Africa were
asked to help build institutions of liberal democratic governance in some
of the continent’s poorest and war-torn states. For their critics, these
mandates had become too broad and unrealistic given the few incentives
for conflict parties in Africa to build genuinely liberal institutions.
One problem was the lack of clarity over how peacekeepers should
fulfill certain objectives and the meaning of key terms. As the head of the
UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations observed, not only were
mission mandates “more complex than ever” but, “there remains a lack
of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled.”4 Part
of the problem was that even basic terminology used in mandates was
often unclear. Peacekeepers were often told to “assist” authorities and
“support” processes using “all necessary measures” without being given
further specific instructions. “Peacebuilding” and “civilian protection”
(see below) were another two widely debated and confusing concepts.
The vague nature of such terms encouraged the unhelpful tendency for
different national contingents within a peace operation to sometimes
interpret their mandates in different ways.
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Another problem stemmed from peacekeepers being given contradic-
tory tasks. In both the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and
South Sudan, for example, peacekeepers were told to help host govern-
ments extend their authority across the country and protect civilians—in
the full knowledge that the government’s armed forces were among
the principal perpetrators of violence against civilians. Peacekeepers had
the legal right to use deadly force against host government forces that
committed war crimes against local civilians. However, in practice, things
were rarely that simple, either because government forces outnumbered
the peacekeepers or because acting against the host government might
cause it to expel the peace operation.
A third mandate problem was the tendency to produce long lists
of tasks without providing criteria to clearly prioritize among them.
The initial mandate for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS), for example, contained a list of well over 40 different tasks
with priority given to assisting with state-building and civilian protection,
tasks that require very different capabilities and approaches and neither
of which have a quick exit strategy. By 2018, the UN Secretary-General
was telling the Council that UNMISS “cannot possibly implement 209
mandated tasks.”5 On the positive side, the UN’s most recent operation
in Africa, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
tion Mission in the Central African Republic (the mission is known by
its French acronym, MINUSCA, the country is known by its English
acronym, CAR), tried to overcome this problem by introducing the
notion of “urgent temporary measures,” i.e., those tasks that should form
the initial priority. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also
tried to prioritize tasks—but ultimately suffered from too many prior-
ities, with its post-2016 mandate identifying three strategic objectives,
four priority tasks, and six essential tasks.6 Importantly, two high-level
panels on UN peace operations had called for peacekeeping mandates
to be sequenced. In 2000, the Brahimi Report called for mandates to
remain in draft form until the UN’s member states provided the requisite
resources.7 In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Oper-
ations (HIPPO) called for a “two-stage sequenced mandating process”
with fewer priorities that would allow missions to develop over time,
rather than trying to do everything at once.8
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Protecting Civilians
Arguably one of the most important mandated tasks in twenty-first
century missions has been protecting civilians.9 Although many peace
operations in Africa grappled with the problems of civilian protection
throughout the 1990s, it was not until 1999 that all UN multidimen-
sional peacekeeping operations in Africa included some explicit element
of civilian protection in their mandates. Since 2003, the European
Union (notably Operation Artemis and European Union Force [EUFOR]
missions in Chad and CAR) and the AU (notably in its missions in Darfur,
Mali, and CAR) have also given some of their operations civilian protec-
tion tasks. In part, the surge of civilian protection mandates stemmed
from the recognition that local civilians usually judged a mission’s effec-
tiveness on how well it protected them rather than other more technical
criteria. But it was also because several UN high-level inquiries concluded
that the inability to distinguish between victims and aggressors and
the failure to protect the former was highly damaging to the UN’s
legitimacy.10
But, even when civilian protection mandates were issued to UN peace-
keepers, they came with geographic, political, and operational caveats.
First, peacekeepers were supposed to protect civilians “without preju-
dice to responsibility of host nation”—despite the armed forces of some
host governments being major perpetrators of civilian harm. Second,
peacekeepers were only supposed to protect civilians within their existing
“capabilities and areas of deployment.” In one sense, this sensibly left key
decisions about implementing this mandate to force commanders on the
ground. But, on the other hand, it often encouraged peacekeepers not to
use force to protect civilians, but rather to remain in their bases which, in
turn, encouraged endangered civilians to flock to them.11 Third, the focus
was usually narrowed to protecting only those civilians “under imminent
threat of violence” which, by definition, is a point at which it is too late
for peacekeepers to succeed. In response to this problem, the UN started
using the phrase “threat of violence” without the reference to “immi-
nent” and emphasizing that peacekeepers should actively deter violence
against civilians.12
Even with these caveats, UN peacekeepers struggled with how to trans-
late this aspirational concept into practical military and policing tasks that
could be trained and implemented in the field. It took the UN over
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a decade to develop guidelines and training regimes on how its peace-
keepers could best operationalize this concept in the field.13 A big part
of the problem was that UN peacekeeping missions had traditionally not
been permitted to use intelligence-gathering capabilities because of polit-
ical disputes within the UN General Assembly and Security Council. And
yet, it was impossible for a mission with limited resources to respond
effectively to threats against civilians if it did not have access to accu-
rate and timely intelligence about the sources of such threats. As a
consequence, some operations, especially the United Nations Organi-
zation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO) and UNMISS, began to innovate their own responses to
overcoming this challenge, including by creating Joint Protection Teams,
Community Liaison Assistants, and Community Alert Networks. The
formation of the All Sources Information Unit (ASIFU) in MINUSMA’s
early years was the closest a UN peacekeeping operation has come to
developing an official intelligence-gathering capability.
Although most media reporting focused on the failures of peacekeepers
to protect civilians, even in truly dire circumstances the presence of peace-
keepers usually made the overall situation for civilians better, not worse.14
The basic problem was that there was only so much even well-resourced
peacekeepers could do. As one analysis correctly observed, peacekeeping
operations could not “protect everyone from everything,” nor could they
“operate without some semblance of a ‘peace to keep’ or halt determined
belligerents wholly backed by a state.”15
Using Force
The fourth trend in peace operations in Africa was persistent debate
over when peacekeepers should use military force beyond self-defense.
This raised fundamental questions about the nature and limits of peace
operations and the efficacy of using multinational forces with large
numbers of contributing countries to wield military power effectively.
In twenty-first century Africa, there have been several examples of peace
operations coming close to war-fighting at the tactical level against partic-
ular “spoiler” groups, including in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire,
Somalia, Mali and Central and West Africa against the Lord’s Resis-
tance Army (LRA) and Boko Haram. While the AU had no qualms
about using a peace operation to engage in war-fighting, the UN’s basic
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principles of peacekeeping—consent of the main conflict parties; impar-
tiality; and minimum use of force except in self-defense and defense of
the mandate—made it much less common in UN-led operations. The
formation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO
in 2013 generated a novel lexicon from the UN Security Council, which
mandated it to “neutralize armed groups” by carrying out “targeted
offensive operations.”16
When the UN Security Council authorized proactive military force
beyond self-defense, it was usually in the name of either protecting civil-
ians or defeating spoiler groups such as M23 in the DRC. The AU
also regularly authorized its forces to protect civilians and defeat partic-
ular spoilers, notably in the Comoros, Somalia, Mali, CAR, and in its
multinational task forces authorized to fight against the LRA and Boko
Haram.
For the UN, this type of combat operations raised questions about
whether it could remain an impartial actor. The UN’s response was,
“yes, it could,” because impartiality permitted the use of force against
recalcitrant parties: “Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize
infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by
the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the
international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping
operation upholds.”17 However, these nuances were clearly lost on some
armed groups who did not view UN peacekeepers as impartial and
targeted them accordingly.
A key question is whether this was a sensible policy for the UN to
pursue given the many difficulties involved with command and control
in its peacekeeping operations, which left them poorly designed to fight
wars. Moreover, most UN contributing countries did not sign up to
fight wars or undertake proactive combat operations against determined
adversaries. As a result of these inherent limitations, the latest HIPPO
concluded that “extreme caution must guide any call for a United Nations
peacekeeping operation to undertake enforcement tasks and that any such
mandated task should be a time-limited, exceptional measure.”18 Nor, it
wrote, should UN peacekeepers conduct counter-terrorism operations.19
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Partnership Peacekeeping
The last major trend analyzed here is that “partnership peacekeeping”
has become the norm in Africa. This entails collaboration on operations
between two or more multilateral institutions and/or various bilateral
actors. Several factors have driven this trend, including widespread recog-
nition that no single actor can cope with Africa’s security challenges alone
and that different actors bring comparative advantages to peace oper-
ations. As Fig. 2.1 shows, however, most peace operations have been
authorized or supported by the UN Security Council, demonstrating the
enduring significance of the UN brand and legitimacy. In Africa, the
central partnerships involve relations among the UN, the AU, the RECs,
the European Union, and important bilateral actors—principally France,
the United States, and Britain.
In Africa, partnership peacekeeping has taken several different forms.
There have been sequenced operations, as in Mali, Burundi, and CAR, in
which responsibility transitions from one set of actors to another, usually
from African organizations to the UN. There have been parallel oper-
ations where multiple missions coexist simultaneously within the same
theater, as in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and CAR. The UN has also
provided a variety of support packages to regional missions using funds
from its assessed contributions to peacekeeping, as in Darfur and Somalia.
There has also been one joint hybrid mission between the UN and the AU
in Darfur, Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID).
Lessons Identified from Peace
Operations in Africa
What are the major generic lessons that can be identified from the
numerous peace operations deployed in Africa during the twenty-first
century? This section briefly summarizes four such lessons: the need to
ensure peace operations are part of a viable strategy of conflict resolution;
that means and ends are kept in tune; that a capabilities and effects-based
approach to force generation is superior to a numbers-centric approach;
and maintaining legitimacy among key international and local audiences
can significantly enhance the prospects for success.
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The Primacy of Politics
Arguably the most important lesson is that successful peace operations are
those that ensure what the HIPPO called “the primacy of politics.”20 In
essence, peace operations are political instruments, sometimes backed by
a security guarantee in the form of troops. They are not the same thing
as a political strategy aimed at resolving the crisis in question. Instead, as
the HIPPO report emphasized, “UN peace operations must be deployed
as part of a viable process” to achieve a political settlement to the crisis in
question. The same goes for other forms of peace operations too. “Lasting
peace,” the report concluded, “is not achieved nor sustained by military
and technical engagements, but through political solutions.” It is, there-
fore, politics, not military force that is the peacekeeper’s primary weapon.
As the HIPPO report put it, “political solutions, not military force, are
the true force multipliers” for peacekeepers.21
A related lesson is that because political primacy ultimately rests with
national actors, peacekeepers can only support peace processes; they
cannot impose sustainable peace in the absence of local willingness to
do so. If the UN, the AU, or other actors deploy peacekeepers without a
political pathway to peace, the best-case scenario is that they limit some of
the worst negative consequences of the armed conflict in question. But it
would be naïve to believe that peacekeepers can deliver peace in a context
in which important local actors want war. Political dynamics in New York
and Addis Ababa will often push politicians to deploy peacekeepers even
in the absence of a viable strategy of conflict resolution, but this only adds
to the imperative to learn this particular lesson.
Ends and Means in Tune
A second key lesson is that peace operations will likely fail when their
means and ends are not in tune, i.e., peacekeepers are not given the
resources necessary to achieve their goals. There are at least two dimen-
sions to this lesson. First, the goals of the operation should be set out
in clear, credible, and flexible mandates, and peacekeepers given appro-
priate Rules of Engagement. Second, once mandated, policymakers must
prevent large vacancy rates i.e., discrepancies between the authorized
force levels and the actual numbers and types of personnel on the ground
(see below on force generation). Such personnel gaps not only hamper a
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mission’s ability to take advantage of the so-called “golden hour” imme-
diately after the cessation of fighting but also signal to the conflict parties
a lack of political will within the authorizing organizations.
Large vacancy rates have damaged the performance of several peace
operations, perhaps most notably UNAMID in Sudan and AMISOM in
Somalia. This issue is not only important at the mission start-up phase but
also when mandates are changed in response to developing circumstances
and alter the mission’s force strength and/or capabilities. Unfortunately,
mandates have often been revised without providing peacekeepers with
the necessary additional or different resources. Authorized reinforce-
ments, for example, have become notorious for not arriving as planned,
as occurred in eastern DRC in 2008 and South Sudan in early 2014. In
perhaps the worst example, it took until December 2016 for AMISOM
to receive its first three military helicopters after the UN Security Council
authorized twelve of them in 2012.
Effective Force Generation
A third, and related, lesson is that without effective force generation
processes peace operations will struggle to achieve success.22 More specif-
ically, it is clear that a capabilities and effects-based approach to force
generation is superior to the traditional numbers-centric approach.23
Once a peace operation has been established, the authorizing institu-
tion must ensure the relevant peacekeepers and capabilities are generated
rapidly. Each peace operation requires a unique combination of force
requirements and capabilities. Most of these must come from volun-
tary contributions from states since most international organizations lack
permanent armed forces or police.
The UN made significant progress in 2015, when it established the
new Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell to play
matchmaker between the UN and its member states who contribute to
peace operations. There is also a new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness
System to coordinate how and where member states can pledge military,
police, and other civilian personnel to participate in UN missions.24 In
addition, high-level political attention at the UN has been maintained by
a series of peacekeeping leaders’ summits and defense ministerials in 2014,
2015, 2016, and 2017, at which UN member states have pledged over
50,000 uniformed peacekeepers and a wide range of assets and enablers.
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Past experiences show that effective force generation (whether at the
UN, AU, or elsewhere) is more likely with a broad pool of poten-
tial contributing states upon which to draw.25 Without a broad pool of
contributors, authorizing institutions are unable to be very selective when
assembling their peace operations and instead have to rely on what capa-
bilities are available rather than what is required for the job. In Africa,
particularly important and persistent gaps in the force generation process
have included a dearth of female peacekeepers; French-speakers; police
and other civilian experts; and a wide range of mobility vehicles and
enabling units (especially medical, engineering, and logistics).
Ensure Accountability
A fourth key, generic lesson is that peace operations are less likely to
succeed if they do not maintain legitimacy among key international and
local audiences. This is often directly connected to ensuring that peace-
keepers remain accountable both to their international bosses and the
local populations they are supposed to serve.26 When peace operations are
dependent on local support for their legitimacy and effectiveness, miscon-
duct (including causing harm to civilians, engaging in sexual exploitation
and abuse, or trafficking in illicit goods) can have negative strategic
effects. Indeed, misconduct by peacekeepers can damage the reputation
of both the particular mission as well as peacekeeping as a whole.
Key Recommendations
In light of the preceding trends and major generic lessons identified
from peace operations in twenty-first century Africa, this concluding
section briefly sketches six recommendations intended to enhance the
effectiveness of peace operations.
1. Enhance peacemaking capabilities. In order to create the impres-
sion that they are engaged in meaningful responses to crises, political
leaders in New York, Addis Ababa, and elsewhere are likely to persist
in deploying peace operations to African crises in the absence of a
viable strategy of conflict resolution. Assuming this trend is likely
to continue, advocates of more effective peace operations should
push to invest more resources in developing better international
mediation and peacemaking capabilities, including ensuring the full
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development of the AU’s new Mediation Support Unit. It is the
failure to resolve Africa’s crises through peacemaking that has placed
an impossible burden on peacekeepers.
2. Clarify the core tasks of peace operations. Political leaders in New
York and Addis Ababa should also develop a stronger consensus
on the core tasks that contemporary UN and AU peace operations
should be able to undertake. So far, too many peace operations
in Africa have involved a mix of different, sometimes contradic-
tory, agendas, including peacekeeping (in its traditional sense), peace
consolidation (assisting conflict parties after they have committed
to a political settlement), civilian protection, atrocity prevention,
counter insurgency, counter terrorism, stabilization, state-building
and war-fighting. Not only does each of these tasks require distinct
capabilities and training regimes, but also some of them may simply
be beyond the capacities of peacekeepers. Certainly, neither the
UN nor AU is well suited to fight wars against transnational insur-
gents or carry out counter terrorism campaigns. The UN and AU
should both urgently clarify the doctrine that shall govern their own
peace operations and develop their force generation and training
requirements accordingly.
3. Incentivize some aspects of force generation. Once the core tasks
(and limits) of UN and AU peace operations have been clari-
fied, the authorizing institutions should look to enhance their force
generation processes accordingly. Both organizations should clarify
whether it is right, and, if so, how to incentivize different types of
contributions from their members. Key areas might include incen-
tives for those contributing states that can assume greater than
average risk and/or can deploy rapidly into the field. The UN’s
new Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System is already offering
premiums in the case of enabling units able to rapidly deploy in
30/60/90 days. This approach should be further developed at the
UN and also considered by the AU.
4. Develop standards and regularly assess peacekeeper performance.
The UN and AU should develop agreed performance standards for
peacekeepers deployed by their respective organizations. The UN
has taken a major step forward in this regard with the release of its
Military Unit Manuals and force assessment guidance. First, there-
fore, the UN should complete the process of identifying operational
standards for the tasks its peacekeepers are expected to perform and
2 LEARNING LESSONS FROM PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA 29
devise metrics for ensuring that peacekeepers live up to them in
the field. This process should be developed for both rank-and-file
peacekeepers and senior mission leadership teams. In the immediate
term, the effort should focus on implementing the UN’s new policy
on “Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improve-
ment.”27 This awkwardly titled document is arguably one of the
most important in the history of peacekeeping because it details how
the UN can improve the performance of deployed military units by
ensuring a holistic approach by all stakeholders. Specifically, the UN
Secretary-General should ensure that the Performance Improvement
Cycle described as part of this process is institutionalized, adequately
resourced, and routinely carried out for all UN peace operations.
This process would also need a policing equivalent. Once the UN’s
operational standards are clarified and the organization is able to
evaluate them in the field, it must ensure that when peacekeepers
fail to perform they should be replaced by those who can. The AU
should adopt a similar type of policy fit for its own purposes.
5. Ensure sustainable and predictable funding for African peace
operations. While the UN system of financing its peace operations
works relatively effectively, the same cannot be said for African-
led missions, which have long struggled to find funds. In order to
satisfy the approach to funding operations set out in Article 21 of its
Peace and Security Council Protocol (2002),28 the AU developed a
new source of funding for its peace operations that was intended to
deliver on its commitment to fund 25 percent of its peace and secu-
rity activities by 2020.29 This took the form of the new AU Peace
Fund, launched in late 2018. By early 2020 the Fund had gener-
ated over $100 million to spend on the AU’s peace and security
activities.30 Despite this significant progress, the AU is still far from
financially self-sufficient with regard to peace operations, hence the
UN and AU must continue to work out how and when African-led
missions can access the UN’s assessed peacekeeping contributions.
6. Stop peacekeepers engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse.
Finally, all actors engaged in peace operations must ensure that
they put a stop to peacekeepers committing sexual exploitation and
abuse and hold perpetrators accountable, quickly and transparently.
The victims must also be given access to reparations for any crimes
committed by international peacekeepers. The most sensible place
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to start is to ensure that the commitments set out in UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016) are consistently
implemented. For the AU, it means implementing its zero-tolerance
policy. In this sense, the firing of the UN’s head of mission in
Central African Republic, General Babacar Gaye, over allegations
of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers there has set an
important precedent. The same should apply when UN peace-
keepers engage in other types of misconduct, including smuggling
and other forms of civilian harm. As Ban Ki-moon noted in his
farewell address as UN Secretary-General, these episodes “tarnished
the reputation of the United Nations and, far worse, traumatized
many people we serve.”31
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CHAPTER 3
The Economics of Peacebuilding:
International Organizations for Dealing
with Victor and Vanquished
Vera Songwe
Peace has been declared at Paris. But Winter approaches.1
Introduction
The art of peacebuilding is as old as conflict. In a bell curve manner,
conflicts began among families, tribes, nations, kingdoms, and clusters
of nations, and have since returned to mostly conflict within nations.
As conflicts have intensified, so have conflict resolution mechanisms
become more sophisticated and institutionalized. Early on, peacebuilding
was achieved through unions between the victor and vanquished. This
tradition persisted up to nineteenth-century Europe. In some traditions,
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especially in the East, the armies of the vanquished were handed over
as part of the spoils of war; in others, the territory was annexed. These
were well-established practices and constituted what could be termed the
etiquette of post-conflict agreements and peacebuilding. The League of
Nations, set up by Allied nations following the end of the First World War,
was the first global institution set up to handle post-war peacebuilding
but also aimed to avoid wars. It met with limited success. Two decades
later, following an even bloodier war, its predecessor was created, The
United Nations (UN), coupled with two development institutions, infor-
mally known as the Bretton Woods institutions (The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund [IMF]).
This chapter draws from the contrasting experiences of the League of
Nations and the United Nations to highlight the centrality of economic
development to peacebuilding. In doing so, the chapter questions the
established sequence of peacebuilding: that only when peace is fully
restored can the focus move to economic development. This sequence is
clearly contrary to all successful experiences. The chapter argues that the
near-dogmatic insistence on this sequential process has, in many cases,
such as Guinea-Bissau and Libya, undermined peacebuilding before it has
even begun.
Most conflicts are about voice, economic equity, inclusion, and access.
Today, J. M. Keynes’s words at the end of the Treaty of Versailles discus-
sions—“peace has been declared at Paris. But Winter approaches”2—still
resonate in many peacebuilding situations as one wonders what is being
done to guarantee shared economic development as a weapon of peace.
The challenge of responding, to more internal conflicts in the case
of Africa, also requires an alternative response that is underpinned by
economic imperatives rather than by an established sequence of polit-
ical negotiations. Most of the conflicts on the continent are, in fact, a
direct result of economic deprivation, or inflation-induced conflicts. These
require rapid economic peacebuilding solutions.
Section one of this chapter will summarize the activities that led
to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the big omissions and
shortfalls of the Treaty. The second section will look at the peace agree-
ment ending the Second World War and compare and contrast this with
the First World War. The third section looks at how the lessons from
both agreements have been applied to peacemaking and peacebuilding in
Africa, with particular attention to the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Côte
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d’Ivoire. The fourth section concludes with lessons learned for the future
of peacebuilding on the continent.
The Treaty of Versailles---An Ambiguous Peace
In 1920 following the end of the First World War, which cost the lives
of more than 20 million people, split roughly equally between mili-
tary personnel and civilians, the Allied powers came together to agree
on the construct of a new world order. In a foreshadowing comment,
Keynes lamented the lack of economic vision in the peace plan. He
wrote, the Versailles Treaty “includes no provisions for the economic
rehabilitation of Europe…nothing to make the defeated Central Empires
into good neighbours…. Nor does it promote in any way a compact of
economic solidarity.”3 For an economist, the concept of economic soli-
darity was vital, as it implied jobs and wages—the centerpiece of Keynesian
economics.
The peacemakers acknowledged the daunting task that lay before
them. “Making peace is harder than waging war,” French Prime Minister
Georges Clemenceau reflected in 1919 as the victorious powers drew
up peace terms, finalized the shape of the new League of Nations, and
tried to rebuild Europe and the global order.4 For Clemenceau and his
colleagues, the prospect of crafting a peace agreement was particularly
challenging. Unlike in 1815, when negotiators met in Vienna to wind up
the Napoleonic Wars, in 1919 Europe was not tired of war and revolu-
tion. Nor had aggressor nations been utterly defeated and occupied, as
they would be in 1945. Rather, leaders in 1919 confronted a world in
turmoil. Fighting continued throughout much of Eastern Europe even as
the Treaty was being crafted.
Then-US president, Woodrow Wilson saw the Paris Peace Conference
and resulting Treaty as the beginning of a crusade for humankind. The
Treaty was to usher in peace and end all suffering. All the Allied leaders
believed that the agreement was just and fitting for both the victor and
vanquished. Wilson’s League of Nations was meant to create an interna-
tional community of democratic nations. By providing collective security
for one another, they would not only end aggression but build a fairer
and more prosperous world.
The victorious Allied forces (Britain, France, the United States, and
Italy), both their populations and their leaders, had the right inten-
tions but also wanted to ensure that the vanquished (Germany, Austria,
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Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) paid for their aggression.
The tension between restoring peace and making the vanquished account-
able is ages old and carries within it a delicate balance, one that proposes
a just peace while ensuring there is enough deterrent on the part of the
aggressors not to exact revenge or feel completely marginalized.
A couple of elements stand out in the Treaty. While it was signed by
all the countries, each country negotiated a separate peace deal with the
vanquished nations and then the agreements were brought together; in
the end, each country tried to exact individual benefit rather than collec-
tively attempt to ensure that the Treaty promoted peace. The French
wanted retribution for the destruction of industry and cities on the Rhine
and assurances this would never happen again. The British, led by Lloyd
George, largely accomplished their main goal, which was to wipe out
Germany’s High Seas Fleet as a threat to the Royal Navy and protect
the British Empire.
Tens of thousands of German civilians died of starvation or
malnutrition-related illnesses before Britain finally lifted the blockade
once Germany signed the Versailles Treaty, sowing the seeds of German
resentment. The Treaty even added to Britain’s colonial empire when it
(along with France, Belgium, and Japan) assumed “mandates” (colonies
in all but name) over colonies the treaty stripped from Germany and
the Ottoman Empire. Britain acquired Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan in
the Middle East and former German colonies in Africa: South West
Africa (present-day Namibia), German East Africa (present-day Burundi,
Rwanda, and mainland Tanzania), Togoland (present-day Togo), and
German Kamerun (mainly present-day Cameroon).
Wilson’s vision for the League of Nations, codified as part I of the
Versailles Treaty, was a “general association of nations established to
afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity
of all nations great and small.”5 The pillars of the League were collective
security, disarmament, and settlement of international disputes through
arbitration. Yet this was based on voluntary participation by League
members—essentially relying on “good will.” The League of Nations had
no standing military force to back up any decision it made, and if a nation
disagreed with the League’s decision, it could simply “opt out”—as Nazi
Germany (1933), Imperial Japan (1933), and Fascist Italy (1937) even-
tually did when they withdrew from the League after it tried to oppose
their aggression. For want of leadership, among other things, the promise
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of 1919 soon turned into the disillusionment, division, and aggression of
the 1930s.
Part II of the treaty creating Germany’s post-war boundaries (Germany
lost 13 percent of its territory and all of its colonies) was seen as dispos-
sessing Germany of its rightful assets and left Germans feeling put upon;
part V imposed military restrictions on Germany’s armed forces; and part
VIII specified war reparations to be paid principally to France, Belgium,
Britain, and Italy for civilian damages caused by the German invasion and
occupation. The reparations clause was later used by Germany to build
national resentment (despite never actually fulfilling their reparation obli-
gations). It provided political fodder for building a new front against the
Allied forces.
Glaringly absent from the Treaty of Versailles was any reference to the
rebuilding of an economic architecture for trade. The League of Nations
focused on the restoration of peace and the protocols for achieving it. The
Allied powers stripped Germany of its assets or destroyed trade routes and
vessels. There was no attention paid to the economics of peace. Instead,
the focus was on the need for Germany to pay reparations and the victors
taking over colonies to increase their influence.
The second omission of the Versailles Treaty was that while it
purported to end the war there was still fighting going on in Europe
further to the East; the appetite for war was not fully quenched. The
central theater had been shut down but the continual confrontations in
the periphery meant that this could ignite suddenly into a full-blown war
again.
The lack of collective enforcement of the Treaty, with the United States
not signing onto the final agreement creating the League—an American
idea which never found sufficient support at home—weakened the overall
peace architecture. The creation of an international body that would help
preserve peace and punish those who started wars was lofty in its own
right, but many Americans worried the Treaty could inadvertently pull
the United States into faraway wars for which it had no direct economic
or political interest. The U.S. Congress voted down the Treaty in 1920
leaving the League of Nations without the backing of its founder.
The League and the reparations agreement all proved to be short-
lived, as their shortcomings created the opening for renewed aggression
in Europe.
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An Economic Peace to Begin All Peace
In 1939, exactly two decades after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles,
Germany invaded Poland, marking the beginning of the Second World
War. Unimaginable in 1919, the casualties from the Second World War
were almost double that of the First. Over 70 million people are esti-
mated to have died. This is equal to the current population of Ghana,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal combined, or 70 percent of the population of
Ethiopia. Following the end of the Second World War, the Allied forces
sought to correct three fundamental mistakes of the Versailles Treaty.
First, the Allies negotiated the peace collectively; second, the role of the
United States was more forceful; and third, the Allied powers listened to
Keynes and sought to build an economic recovery plan—The European
Recovery Program (ERP), otherwise known as the Marshall Plan.6
This is the first time in the history of peacebuilding that a full-fledged
economic development plan was linked to a peace treaty, with credible
and well-funded institutions attached to the plan. The ERP, which began
in 1948, was a massive program of aid from the United States to western
and southern European countries, aimed at helping economic renewal
and strengthening democracy after the devastation of the Second World
War.
Sixteen European countries received about US $14 billion in aid
between 1948 and 1951. Britain received the largest share of this support
(US $3.2 billion); the next largest amounts went to France (US $2.7
billion), Italy (US $1.5 billion), West Germany (US $1.1 billion), and
the Netherlands (US $1.1 billion). These funds comprised about 2.5
percent of the aggregate national income of European countries over
the 4 years. They were 1.2 percent of the total gross national product
of the United States. In present-day terms, this would be equivalent
to about $217 billion for reconstruction. The recovery plan had condi-
tions for the disbursements of aid to address issues of inter alia taxation,
budgeting, money, labor markets, and trade. Britain, for example, agreed
in 1948 to balance its budget annually, maintain currency reserves at
specific levels, and restrict tariffs. The unique element of the ERP was
that it was administered entirely by the US government, rather than all
the Allied powers. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA),
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the US agency that administered aid, used 5 percent of these funds for
its in-country administrative costs. The remainder was allocated mainly
for economic development, as a result of negotiations between officials
of the ECA and each European government. The implementation of the
plan benefitted from total bipartisan support.
Dividends of the Economic
Reconstruction Program
The achievements of the ERP were unparalleled in global economic
history. After the First World War, it took seven years to regain the pre-war
levels of production in Western Europe. At the end of 1951, three years
into the implementation of the ERP, industrial production was 41 percent
above pre-war levels, 64 percent above 1947 levels, and well beyond the
target originally set for 1952. Agricultural production was 9 percent above
pre-war and 24 percent above 1947 levels. Gross national product—the
total sum of Western Europe’s production of goods and services—had
risen 25 percent in real terms in less than 4 years and was 15 percent above
pre-war. The transportation system was rehabilitated; electrical output
doubled over pre-war levels; steel production doubled between 1947–
1951, far exceeding production by Russia and her satellites; and refined
petroleum production quadrupled over pre-war levels.
The gains in agricultural production were less striking but also substan-
tial. Cereal production and bread grains almost regained their pre-war
levels, and the output of potatoes, sugar, meat, milk, and oils overshot
the targets of the ERP program; in every case, except meat, the results
were faster. All other outputs were substantially above the targets and
pre-war levels.
The ERP was the largest economic development plan implemented
following conflict to restore peace. But it was more than a peacebuilding
plan. It was also a vast investment program which guaranteed substantial
returns for the United States.
Europe was therefore guaranteed sufficient energy to power and revive
its industries; while the United States was able to ensure it was guaranteed
supply for its industries and demand for its products. For these objectives
to be realized, two conditions had to be met: real incomes had to increase,
thus increasing domestic savings; and Europe’s current account deficit
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had to be reduced. The peace plan was, thus, at its heart, an economic
plan. By 1951 the UK was fully back on its feet and tensions began to
emerge between the UK and United States over the former’s develop-
ment trajectory, especially the national health programs the UK sought
to adopt.7
Christopher P. Mayhew, then Parliamentary Undersecretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, speaking in a debate at the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, famously said, “We have not the slightest intention
of modifying our economic, our social, or our political plans in order to
qualify for this aid.” Moreover, he argued, the British economic recovery
was a result of according priority to “human welfare and social progress,”
including a “complete national health service” and “public ownership of
industry.” As economic activity was restored in the UK, tensions between
the United States and UK also rose over economic priorities, resulting in
the UK finally deciding to opt out of the plan, even as they continued to
receive some support from the United States mainly to ensure they were
protected from any aggression from Russia.8
Lessons from the Economic
Reconstruction Program
The lessons from the successful ERP are important for all subsequent
peacebuilding efforts globally. Yet, for reasons that are difficult to explain
the world has never been able to replicate the ERP as a tool for
peacebuilding anywhere else.
The ERP was administered by one country and agency, and rolled out
across numerous countries. Essentially, its main objective was to restore
and strengthen the economic might of Europe. But, more critically, the
ERP did so without sequencing and conditioning initial recovery support
on the need for governments to change their fiscal, tax, or monetary
policy. Resources were disbursed even as conversations on reforms took
place. Even in the case of the UK, where there was growing criticism that
it was building a welfare state, the ERP continued to support the country
while trying to negotiate a different approach to the UK’s domestic policy
stance on its social programs. In response to the demand for raw materials
from the United States, an important part of the European reconstruc-
tion effort was the agreement by the Steel Committee to manage steel
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output in order to control prices to the benefit of the member states.
While Europe benefitted from the ERP to recover economically, it was
in parallel looking to increase its competitiveness, grow its markets, and
strengthen its economic base. To do this, it began to build a European
integration plan under French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. This
ultimately led to the creation of the European Union.9
As George C. Marshall remarked in his famous “Marshall Plan” speech:
“The remedy [to peace] in Europe lies in breaking the vicious circle and
restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future
of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and
the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange
their product for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to
question.”10 This remains true and pertinent for Africa today.
Economic Development
and Peacebuilding in Africa
The preceding sections have summarized the failures and successes of
two of the world’s most famous peace agreements. The world has not
seen destruction on this scale since 1945. However, conflicts persist and
the international community in many cases appears incapable of restoring
peace. How is it that we have not been able to replicate the ERP? What
elements of the plan bear replicating or building on? What ingredients of
the plan apply to Africa?
Africa has made considerable progress on the cross-border peace
front. At the end of 2019, there were fewer than five active or latent
cross-border conflicts on the continent. Post-independence, African coun-
tries pledged to respect colonial borders and, with the exception of
Sudan/South Sudan, they have largely kept to this promise. The biggest
challenge on the continent is that of intra-state conflict. And it is here that
peace remains elusive on the continent. Compared to 2005 when there
were only 6 countries in active conflict on the continent and 7 armed
conflicts, as of 2019 the number of countries with armed conflicts has
risen to 17.
The institutional architecture of the UN and the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions as initially conceived does not allow these institutions to play
their rightful role in peacebuilding. The continuum from peacemaking,
to peacekeeping, to peacebuilding is fragmented and often replete with
interests that are not aligned, as was the case in 1919.
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Inaction in Guinea-Bissau
The case of Guinea-Bissau is instructive. Guinea-Bissau gained indepen-
dence in 1974. In its short existence, the country has had over 17 coup
d’états and as many elections, while the three processes of peace making,
keeping, and building have been quite separate and not integrated. Peace-
making is mostly run by the UN; peacekeeping is led by Nigeria and
Angola as continental interests dictate; and peacebuilding or economic
peacebuilding driven by the Bretton Woods institutions. Unlike post-war
Europe, no one single economic power—be it Nigeria, Angola, Portugal,
or Brazil—has stepped up to design an economic recovery program that
would provide a win-win result for both. The mediation by purely interna-
tional institutions has proved insufficient and inadequate to restore peace
fully.
In addition, like Germany after the First World War, conflict in Guinea-
Bissau has never been fully quelled. A faction of the population still
remains equipped for conflict, believing that conflict can and will provide
a better shift of power in their favor. More than 20 years after inde-
pendence, Guinea-Bissau has not been able to establish a viable peace,
as the warring factions remain divided along ethnic, and military versus
civilian, lines. To date, the international community has been incapable of
launching a sizeable and fully inclusive economic recovery plan that bene-
fits all the citizens, akin to the ERP. Rather, these piecemeal attempts
have helped to foster divisions and left Guinea-Bissau with one of the
highest rates of poverty on the continent despite its rich natural marine,
agriculture, and mineral resources.
Côte d’Ivoire---A Success Story
Though not as successful in magnitude as the ERP, the case of Côte
d’Ivoire nevertheless provides some useful pointers on what can be
achieved. While the international community, in all its formats, was
present in Côte d’Ivoire as the peace was established, following nearly a
decade of on-again, off-again civil war in the 2000s, one main economic
power, France, decided to underwrite an important part of the peace-
building plan. As a result, Côte d’Ivoire did not have to wait for years
for the economic recovery plan to kick in. Unlike the impressive record
within the first four years of the ERP, Côte d’Ivoire did not experi-
ence such high rates of growth but nevertheless it registered a consistent
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8 percent growth rate, demonstrating its ability to rebound. A strong
Côte d’Ivoire allowed for more French investment in the country, similar
to the case of the UK and United States during the ERP.
It is often argued that Côte d’Ivoire was able to rebound because the
human capital needed to revive production and industry already existed.
The success of the ERP rested, in a similar way, on the availability of
skilled labor and strong institutions on which to build a recovery plan.
Where institutions are weak, replicating the success of the ERP will prove
difficult but not impossible. An important element of the ERP was the
recognition of some mutual dependence: the United States needed steel
and Europe needed coal. In Côte d’Ivoire, the crisis affected cocoa and
chocolate prices considerably and there was a need to stabilize supply
and prices in order to minimize global market disruptions. International
support for the recovery, as in the case of the ERP, focused on improving
the balance of payments so Côte d’Ivoire could rely less on aid and more
on Foreign Direct Investment and domestic savings for investment. Côte
d’Ivoire was able to quickly rebuild its reserves and increase productivity.
The test of the robustness of the peace will come with the electoral
process. The ERP focused on the economic peacebuilding because, even
in Germany, broad principles of representative governments had already
taken hold, thereby reducing the need to emphasize the “democracy”
element.
Overall, despite its shortcomings, Côte d’Ivoire’s experience of peace-
building—relying heavily on an economic recovery program underwritten
by a single nation, France, and supported by the UN and the Bretton
Woods institutions—has proven successful. Essential to peace in Côte
d’Ivoire was the fact that the international community negotiated as one;
and internally, strong coalitions for peace were able to form, underpinned
by the promise of economic prosperity.
Bleak Outlook for Libya and the Sahel
The Sahel, and Libya in particular, do not present any of the elements
needed to deliver a long and lasting peace. Similar to Versailles, the victors
individually focused on ensuring they benefitted or protected existing
investments in Libya or increased their investments. There was not a
collective peace deal aimed at restoring the economic potential of Libya.
Second, again like Versailles, while the end of the war was declared, the
Libyan factions are not done fighting; as peace was declared in some
parts of the country, fighting continued in others, opening the door for
renewed escalation of conflict. While Libya’s exports could have helped
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to launch a massive ERP, the lack of cohesion within the international
community did not allow for such a solution. In addition, unlike in the
Second World War where the United States was able to play a strong lead-
ership role, Italy could not take up this role with Libya and the United
States was reluctant to do so, creating a leadership vacuum which still
persists in 2020.
Conclusion
The end of the ERP for Europe saw the beginning of the greatest Euro-
pean project: European Integration, which resulted in a stronger and
more united Europe, built on clear democratic principles and comple-
mented by principles of macroeconomic prudence and competition and
trade openness. With zero interest rates in the West, a young popula-
tion in Africa and a growing middle class, the economic argument for a
peacebuilding partnership with Africa has never been more compelling.
The Marshall Plan was a limited investment that paid incalculable
dividends. A situation favorable to American interests was established in
Europe. The aid program lifted Western Europe off its knees, launched
the American challenge to the Soviet Union, and bolstered the Amer-
ican economy. This last point runs counter to conventional economic
wisdom: how could massive government expenditures be a net plus to
the domestic economy? The experience of the Marshall Plan shows the
answer. Investing to protect prosperity at home generated peace and
prosperity abroad, which in turn led to still greater prosperity for the
donor.11
Africa is a peacebuilding theater. An ERP-type program in some
conflict settings could unleash benefits to first movers who dare to take
up the challenge.
Key Recommendations
1. The Economic Reconstruction Program (ERP) is an imperfect
but important model. The ERP is hardly the perfect solution to
today’s conflicts and peacebuilding efforts in the developing world.
Nevertheless, it holds the main ingredients for sustained and inclu-
sive peace. The promise of economic prosperity is a clear prerequisite
for peace. Over the last 50 years, the developed world has spent huge
sums on development aid and the World Bank and IMF, like the
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UN, have been very active. But, the overall results of interventions
remain below expectations.
2. Establish a social contract for economic improvement between
peacemakers and peacebuilders. Numerous case studies reveal that
the absence of a social contract between the peacemakers and
peacebuilders on a clear economic improvement plan has been a
central factor in the failure of efforts to build peace. Where atten-
tion has not been paid to the importance of inclusion, it has led,
as in the case of Sudan, to the breakup of the country rather
than to the consolidation of the positives and creation of economic
inter-dependence benefitting both sides.
3. Committed investment partners and institutions are essential. A
successful ERP plan in Africa needs only one of two conditions to
exist: adequate institutions, as existed in Côte d’Ivoire, or a deep
entrepreneurial culture, together with a committed bilateral invest-
ment partner. Where the possibility of reviving or building economic
activity exists, where markets for outputs exist to guarantee that aid
will turn into an investment in the short run, and countries can
move from being aid-dependent to partners, the ERP model holds
great promise. Institutions like the UN and the Bretton Woods duo
can then serve as honest brokers of these relationships.
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CHAPTER 4
Religion and Peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan
Africa
Lado Tonlieu Ludovic, S. J.
Introduction
Three religious systems dominate the religious landscape in Sub-Saharan
Africa today: African traditional religions, Christianity, and Islam. Reli-
gion remains a significant component of social life on the African
continent; recent projections suggest that this importance will continue
for the next four decades.1 According to a 2016 survey conducted by
the Pew Research Center, “The share of Christians worldwide who live
in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase dramatically between 2015
and 2060, from 26 percent to 42 percent, due to high fertility in the
region. Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to become home to a growing
share of the world’s Muslims. By 2060, 27 percent of the global Muslim
population is projected to be living in the region, up from 16 percent in
2015.”2
L. T. Ludovic, S. J. (B)
Centre d’Étude et de Formation pour le Développement (CEFOD),
N’Djamena, Chad
e-mail: directeurcefod@gmail.com
© The Author(s) 2021
T. McNamee and M. Muyangwa (eds.),
The State of Peacebuilding in Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_4
47
48 L. T. LUDOVIC, S. J.
But, clear-cut statistics can be misleading when it comes to dynamics of
religious identity in Africa, partly because of the complexity of religious
practice. In daily practice, religion is perceived and lived primarily as a
problem-solving tool. Many believers expect religion to solve personal and
social problems such as finding a spouse, bearing a child, curing an illness,
finding a job, fighting witchcraft, obtaining a visa, etc. This is especially
pronounced in the context of the crisis of the social responsibility of the
state.3 The complexities of the religious landscape paired with the impor-
tance of religions in the lives of Africans mean that “to ignore religion, as
a matter of obvious political and even economic importance, threatens the
credibility of academic investigations.”4 This insight obviously applies to
the domain of peacebuilding in Africa as peace, justice, and reconciliation
feature prominently among the religious expectations of African believers.
The role of religion in peacebuilding in Africa has to be located within
the wider framework of the role of religion in the public space in Africa
more generally. Indeed, religion and public policy “intertwine because
both claim to give authoritative answers to important questions about
how people should live.”5 In a critical appraisal of earlier theories of secu-
larization, José Casanova has argued that although the fusion of politics
and religion is no longer an option in modern societies, at least in the
West, the social differentiation of religion and politics is not incompatible
with the public role of religion.6 In spite of processes of secularization,
religious voices are not absent from public debates—especially those that
directly challenge their core beliefs and practices. To begin with, “religion
in Africa was never relegated, even superficially, to a space outside poli-
tics and current events, or to benign places of private worship. Rather,
because of the history of religion and religious transformation in Africa,
religion has always been perceived, by a majority of Africans, as having
the power to radically change social life and history.”7 It is, therefore,
no surprise that people in Africa turn to religion for resources to prevent
conflicts or to restore peace.
The past 30 years have been marked by major developments that have
determined the role of religion in Africa’s public sphere. These include the
continent’s tilt toward democracy, the decline of the social responsibility
of the state particularly following the implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s, civil wars, and threats
from a variety of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organiza-
tions. Given these developments, non-state actors, including religious
organizations, have thrived, and some have taken up the challenge of
peacebuilding.
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The first section of this chapter reviews some of the major develop-
ments in the field of religious peacebuilding in Africa in a context of
crisis-ridden democratization processes; the second section looks at the
case studies of Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic (CAR), and
explores some key issues and lessons learned related to religious peace-
building; the third and final section identifies three issues that require the
attention of policymakers.
The Past 30 Years: An Overview of Major
Developments in Religious Peacebuilding in Africa
Whereas in Western academic circles there are debates about what some
have described as the “return” of religion in the public space, in Africa
the reality is that religion has never left the public space, in spite of the
rhetoric of the “secular” state.8 Not only is religion present in the public
space, it is eager to make its voice heard in policymaking. Besides their
active involvement in the fields of relief services, education, health, human
rights, and civic education, religious organizations in Africa have been
involved in the three dimensions of peacebuilding—preventing violence,
managing conflict, and transforming conflicts.9 Thomas Banchoff rightly
speaks of the “underappreciated” contribution of religious communities
to peacemaking: “Less visible, but no less significant, is the peaceful
engagement of religious communities in contemporary world affairs.
… But it is nonviolent. Less likely to make the newspapers, it has
far-reaching, if underappreciated, impact.”10
Religious Diplomacy
In a number of significant cases, religious diplomacy has succeeded where
state actors and international organizations had failed to bring back peace
in communities torn by conflicts. The outstanding peacemaking success
of the Catholic lay movement of Sant’Egidio in Mozambique is one of
the best illustrations of this commitment to peace of religious organiza-
tions. Thanks to their quiet and discrete diplomacy, consisting of several
rounds of talks between warring factions, they managed to secure a peace
agreement in October 1992 which ended decades of civil war between
FRELIMO and RENAMO.11
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Over the past 30 years, religious leaders in a number of African coun-
tries have been called upon to act as mediators, especially in times of polit-
ical transition and conflicts. For example, religious leaders were solicited
in the early 1990s to preside over sovereign national conferences in coun-
tries such as Benin, Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and on the whole, they were quite effective in facilitating
peaceful transitions from one-party systems to political pluralism.12 This
was a tremendous contribution to peace and stability. Even in countries,
such as Zambia, where there was no national conference, churches played
a critical role to ensure a relatively peaceful transition to multiparty politics
in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, they exerted public
pressure on Kenneth Kaunda’s regime to return to a pluralistic political
system.13 Religious leaders have also been called upon to head national
truth and reconciliation commissions. Archbishop Desmond Tutu was in
charge of the first commission of this kind in Africa, leading the recon-
ciliation process in post-Apartheid South Africa. Since then a number
of clerics have been appointed to such commissions in other countries,
including Togo and Côte d’Ivoire.
Islamic Social and Humanitarian Services
Recent decades have also witnessed the growing visibility of Islamic
social and humanitarian services in a field previously dominated by Chris-
tian and secular social and relief services. One of the major successful
Muslim peacebuilding actors in Africa is the Wajir Peace and Develop-
ment Committee (WPDC), (based in the Wajir district of north-eastern
Kenya), which incorporates Muslim traditional mechanisms and values in
its conflict resolution initiatives. Some of its achievements include the
establishment of a Joint Committee of Clans to monitor tensions and
prevent violent conflict in the Wajir district; the increased acknowledg-
ment of the contribution of women to peacemaking in their communities;
a change in attitude among local police chiefs; and the incorporation
of peace education in schools.14 Besides Muslim peacebuilding actors,
there is also a growing recognition of the contribution of women, and
religious women in particular, to peacebuilding in Africa. There are a
number of efforts underway to make these contributions more visible.15
For example, the Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace (SWVP), formed
in March 1994, contributed to peacebuilding in Sudan through peace
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education programs and campaigns meant to raise awareness and prevent
violence at the grassroots level.16
Inter-faith Peacebuilding Initiatives and Education for Peace
Another major evolution in this field in recent decades is the multiplica-
tion of inter-faith peacebuilding initiatives and the progressive acknowl-
edgment at the international level of their contribution to peacebuilding.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, inter-faith organizations exist at the local, national,
and international levels. Some of the most notable at the continental
level are the African Council of Religious Leaders (ACRL),—Religions for
Peace, the Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa (IFAPA), the Programme
for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA), and the Inter-
Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL). Multi-faith associations in
peacebuilding have the potential to neutralize attempts to divide commu-
nities along religious lines.17 They also go a long way to help “change
the negative perceptions and suspicions that exist between the various
religious communities,” and to engage in “dialogical action,” meaning
“organized actions to transform the social structures of injustice within
society.”18 The Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA), based in Kenya, is
one such organization. Its activities include advocacy, inter-faith dialogue,
education, intermediation based on traditional Islamic justice, and conflict
resolution mechanism of Suluh (the Arabic word for reconciliation),
and traditional African methods of conflict management and resolution
involving elders, chiefs, youth, and women.
Case Studies, Key Issues, and Lessons Learned
Since inter-faith initiatives are the most prominent tool of religious peace-
building in Sub-Saharan Africa, this section probes two case studies: Côte
d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic. Over the past two decades,
Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic have witnessed polit-
ical crises involving the use of religion in contradictory ways: to justify
violence and to build peace. These cases are a good illustration of what
some scholars have termed the “ambivalence of religion.”19 In Côte
d’Ivoire, the timely intervention of religious leaders prevented the trans-
formation of a political conflict into a religious one; in the Central African
Republic they have been less successful.
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Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire, the economic and political locomotive of francophone
West Africa, is still trying to recover from the political crisis that consumed
the country throughout much of the 2000s. This crisis was essentially
fueled by a power struggle tapping into identity politics, which almost
took a religious turn. Most of the political and economic life of Côte
d’Ivoire is concentrated in the southern part of the country, particularly
in Abidjan, the economic capital, leaving the northern part of the country
with fewer opportunities. This situation makes Northerners feel marginal-
ized. Also, in popular perceptions, the South is mostly associated with
Christianity whereas the North is linked with Islam, in spite of the fact a
substantial number of Northerners have migrated to the South in search
for economic opportunities. For this reason, the North/South divide
is also presented as a Muslim/Christian divide. But, in spite of these
underlying perceptions, Muslims and Christians mostly coexist peacefully.
The most recent general population census took place in 2014 and
provides some data on the religious demography of Côte d’Ivoire’s 22.7
million people (per a 2016 estimate) (Table 4.1).20 What these statis-
tics show is that although Muslims are the majority population in the
country, more than half of them are immigrants from neighboring coun-
tries. This reality has sustained the idea of “the Muslim as a stranger” in
popular perceptions in Côte d’Ivoire”. However, given the intricacies of
migration patterns in Côte d’Ivoire, distinguishing an Ivorian from a non-
Ivorian, a distinction that is at the heart of nationalistic politics in Côte
d’Ivoire, is not obvious. Indeed, a war of succession with nationalistic
overtones followed the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the
Table 4.1 Religious distribution of the population of Côte d’Ivoire
Religions Ivoirians Non-Ivoirians Percentage/Population
All Christians 39.1 17.7 33.9
Muslims 33.7 72.7 42.9
Animists (Traditional religions) 4.4 0.9 3.6
Other religions 0.6 0.2 0.5
Without religion 22.2 8.5 19.1
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source Institute National de la Statistique, Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitat 2014
(Côte d’Ivoire, 2014), http://www.ins.ci/n/documents/RGPH2014_expo_dg.pdf
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first president of independent Côte d’Ivoire, in 1993. The conflict exacer-
bated ideological and social cleavages, culminating in an armed rebellion
in 2002. The rebellion split the country into two, with the North, asso-
ciated in collective representations with Muslims, on one side, and the
South, linked with Christianity, on the other. Until then, followers of
Islam, Christianity, and African traditional religions had, mostly coexisted
peacefully in Côte d’Ivoire. But, from 1995 onwards, there were repeated
attempts by successive ruling “Christian” presidents to exclude Alassane
Ouattara, a Muslim linked to the North and labeled as a non-native
Ivorian, from presidential contests. These attempts were the formalization
of the policy of “Ivoirianness” (ivoirité) launched by Henri Konan Bédié
upon taking office as President after the death of Houphouët-Boigny.
The policy of Ivorianness was the embodiment of identity politics meant
to distinguish the “true” Ivorian from the non-Ivorian in a country with
a large proportion of immigrants (about 25 percent).
The 2000 elections were contested principally by President Gbagbo
and Ouattara. During the violent confrontations between the pro-Gbagbo
and the pro-Ouattara factions in the aftermath of the elections, a mosque
in the city of Abidjan was looted and burned down by youth associated
with Gbagbo’s party. In retaliation, a group of young people linked with
Ouattara’s party burned a Christian church in another part of the city.
Following this, more Muslim dignitaries suspected to be close to Ouat-
tara’s camp and to the rebels in the North were assassinated in the South.
In the space of three months, three imams were assassinated.21 The risk
of the conflict taking a sharp religious turn was real. Fortunately, most
Muslim leaders never called for retaliation against Christians. Their only
public complaint was that they were being targeted because of political
feuds. Their restraint played a major role in preventing the conflict from
degenerating into further inter-religious violence.
It is in a similar context conducive to religious conflict that the
National Forum of Religious Denominations (Forum National des Confes-
sions Religieuses) was launched in 1995. Indeed, religious leaders were
concerned about the growing threat of the instrumentalization of reli-
gion for political purposes and wanted to prevent the transformation of
a political crisis into a religious conflict. The Forum attracted around 20
different religious denominations including Catholics, Protestants, Evan-
gelicals, Muslims, adherents of African traditional religions, Bahaï faith
followers, and Harrists. Since its creation, the Forum has operated as a
structure of religious mediation both between political opponents and
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between religious denominations in an effort to promote social cohe-
sion. Its main tools of social intervention include joint declarations to
warn the faithful against the political manipulation of religion (espe-
cially in the aftermath of the destruction of mosques and other acts of
violence targeting religious denominations), joint prayer sessions, and
political mediation, as well as training and sensitization programs for the
faithful. All these interventions seek to prevent conflict and promote social
cohesion.
However, the Forum has faced a number of challenges. As a result of
religious differences, some Protestants and Evangelicals refused to join
the Forum, arguing that some of its members’ religions are witchcraft
or diabolical. The Forum has also been plagued by governance issues.
For example, the founding text stipulated that the presidency is to rotate
among religious denominations, but the first president of the Forum
elected in 1995 ended up abolishing the rule thus causing the demission
of some of its founding members.
The Central African Republic
The Central African Republic has been plagued by conflict since indepen-
dence in 1960. It is also one of the poorest countries in the world.
Table 4.2 shows that Christians constitute about 70 percent of the
overall population whereas Muslims make up only 10 percent. Most
Christians live in the South whereas the North is associated with Islam.
Table 4.2 The
religious distribution of











Source Bureau Central du Recensement, Direction Générale de
la Statistique, des Études Économiques et Sociales, Ministère de
l’Économie, du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale, Résultats
du Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitation
Decembre 2003 (Central African Republic, 2003), https://ireda.
ceped.org/inventaire/ressources/caf-2003-rec-o_rca_en_chiffres.pdf
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The North is poorer than the South and has become the breeding ground
for rebel groups that pose a major threat to the stability of the country.
The 2015 elections aimed to end the sectarian violence that exploded
in 2013. The conflict centers on the violence between two militias:
the Séléka,22 linked with Islam, and the anti-Balaka,23 associated with
Christianity. Séléka appeared on the political scene of the Central
African Republic in 2012 as a loose coalition of dissident political and
rebel groups. The group lacked any clear political agenda—except their
common objective to overthrow the then-head of state François Bozizé.
Séléka finally succeeded in forcing him out of power in March 2013,
and their leader Michel Djotodia took over as the new ruler of the
country. Though the group was not predicated on religious affiliation,
the rebel groups forming Séléka drew their membership from the coun-
try’s marginalized North, which is predominantly Muslim. As a result,
most of the combatants who overthrew Bozizé’s regime were Muslims.
Many explicitly targeted Christians and their properties in acts of violence
and extortion, exacerbating communal tensions.
The anti-Balaka faction is a loosely structured set of self-defense groups
that emerged in 2009, before the current crisis, to counter extortion and
insecurity generated by organized armed robbery on the roads. Initially,
it had neither a political nor a religious connotation. The group simply
embodied a limited community response to a situation of insecurity that
the weak state security apparatus was unable to address effectively. People
felt they had to take responsibility for their own security. Once these
groups emerged in a context of a weak and unstable state such as the
Central African Republic, they were hard to control.
Following the coup d’état by the Séléka rebels in 2013, the anti-
Balaka emerged once again as a grassroots response to the ensuing chaos.
Muslims became the main targets for acts of revenge by anti-Balaka,
who accused them of being accomplices to the crimes of the retreating
Séléka. Since then anti-Balaka groups have terrorized Muslim communi-
ties suspected of cooperation with the dismantled Séléka, and thousands
of Muslims have fled to neighboring countries.
Having acknowledged the religious tenor of the conflict, it is impor-
tant to underline the fact that neither Séléka nor anti-Balaka qualify as a
religious group from a sociological point of view. Neither of these groups
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is institutionally related to a major religious organization. Nor do the
groups appear to be pursuing a clear religious agenda, as do terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, or al-Shabaab. Furthermore,
neither Séléka nor anti-Balaka has the open support of any major religious
group inside or outside of the Central African Republic. And, because
Christianity and Islam are not a monolithic reality in the Central African
Republic, it is just as difficult to link Séléka with a particular Muslim
group as it is to connect anti-Balaka with a particular Christian denom-
ination. However, there are some suspicions among the population that
some factions of anti-Balaka are being controlled and manipulated for
political purposes by allies of the overthrown president, François Bozizé.
When the factional violence erupted in 2013 in the CAR, Cardinal
Nzapalainga, the Archbishop of Bangui; Imam Oumar Kobine Layama,
the President of the Islamic Community of CAR (CICA); and Reverend
Pastor Nicolas Guerekoyame-Gbangou, the President of the Alliance
of Evangelicals of CAR, came together to denounce attempts by the
main instigators to transform a military and political conflict into an
inter-religious conflict. As factional killings intensified, they became
ambassadors for peace at the national and international levels. Their
efforts led to the creation of the Plateforme des Confessions Religieuses
de Centrafrique (PCRC) whose motto is, “For an interreligious approach
to peace and social cohesion.”24 In June 2016, the PCRC met to draft its
foundational documents, including a charter, rules and procedures, as well
as a strategic plan. Besides a board of directors, the governing structure
of the PCRC comprises a permanent secretariat, various commissions,
and regional branches. The three main denominations represented in
the PCRC are Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. In addition to
managing a website and running radio programs to educate the popu-
lation on peacebuilding, they also intend to establish regional offices for
outreach programs and grassroots engagement. The PCRC has become
the backbone of the peace process in the Central African Republic.
This is an especially critical role given that rebuilding the institutional
infrastructure of the country will take years.
It remains to be seen how the PCRC will handle denominational differ-
ences within the organization and associated structures. This could also
become a weakness that hinders sustainability. The PCRC is probably
among the youngest national inter-religious platforms on the continent,
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but it is also one of the most structured organizations, underpinned by
a clear strategic plan. Its sustainability will depend on the ability of its
leaders to maintain a united front around common objectives. But as
donors pour in money, it might ignite inter-denominational competition
for financial resources that could weaken the PCRC and undermine its
credibility.
Religious Pluralism as a Challenge to Peaceful Coexistence
The last three decades in Sub-Saharan Africa have been marked by a
degree of political liberalization, leading to a boom in non-state organi-
zations including many tied to Christianity and Islam. Some scholars have
described the religious component of this evolution in terms of the frag-
mentation of the religious landscape of Africa.25 The multiplication of
religious organizations creates new challenges for the postcolonial state
as far as the management of religion in the public space is concerned.
Furthermore, until recently, Christian missionaries were the dominant
religious actor in the public space in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Today,
myriad religious groups of different faiths operate in the public space
through politics, social action, or social debates.26 This competition for
control of the public sphere is a major potential source of conflict.
Forms of Intolerance
Religion can be used to promote violence or foster peace. African tradi-
tional religions are, however, only rarely associated with the former. Over
the past 30 years, only a handful of neo-traditional movements have been
associated with violence. These include among others the Mai-Mai in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Mungiki in Kenya.27 There
are two main forms of religious intolerance in Sub-Saharan Africa today:
attitudinal, which is often conveyed through religious-owned media
outlets, propagating negative portrayals of the “other” to increase their
following,28 or aspects of modernity (especially regarding sexuality and
family laws)29; and repressive, which is associated with various religious-
inspired terror groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda or
Boko Haram in Nigeria.30
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Muslim Peacebuilding
There is a growing awareness of the differences in peacebuilding across
different faiths. Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic are two
examples of a broader trend in inter-faith initiatives, where Christians and
secular leaders take the lead and Muslims play secondary roles. Indeed,
lamenting the low visibility of Muslim peacebuilding actors, Mohammed
Abu-Nimer and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana write:
The lack of systematic studies that identify and analyze the contribu-
tions and shortcomings of Muslim peace-building actors working toward
peace in their communities creates the impression that there are no peace-
building organizations or institutions in the Muslim world. … Indeed,
there are quite a number of nongovernmental organizations, as well as
local leaders around the Muslim world, working in their communities to
resolve conflicts, build peace, and encourage interfaith dialogue.31
Explaining the reasons for their relative obscurity, they add,
Muslim peacebuilding organizations have less experience with formally
constituted bodies and stable institutions. For that reason, it is not easy
to identify Muslim peace-building NGOs or other institutions similar to
those in the West. Nevertheless, in many Muslim societies, NGOs in the
modern sense are a new phenomenon, evolving because of contacts with
Western/Christian institutions.32
Issues around Muslim leadership of peacebuilding initiatives have come
into sharper focus due to two interconnected trends: groups identifying
with Islam are responsible for more violent attacks than those identi-
fying with Christianity, particularly as it relates to violent extremism;
and Muslims comprise a higher number of victims of those attacks than
Christians.
Most conflicts generally described as “inter-religious” are rarely
primarily about religion. More often, religion is used to articulate
perceived political, social, and economic marginalization and the related
feelings of frustration.33 In Sub-Saharan Africa, recent terrorist attacks
notwithstanding, religious intolerance is, almost always, expressed nonvi-
olently. Peaceful coexistence of Africa’s religiously diverse communities is
the norm, as it has been for generations. This tradition, exploited wisely,
can strengthen a culture of peace and social cohesion in Africa. More-
over, trusted religious leaders can be more effective in peacebuilding,
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especially in mediation processes, than secular authorities. “Local religious
actors embedded within communities,” it is argued, “can often draw on
a reservoir of trust not available to secular actors.”34
Key Recommendations
The politics of inclusion paired with the dispensation of social justice and
the respect for human rights remain the cornerstones of any peacebuilding
endeavor. In Sub-Saharan Africa, religious leaders and organizations are
actively involved in advocacy initiatives for the promotion of social justice
and peace.35 In some Christian circles, for example, advocacy for the just
distribution of natural resources is seen as an integral dimension of peace-
building.36 Muslim traditions have their own indigenous mechanisms for
peacebuilding such as sulha (or suluh), and African traditional religions
are rich in rituals of reconciliation to restore social harmony. These are
resources to build on. More specifically, for the purpose of this chapter,
there are three key policy issues that demand the urgent attention of
policymakers and religious peacebuilders.37
1. Pay more attention to attitudinal intolerance. Policymakers tend
to focus on violent forms of religious intolerance. More attention
needs to be given to how such violence is seeded, through atti-
tudes promoted in communities, schools and, especially, faith-based
media. Funding intolerant attitudes also comes into play at the
transnational level, where various global networks are responsible
for propagating negative depictions of the “other” at the grassroots
level. Thus, efforts to counter hate and build comity cannot be
restricted to the elite.38 A focus on inter-religious and inter-ethnic
encounters at the community level will enhance societal resilience
and help prevent intolerance from gaining a foothold.
2. Give more assistance to muslim peacebuilding. As radicalized
interpretations of religious traditions have gained wider attention
through social media, the tendency to equate religion, especially
Islam, with heinous acts of terrorism—from Somalia and Kenya
through to the Sahel and North Africa—has grown in Africa.
Greater effort needs to be invested in the communities that are
most affected—both in a perceptual sense, by the misconceptions;
and in a practical sense, due to suffering disproportionately from
such attacks. “One way to counter these radical and militant voices
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is,” some experts argue, “to engage with and strengthen the peace-
building capacity of Muslim actors that focus on Islamic conflict
resolution and Muslim peacemaking traditions.”39 This means
concretely supporting the efforts of these actors in spreading the
Islamic culture of peace and conflict resolution and “requires under-
standing specific characteristic of Muslim peace-building actors, their
strengths and the challenges they face.”40
3. Promote inter-religious socialization and leadership for peace.
Although inter-faith initiatives are mushrooming on the African
continent, they need more coordination and networking. In the
future national, regional, and continental organizations will need
to mainstream inter-religious efforts in a more preventive approach
in order to promote tolerance and peaceful coexistence. In most
cases, inter-faith initiatives are launched as an ad hoc solution to an
escalating conflict. A more sustainable solution would be to estab-
lish regional and national offices to coordinate inter-faith efforts for
peacebuilding. These efforts should involve continental institutions
such as the African Union and sub-regional bodies. Additionally,
religious peacebuilders should receive more training in conflict reso-
lution; typically, they know the local terrain much better and are
more influential in communities than “outsiders.” The professional-
ization of religious peacebuilders will also make cooperation with
secular bodies more effective. It is equally important to educate
and sensitize diplomats and international mediators on the place
of religion in Africa today, especially in relation to violence and
peacemaking.41
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CHAPTER 5
Field Reflections on Post-Conflict





War does not end when the guns go silent. Christopher Cramer called
this post-violence period, “the Great Post-Conflict Makeover Fantasy,”
and “the continuation of war by other means.”1 Many war-like frontiers
of contestation and negotiation open as soon as the guns fall silent. By the
end of violent conflicts, infrastructures are broken down. People’s modes
of subsistence and access to medical care and education are completely
shattered. War disrupts the rhythm of normal life by destabilizing the
flow of essential supplies such as food and water. This is exacerbated
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by the disruption of social and cultural securities often found in family
and society. The failure to quickly ensure that necessities are restored can
result in renewed violence. Post-conflict mediation interventions must,
therefore, be underpinned by a singular aim: entrenching sustainable
peace.
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
The terms disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are
often deployed in studies and projects relating to peacekeeping in a “post-
conflict” environment. Whether any place ever gets into a “post-conflict”
moment is an open question. The term “reconstruction” after conflict
has also been queried many times, with critics wondering whether soci-
eties ever “reconstruct” or simply “transform.”2 By the end of war, it
is difficult to return to the exactness, sometimes even the semblance, of
what previously existed. New centers of power emerge, and social and
cultural norms are often transformed by the end of war, making any claims
to “reconstruction” rather difficult. Roger Mac Ginty provides us with a
definition that attempts to capture the implications behind “post-conflict
reconstruction,” in a more comprehensive fashion:
[R]econstruction encompasses short-term relief and long-term devel-
opment. It extends far beyond physical reconstruction to include the
provision of livelihoods, the introduction of a new or reformed type of
governance and repairing fractured societal relationships.3
Critically, it emphasizes that reconstruction is not merely a technocratic
exercise, but rather
it is an acutely political activity with the potential to effect profound social
and cultural change. Post-war reconstruction holds the capacity to remodel
the nature of interaction between the citizen and the state, the citizens and
the public goods, and the citizens and the market.4
Mac Ginty, thus, seeks to draw our attention to how the lives of
ex-combatants and victims can be transformed.
I intend to place my conversation on DDR into the above definition,
as a process meant for both short-term relief and long-term develop-
ment, but with potential for “social and cultural change.” Kees Kingma,
reflecting on the reintegration element, has noted that “reintegration is
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not one general process, but consists of thousands of micro-stories, with
individual and group efforts, and with setbacks and successes.”5 These
different stories and actors seek, among other things, to repair fractured
societal relations as ex-combatants return to their villages and reunite
with their families. That is, returning victims to normal civilian lives. The
United Nations (UN) says of DDR:
The goal of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as a
process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the
combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially
and economically into society, thereby seeking to support ex-combatants
so that they can become active participants in the peace process.6
In other cases, the term DDR is used for the long-term goal of ensuring
permanent disarmament and sustainable peace. Often, ex-combatants are
helped to enter job placement services, participate in skills training and
credit schemes, and get the education needed to secure a decent living
and livelihood.7
At the end of armed conflicts, different sets of victims emerge. These
include the main victims of war: ordinary people caught up in the crossfire
of warring factions. Many end up either as Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in camps or as refugees in another country. Those inside the IDP
camps, including children, are often directly impacted by violence—in the
form of physical injuries like bullet wounds or broken limbs—or conflict-
related stresses such as limited access to food and water or loss of parents
and other family members. Children are also exposed to trauma and other
forms of stress, diseases, and complications such as malnutrition. Women
inside the camps also face very specific sets of challenges, including rape
and forced marriages, and the resulting unwanted pregnancies. With their
husbands killed in conflict, many women are forced to take on the role
of breadwinner. There are also child mothers, especially victims of rape,
who will be forever haunted by the horrors of war.
The aftermath of war also presents another set of victims in the form of
former combatants on either side of the conflict. Child soldiers—defined
as persons under 18 years of age, who are often recruited in times of
conflict either as combatants or to perform other support roles8—and
defeated combatants are especially prone to victimization in the post-
conflict period. Civil wars typically draw in fighters from many different
parts of society, most of whom would never consider a career in the
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military. They have to be reintegrated back into civilian life. For those
potentially interested in military careers, rarely are post-conflict armed
forces able to absorb all former combatants into its ranks. Aside from
budget constraints, there is a normative push to reduce the size of
militaries after wartime.
This chapter focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction
strategies after conflict has ended. It looks at processes of rehabilitation,
demobilization, and reintegration for returning different categories of
people victimized by the conflict to civilian life. The normative assump-
tion underpinning the analysis below is that peacebuilding should, among
other objectives, seek to return ex-combatants to an existence as close to
what they experienced before violence disrupted their lives.
Case Studies: Uganda and Burundi
To highlight some of the challenges, lessons learned, and best practices,
this chapter delves into two contrasting case studies of DDR: Uganda
and Burundi. Specifically, this author draws heavily on her firsthand
involvement in two key initiatives across these countries: the voluntary
demobilization of close to 40,000 National Resistance Army (NRA)
fighters in Uganda from 1993–1996, and the reintegration of child
soldiers after Burundi’s civil war in 2001–2004. The concluding recom-
mendations flow from deep reflection on these difficult and complex
experiences.
A main contention of the chapter is that the failure of reintegration
and rehabilitation is rarely down to one big factor but instead typically
involves a number of smaller failings: exclusively “rewarding” combat-
ants in grand schemes while ignoring non-combatant victims; a mismatch
between the economic potential of the environment and the intervention
packages (e.g., when re-skilling is done without due regard for extant
opportunities in the market); cultural nuances, including ethnic rivalries
at play; and privileging seniority in economic re-empowerment (which
often takes precedence over everything else). Lastly, the chapter illustrates
that psycho-social support needs to move hand-in-hand with economic
reconstruction. It is neither one nor the other, rather one after the other.
5 FIELD REFLECTIONS ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION … 69
Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme
Between 1992 and 1995, the Government of Uganda embarked on the
demobilization and subsequent reintegration into productive civilian life
of 36,358 soldiers out of an estimated 90,000-member NRA army. The
project was named the Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme (UVAP).
The UVAP had a dual mandate: help reduce the size of the army, thereby
reducing government expenditure, and help ex-combatants return to
productive civilian life as a way of transitioning from conflict to peace.
The focus of the analysis here is the latter.9 The UVAP process of reinte-
grating the 36,358 soldiers was undertaken in three phases starting with
23,903 soldiers, then 9,308 soldiers, and finally 4,147 soldiers.10
According to some analysts, the government intended “to shift the
burden of its public expenditure away from its earlier emphasis on defense
and security to the promotion of social and economic development.”11
But since this project followed a period of civil war, and many ex-
combatants had been integrated into the NRA force as a strategy aimed,
in part, at keeping them from returning to violence, the project was then
viewed as an initiative in peacebuilding. Indeed, after 15 years of civil war,
Uganda was a war-torn and ravaged economy and society.
In terms of financing, emphasis was still on security; national defense
expenditure continued to rise, going from 28 percent in 1986 to 43
percent in 1991. This was unsustainable for a country just emerging from
war. The World Bank noted that in the same period, capital expenditure
on defense rose from 18 to 38 percent of government’s contribution to
development. At the time, the explanation for this increase was that:
These expenditure increases initially reflect the assimilation of defeated
rebel forces and later the deliberate professionalization of the regular army
through, for example, the establishment of a command structure, personnel
and logistics systems, training, and the acquisition of necessary equipment
and supplies as much as new recruitment.12
With most armed insurrections concluded around 1991—except
Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion, which was then
in its infancy—government sought to reduce expenditure on the military.
Veterans, who constituted a “vulnerable group” facing myriad difficulties,
would be given a chance to seek voluntary retirement from the army. The
problems confronting ex-combatants were often like those of the general
public: lack of shelter, lack of self-reliance skills, little money, and so on.
70 B. O. BIGOMBE
But most of the ex-combatants did not enjoy the social capital of ordinary
citizens, gained through being part of rural communities and compara-
tively broad social and cultural relations. Substantial assistance was thus
required to help ex-soldiers cope with life after the military.
As a process aimed at reintegration, soldiers were to receive help
toward resettling among their families and would be facilitated socially
and economically into a peaceful, productive, and sustainable civilian life.
The category “voluntary” and those marked for “reduction in estab-
lishment” constituted the largest percentage of veterans who would be
returned to civilian life. However, it was also estimated that one in five
of those who were demobilized had medical reasons for being discharged
(irrespective of the other reasons offered for their demobilization). The
program of reintegrating veterans back into the communities was divided
into transitional safety nets including entitlements, reintegration initia-
tives, and administration. Each of these stages was associated with a
different package ranging from cash to agricultural input. These were
categorized as follows (Table 5.1).
With enormous support from the World Bank, this reintegration
process worked well in the beginning but subsequently experienced
several challenges. Although most problems stemmed from a lack of
resources—e.g., insufficient money to buy cows, pay school fees for their
children or bury their deceased kindred—some were conceptual. One
erroneous assumption was that the veterans were “homogenous and their
needs similar in nature. Individual problems, place of origin, period of
Table 5.1 Components of the Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme
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service, and rank were all disregarded as a basis for classifying individual
needs.”13
The Structural Challenges with the Uganda Veteran Assistance
Programme
There were several significant challenges with the UVAP system, including
challenges relating to the communities to which the veterans were being
returned as well as those relating to the packages provided to veterans.
Firstly, most of the packages were provided in the form of cash, not in-
kind as had been planned. However, most of the packages, especially those
under the transitional safety nets, were too small in comparison to the
needs of the veterans and often given out in installments.14 Many veterans
grumbled that the USH 150,000 (roughly US $40 in 2020) was not
enough to meet their basic needs, let alone invest in something to secure
their future.15
Most soldiers had health challenges, but many of them were unable to
access medical care after they left the military. The number of soldiers
discharged on medical grounds was about 75,000, at a time when
HIV/AIDS was sweeping through Uganda like a bush fire on a windy
day. The World Bank study noted that 1,696 soldiers died due to
HIV/AIDS in the immediate aftermath of discharge. The challenge of
accessing medical care was further complicated by the difficulties with
finding food, as many had to choose between the two—medicine or
food—as their financial packages were often insufficient to cover both.
That the UVAP budget and cash packages did not include the veterans’
families, who had hitherto received help from government, was a big over-
sight and shortcoming of the program. Further, the many veterans had
neither education nor the requisite survival skills for the world they had
been plunged into. The World Bank study noted:
Only slightly more than a quarter of phase II veterans have secondary or
higher education; 12 percent had no formal education, and approximately
half finished primary school. Of phase I veterans, 70 percent have not
progressed beyond primary education. Although more than half of phase
II veterans stated that they acquired skills while in the army, most of these
skills are not marketable. Only 13 percent possess skills in mechanics, metal
work, woodworking, or tailoring. Only 34 percent of phase II veterans
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possess cash cropping skills, whereas 50 percent know how to under-
take subsistence farming. No more than 4 percent are familiar with cattle
raising.
The study goes on to suggest that it is, consequently, hardly surprising
that
71 percent of phase II veterans intended to go back to farming on resettle-
ment. Nineteen percent envisaged activities in commerce and production.
Two months after phase II resettlement, 73 percent were actually active
in farming; however, 11 percent ended up as agricultural day laborers or
unpaid family workers (against 1 percent intended), suggesting that around
1,000 veterans had to lower their expectations substantially. Economic
reintegration, thus, proves the most elusive of all problems facing a
veteran on resettlement, although personal and social attitudes can ease
this process.16
The picture that emerges is one of colossal failure insofar as the economic
reintegration of veterans. Many would depend on land to survive yet the
UVAP failed to make land available to the demobilized soldiers or to
provide them with farming knowledge and skills.
Since the start of the conflict in 1980, many of the veterans had not
returned home to visit their families. Long absences made their reinte-
gration difficult; a lot had changed while they were away. Relatives also
erroneously believed that due to their military service, the returnees were
comparatively well off. In other cases, the violence soldiers experienced
traveled, metaphorically, back with them to their old homes, creating fear
and suspicion of them in communities. This stigmatization led to high
levels of frustration and depression among ex-combatants.
On land and the return to families and communities, Colleta et al.
note:
Forty percent of phase II veterans did not have a house of their own on
return to their home community. The majority of this group, a third of
the total, lived with relatives. On the other hand, most veterans were able
to secure access to land for cultivation. Only 826 cases of landlessness (or
9 percent of phase II veterans) were reported until October 1994. Around
one-quarter had private land (23 percent), one-third had family land (34
percent) while another third (31 percent) had both family and private land.
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Under phase I, an estimated 700 veterans could not find access to land
(although data may be incomplete).
Overall, the authors suggest that the number of those landless may be less
than 3 percent, which
allays initial concerns expressed mainly by the donor community, although
containing severe individual reintegration difficulties. A noteworthy fact is
that almost one-third (31 percent) of phase II veterans did not have home
contact since 1991. Another 22 percent visited home only once; thus, it
can be assumed that knowledge about the specific location of resettlement
is limited to nonexistent in many instances, aggravating the challenge of
reintegration.17
In the end, frustration led many of these demobilized soldiers into either
a menial existence or not returning to their communities for months after
demobilization.
Although there were fewer cases of failed land access reported in the
final two phases of demobilization, a number of veterans did not have
land to till. In providing farm equipment, the government assumed that
veterans would be returning to familial lands. Often this was not the case.
Many veterans tried to avail themselves of public land through an arrange-
ment set up by UVAB at the district level.18 Long and painstaking, the
process of transferring public land proved prohibitively expensive. In cases
where veterans could access family land, strife among family members
often ensued.
Of deeper, societal significance was the sense that communities were
being “punished twice.” In contrast to Eritrea, where its soldiers in
the early 1990s war against Ethiopia were celebrated as liberators,19 in
Uganda, communities were negatively disposed toward returnees, who
were often seen as having been responsible for widespread suffering.
The idea that they should be helped (financially and otherwise) to settle
back into normal life was anathema to many. This perception greatly
complicated the reintegration process.
The dismal experience of the NRA’s demobilization is a stark reminder
that victims in communities cannot be ignored. Friction between them
and veterans is the source of considerable trauma and depression, which
can quietly engulf the lives of so many affected by war.
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Reintegration of Burundi’s Child Soldiers
The conflict and tensions between the ethnic Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi
have a long history. Mostly, they spring from the historical privileging of
Tutsis over Hutus since independence. Violence escalated in 1993 when
the first democratically elected president of Burundi, a Hutu, Melchior
Ndadaye, was killed in a coup. This prompted the formation of Hutu
militias to fight the Tutsi political opposition, which was backed by
the Tutsi-dominated military. Throughout this period, both sides have
recruited child soldiers into their ranks. In 2002, the Government of
Burundi and then-rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza signed a ceasefire agree-
ment under the auspices of the African Union, which was headed by
former South African President Nelson Mandela.
By the end of the fighting, UNICEF estimated that over 6,000 chil-
dren had participated in these conflicts, including some as young as eight
years old.20 All of them needed to be disarmed and reintegrated into
civilian life. However, to properly reintegrate them, there was a need to
understand their motivation for joining the armed ranks. According to
Allison Dilworth, for many children, joining the conflict:
[Was] a way of countering decades of social and ethnic discrimination,
and of ending years of repression by the “Tutsi army” with its history of
massacring Hutu. Many volunteer recruits had been directly affected by
the conflict, either seeing the murder of family and neighbours or being
forced to leave their homes. Some children were reportedly encouraged by
their families to join, sometimes after receiving payment or in the belief
that payment would be forthcoming… Others reportedly joined partly as
a result of social or peer pressure.21
There were also other forms of recruitment such as coercion and abduc-
tion from schools.
The FDD (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, the military wing of
the leading rebel group) recruited directly from schools, which were also
attacked and destroyed, a tactic that may have facilitated the recruitment
of children. An already low level of schooling dropped significantly during
the war and the majority of child soldier recruits are thought not to have
been enrolled in schools.
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In addition to recruitment and abduction within Burundi, Dilworth adds
…the FDD recruited child soldiers from refugee camps, particularly in
Tanzania and the DRC… further recruitment and a number of mass
abductions took place from schools, including the abduction of nearly 300
children from schools in Ruyigi and Kayanza provinces in November 2001.
Most, but not all, returned home shortly afterwards. Children as young as
eight are known to have been recruited, sometimes forcibly.22
The motivation for recruitment, and the difference in age among the
child soldiers, were not factored into reintegration efforts. Those who
joined after encouragement from families would be seen as heroes fighting
the enemy, and their reintegration had to take an entirely different form.
Those who joined when they were too young but had spent years in the
conflict would have matured with exposure to adult-like practices and
behaviors, and their reintegration needed to take a different approach. As
the ceasefire was being signed, the Government of Burundi, with assis-
tance from UNICEF, launched a plan to help disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate child soldiers into civilian life. As Dilworth has noted, there
were serious problems with the effort, including:
[Lack] of focus in programs for the prevention of re-recruitment; treating
battle-hardened 18 year olds as children rather than adults; and lack
of long-term reintegration strategies including vocational training. At
the community level, attitudes towards former child soldiers appear to
vary from considering them as victims of the conflict, to fearing them
due to their violence and brutalization through involvement in the war.
Economic factors were perceived to be key to the successful and sustained
reintegration of former child soldiers.23
In addition, while work was underway to identify the child soldiers,
it never registered that their ethnic kin viewed them as heroes. Relatedly,
attention was not paid to child soldiers whom the government had turned
into local defense units called Peace Guards, yet this was equally troubling
for the impact that it had on these children. This was especially important
as the government took the position that it had no child soldiers in its
ranks, just children “under its protection.” Dilworth suggests further that:
No significant demobilization or reintegration of FDD child soldiers took
place prior to these programs. Child soldiers who deserted from the FDD
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were largely incorporated into the Peace Guards militia, exposing them to
new dangers and trauma.24
In most cases, more time was spent speaking with officials in the
capital, Bujumbura, who did not have a good feel for what had happened
on the ground, than was spent in communities where child soldiers actu-
ally were. Rarely were the child soldiers consulted on what should be
done. Many times, child soldiers had been tasked to kill the “other”—for
example, a Hutu grandmother of a Tutsi grandson. Yet the reintegration
efforts never addressed the issue of intermarriage among the two ethnic
groups, which was common. Psycho-social healing for those children who
had been involved or had witnessed the killing of family members of the
“other” ethnic group was never provided.
The sequencing and timeframe for the reintegration efforts was
another key challenge. Often victims were asked to speak about their
trauma and suffering at very short notice. For former child soldiers
whose indoctrination/conscription into armed conflict often occurred
over years, this was wholly misguided. Once again, as in the case of
Uganda, the inordinate focus on economic reconstruction meant that key
aspects of reintegration at the individual level were all but ignored.
Key Recommendations
Based on the record of DDR efforts in Africa over the last 30 years, and
especially the author’s engagement with the two case studies outlined
above, a few recommendations for improving the reintegration element
of DDR are offered below.
1. Assess and balance the needs of ex-combatants. The assumption that
veterans, ex-combatants, and child soldiers need financial support
more than other forms of rehabilitation needs reconsideration.
There is a need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach
that includes personal, educational, and physical and mental health
elements. Arguably, the most critical missing component in DDR
efforts has been psycho-social well-being. Violent conflicts often
cause considerable trauma to victims and combatants. Even if
economic reintegration occurs, the mental and emotional scars of
conflict will always have the potential to ruin lives if left unaddressed.
This is especially important for child soldiers.
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2. Address the tenuous state of funding for disarmament, demobi-
lization, and reintegration. Financing and resourcing of DDR
efforts in Africa have been dominated by donor funding. Yet this
is often tenuous and unsustainable over the long term. The over-
reliance on donors means that the reintegration efforts are often
of a much shorter timeline than required by the scale and scope
of the challenge. Appropriate re-skilling of veterans, adult educa-
tion, or offers of education support to younger ex-combatants or
child soldiers would be cheaper and more sustainable if African
governments provided long-term funding (especially in the absence
of donor funding). African countries need to find mechanisms to
assume more of the financial burden of continuing reintegration
efforts.
3. Reconsider a one-size-fits-all approach to disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration. Reintegration interventions have
tended to assume a great deal of homogeneity of target groups.
Women and men, boys and girls (child soldiers), young and old,
urban and rural, all receive essentially the same assistance pack-
ages. Intervention projects should instead seek to disaggregate
the different categories of people needing support or impacted
by conflict, determine their needs, and structure intervention
programs accordingly. In Uganda, for example, veterans returning
to Buganda, where land has been properly parceled with a clear
tenure system, required a different approach than what was needed
by veterans returning elsewhere, where land is still communal and
family-owned. Differences in cultures with respect to rituals around
cleansing of evil spirits also demand proper attention, as this often
determines levels of acceptance in the recipient community.
4. Implement better accounting of local opportunities and disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration. There is a need to
understand better the economic and other opportunities that exist
in the regions and communities to which people are being reinte-
grated. For example, it was an oversight for the Uganda Veteran
Assistance Programme not to give sufficient farming education to
veterans returning to villages, and business education to those rein-
tegrating into urban locations. Interestingly, these items had been
planned, but insufficient attention was paid to them since they
were deemed of little consequence. This partly explains why some
veterans quickly ran out of funds and their businesses collapsed.
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CHAPTER 6
United Nations Peacekeeping, Human Rights,
and the Protection of Civilians
Ibrahim J. Wani
With the increasing trend toward human rights violations and the
displacement of civilian populations in conflict, the protection of civil-
ians has become an essential part of peacekeeping.1 This trend has been
dictated by the changing circumstances of conflict and is supported by
the international normative order and global human rights framework.2
Drawing on lessons from United Nations (UN)-led peacekeeping oper-
ations in Africa,3 this chapter discusses the background and evolution
of peacekeeping engagement on issues related to human rights and the
protection of civilians; the array of norms and institutions that have devel-
oped to formalize the mandate in the UN peacekeeping framework; and
experiences, lessons, and challenges in its implementation.
Despite some notable achievements, much remains to be done to
bridge the gap between rhetoric and concrete actions so that civilians
are not, as they all-too-often are, treated as fodder in conflict.4 It is
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a challenging and complex undertaking, confronting intractable polit-
ical problems in countries where communities are deeply fragmented,
mechanisms for conflict mediation and resolution are lacking, and state
institutions barely functioning. This is sometimes complicated by the fact
that the state itself may be an enabler, if not directly complicit, in violence
against civilians. At the international level, the protection of civilians also
suffers from uncertain political support, conceptual uncertainty, and other
inherent contradictions in its normative and political framework. On a
positive note, there is growing awareness—evidenced by regular reviews
and robust debates—that this important undertaking remains a work in
progress. Nevertheless, there is a crucial need for a meaningful dialogue
to seek consensus and address the fundamental challenges and internal
contradictions highlighted below.
The Basis of the Mandate
UN peacekeeping engagement with human rights, and the attendant
problems of internal displacement and refugees, was in large part
compelled by the horrors of the 1990s, particularly the 1994 Rwanda
genocide and the massacre of Bosnians a year later at Srebrenica in the
former Yugoslavia. Until then, peacekeeping was largely affixed to its orig-
inal conception as a limited instrument interposed between conflicting
parties and playing a rather passive role. The specter of a noticeable inter-
national presence watching or, worse, fleeing while hundreds of thousands
of helpless civilians were massacred evoked outrage and shame, challenged
the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and the global peace and security
order,5 and triggered critical reviews of peacekeeping.6
The result was the pledge to “never again” allow a repeat of such
atrocities as Rwanda and Srebrenica and the declaration that the inter-
national community had a duty to intervene when such circumstances
arose. UN peacekeeping was the obvious instrument of intervention. As
the UN Secretary-General noted in his report to the General Assembly at
the time,
[t]he plight of civilians is no longer something which can be neglected, or
made secondary because it complicates political negotiations or interests.
It is fundamental to the central mandate of the Organization. The respon-
sibility for the protection of civilians cannot be transferred to others. The
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United Nations is the only international organization with the reach and
authority to end these practices.7
Despite these laudable affirmations, civilians continued to suffer grue-
some atrocities in conflicts, which, in turn, drew UN peacekeeping into
the inevitable undertaking of human rights protection. Recent conflicts
in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan illustrate this trend. Since
December 2013, the Security Council has progressively reinforced the
mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as the human
rights situation has deteriorated. The glimmer of hope that greeted
South Sudan’s independence in 2011 following more than five decades
of conflict soon faded when another round of conflict, one of the most
brutal and destructive conflicts of the twenty-first century, flared up in
December 2013. The conflict has been characterized by revenge killings,
sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment of child soldiers, the
destruction of homes and other personal property, and the forcible
displacement of more than half of the country’s population.
South Sudan is perhaps an extreme example, but similar phenomena
exist where UN peacekeeper are deployed in large numbers. In the CAR,
civilians are caught up in the ferocious conflict between the anti-Balaka
and Séléka, thousands have been killed and many are displaced within the
country and other neighboring countries. The multiple armed groups and
government forces in the DRC continuously target civilians, particularly
in the eastern part of the country. In Mali, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam
wal Muslimin (JNIM) and affiliated insurgent groups have continuously
attacked and killed civilians, and in Darfur, for more than a decade now,
civilians have been targeted and killed or forced into camps for Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs).
The so-called “CNN effect,” which projects the horrors of conflict
into living rooms around the world in real time,8 puts pressure on
governments, the UN system, and the international community to do
something to halt gross violations of human rights. The presence of a
UN peacekeeping operation on the ground has often been the logical and
most cost-effective response mechanism. Where no peacekeeping mission
existed, the UN was compelled to establish one.
Ironically, the presence of the UN on the ground, in turn, has fostered
the expectation that it will provide protection to the civilian popula-
tion. The failure to fulfill this expectation is perceived as a potentially
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serious blemish on the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and the
international system that could undermine its central purpose to facili-
tate and support a peace process. In other words, UN peacekeeping has
become the instrument of last resort in situations of human rights and
humanitarian crises. Beyond this practical dimension, UN peacekeeping
engagement on human rights and the protection of civilians and refugees
is also considered integral and essential to its primary mission and core
purpose of securing peace. Systematic human rights violations and the
displacement of populations are not only a result of the conflict; experi-
ence also shows that they perpetuate conflict. Peace cannot be realized
when civilians do not feel secure and safe, and public confidence, which is
essential to the realization of sustainable peace and security, cannot exist
when civilians are systematically and consistently threatened or abused.
The Normative and Institutional Framework
In 1999, the United Nations Security Council explicitly mandated the
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to “take the necessary action…
within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”9 Every UN peace-
keeping mission established since then has had an explicit mandate from
the Security Council to protect civilians,10 (only four out of the fourteen
active UN peacekeeping operations do not have the explicit mandate to
protect civilians).11 An elaborate body of norms, policies, and institutions
across the UN system, which includes the UN Charter and the global
human rights and humanitarian laws framework, Security Council reso-
lutions and pronouncements, and internal UN policies and guidelines,
supports the formalization and operationalization of human rights and
the protection of civilians as priorities for UN peacekeeping.
Implementation and Track Record
Nearly 20 years of UN peacekeeping experience with the protection
of civilians and human rights, most of it in Africa, has been exten-
sively documented and reviewed. The most recent such review was by
the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(HIPPO).12 While there have been no incidents of the magnitude of the
Rwanda genocide—although conflict in South Sudan has been described
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as “genocide” by some—the plight of civilians in conflict has been increas-
ingly brought to the fore through actions by peacekeepers, including
when the presence or action by a peacekeeping mission has arguably saved
civilians. Overall, however, the experience has been unsatisfactory.
At the political level, the UN Security Council has been more respon-
sive to civilian atrocities and is more likely to deploy a peacekeeping
operation when there is widespread violence and systematic human rights
violations, as the CAR mission (MINUSCA) illustrates. Enforcement
mandates which empower peacekeepers to intervene with armed actors in
order to protect civilians are also more common. The Security Council is
also frequently engaging on human rights and refugee issues, highlighting
their importance in peace and security.
There is some evidence that peacekeeping has reduced the occurrence,
duration, and intensity of conflict as well as the likelihood of a resur-
gence of conflict.13 The presence of a peacekeeping force has also been
cited as an important deterrent and confidence builder, dissuading attacks
against civilians and supporting the settlement of displaced civilians and
the return and resettlement of refugees.14
In Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra
Leone, and Liberia, UN peacekeeping made positive contributions to
the protection of civilians. Through mediation and assisting reconciliation
processes, supporting elections and democratization, helping establish the
rule of law, and facilitating the repatriation and resettlement of internally
displaced civilians and refugees, tangible improvements were made to the
lives of ordinary citizens in these countries.
At the same time, plenty of data suggests that claims of “peacekeeping
successes” may be exaggerated. Often much vaunted successes are short-
lived, many conflicts tend to relapse, not least because peacekeeping
operations typically do not address the underlying issues which gave rise
to conflict in the first place.15
Lessons and Challenges
Extensive reviews of the record of UN peacekeeping the protection of
civilians identify several important lessons and challenges. Besides the
complexity of the mandate and the difficult environment under which
peacekeeping operations are deployed,16 key issues include:
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i. The uncertainty of political support for peacekeeping involvement
in human rights;
ii. ambiguities surrounding the scope of the mandate; and
iii. lack of coherence and a common understanding around the chal-
lenges of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, in particular
the problem of overcrowded agendas, resource constraints and
limited capabilities and issues related to leadership.
The wide scope of responsibilities and tasks in multidimensional
peacekeeping operations has a particular impact on human rights and
protection of civilians. In addition to the primary mission of facilitating a
peace process, the typical peacekeeping operation is required to support
the extension of state authority, capacity building, the rule of law, building
a police force, gender integration, child protection, and support to civil
society and non-governmental organizations, just to name a few. These
are all considered priorities, which means that the protection of civilians
and human rights has to compete with dozens of other priorities for atten-
tion, political support, and resources. Moreover, the various mandates
and tasks require different skills and capabilities and many tend to overlap
and are expressed in vague terms, which the different units interpret in
different ways.17
Budget and resource constraints also have a significant impact on
human rights and protection of civilians. There is a legitimate concern
about the cost of peacekeeping, which in the last few years has averaged
between US $7–8 billion annually, most of which is borne by about ten
countries. High as it is, almost every analysis has pointed out that the
peacekeeping budget is grossly inadequate for the multitude of tasks that
missions are expected to perform.18 The human rights component of the
mandate tends to receive a minuscule share of the budget.
Uncertain Political Commitment and Support
In moral and normative terms, it is tempting to assume a high degree
of political support and commitment to the protection of civilians and
human rights in peacekeeping. Yet weak political support is the norm.
This is partly a function of the way the protection mandate has developed,
but it is also a reflection of the general ambivalence at the global level
about human rights, sovereignty, and the scope of international action.
Within the UN Security Council, where the peacekeeping mandate
is defined, there are manifest misgivings about the human rights and
protection undertaking.
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Members tend to have different understandings and expectations
about individual peacekeeping operations and consensus on the scope of
mandates is rare. While, in principle, each mission is supposed to be estab-
lished after careful analysis and deliberations, that is atypical. Instead, the
process is often a “cut and paste” job, with some political “give and take”
and minimal deliberation on how the mandate is to be executed. It is
left up to the secretariat at implementation to confront the difficult chal-
lenge of allocating scarce resources to competing tasks. This results in
obfuscation and fruitless debate.
The trend toward partnership and subsidiarity is another dimension
of the political challenge. The African Union and its RECs have increas-
ingly assumed greater roles on peace and security matters in the region,
including in peacekeeping. This is justified as a necessary complement
to the UN’s primary role and arguably a more effective approach to
conflict resolution because of the proximity of regional organizations to
the issues. But it belies a conceptual gap because regional organizations
do not necessarily share the same normative perspectives. There is still a
lot of reticence about human rights in the AU. Traditional sovereignty still
predominates and poses a major obstacle to the realization of consensus
on mass atrocities and other challenges emanating from human rights
violations. This discordance between global and regional perspectives is
a significant obstacle to the human rights agenda.
Political expediency also often overrides human rights niceties. In 2010
the UN shelved a comprehensive report about human rights violations in
the DRC because of protests from some of the countries implicated in
the report. A year earlier, a Security Council-appointed team opted not
to discuss serious concerns about the integration of armed groups into the
national army (FARDC), contrary to the UN Human Rights Due Dili-
gence Policy, allegedly because it would upset the host government. On
several occasions in South Sudan, sanctions for human rights violations
were not pursued because of concern that they might jeopardize efforts
to end the conflict.
Despite the huge scale of human rights violations in parts of Africa,
the high level of political commitment which characterized past interna-
tional engagements on human rights concerns in conflict elsewhere, such
as Kosovo beginning in 1999, has not been evident. To put it bluntly,
Africa tends to attract less attention. This could be a legacy of “conflict
fatigue” over Africa or/and the absence of strong political interests on
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the continent among the key powers. It is argued by some that the inter-
national community lacks a genuine commitment to resolve conflicts in
Africa; peacekeeping thus serves as a kind of palliative. The situation is
not helped by an insidious paradox: those who fund peacekeeping, largely
Western nations, define the mandate, which typically centers on damage
limitation rather than substantive attempts to resolve the conflict; the
Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), which are largely from Africa and
Asia, have little say in how the mandate is shaped.19
As the HIPPO report has pointed out, peacekeeping operations express
“different interests and concerns”—of the Security Council, regional
neighbors, and TCCs. It is therefore important to have “a shared under-
standing of the situation, a common political goal and clarity on the
level of resolve and resources required to help deliver and sustain a polit-
ical solution.”20 The lack of political commitment and coherent support
is serious and foreshadows most of the other challenges related to the
mandate to protect civilians, including the lack of clarity on its scope, the
diffusion of tasks and responsibilities, the limited resources and the lack
of political support during critical phases of implementation.
Conceptual Ambiguity
Closely linked to the lack of political consensus is the fact that despite
the overwhelming sentiment that the UN should do something about
the plight of civilians in conflict, the key concepts—protection of civil-
ians, human rights promotion and protection, humanitarianism and
responsibility to protect—are used in different and sometimes contradic-
tory contexts. These ambiguities lead to confusion, undermine political
support, and negatively impact operationalization and implementation.21
For example, the UN Security Council has used the concept of “protec-
tion of civilians” in different senses, alluding to “physical protection” but
also appearing to allow for other broader perspectives including human
rights. In Resolution 2448, renewing MINUSCA’s mandate, for example,
the Security Council authorized it to “protect, without prejudice to the
primary responsibility of the CAR Authorities and the basic principles of
peacekeeping, the civilian population under threat of physical violence.”22
This is essentially the same formulation that the Council has used since
1999 when it first mandated the protection of civilians in UNAMSIL,
with minor but important modifications: deleting the phrase “imminent
threat of violence” in earlier resolutions in favor of simply “threat of
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violence” apparently because the term “imminent” caused confusion and
equivocation.
The formulation in the Security Council resolutions, particularly the
use of terms such as “all necessary means,” “civilians under threat,” and
“within area of operation or presence,” and the context of the debate
around the first mandate have been interpreted to suggest that the Secu-
rity Council means “physical protection” when it mandates the protection
of civilians.23 But the Security Council does not explicitly say that. More-
over, the language in other parts of the resolutions alludes to broader
notions beyond physical protection. The standard caveats used in the
resolutions—“consistent with principles of peacekeeping,” “within their
capabilities and areas of deployment”—seem to limit the scope of the
mandate and create further confusion and uncertainty, seemingly permit-
ting a peacekeeping mission to not act if it determines that it lacks the
“capability.” This may seem reasonable on the surface, but it creates the
potential for equivocation, and no assurances that the mission will be held
accountable for not acting.
In a bid to offer guidance to peace missions, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed a policy aimed at clar-
ifying and reconciling the concept.24 Supposedly, the policy draws from
the Security Council’s definition of “protection,”25 from which it elabo-
rates three tiers of activities that encompass the protection of civilians. Tier
I includes public information campaigns to promote respect for human
rights; dialogue with a perpetrator or potential perpetrator to deter viola-
tions; mediation and the resolution of conflicts among the parties to the
conflict; persuading governments and other relevant actors to intervene to
protect civilians; and other related activities which are intended to prevent
human rights violations. Tier II relates to physical protection and involves
the show of or use of force by the police and military components to
prevent, deter, preempt, or respond to situations in which civilians are
under threat of physical violence. Tier III are activities that are intended to
create an environment that protects civilians, such as supporting elections
and political processes; conflict mediation and resolution; security sector
reform; strengthening the rule of law; the promotion and protection of
human rights; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-
combatants; and supporting the return and reintegration of IDPs and
refugees. These are medium- to long-term programmatic activities of the
entire UN system and partners in the country, including the peacekeeping
mission.
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Complicating matters is the fact that human rights activists and groups,
which play critical roles in the protection of civilians, often have different
perspectives. The humanitarian community envisages the protection of
civilians to include “all efforts aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights
of the individual and of the obligations of the authorities/arms bearers
in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of
law.”26 From a human rights perspective, the scope of protection is much
broader, covering all the rights and freedoms recognized in international
and regional instruments and ensuing obligations, including international
human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal
law, and international refugee law, and applies in times of peace and war
to all individuals, not just civilians.27 The DPKO policy seems to embrace
both the humanitarian and human rights perspectives.
It is left up to peacekeeping missions to develop their strategy for
the protection of civilians, indicating priority areas of focus. This may
seem pragmatic but it is not prudent. Mission strategies tend to be a
laundry list: clearly articulated, concrete goals and priorities are absent.
The differing and sometimes competing perspectives on the key concepts
has made it challenging to articulate “protection of civilians” in imple-
mentable terms.28 There is no consensus in the Security Council on
when it should be triggered and what the circumstances warrant. The
various components in UN peacekeeping missions can become embroiled
in disagreements over concepts, which impede the development of a
decisive, unified approach. Humanitarian partners, for instance, eschew
the carrying of or use of arms for physical protection. This can create
tension with, as well as uncertainty and indecision for, the military compo-
nent (and TCCs). The consequent inaction is then exploited by the host
country and those not fully supportive of human rights and the protection
of civilians.
Compatibility with the Original
Idea of Peacekeeping
Although it is generally conceded that UN peacekeeping has evolved from
its traditional underpinnings, its original architecture remains in place.
The idea behind UN peacekeeping was to position “neutral” UN troops
between belligerents who had agreed to stop fighting in order to limit the
risk of resumption in the fighting while a peace process was progressing.29
It was considered a limited instrument, premised on a peace agreement
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and the commitment of the parties, and the UN as a peace broker and
a neutral party with no stake in the conflict. The core UN peacekeeping
principles—impartiality, consent, and the restriction on the use of force—
derive from this general context and premises.30
Much of the original conception no longer holds. And yet, it continues
to dominate the architecture of peacekeeping. As African experiences
demonstrate, UN peacekeeping is no longer just deployed where fighting
has ended; in fact, it is usually deployed where active hostility is still
on-going, often involving multiple actors. Furthermore, the typical peace-
keeping mandate today is also expansive, comprising mediation, extending
and supporting state authority, and protecting civilians, sometimes against
their own governments.
Finding the Right Balance Among the Tools
An important policy issue that has not received much attention concerns
the order of priorities among the various peacebuilding tools. The rela-
tionship between the relative investments in physical protection and
diplomatic engagement is a case in point. In practice, military and police
components receive far greater resources and attention than the political
aspects. Yet it is the politics on which so much else, including the physical,
turns.31
Physical protection, in the sense outlined in Tier II of the DPKO
Policy, involving “…those activities by police and military components
involving the show or use of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt and
respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical
violence”32 is important and necessary as a protection tool. It is this idea
which dominates the Security Council’s thinking when it mandates the
protection of civilians. Peacekeeping missions need a force not only to
protect the mission’s assets and personnel but also, as recommended in
the Brahimi report, “to protect civilians in imminent risk of violence.”
Hence, the trend toward enforcement mandates and the robust initia-
tives such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUSCO), which was mandated to carry out “targeted
offensive operations” to “neutralize armed groups”33 and the Regional
Protection Force in UNMISS.
Heads of missions and TCCs regularly complain that they lack the
resources to properly equip the military and police for the mandated tasks,
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especially for its physical protection responsibility. As Hilde Johnson has
pointed out, the glaring mismatch between the UNMISS’ mandate and
its resources made it “close to impossible” for the mission to deliver on its
mandate to provide physical protection to civilians under threat.34 Objec-
tive assessments confirm that almost all are woefully equipped for the
challenge that they confront. On the other hand, the military and police
components consume the bulk of the resources of the mission. They are
expensive. The civilian components of peacekeeping missions receive very
little in relative terms, and most of their resources are allocated to staff
salaries and benefits. Very little, if any, is devoted to programs.
The argument is not that the allocation for the military and police
should be reduced. On the contrary, there is a very good case to be
made that they ought to be properly equipped and staffed to meet the
requirements of the mandated tasks. But in the current scenario, where
the military are inadequately equipped and there is under-investment in
the diplomatic and political spheres, success is all but impossible. Along
with strengthening the military component, therefore, it will be impor-
tant to invest commensurately in the diplomatic and political dimensions,
and to strengthen more explicit synergy among the three. Clarity is also
needed on the relevance of the peacekeeping principles, especially consent
and the use of force.
Enforcing the Primary Responsibility of the Host State
Under international law, the state bears the primary responsibility to
protect human rights. This is concretized in the “Responsibility to
Protect” doctrine: the idea that sovereignty entails the responsibility to
protect, which came out of the same movement and sentiment that
spurred the protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping. The
state’s responsibility entails the duty to ensure that its institutions and
citizens, and those under its control, do not violate human rights.
All Security Council resolutions mandate peacekeeping operations to
protect civilians “without prejudice to the responsibility of the state.”
In practice, the state is best placed to protect human rights. As HIPPO
rightly points out, however, peacekeeping, even in ideal circumstances, is
no substitute for an effective state.35 A necessary part of a strategy for
the protection of civilians should be to ensure the state fulfills its primary
responsibility.
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In most peacekeeping situations, the state is either unable to provide
protection or often complicit in, if not responsible for, perpetrating
human rights violations and undermining the rule of law. In South Sudan,
for example, the state is implicated in violent attacks against civilians; in
CAR, some of the armed groups that are accused of human rights viola-
tions are supported by the state. In these circumstances, the responsibility
of the international community is to remind the state of its responsibility
and to support the state as necessary to enable it to fulfill its responsi-
bility; failing that, the international community must intervene through
diplomatic demarches or even armed intervention.
UN peacekeeping missions have not been very effective in holding the
state to its primary responsibility—using any of these tools—and do not
consistently use their political leverage. The failure to act has had the
impact of emboldening governments and other perpetrators, perpetuating
impunity and possibly worsening the human rights situation. The most
intransigent countries, such as the DRC and South Sudan, ignore Secu-
rity Council resolutions and ultimatums because they are confident that
there will be no repercussions. In turn, this tends to disempower and
undermine the peacekeeping mission’s human rights efforts. Cognizant
that they are unlikely to get strong support from the Security Council
and from the UN, mission leadership treads very carefully around human
rights issues.
Key Recommendations
1. Reinvigorate UN peacekeeping focus on the protection of civilians
and human rights. Without this, its core mission of ending conflict
and restoring peace and stability is unlikely to succeed. Despite some
notable accomplishments, overall the UN’s record on the protec-
tion of civilians and human rights is poor. Mandates have almost
invariably promised more than they have delivered. There are far too
many reports of civilians being attacked, sometimes in the presence
of UN peacekeepers, and cases where the system has not responded
adequately or failed to respond in the face of threats to civil-
ians. Reviews of UN peacekeeping performance identify formidable
challenges: weak and unreliable political support; conceptual and
normative ambiguities; differing interpretations by key actors on the
scope of the mandate; structural and systemic contradictions, and
inadequate resources and capabilities.
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What is clear from this record is that the current state of affairs is
no longer tenable. UN peacekeeping must move beyond rhetoric
and improve its performance. A genuine commitment to imple-
ment the recommendations of HIPPO, which member states seem
to support, would be an important first step.
2. Strengthen political consensus around human rights and the protec-
tion of civilians. The assumption that the fundamentals of peace-
keeping and protection of civilians are sound is false. Equivocation,
politicization, and a weak consensus persist around critical issues.
It is therefore important to have an honest debate to seek fresh
consensus on the purpose, relevance, and scope of the protection
of civilians mandate and its place in peacekeeping, including a real-
istic assessment of what peacekeeping can—and cannot—deliver.36
That will not be easy in the context of the current erosion of the
international global order, but the issue must be addressed more
candidly for meaningful change to take place in a process involving
all key actors—General Assembly member states, regional groups
and neighbors, TCCs, etc.—in order to close the gap between the
Security Council where mandates are defined and the other actors
who bear some of the responsibility for implementation.
3. Address the apparent incompatibility between traditional peace-
keeping and deference to national sovereignty. The apparent incom-
patibility between the traditional principles of peacekeeping, particu-
larly with respect to the requirement for consent and the underlying
deference to sovereignty, and what is required to protect human
rights needs to be resolved. The obstinacy of the host state, in
delaying requests for patrols, restricting the movement of peace-
keepers and visits to sites of human rights violations, perpetually
frustrate efforts to protect civilians and are indefensible. Waiting for
consent in such circumstances undermines the protection of civil-
ians. The privilege of sovereignty does not seem warranted in such
cases. On the contrary, a more concerted effort is needed to uphold
and enforce the primary responsibility of the host state to defend
and protect human rights. Peacekeeping can only do so much and
will not succeed without this. The Security Council needs to demon-
strate that it has the resolve to follow through. Moreover, that it
will take action if its resolutions are not respected or cooperation is
absent. Strongly worded resolutions and threats are not enough and
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could even be damaging to international order and the credibility of
the Security Council if they can be ignored with impunity.
4. Close the gap between mission mandates and resources required to
achieve the missions. As others have recommended, the Security
Council needs to more seriously consider the operational implica-
tions of mandates and the resources and other capabilities required
to follow through and implement the mandate; doing more with
less is a failing strategy. UN missions should be properly staffed
and equipped and a more explicit link between the military, polit-
ical and diplomatic aspects of the mandate should be cultivated.
The UNSC should also continue to be involved at all stages of
the mandate’s implementation and, in particular, to continue to
lend political support, including to heads of missions, who must be
accountable. The Security Council should approach subsidiarity with
caution, remain closely engaged and insist on adherence to agreed
international norms—to deter regional organizations and neighbors
from acting as spoilers, as they sometimes do.
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In May 2000, the Government of Namibia hosted a workshop focused
on mainstreaming a gender perspective into the work of multidimensional
peace support operations. The workshop set out to examine practical ways
that the United Nations (UN) and member states could strengthen the
principles of gender equality, through the vehicle of peace operations, as
a means to ensure a “situation of political stability in which women and
men play an equal part in the political, economic, and social develop-
ment of their country.”1 It was a timely discussion in Namibia, as the
workshop marked ten years since the country had hosted a UN peace-
keeping mission.2 One outcome from that workshop was the Windhoek
Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender
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Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations.3 That outcome docu-
ment contributed to the eventual adoption of the UN Security Council’s
first resolution (UNSCR1325) on women, peace, and security (WPS) in
October 2000.4 As such, the council recognized that women’s equality
and security was linked to the maintenance of international peace and
security. UN peace operations had an important role to take forward the
agenda in areas where they were deployed.
More UN peacekeeping missions have deployed to Africa than any
other continent. As of October 2019, seven UN peacekeeping missions
were deployed on the African continent, with more than 80,000 blue
helmets serving across large multidimensional missions in contexts such
as Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, the
Central African Republic, and Western Sahara. Two long-term missions,
in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, recently transitioned and exited the country
after nearly fifteen years.
Although there has been progress with women’s political represen-
tation in Africa, women remain disadvantaged in many parts of the
continent due to patriarchal attitudes and cultural norms. Women have
disproportionately borne the consequences of conflicts across the conti-
nent. They have been targeted through sexual violence as a tactic of war,
kidnapped and instrumentalized by terrorist groups, and been limited by
attitudes that marginalize their voices in conflict resolution. This is despite
the fact that women’s participation and engagement in conflict resolution
efforts are likely to contribute to a more sustainable peace.
UN peacekeeping has provided an important vehicle for progressing
the WPS agenda, with mandates focused on strengthening women’s
participation in peace processes, ensuring the protection of women and
girls, and integrating gender considerations into the approach of missions
aimed at building sustainable peace.5 These missions have subsequently
influenced efforts in parts of the continent to improve women’s equality
and strengthen their participation in the security sector, government,
and political life. Research has shown that peacebuilding is less likely to
succeed without the participation and consideration of women, and that
gender inequality can be an indicator of conflict.6
Consequently, the role of UN peace operations in advancing WPS is
worthy of further examination when it comes to examining lessons for
peacebuilding efforts in Africa.
This chapter explores the opportunities and challenges that emerge
from the efforts of UN peacekeeping missions advancing WPS in Africa.
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The first section examines how UN peacekeeping missions can advance
WPS and whether these efforts within Africa have aligned with the efforts
of continental, regional, and national approaches in Africa to build peace
through women’s participation and the integration of gender perspec-
tives. The second section draws on the case studies of Liberia and South
Sudan, as past and present hosts of UN peacekeeping missions, to high-
light some of the different opportunities and challenges that are presented
through the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions when it comes
to furthering WPS. And the third section identifies some opportuni-
ties, limits, and constraints of UN peacekeeping as a tool to advance
WPS, particularly when assessed against many of the initiatives already
underway on the continent and the different types of reforms required at
the national and subnational level to support implementation.
Catalyzing Women, Peace, and Security
through UN Peace Operations in Africa
The women, peace, and security agenda has been codified through the
adoption of ten resolutions by the UN Security Council over the last two
decades.7 Yet efforts to link women’s participation and engagement in
conflict prevention efforts, as well as their protection, had been underway
across the globe for decades before it came to the fore of the Security
Council. Women-led civil society organizations had been championing a
feminist peace agenda and their right to have a voice in such discussions
long before the adoption of Resolution 1325. Indeed, the resolution had
some origins in the work of African feminists and regional institutions
on the continent in the years prior. As Toni Haastrup notes, the current
Special Envoy on WPS for the African Union, Bineta Diop, spearheaded
this work as the founder of Femmes Africa Solidarite. The WPS agenda
is consequently considered by some to have been midwifed by Africa,
with the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration in May 2000, which was
championed by Namibia and laid the foundations for the comprehensive
globalization of the agenda.8
Early lessons on the value and importance of women’s participation
and the consideration of gender perspectives in efforts to address conflict
had emerged from some of the peacekeeping missions deployed in the
decades prior to the adoption of Resolution 1325. But as the Wind-
hoek Declaration noted, women had been “denied their full role in these
efforts” and the gender aspects had “not been adequately addressed.”9
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The Declaration identified a number of reforms and improvements
related to UN peacekeeping that were included in Resolution 1325,
such as urging an expanded role and contribution for women through
their participation in peacekeeping missions (including their appointment
into senior leadership positions), and integrating gender expertise into
peacekeeping missions through training and a gender component.
With more than a dozen UN peace operations deployed to the African
continent since the adoption of Resolution 1325, peacekeeping has conse-
quently served as a modest vehicle for operationalizing some aspects
of the agenda through WPS in Africa.10 Similarly, African troop and
police contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have offered an impor-
tant vehicle for operationalizing aspects of the agenda through fostering
women’s participation and delivering training on integrating gender
considerations. Yet those efforts have yielded mixed results, reflecting
some of the broader challenges. There have also been limits with regard
to how effectively peacekeeping missions have worked to build on existing
national and local processes so that they are likely to be sustainable
beyond the deployment of the peacekeeping mission.
Evolution of Women, Peace, and Security in Peacekeeping
Efforts to integrate different aspects of the WPS agenda into the mandates
of UN peacekeeping missions have progressed significantly over the last
two decades. When the Security Council authorized the deployment
of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, it simply
included a reference to the importance of training on “child and gender-
related provisions.” As the adoption of a suite of resolutions on WPS has
expanded, so has the initiative of the Security Council to include more
detailed and specific provisions in its mandates, for instance to:
i. Address a wider range of different provisions to respond to women’s
protection needs, including from sexual and gender-based violence
through mechanisms such as women’s protection advisors;
ii. encourage host authorities to facilitate women’s participation in
electoral and political processes;
iii. consider women’s needs in disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration processes;
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iv. increase women’s participation in the security sector (including
through improved representation of women in peacekeeping
missions); and
v. more comprehensively integrate gender into all aspects of the work
of peacekeeping missions (including through the deployment of
gender advisers).
The significant number of UN peacekeeping missions deployed across the
African continent over the last two decades has resulted in their use as a
driver for WPS in some country-specific contents. For instance, missions
have included mandates to:
i. Protect women from physical violence and the widespread use of
rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war (e.g., MONUSCO
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UNMISS in South
Sudan);
ii. elevate the voices of women and civil society actors who may have
been largely absent from government and the security sector (e.g.,
UNMIL in Liberia and UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire); and
iii. ensure that women have a meaningful voice in peace forums and
negotiations (e.g., MINUSCA in the Central African Republic).
In many instances, these efforts have been complemented by the work
of regional and sub-regional organizations on the continent, whether it
be through engagement in peace processes, joint United Nations-African
Union (AU) visits by envoys, or the work of AU peace operations, which
have mirrored many of the approaches of UN peacekeeping missions. For
instance, in AMISOM “gender” is one of the six units of the civilian
component. While these efforts have been directed at advancing women’s
participation and gender equality, they also contribute to furthering the
sustainability and likelihood of peace long after a peacekeeping mission
has transitioned and departed the country.11
The “Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Oper-
ations,” agreed to by more than 150 members states and regional
organizations, including 41 African Union members and the African
Union Commission, captures many of these developments on WPS and
commits to ongoing reforms. It does so in four areas:
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i. Ensuring the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in
all stages of the peace processes;
ii. systematically integrating a gender perspective into all stages of
analysis, planning, implementation and reporting;
iii. increasing the number of civilian and uniformed women in peace-
keeping at all levels and in key positions; and
iv. tailored, context-specific peacekeeping approaches to protecting
civilians, in relevant peacekeeping operations, emphasizing the
protection of women and children in those contexts.12
If implemented effectively, through prioritization, member state
commitment, and sufficient resourcing, these measures will ensure that
UN peacekeeping missions advance women’s role in peace and security
in their countries of deployment. Efforts to work closely with the UN
Country Team (UNCT) when it comes to gender may also be critical
in supporting national efforts. But there are still limits as to how far
such initiatives may influence domestic reforms within their countries of
deployment, as ultimately it is up to the host authorities to ensure that
these reforms are being integrated through governance, justice, and the
work of the security sector. For those efforts to be sustainable, peace oper-
ations must promote local, national, and regional ownership of the WPS
agenda.
Intersection with Continental, Regional, and Domestic Approaches
The African Union has taken a leading role in implementing the WPS
agenda in parallel with the developments globally through the UN
Security Council. The formation of the African Union, building on
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), contemporaneously with the
adoption of Resolution 1325, meant that many of the African Union’s
foundational documents and institutions incorporated aspects of the WPS
agenda into their formation.13 For instance, gender equality and female
participation are included in the African Union’s founding documents
including the African Union Constitutive Act (2002). As Haastrup notes,
Africans have been engaged in WPS from the beginning, therefore “it is
thus unsurprising that the African Union has also taken up the discourse
that aims to prioritize gender perspectives in the institutionalization and
practice of peace and security on the continent.”14
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In the last twenty years, the African Union has institutionalized WPS
and ensured it is embedded across a range of continental, regional, and
national policy instruments.15 In 2014, the Chair of the AU Commis-
sion appointed a Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security, with a
mandate “to promote and echo the voices of women in conflict preven-
tion, management and resolution, as well as advocate for the protection of
their rights, including putting an end to impunity on sexual and gender-
based violence.”16 The African Union has developed a Gender Policy
(2009) and a strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment
(2017–2027). In 2017, the AU launched the Network of African Women
in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (Femwise). The Peace and Secu-
rity Commission continues to hold open sessions on women, peace, and
security.
The continent has, at times, been lauded for the levels of women’s
political representation as well. For instance, Rwanda continues to have
over 60 percent representation of women in parliament, a figure of envy
for many in Europe and the West. Countries such as Kenya have consti-
tutional quotas for women’s representation (one third) in appointed
and elected bodies. There have also been efforts to implement quotas
as part of peace agreements. For example, the Revitalized Agreement
on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan requires 35 percent
women’s representation in governance and transition structures in South
Sudan. But results have been mixed, with many targets continuing to fall
short and women being negatively impacted in their efforts to engage in
political life.
Many countries have also demonstrated political commitment to WPS
through the development of National Action Plans (NAPs). As of 2019,
23 African member states have adopted NAPs on WPS.17 Similarly, at
the regional level, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
the Mano River Union, and the Great Lakes Region have all adopted
regional action plans. Yet as the African Union Commission has noted,
implementation often remains poor, with NAPs being viewed as an end
for the achievement on WPS, rather than a means to transform the lives
of women.18 Several of the countries that have developed NAPs have
hosted UN peacekeeping missions, with some working with the UN
peacekeeping mission to develop their NAP (e.g., Liberia). As Sabrina
Karim and Kyle Beardsley argue, there is some evidence that peacekeeping
missions can encourage the creation of NAPS that focus on “domestic
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gender reforms.”19 But like the flaws identified in other NAPS, their
effectiveness and sustainability require political will, financial support,
and accountability mechanisms.20 This has often been in short supply.
Nonetheless, there are risks that UN peacekeeping missions might over-
look the already existing mechanisms on the continent for addressing
women’s participation, their engagement in conflict prevention, and their
protection.
Furthering Women, Peace and Security Through
UN Peacekeeping Missions: Case Studies
Each UN peacekeeping mission deployed to the African continent offers
different lessons when it comes to examining efforts to progress WPS.
This section examines two different mission contexts—UNMIL in Liberia
and UNMISS in South Sudan—to identify some of the different oppor-
tunities and challenges for advancing gender equality and furthering the
participation of women in politics and the security sector. Each case
study represents a mission at different stages (one transitioned, one still
deployed), different conflict situations (one emerging from civil war, one
a newly independent nation now grappling with the consequences of civil
war), and different geographic locations.
Liberia: Lessons from Integrating Gender and Transitions
UNMIL completed its deployment in March 2018, after close to 15 years
on the ground. UNMIL had deployed in October 2003, following the
signing of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Liberia
had been ravaged by civil war throughout the 1990s. What makes
UNMIL such an interesting case study, is that it was one of the first
missions to incorporate significant provisions from Resolution 1325,
following its adoption a few years earlier. As a result, the mandate for
UNMIL picks up on many of the themes that were included in that
resolution. Consequently, UNMIL has been viewed as one of the more
successful missions when it comes to implementing key provisions of
the WPS agenda.21 Throughout the fifteen years that the mission was
deployed, it supported Liberia’s efforts to advance WPS domestically
in several ways. This section will examine the mission’s role in facili-
tating women’s participation in government and politics, advocating and
modeling a role for women in the security sector, and facilitating processes
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to develop a national and domestic approach through the development of
Liberia’s first National Action Plan on WPS.
Women bore a significant brunt of the conflict throughout the 14-
year civil war in Liberia. The economic decline had limited their rights,
there was widespread victimization making women more susceptible to
sexual and gender-based violence, and women had lost critical access to
different types of infrastructure across society, disempowering them.22
The first mandate authorizing the deployment of UNMIL in October
2003 consequently included a heavy focus on women’s protection from
violence. Resolution 1509 deplored “all violations of human rights,
particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread
sexual violence against women and children,” and referred to the impor-
tance of considering the “special needs of child combatants and women”
in terms of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation
programs, as well as protecting and promoting human rights. Perhaps
most importantly, it reaffirmed “the importance of a gender perspective
in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building in accordance
with resolution 1325 (2000), recalled the need to address violence against
women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encouraged UNMIL as well
as the Liberian parties to actively address these issues.”23 This mandate
enabled the establishment of a gender adviser function within the mission,
which facilitated ongoing initiatives across the mission.
Despite the disproportionate impact that the civil war in Liberia had
on woman, this had not stopped their efforts to ensure their voices were
heard when it came to the political processes in the country. Prior to the
deployment of UNMIL in 2003, women had engaged through initiatives
such as the Liberian Women Initiative, the Mano River Women Peace-
building Network, and Women in Peacebuilding Network, to develop
constituencies of support and insert themselves into the peace negoti-
ations.24 This ultimately meant that the will of women was captured
in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which also set quotas for
representatives in the Transitional Legislative Assembly. Similarly, the
Ministry of Gender and Development was established in 2001, serving
“as the primary vehicle on all matters affecting the protection, promotion,
participation and advancement of women in Liberia.”25
Notably, much of the groundwork on women’s participation and
gender mainstreaming had been laid before the deployment of a
UNMIL.26 Many of the reforms that contributed to the environment
that fostered women’s participation and contributed to the election of
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the continent’s first female President in 2005, for instance, is there-
fore attributable to the work of women’s civil society organizations in
Liberia, although this was amplified by the work of UNMIL in investing
in gender training and providing support to the Ministry of Gender.27
Notably, as the best practices study by the UN indicated in 2009, the key
to success up until that point had been a “multi-stakeholder” process,
which engaged with the government, civil society organizations, and
community-based organizations, “harnessing the existing political will for
gender issues in the country.”28 The emergence of key women leaders
was also fundamental to these efforts.
Also notable was the focus on women’s participation in the secu-
rity sector in UNMIL’s mission mandate. UNMIL is often lauded for
being one of the first missions to facilitate the deployment of an all-
female Formed Police Unit (FPU) from India, with this being identified
as an important enabling factor in encouraging and modeling women’s
participation in the security sector.29 However there are mixed views on
how effective the deployment was in encouraging greater participation
of women in the security sector and engaging with local women, given
that restrictions on their mobility and interactions may have limited them
reaching their potential.30 As Karim argues, while the deployed FPUs
may have contributed to important overall goals within the peacekeeping
mission (such as increased ratios of female peacekeepers and their engage-
ment in protection efforts), those achievements still largely focused on
largely “feminized work,” meaning female peacekeepers continue to face
barriers to their engagement.31 Consequently, if these deployments of
female peacekeepers are to serve as role models, then it is a narrow scope
for the women seeking to serve in the Liberian security sector.
Efforts to increase women’s participation in the national police in
Liberia extended beyond simply mirroring the representation of female
peacekeepers in missions. UNMIL worked closely with the Liberian
National Police (LNP) to deliver on targets for women’s participation,
and develop educational support programs to ensure women met the
basic standard for qualification and recruitment.32 Numbers consequently
increased, although efforts to generate more sustainable reforms remain
hampered by many of the challenges facing women in defense and police
sectors globally, including family pressures, pregnancy, and health issues.
Nonetheless, UNMIL’s engagement expedited efforts to increase the
participation of women in the security sector, including through working
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with donors and other partners to implement security sector reform
programs.
In support of more comprehensive engagement on WPS, UNMIL also
engaged in supporting the development of Liberia’s first National Action
Plan on WPS. In fact, the plan, adopted in 2009, recognized the support
not only of UNMIL, but other UN agencies and donor countries in
supporting its development. While there has been no second national
version to follow after the NAPs initial period of 2009-2013, Liberia
now has in place 11 localized plans on WPS.33 Although NAPs are not
the only indicator of government commitment to WPS (and indeed, can
often serve as a smokescreen to conceal other failings), the presence of a
NAP is often viewed as a starting point.
There is no doubt that UNMIL and the engagement of stakeholders
brought resources to bear that supported Liberia’s engagement on WPS
over the last two decades, demonstrating that UN peacekeeping missions,
in particular, can contribute to the advancement of WPS in countries
affected by conflict. For Liberia, the challenge will be ensuring that those
gains are sustained going forward.
South Sudan: Navigating Politics and Protection Concerns
Women were actively engaged in the independence movement for South
Sudan. However, since then, they have continued to struggle to have a
more formal role in peace negotiations as the country has struggled to
resolve decades of internal divides, particularly since the outbreak of civil
war in the country in December 2013.
UNMISS was established in July 2011, following the country’s inde-
pendence. Unfortunately, after decades of conflict with the north, South
Sudan fell into civil war in December 2013, and women have dispro-
portionately suffered as a consequence, through mass displacement and
unprecedented levels of sexual violence, with the latter often being used
to reward fighters for their engagement in the conflict.34 With these
developments, UNMISS’ WPS mandate shifted from an initial focus on
women’s participation and engagement in political processes, to one that
is focused on women’s protection.35 With that change, the mission also
disengaged in its capacity-building efforts with the host government as
it had largely become complicit in human rights abuses and atrocities,
including against women. Needless to say, the operating environment for
UNMISS when it comes to advancing WPS has been challenging.
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Efforts to progress women’s engagement in political participation and
representation across government have, similarly, continued to face obsta-
cles throughout the deployment of UNMISS. Women have continued
to be underrepresented in formal peace negotiations, despite commit-
ments to minimum levels of women’s representation as part of transitional
governance arrangements and peace agreements. Culturally, some of the
gendered roles continue to drive the dynamics of localized conflicts, with
the underage marriage of girls common and bride price (an amount paid
by the husband to a woman’s family) driving cattle-raiding and conflict
across the country. Women also have considerably less access to education,
meaning an overwhelming proportion of the female population is illit-
erate. Nonetheless, women have been actively engaged in many informal
and localized conflict resolution efforts across the country, despite their
lack of access to formal peace processes.36
The Security Council has recognized that many barriers exist to the
full realization of Resolution 1325 in South Sudan:
“[they would] only be dismantled through dedicated commitment to
women’s empowerment, participation and human rights, concerted lead-
ership, consistent information and action, and support, to build women’s
engagement in all levels of decision-making, and through ensuring that the
full and meaningful participation and involvement of women in all spheres
of political leadership.”37
Yet part of the challenge for UNMISS is that the government’s
largely authoritarian approach continues to limit the voice of women in
peace efforts. Women-led organizations have to formally register with the
government. With many of them being viewed as opposed to govern-
ment, often they are stymied.38 Following a march in the capital, Juba in
2018, many of the leaders of different women’s groups were summoned
and subjected to threats and intimidation by the government’s security
agencies. UN peacekeeping can have a big role in strengthening the advo-
cacy of women’s groups in these environments, through their high-level
engagement with the government.
While the current mission mandate, renewed through Resolution
2459, includes a focus on women’s participation, particularly the require-
ment for 35 percent women’s representation in parliament as part of
the most recent peace agreement, there is considerably more language
devoted to sexual and gender-based violence and women’s protection by
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the mission. Impunity, lack of established rule-of-law mechanisms, and
a poorly governed and supported security sector, have contributed to
an environment where sexual violence is rife in parts of the country.39
Through its protection of civilians mandate, UNMISS has afforded some
protection to vulnerable groups, including women, in designated sites
(referred to as “POC sites” or protection of civilian sites), and in areas
where it has been able to project force. However, without significant
reforms across the security and justice sectors, as well as political commit-
ment, any initiatives undertaken by UNMISS are unlikely to remain
sustainable beyond the deployment of the mission.
Like many countries on the continent, South Sudan has also developed
a National Action Plan on WPS, with a duration from 2015–2020. Similar
to Liberia, the plan was developed with the support and consultation
of the peacekeeping mission, as well as other donors and stakeholders.
But the plan has had a very limited impact on addressing some of the
challenges that women continue to face.
Conclusions
Over the last two decades, UN peacekeeping operations have offered an
important vehicle to facilitate the engagement of countries in Africa on
women, peace, and security. They have:
i. Supported efforts to amplify women’s voices in political processes,
in government, and as part of conflict resolution initiatives;
ii. modeled the importance of engaging women in the security sector
and positions of leadership;
iii. supported host governments in their efforts to respond to women’s
protection needs (and intervened when they have been unwilling to
do so); and
iv. sought to mainstream the importance of gender across programs
directed a long-term peace, including disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration, reform of the security sector, justice and the rule
of law, and longer-term peacebuilding initiatives.
Of course, there are limits to what UN peacekeeping can and should
do when it comes to advancing women, peace, and security. Peacekeeping
is not a panacea when it comes to WPS and has its own flaws in its effort
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to integrate WPS across its work. Peacekeepers often come with a limited
understanding of the cultural context they are deploying into or the local
and regional mechanisms that may be available to them when it comes
to WPS. Furthermore, there are some countries that are actively working
against the work of gender advisers in peacekeeping missions, despite
the successes that these roles and functions have been shown to have in
contexts such as Liberia. As the Global Study on Resolution 1325 identi-
fied in 2015,40 these measures are often not prioritized. Gender advisers
are not deployed at appropriate levels of seniority, women’s civil society
organizations are not funded adequately and many of the governments
where UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed have continued
to trample on women’s rights and their role in society. These are all
different challenges that countries are likely to continue to face, long after
a peacekeeping mission has transitioned and departed.
It is difficult to measure progress when it comes to WPS in domestic
contexts. Efforts to put in place effective monitoring and evaluation
systems as part of the development of National Action Plans have
remained a challenge for many countries. Nonetheless, there are some
elements and areas of change that reflect whether a country is moving
forward, including the levels of women’s participation across political,
electoral, and governance institutions, whether the levels of their engage-
ment in the security sector are increasing (and if so, whether this is taking
place at different levels and roles throughout the organization), and the
overall perceptions of women’s security across the country, including
whether they are feeling safe, whether there is impunity, and whether
their rights are being upheld. This is not an exhaustive list. There are
many other indicators that can be drawn on.41 But these highlight some
of the pillars where peacekeeping missions tend to engage when it comes
to participation, prevention, and protection.
The case studies of Liberia and South Sudan highlight some of
the different challenges when it comes to UN peacekeeping missions
supporting countries’ commitments to WPS. UNMIL and UNMISS had
different priorities and experiences in garnering government support and
the engagement of civil society. Even with the progress that has been
made in Africa at the continental and regional level, each approach by UN
peacekeeping missions to WPS at the national and local level in-country
must be context-specific to the circumstances on the ground.
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Ultimately, UN peacekeeping missions offer an important but limited
vehicle for advancing WPS on the African continent. Efforts will need
to be increasingly focused on regional and sub-regional approaches to
conflict. Similarly, the African Union will increasingly need to invest in its
own regional and sub-regional peace operations, including some of the
gender mechanisms that have already been deployed in contexts such as
Somalia and elsewhere. Africa is well placed with a range of regional and
continental mechanisms available to facilitate women’s engagement across
the continent. Countries on the continent have shown a willingness to
lead and engage on the agenda, including through the work of the UN
Security Council and multilateral institutions. Perhaps most importantly,
women’s civil society organizations have shown the way when it comes
to leadership and advocacy to take forward reforms to advance women’s
participation and amplify their voices in peacebuilding initiatives on the
continent. Those lessons and experiences offer an important roadmap for
the way forward for UN peacekeeping as it continues to work with African
partners to advance women’s peace and security.
Key Recommendations
1. Listen to women, then engage, and build upon the networks that
already exist in civil society organizations across the country. This
requires ongoing, meaningful engagement with women. Women
need to have influence and be heard. This should be captured in
mission assessment and planning processes, as well as peacekeeping
mission mandates. It is imperative that UN peacekeeping missions
avoid becoming another form of colonialism that neglects the views
of those they seek to serve, particularly when it comes to women
and their role in society.
2. African governments and civil society need to be involved at the
outset of programs focused on Women, Peace, and Security by UN
peacekeeping missions. Missions need to ensure that programs they
develop—often in conjunction with UN country teams, agencies,
and international and local non-governmental organizations—build
sustainable approaches to WPS within institutions across govern-
ment and mechanisms to engage effectively with civil society.
National Action Plans on WPS offer one approach to facilitate this
engagement.
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3. Ensure that missions are making themselves obsolete in order to
advance gender equality. This requires that equality becomes “busi-
ness as usual” for the country’s political leaders. In some countries,
there is still much to do. But where leaders are not supportive of
this agenda, regional and continental mechanisms to compel change
need to be enforced.
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CHAPTER 8




This chapter analyzes the role of local peace committees (LPCs) as mech-
anisms for microlevel peacebuilding in Africa. Since the end of the Cold
War, LPCs have been used globally as mechanisms to promote sustain-
able peace, against the backdrop of changing conflict dynamics and a
new peacebuilding discourse that valorized the local context, local initia-
tives, and local agency in peacebuilding processes. The so-called “local
turn” in peacebuilding inspired support for diverse forms of grassroots
peacebuilding initiatives, not least in Africa, which have generally been
identified with the generic term of “local peace committees.” In taking
stock of the practices and evolution of LPCs in Africa over the past
30 years, this chapter seeks to highlight the key issues that have animated
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grassroots peacebuilding during this period, while also identifying valu-
able lessons and best practices that could form the basis for improving
this approach to peacebuilding in Africa.
The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section provides
an overview of the peacebuilding the role of LPCs in Africa over the past
three decades, coinciding with the ascendancy and evolution of the global
discourse on “peacebuilding from below.” The second section identi-
fies and analyzes some of the key issues, lessons, and best practices that
stand out from 30 years of grassroots peacebuilding through a variety of
LPCs. The third and final section offers three policy recommendations
for unlocking the full potential of LPCs.
Evolution of Local Peace Committees
as Mechanisms for Grassroots
Peacebuilding in Africa
Local peace committee is a generic name for a variety of local struc-
tures established for purposes of peacemaking and peacebuilding, using
both traditional and modern conflict resolution mechanisms. LPCs are
envisioned as organic, inclusive, participatory, and non-threatening social
spaces that facilitate dialogue and mutual understanding, and allow for
constructive problem-solving and joint action to prevent violence.1 They
have, therefore, been described as instruments that strengthen social
cohesion and the resilience of local communities, thereby contributing
to the search for sustainable peace beyond the immediate local envi-
ronment.2 Local peace committees are founded on the premise that
individuals in communities affected by violent conflict have greater incen-
tives than any external actor to resolve such conflict. They are also
thought to be better placed to build and sustain peace through their inti-
mate knowledge of the local culture, as well as community relations and
dynamics. In this regard, the concept of LPCs resonates with the “peace-
building from below” discourse, which gained prominence in the 1990s
and argued for local communities affected by violent conflict to be recog-
nized as resources and not just recipients of peacebuilding efforts that are
largely driven from the outside.3
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Emergence of Local Peace Committees in Africa as Self-Help
Community Initiatives
In Africa, “local peace” committees arose as mechanisms for grassroots
peacebuilding in the 1990s when local communities affected by violent
conflict resorted to diverse self-help structures to facilitate dialogue,
manage conflict and promote peaceful coexistence. Local peace commit-
tees in this context were essentially self-organizing community initiatives
that emerged organically to fill the void left by national and international
peacebuilding efforts, and generally drew on traditional African conflict
resolution practices. In Kenya, for example, the Wajir Peace and Devel-
opment Committee (WPDC) was established in 1995 through the efforts
of a small group of women in response to recurrent violent conflict that
had virtually crippled life in Wajir County. As Kaitlyn Hedditch noted, this
homegrown peace initiative was the last resort to restoring some degree of
normalcy in the Wajir district after international actors working to bring
peace in the area pulled out following the killing of a United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) pilot and aid worker in September 1993.4
Although it would eventually engage with district authorities, the Wajir
peace initiative originated with and was led by peace crusaders within
the conflict-affected communities, who through sensitization campaigns
and mediating among clan elders “succeeded in implementing and main-
taining peace in the district.”5 The relative success of the Wajir peace
committee in arresting the tide of violence in the district inspired the
establishment of similar structures in other districts in northern Kenya in
the 1990s. Local peace committees also became the preferred mechanism
for resolving cross-border disputes along Kenya’s borders with Somalia
and Ethiopia.6
Similar examples of indigenous peacebuilding initiatives were recorded
during this period in other African countries, such as Ghana and Burundi.
In the case of the former, local peacebuilding initiatives spearheaded by
civil society formations, based primarily on a methodology that combined
community dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation, were credited with
contributing to restoring relative peace and stability in the northern
part of the country which had experienced high levels of inter- and
intra-communal violent conflict between 1990 and 2002.7
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In Burundi, LPCs emerged in the mid-1990s as informal mechanisms
for dialogue, conflict management, reconciliation, and social rehabili-
tation to complement the official Arusha Peace Process that ended a
decade-long civil war. The first of such structures, the Kibimba Peace
Committee established in 1994, inspired the formation of LPCs across
Burundi by playing an effective role in restoring trust among rival Hutu
and Tutsi, and rebuilding the social fabric of a community that had been
torn apart by inter-ethnic atrocities during the civil war.8
Toward the Formalization of Local Peace Committees in Africa
Arguably, it was in South Africa that local peace committees were first
institutionalized and given a formal mandate to localize a national peace
process in an African country. Following the signing of the National
Peace Accord (NPA) in 1991 as part of South Africa’s political transition,
a nationwide network of peace committees was established. Within this
framework, LPCs were charged with facilitating dialogue, building toler-
ance, and addressing issues of conflict through mediation and problem-
solving approaches.9 Andries Odendaal argued that, thanks in part to their
institutionalization and the material and technical support that came with
this, LPCs played an important role in mitigating the violent effect that
South Africa’s volatile transition had on local communities. However, he
also observed that as part of a top-down peace process, LPCs did not
always enjoy the support of local actors. What is more, their peacebuilding
role was constrained by the deep polarization that characterized the tran-
sition, and the fact that both the NPA and LPCs were ill-equipped to
resolve the greater structural conditions of inequality that caused conflict
within the South African society.10 As a result of these and other chal-
lenges, South Africa’s formal LPCs fell into disuse after the country’s
political transition in 1994.11
The trend toward the formalization of LPCs in Africa became more
prominent in the first part of the twenty-first century, amidst new and
intractable peacebuilding challenges, which had prompted African leaders
to adopt a resolution in 2002 requesting African countries to estab-
lish national frameworks to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts.12
New thinking within the “peacebuilding from below” discourse, which
cautioned against taking for granted the peacebuilding potential of
the local context, and questioned the dichotomy often maintained
between local, national, and international peacebuilding initiatives,13 also
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contributed to efforts at institutionalizing LPCs by giving prominence to
ideas such as Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). As a concept, I4P is loosely
defined as “a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and
skills held by government, civil society, and community institutions that
promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful
mediation when violence occurs in a society.”14 Proponents of I4P argue
that it affords local actors and communities the opportunity to “call
on political and infrastructural resources at national [and international
levels],” while still rooting their peacebuilding initiatives in the relevant
local context, history, and culture.15 It is, therefore, seen as an alterna-
tive peacebuilding approach with the potential to transform the power
dynamics inherent in, and harness the positive aspects of, the relationship
between local, state, and international actors.
Ghana is the first African country that has in recent years taken steps
to recognize, formalize, and incorporate LPCs into a national peace
infrastructure. Inspired by the relative success of local peacemaking and
peacebuilding processes, the Ghanaian government, with the support of
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established a
peace architecture in 2005 composed of national, regional, and district
peace councils with mandates to facilitate dialogue, problem-solving,
and reconciliation processes throughout the country. Peace councils are
supported administratively and technically by a Peacebuilding Support
Unit within the Ministry of the Interior. Although it is yet to be fully
institutionalized, Ghana’s national peace architecture is believed to have
contributed to defusing political tension during the highly contested 2008
and 2012 elections, and is seen as a model for harnessing local peace
processes to promote peace and security at the national level.16
In Kenya, early attempts to formalize LPCs can be traced to 2001
when the government established the National Steering Committee on
Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, which was tasked with formu-
lating a national conflict management and peacebuilding policy, and
coordinating various peacebuilding initiatives, including LPCs. However,
it was in the aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence that a concerted
effort was made to institutionalize a national peace architecture on the
back of existing local peace structures. Odendaal argued that “the fact
that districts with peace committees reported much less violence than
others considerably raised awareness of the importance of enhancing
local capacities for peace.”17 The 2008 National Accord and Reconcilia-
tion Agreement that ended the violence recommended the establishment
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of district peace committees throughout the country. With the support
of external donors such as the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), peace committees have since been created and
capacitated in almost every district in Kenya, and have become key
components of an evolving national architecture for peacebuilding and
conflict management, albeit with mixed outcomes.18
Ethiopia represents a rather unique case of the formalization of LPCs
in Africa. Since 2009, LPCs have become an integral part of the state’s
conflict prevention and resolution mechanism. What is more, LPCs in
Ethiopia’s border areas that form part of East Africa’s Karamoja and
Somali clusters have also been integrated into the subregional mecha-
nism for conflict early warning and early response under the auspices
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD’s
early warning and early response mechanism relies on the activities of a
network of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in each of
its member states, coordinated by national Conflict Early Warning and
Early Response Units (CEWERU). In Ethiopia, local peace committees
play a significant role in localizing the mandate of the subregional mech-
anism for preventing, de-escalating, and resolving pastoral and related
conflicts along the country’s borders with Kenya, Somalia, and South
Sudan. LPCs in turn receive financial, technical, and material support
from IGAD’s Rapid Response Fund.19
The Ascendancy of NGO-Sponsored Local Peace Committees
In those African countries where persistent social conflict has generated
a strong need for concerted efforts to capitalize on grassroots mecha-
nisms for peacebuilding and social cohesion, but there has not been an
appetite to institutionalize these structures, it is often local and interna-
tional NGOs that have stepped in to support and, in some instances,
create LPCs. This is the case in Burundi where despite the relative
successes of LPCs in restoring the social fabric of communities in the
war-torn country, local peace processes have unfolded without govern-
mental support or an overarching peace architecture. Instead, it is national
and international NGOs, such as the Ministry for Peace and Reconcil-
iation Under the Cross (MI-PAREC) and the British-based Agency for
Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), that have been
instrumental in creating and supporting LPCs as part of their peace-
building and reconciliation strategies in the country.20 Inspired by the
8 LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES … 129
first LPC established by the residents of Kibimba in 1994, it is estimated
that by 2012 NGOs had established and were supporting about 450 local
peace committees in over 30 percent of the communes in Burundi.21
A similar trend can be observed in South Africa against the backdrop
of increasing violence and social unrest in the country’s impoverished
townships and informal urban settlements, including xenophobic intol-
erance against migrants from other African countries. For example, in
response to the large-scale xenophobic violence that killed more than
60 people in major urban areas across South Africa in 2008, the Action
Support Centre (ASC), a Johannesburg-based NGO, launched an initia-
tive in 2010 to harness the positive legacy of LPCs that were created
during South Africa’s transition but had since become defunct. The ASC
has worked to revive LPCs in major hotspots of xenophobic conflict in
townships and impoverished suburbs around Johannesburg, Pretoria, and
Durban. It provides continued technical, logistical, and moral support
to LPCs, mostly in the form of training in mediation and conflict trans-
formation, but also through initiatives such as the Local Peacebuilders
Awards, which recognize individual and community efforts dedicated to
promoting peace and social cohesion in these townships and suburbs.22
Local peace committees in this context have used a combination of
community dialogues, mediation, as well as education and awareness
campaigns to attempt to resolve differences and foster mutual under-
standing and reconciliation between foreign nationals and their South
African hosts.23 They have also reportedly been instrumental in arresting
the spread of violence during the recent 2019–2020 episodes of xeno-
phobic unrest, playing a major role in alerting the police and other
relevant authorities to potential attacks, and mobilizing communities to
protect foreign nationals and their properties.24
Three Decades of Local Peace Committees:
Key Issues and Lessons Learned
For the purpose of highlighting pertinent lessons that could assist in
strengthening local peacebuilding processes on the continent, this section
identifies and discusses five key issues and best practices that stand out
from the preceding review of the peacebuilding role of LPCs in Africa.
These relate to the formalization, or lack thereof, of LPCs; their relation-
ship with formal institutions and processes of governance; the scope of
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intervention of; contradictions in the peacebuilding role of LPCs, as well
as the issue of external funding and support.
To Formalize or Not to Formalize?
Perhaps the major issue that has defined the peacebuilding role of LPCs
in Africa is how to reconcile the dilemma: between retaining the essen-
tially informal character of these structures and reaping the benefits that
come with formalization. As pointed out earlier, the value proposition of
the notion of local peace committee rests primarily on the argument that
peacebuilding initiatives that are anchored in the resources and everyday
experiences of local communities, as opposed to being externally imposed,
have a greater chance of success and sustainability. The relative success
of pioneering LPCs in countries like Kenya, Ghana, and Burundi has,
therefore, been attributed largely to their informality, which encouraged
dynamism in, as well as local participation and ownership of, peace-
building processes. Informality also means that the work of LPCs is not
hamstrung by the politicking that often undermines the effectiveness and
efficiency of formal peacebuilding processes.
However, as the South African case suggests, informality can also pose
a challenge to the effectiveness of LPCs. In the post-apartheid period,
LPCs operating as informal community structures have been constrained
in their peacebuilding role by their lack of institutional legitimacy and the
corresponding inability to influence the formal processes of governance.
Local peace committees in this context have also received little support
and cooperation from state agencies, making it difficult for them to effec-
tively address local conflicts that are embedded in the broader political,
social, and economic structure of the state. The present situation contrasts
with the experience of LPCs that operated in South Africa in the 1990s.
Because these earlier structures were institutionalized as part of a national
peace architecture, and were endowed with a formal mandate to localize
the transitional peace process, they had access to material, technical, and
institutional support from the state. This formalization was crucial in
empowering LPCs to play an important role in mitigating the violent
effect that South Africa’s volatile transition had on local communities,
even though the top-down nature of the peace process meant that LPCs
did not always enjoy the support of local actors.25
It is partly in an attempt to reconcile this dilemma that the idea of I4P
has gained prominence in discourses on peacebuilding in Africa. National
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and regional peace architectures that have been established in Ghana,
Kenya, and other parts of East Africa hold the prospects of “[creating]
sufficient space for local leaders to establish structures and processes that
suit their situation best and that will enhance their sense of local owner-
ship and achievement… [while allowing] local communities to call on
political and infrastructural resources at national [and regional levels].”26
However, the existence of national peace infrastructures is no guarantee
that LPCs will have a constructive relationship with the formal institutions
and processes of governance.
Relationship with Formal Institutions and Processes of the State
Whether operating as informal or institutionalized mechanisms, local
peace committees cannot escape the influence of formal institutions and
processes. The effectiveness of the peacebuilding role of LPCs, therefore,
depends to a large extent on the nature and quality of their relationship
with the formal institutions and processes of the state. This relationship
takes on various forms. Firstly, LPCs often rely on their association with
state institutions to legitimize and garner broad support for their peace-
building activities. However, the involvement of local authorities in the
work of LPCs has sometimes had a constraining rather than an enabling
effect. Elected officials, in particular, have tended to infiltrate LPCs for
purposes of using these structures to promote their narrow political ends.
Because LPCs generally lack enforcement capacity and often rely on their
moral authority, the absence of a cooperative relationship with local offi-
cials and other state agencies such as the police has, in some instances, also
undermined the efficacy of their peacebuilding initiatives. In other cases,
LPCs have been forced to assume a subordinate and largely ineffective
role because their mandate and functions overlap with those of local state
structures.
The complementarity between the methods used by LPCs and existing
institutional processes is also a key determinant of the peacebuilding effec-
tiveness. For example, in South Africa where a Mozambican national was
gruesomely murdered during the wave of xenophobic violence in 2015,
the local peace committee in the township of Alexandra was able to
complement the formal judicial process of prosecution with a traditional
process of forgiveness and healing, which, according to a member of the
Alexandra LPC, brought some degree of reconciliation to the affected
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families. A member of the Alexandra local peace committee describes the
relationship of their intervention to the formal judicial process as follows:
Two of the families of the boys who killed Sithole [the murdered Mozam-
bican national] wanted to talk to the bereaved family. All the families
wanted was to say “sorry,” but that process was not allowed because
according to our formal justice system the two parties should be sepa-
rated. I told the families to write a letter expressing their apology which
I took to the Sithole family. Sithole’s family read the letter and said they
forgive them, but the total and true forgiveness will come when the family
of Mthethwa [one of the accused] goes to the grave of the deceased and
apologises according to our culture.27
Where this complementarity is lacking, the tension between the preferred
peacebuilding methods of local peace committees and the institutional
processes of the state has tended to constrain the role of LPCs. This
is the case in Kenya, where the use of customary conflict management
and peacebuilding methods by LPCs has sometimes come up against the
constitutional values and justice system of the state.28 There have been
instances where court orders have been used to challenge and inhibit the
work of LPCs.29 A legal and policy framework that clearly defines the role
and mandate of LPCs in relation to the formal institutions of the state is,
therefore, critical for the effectiveness of these structures.
Scope of Local Peace Committee Intervention
Another important lesson that stands out from the review of local peace
committees in Africa over the past three decades relates to what LPCs can
do and what they cannot be expected to achieve. As the cases highlighted
above suggest, LPCs are most effective in the context of low-key commu-
nity conflicts that can be addressed using dialogue, mediation, or other
problem-solving approaches. LPCs are generally ill-suited for conflict situ-
ations that require the enforcement of peace, as they are often designed
to be essentially consensus-building forums. This is particularly true for
informal LPCs, which lack institutional legitimacy and depend largely on
their moral authority for acceptance in the local environment in which
they operate.
Even in cases where LPCs are formalized, it would be naïve to expect
them to make any significant contribution to resolving conflicts that are
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rooted in the socio-economic and political structure of the state, especially
in the absence of a commitment by the relevant authorities to address the
underlying causes of conflict. As Odendaal has observed, “LPCs will not
be successful when there is a lack of political will toward peace at national
level [and] it cannot be expected of LPCs to address the root causes of
conflict, namely the larger political, social, or economic systems.”30 In this
regard, LPCs can play a role in mitigating the effects of violent conflicts in
their communities, but are often powerless in transforming the dynamics
of the conflict and bringing about sustainable peace.
Likewise, although in countries like South Africa local peace commit-
tees have been instrumental in resolving disputes arising from inefficien-
cies and perceived corruption in the processes of local governance, LPCs
cannot be expected to assume the service delivery and community safety
functions of local governments for which they have no mandate. They
can collaborate with relevant local government structures and facilitate
the efficient and equitable delivery of social services, but should, at all
times, resist the temptation of taking on local government functions that
would dilute their core peacebuilding role.
Local Peace Committees as Sites for Social Contestation and Normative
Contradictions
In principle, LPCs are intended as inclusive and non-threatening social
spaces that promote broad stakeholder participation in the common
search for peace and harmony. However, a closer look at the history of
LPCs on the continent suggests that these same characteristics can be
an impediment to micro-level peacebuilding. The imperative for inclu-
siveness means that LPCs sometimes include local actors who have no
vested interest in peace, but see these structures primarily as forums
for extending their influence and promoting their narrow political and
economic interests.
In this context, LPCs become sites for power struggles between
different social interests, often at the expense of efforts to foster peace
and social cohesion in the respective communities. In the aftermath of
the 2015 xenophobic unrest in major urban areas across South Africa,
efforts by the Orange Farm LPC to promote reconciliation between
foreign nationals and their South African counterparts were held hostage
by political party posturing within the committee. Community dialogues
convened by the local peace committee “were marred by political jostling
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by ANC members who refused to allow the meetings to continue unless
the ANC branch chairperson facilitated proceedings.”31
Moreover, while LPCs draw significant strength and legitimacy from
being rooted in the local culture and processes, this local embedded-
ness also means that they almost invariably replicate the power structures
that prevail in the communities in which they operate. Working through,
instead of attempting to transform, traditional power structures that are
oppressive and discriminatory may enable local peace committees to earn
the cooperation of local power brokers, but this compromise has implica-
tions for the nature of the peace that LPCs are able to create. For example,
Kaitlyn Hedditch noted that accounts of the success of the Wajir peace
committee in Kenya often mask “the challenging circumstances through
which [the women at the center of the initiative] were forced to both
assert and compromise their agency,” in an attempt to simultaneously
accommodate and challenge traditionally ascribed gender roles.32
In South Africa, where a xenophobic attitude is entrenched in the
dominant power structure prevailing in townships and informal settle-
ments, some LPCs have tended to embody and reproduce the marginal-
ization of, and discrimination against, migrants from other African coun-
tries. For example, the LPC in Orange Farm has been used by local
politicians, business people, and other dominant interest groups to infor-
mally exercise control over the existence and activities of migrants residing
in the township.33
These inherent contradictions in the role of LPCs do not only under-
mine their peacebuilding effectiveness, but also raise questions about their
accountability. LPCs often lack formal accountability mechanisms, and
tend to rely on the principles of inclusiveness, participation, and trans-
parency to safeguard the integrity of their activities and outcomes. The
restraining effect of these principles is sometimes trumped by contending
norms and unequal power relations in the local communities in which
LPCs are embedded.
Funding and External Support
The issue of funding and external support has been a contentious theme
in the evolution of LPCs as peacebuilding mechanisms in Africa. Although
many LPCs in Africa started their work relying almost exclusively on
community resources, they have tended to depend on external support to
sustain their peacebuilding activities. Financial, technical, institutional, or
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even moral support for LPCs in Africa has come from local and national
governments, donor agencies like USAID, intergovernmental and multi-
lateral development organizations such as IGAD and the UNDP, as well
as a variety of international and local NGOs.
Historically, external support for LPCs in Africa has produced mixed
outcomes. On the one hand, some LPCs established by NGOs have
become so dependent on external funding and support that they have
been unable to operate on their own. Similarly, it has been reported
that in countries like Kenya and Liberia where NGOs have paid so-called
“sitting fees” to peace monitors, this has destroyed the spirit of volun-
teerism and undermined the very essence of local peace committees as
community-inspired and community-owned initiatives.34 On the other
hand, as noted above, it has been thanks to the involvement and support
of external actors that many LPCs have been able to sustain their activ-
ities over an extended period of time. The centrality of external support
is underscored by the recent trend in which some LPCs in South Africa
and Kenya have opted to transform themselves into NGOs in order to be
eligible for donor funding. There is a need for more empirical research to
better understand the implications of external support for the autonomy
and effectiveness of local peace committees. It is, however, clear from the
cases discussed above that LPCs could, at the very least, benefit from
some financial, logistical, and technical support. The lingering challenge
is how to ensure that external involvement does not compromise their
indigenous character.
Conclusion
Grassroots initiatives for peacebuilding and social cohesion have a long
history in African societies. However, it was the post-Cold War local
orientation in peacebuilding, embodied in the concept of peacebuilding
from below, that gave greater prominence to these initiatives within
“mainstream” peacebuilding discourses and practices. The prevalence of
LPCs as mechanisms for micro-level peacebuilding across the continent
should be seen in this context. The experience of three decades of LPCs
discussed in this chapter can be summarized in two overarching lessons.
First, the principles of local initiative and local agency that underpin the
idea of LPCs are necessary but not sufficient peacebuilding requirements.
This is because the local context itself is as much a terrain for the rein-
forcement of oppressive and violence-breeding tendencies as it is a catalyst
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for building sustainable peace. The fact that LPCs are embedded in these
complex local environments presents both opportunities and challenges
for peacebuilding.
Second, the effectiveness of LPCs is strengthened when these initiatives
are conceived as a complement to broader national, regional, or interna-
tional peacebuilding processes. Against the backdrop of the complex and
multi-level nature of contemporary conflicts, it is naïve to imagine that
grassroots initiatives can, on their own, resolve the multiple threats to
local peace and social cohesion. In many instances, local conflicts and inse-
curity are intertwined with national, regional, and even global dynamics so
that even with the best of intentions, local actors often lack the authority
and capacity to act decisively. This then calls for a collaborative peace-
building framework that links local, national, regional, as well as global
initiatives and resources, although care must be taken to ensure that local
agency is not stifled in the process.
Key Recommendations
1. Create an enabling legal and policy framework for local peace
committees. African governments can contribute to creating an
enabling environment for local peace committees by putting in
place appropriate legal and policy frameworks that clearly define
the role and mandate of LPCs in relation to existing peacebuilding
and governance institutions. While the formalization of LPCs is
not a prerequisite for their effectiveness, and in some instances can
even be an impediment, it is still imperative for these structures
to be institutionally recognized and protected. This will not only
provide institutional support for LPCs, but will also eliminate poten-
tial overlap and conflict between LPCs and state institutions. An
appropriate legal and policy framework will also help to address
the accountability deficit that many LPCs face. This is particularly
useful in those countries that are yet to establish a national peace
infrastructure.
2. Incorporate local peace committees into all new post-conflict peace-
building initiatives. Subsequent United Nations (UN) and African
Union (AU) post-conflict peacebuilding missions should include a
mandate to support and integrate LPCs into their respective national
peacebuilding strategies. As observed earlier, local peace committees
can be effective mechanisms for localizing national peace efforts.
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Recognizing LPCs as an integral part of the post-conflict peace-
building frameworks of the UN and the AU, while also respecting
their autonomy and uniqueness, will assure these local structures
of the resources as well as the institutional legitimacy and support
needed to make a meaningful contribution to the peaceful and
sustainable transformation of post-conflict environments in Africa.
3. Establish national and regional networks of local peace committees.
International actors like the UN and Western donors can contribute
to developing the peacebuilding capacity of local peace commit-
tees in Africa by establishing and supporting national and regional
networks of LPCs to serve as platforms for facilitated peer learning
and support, as well as the sharing of experiences and best prac-
tices. These mechanisms can be used to strengthen the capacity and
performance of individual LPCs without directly interfering in their
operations or making them dependent on outside support.
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CHAPTER 9
Three Decades of Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration
of Ex-Combatants in Africa: Lessons Learned
and Challenges Ahead
Anatole Ayissi
We are living in dangerous times. Protracted conflicts are causing unspeak-
able human suffering. Armed groups are proliferating, equipped with a
vast array of weapons. As armed conflicts grow more deadly, destructive
and complex, we need a new focus on disarmament that saves lives.1
Introduction
This chapter is an analysis of three decades of efforts to disarm, demo-
bilize, and reintegrate former combatants as part of conflict resolution
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and post-conflict peace consolidation, particularly in contexts of peace-
keeping operations carried out by the United Nations. The chapter
reviews the evolution of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) programs in Africa over the last 30 years, highlighting, in partic-
ular, trends and challenges relating to their implementation as well as
the lessons learned and the best practices recorded. It concludes with
a few observations on the future of DDR in Africa, as well as prac-
tical recommendations to policymakers and practitioners, taking expressly
into consideration the prevalent conflict landscape in Africa, made up of
“the continuing volatility of local conflict dynamics,”2 which is aggra-
vated by the mounting scourge of violent extremism, terrorism,3 and the
“democratization of armed violence” in a number of countries and areas.
DDR is defined as an operation that consists of the assembly and
cantonment of ex-combatants, consistent with the provisions of a peace
agreement, with a view to collecting their weapons, disbanding their
formal military framework, and assisting them in reintegrating into
society, either as civilians or formal members of national armed or security
(e.g., national police, gendarmerie) forces.4
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
in Africa: Contexts and Contents
The “Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation”
(DDRR5) of ex-combatants has emerged as a major pillar for post-conflict
peace consolidation in Africa. For a number of peace processes and oper-
ations on the continent, the quality of DDR implementation ranks high
on the list of the criteria against which the probability of a country recov-
ering from crisis to relapse into violence is assessed. As stated by Colonel
(rtd.) Prosper Nzekani Zena of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), experience shows that “incomplete or poorly conceived disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives have been key
factors to high rates of conflict relapse in Africa.”6 Successfully imple-
mented DDR programs, however, give the stronger chances to conflict
resolution and post-conflict peace. Indeed, the rationale behind the need
to respond urgently to the challenge of ex-combatants after conflict is that
“DDR programs are essential in helping to prevent the recurrence of war
in post-conflict situations.”7
An overview of DDR programs in Africa over the last three decades
shows that these programs have been carried out in two broad crisis
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contexts. Some DDR programs are initiated as part of efforts toward
addressing a security crisis provoked by inadequacies and deficits in
the national security sector, with a view to implementing a national
security sector reform (SSR) strategy. Though a significant number of
African countries have carried out such programs, especially southern
and West African countries, experience shows that the vast majority of
DDR programs in Africa are, instead, carried out in the context of the
implementation of a peace agreement, generally concluded between the
protagonists of a civil war.
When adopting its standards and operational rules pertaining to the
implementation of DDR programs ten years ago, the United Nations
took note of the growing demand for DDR, stressing that especially
since the late 1980s, the international community had “increasingly been
called upon to support the implementation of DDR programs in coun-
tries emerging from conflict,”8 including African countries in particular.
Indeed, as of 2019, over two-thirds of the 54 African countries have
implemented DDR programs in the context of a peace process, often with
the assistance of the United Nations.9
Thirty Years of Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa:
Issues, Trends and Lessons Learned
One of the major lessons learned from these programs is that the fate of
DDR is shaped by changes and evolutions in UN peace operations. In
a keynote address delivered during a meeting on DDR in Abidjan, Côte
d’Ivoire in 2017, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs,
Izumi Nakamitsu, emphasized this connection between “the nature of
DDR operations and peacekeeping.”10 She recalled “how crucial the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes are to sustaining
peace.” She stressed that “over the past three decades, DDR has become
an integral part of peace operations across the globe [and] has played
a key role in violence prevention, stabilization and support to political
processes.” She noted that “this crucial contribution to sustaining peace is
manifested in successful DDR programs, as witnessed in Central America,
Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and—of course—Côte d’Ivoire.”11
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Africa, a Major Host of Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration Programs
The fact that four out of the five examples cited above are from Africa is
not a coincidence. Since the inception of the first major United Nations
DDR programs in Central America about three decades ago,12 the African
continent has been the most important host for DDR programs.13 In
2006, the Secretary-General of the United Nations revealed that between
February 2000 and March 2006, “six peacekeeping operations have
included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as part of their
mandate,” among which five were in Africa: the United Nations Organi-
zation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO);
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); the United Nations
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI); the United Nations Opera-
tion in Burundi (ONUB); and the United Nations Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS).14 Three years later, in 2009, the World Bank estimated that
two-thirds of the over 30 countries where DDR programs have been
implemented over the last 20 years are in Africa.15
As of 2020, there were 13 peacekeeping operations active globally,
many with a DDR component. Half of these operations are in Africa:
Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, Mali, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Abyei (the border between Sudan and
South Sudan), and South Sudan.16 DDR is a major priority for all of these
operations. For many of them, DDR has proved to be a strong imperative
for a timely and efficient implementation of signed peace agreements.
From the quantitative standpoint, hundreds of thousands of ex-
combatants have been disarmed and demobilized in Africa over the last
decades, thus contributing significantly to increasing chances for sustain-
able peace and recovery after crises.17 Overall, available data show that
close to one million ex-combatants have gone through formal DDR
programs since the late 1980s. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo
alone, 209,605 ex-combatants had gone through DDR by March 2011,18
while over 100,000 ex-combatants were disarmed, demobilized, and sent
back to regular life at the end of the civil war in Liberia, and about 93,000
ex-combatants were the subject of DDR in Mozambique.19 In addition,
72,490 and 80,000 ex-combatants underwent DDR in Sierra Leone and
Angola, respectively.20 The most recently concluded DDR program in
Africa was in Côte d’Ivoire, where a total of 69,505 ex-combatants were
disarmed and demobilized between October 2012 and June 2015. Thus,
in terms of numbers, DDR has achieved tremendous success in Africa.
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This is good news for peace and recovery, since the “process of disarma-
ment, demobilization and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital
to stabilizing a post-conflict situation” and “to reducing the likelihood of
renewed violence.”21
However, the analysis in the next section will show that this success
has to be appreciated against the background of a great deficit of qualita-
tive outcomes in many DDR programs. In practice, many DDR programs
have essentially been about the “DD,” while the most critical “R” gener-
ally remains unaddressed. Many DDR programs have also suffered a lack
credibility stemming from the inherent fragility of the peace agreements
which gave rise to them. Yet when done well, the evidence is clear that
DDR can “make a key contribution to strengthening confidence between
former factions and enhancing the momentum toward stability.”22
Africa as a “Living Laboratory”23 for Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration
Africa has also proved to be an important “laboratory” for DDR exper-
iments, in particular in the context of rapidly changing post-Cold War
conflict settings. In the 2000s, as new conflict landscapes were emerging
in Africa—and the rest of the world24—many DDR programs increas-
ingly faced difficulties and could not be implemented as provided for in
peace agreements. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, in
a report to the General Assembly, noted that “while the scale, complexity,
scope and type of the United Nations work in disarmament, demo-
bilization and reintegration have changed, our means of planning and
implementing such operations have not.” He warned that this has ulti-
mately led “at worst […] to disillusioned ex-combatants returning to
arms.” The resurgence of armed violence amidst peace processes in
these countries led the Secretary-General to recognize that “the narrow
focus on short-term security goals,” when it comes to implementing
DDR programs, was inefficient, if not counterproductive, for post-conflict
recovery and peace consolidation. He recommended “to capture system-
atically lessons learned from previous disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration programs and to ensure that the lessons are rigorously
applied in future operations.”25 The exceptionally tough challenges that
UN peacekeeping operations met in Africa, including in places such as
Sierra Leone and Somalia, greatly informed the thinking that followed
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these recommendations and which, in 2010, led the UN to develop “the
‘second generation’ DDR.”26
A major emerging trend in the “transformation of conflict” taken
into consideration when crafting the second generation of DDR was
the mounting threat of what Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputat called
“Armed Non-Statutory Actors” (ANSAs), i.e., those spoilers who were
neither part of national armed forces nor “non-state” (rebel) armed
groups formally part of the process of implementation of peace agree-
ments. An ANSA was defined as an “organized group with a basic
structure of command operating outside state control that uses force, or
the threat of force, to achieve its objectives […], ranging from insurgent
armies and militias to vigilantes and urban gangs, exercise some degree
of control over territory and populations, and they may develop levels of
organization similar to or even surpassing that of statutory armies.”27
In line with this analysis, when crafting the second generation of DDR,
Munive and Stepputat underscored that while “in the 1990s, international
DDR programs were used mostly to deal with statutory and insurgent
armies following peace accords to which the warring parties were signa-
tories, since then, however, other types of armed actors, such as militias,
have grown in importance and have influenced the stability of govern-
ments and the security of civilian populations by demonstrating a high
degree of flexibility and […] adaptability to shifting circumstances.”28
The ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC, which has now lasted over 20
years, is one of the most emblematic illustrations of this situation.
As a “response to the shifting anatomy of armed conflict,” the DDR
concept was radically reconfigured, especially “to deal with armed groups
while conflict is still ongoing and without a negotiated peace accord being
in place,” and also to address “situations of armed conflict that involve
hybrid forms of violence as well as a range of armed actors that control,
or influence significantly, populations and territories, without being part
of peace negotiations or under direct state control,” as is the case, for
instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and
Somalia, where “militias have become one of the main agents of political
violence.”29
One of the reasons behind the advent of the second generation of
DDR was to “contribute to a secure environment and help build the
foundation for longer-term peacebuilding.” But more than a decade after
the adoption of the UN’s DDR standards and the advent of the second
generation of DDR, there is still a strong sense in Africa that many
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conflicts/crises on the continent will not be solved unless the interna-
tional community changes how peacekeeping and DDR are done. To
highlight only a few examples:
i. In January 1999, in Sierra Leone, a failed peace and DDR process
led to armed rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
launching a brutal attack on Freetown, the capital city. By the time
the peace operation regained control of the situation, more than
5,000 people had been killed.30
ii. In the DRC, where more than 200,000 ex-combatants were
disarmed and demobilized in the early 2010s, dozens of armed
groups were still active in the eastern part of the country at the
end of the decade, resulting in thousands of deaths annually over
the period. More than two million people were newly displaced in
2017 and 2018 alone.31
iii. The Central African Republic (CAR) has hosted more than 13 inter-
national or regional peace missions over the last 20 years,32 and as
many, if not more, DDR programs. Yet as of early 2019, over 80
percent of the country was controlled by armed groups.33
iv. For many years, the UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire
was highly supportive of DDR endeavors deployed by the govern-
ment and much was accomplished. On June 28, 2017, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed “the closure
of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)
[scheduled] on 30 June 2017, after having successfully achieved
its mandate.”34 Unfortunately, three months later, supposedly
disarmed ex-combatants launched a series of attacks or mutinies
(for those reintegrated in the national armed forces) in Abidjan and
other localities of Côte d’Ivoire, threatening to “set the country
on fire,” claiming that the government had yet “to pay” the full
amount of money promised to each combatant as a component
of the DDR package.35 This was the second time in six months
that Ivorian ex-combatants had rebelled against state authority and
wreaked havoc in their respective neighborhoods.
It is worth noting that in all of these cases, civilian populations in the
affected communities were the first and main victims of the recurring
waves of DDR-related violence.
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From Combatant-Focused to Community-Based
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
There is a major lesson that emerges from these and other DDR experi-
ences36: the most effective way to guarantee the success and sustainability
of DDR programs is to make sure that these programs serve not only ex-
combatants, but also, and above all, all the populations and communities
affected by violent conflict, including the most vulnerable among them.
As such, as many African countries emerging from crisis continue to deal
with the impact of armed violence on civilian populations, it has become
common practice to assess the efficiency of a DDR project holistically:
how well has it served the whole community that has been devastated
by armed conflict? Fifteen years after the very first DDR programs were
launched on the continent, Africa Renewal, a publication of the United
Nations that focuses on African economic and social issues, recalled that
this concern had become one of the most pressing challenges that DDR
programs faced in the majority of the countries in which they were being
implemented. In a special issue, released in October 2005, which under-
took a comprehensive assessment of DDR implementation programs, a
wide range of practitioners and academics spoke about their respective
experiences with DDR. The majority of them deplored the fact that
“because of their specific mandates [which focus on ex-combatants], most
DDR programs concentrate on ex-combatants, and less on the commu-
nities to which they will return.” They recommended that these projects
“should do more to help broader community recovery.”37
Five years earlier, in 2000, as the counterproductive effects of ex-
combatant-focused DDR were being increasingly felt amidst coun-
tries and communities recovering from conflict, Victor Odame Asiedu
published a PhD dissertation entitled “A Study of How Community-
based Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) can Contribute More Effectively to Peacebuilding” in Africa.38
His analysis highlighted the fact that “whilst the use of DDR continues
to grow, it has been criticized for its focus on ex-combatants rather
than communities.”39 He concluded that a major consequence of such
narrowly focused DDR is that it “sometimes creates divisions among
community members and strains the entire peacebuilding process.”40
Asiedu further observed that “in view of this limited approach to
DDR, academics and practitioners alike are increasingly arguing for
a community-based (CB) approach, especially during the reintegration
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process, as a way of addressing resentment among community members,
which impedes more effective peacebuilding.”41 His analysis echoed the
work of two experts from the Danish Institute for International Studies,
who argued that DDR should “comprise communal development projects
in order to diminish resentment from non-combatants in the ‘home
communities.’”42
The initial DDR programs implemented in African countries emerging
from armed conflict were exclusively intended for “those bearing arms.”
These “weapons-users” were considered and treated as a distinctly specific
group, different from the rest of the community. Consequently, instead of
strengthening social cohesion after conflict, DDR programs became one
of the most divisive factors in communities affected by armed conflict,
re-fueling conditions that led to armed violence. The disruptive effects of
DDR were both domestic and cross-border/regional.
On the domestic side, DDR packages offered to ex-combatants
included, among other features, in-kind compensation, free vocational
training, and resources for income-generating projects. In addition,
each ex-combatant was provided with a significant amount of cash; for
instance, in Liberia it was US $300 per ex-combatant, and in Côte
d’Ivoire, US $1,000. In the post-war environment of acute scarcity and
dire poverty, in which the vast majority of peoples live on less than half
a dollar a day, these payments were relatively generous. In the eyes of
those populations excluded from DDR programs because they neither
carried guns nor killed people, such a comparatively large amount of
money offered to ex-combatants was morally and economically unjust.
They viewed ex-combatants as the privileged few who benefited from the
tragedy of war. This situation generated widespread frustration and anger,
further complicating the relationship between returning ex-combatants,
the civilian population, and the international community that funded and
implemented DDR programs. In some cases, international partners were
accused of “rewarding violence.” The challenges raised here mirror those
highlighted by Bigombe in her case studies of DDR in Uganda and
Burundi in this volume.
On the regional side, combatant-focused DDR also had impor-
tant regional and cross-border consequences. In countries where armed
conflicts are recurrent, one of the grimmest effects of combatant-focused
DDR was that every recurring wave of armed violence generated an
increasing number of people, especially the young, taking up arms and
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fighting, some with the hope of benefiting from post-crisis DDR pack-
ages. Hence, ironically, DDR became yet another incentive to violence,
especially in those parts of Africa where armed conflicts easily spread
across state borders. The cross-border impact of violence culminated in
a phenomenon the United Nations calls “foreign combatants.” Their
implications for DDR are significant.
“Foreign combatants” are nationals from a country crossing the border
to participate in an armed conflict in another country, generally for
political or economic reasons. In terms of the rules governing armed
conflict, African “foreign combatants”—also called “negative forces” in
the DRC—are a distinctive type of “soldiers of fortune” with a gray
legal status between a “mercenary” and a “transnational criminal.” For
instance, while many young Sierra Leoneans fought in the civil war in
Liberia, there are also many young Liberians who were recruited by Sierra
Leonean rebel groups to fight in Sierra Leone; likewise, nationals from
Chad fought in the civil war in the CAR, while many Sudanese “foreign
combatants” are found in both Chad and the CAR.43 The situation in
the DRC, where spoilers of one kind or another are pervasive in the
eastern part of the country, illustrates how DDR can serve to incen-
tivize the regionalization of both armed conflict and armed combatants.
Many ex-combatants could easily cross state borders and fight multiple
wars, thus benefiting from DDR packages from two to three countries
as happened during the wars that raged in the West African Mano River
Basin (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire) between December 1989
and April 2011.
DDR experts and practitioners have learned from these experiences.
Today’s DDR programs enable countries to foster community-based
development, social cohesion, post-conflict reconciliation, and peace-
building. According to the UN’s new Integrated Disarmament, Demo-
bilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), such community-based
DDR lays the groundwork “for safeguarding and sustaining the commu-
nities” in which ex-combatants “can live as law-abiding citizens, while
building national capacity for long-term peace, security, and develop-
ment.”44
Over the last decade, many governmental and non-governmental
actors who committed to rebuilding peace in African countries recov-
ering from armed conflicts have been consistently adjusting their DDR
programs in the field with the objective of addressing the concerns and
priorities of local communities. This is, for instance, the case for the
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United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its
“Community-Focused Reintegration” (CFR) project,45 which takes into
consideration the need “to promote reintegration by creating a safe
environment in which elements of divided communities could interact.”
Likewise, Pax Christi, a Rome-based NGO helping communities affected
by armed crises to respond to the challenging issue of transitional justice,
has crafted a “Community Based Reintegration and Security” (CBRS)
program that recommends that DDR efforts should “take root at local
levels, which is essential to their legitimacy and sustainability.”
In order to disseminate knowledge and build the skills of practi-
tioners in the area of community-based DDR, the United Nations,
in synergy with other partners, has developed a specialized training
course on “Community-Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS) for
practitioners.” The course teaches “an innovative approach for more
comprehensive context and community-driven reintegration, integration,
resilience, and community security programming,” focusing in partic-
ular on “how community-based economic development can increase
economic opportunities” for both ex-combatants and the larger commu-
nity, thus “encouraging acceptance amidst those hosting communities”
of ex-combatants.46 The course also explores new ways to design more
“gender responsive programming.”47 In terms of information and expe-
rience sharing, the course offers the opportunity to bring together
“experienced practitioners from around the world to learn about cutting-
edge approaches and theories, to share experience, and develop their skills
to effectively plan and deliver community-based reintegration and security
programmes.”48
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
in Africa: The Achilles Heel, and the Iron Rules
The Achilles Heel: The Challenge of Incomplete Reintegration
DDR is a hugely complex operation, especially in Africa’s conflict settings.
One of the early lessons to emerge from the UN’s first comprehensive
review of DDR on the continent is that “the disarmament, demobilization
and in particular the reintegration processes extend beyond the life of a
peacekeeping operation.”49 Nearly 15 years after that assessment, it seems
clearer still that whether a peacekeeping operation concludes its mandate
successfully or not, DDR should continue regardless.
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The good news is that thinking on DDR in the UN and other insti-
tutions is not static. It is, in fact, almost constantly under scrutiny, with
considerable attention given to reforming its practice to align with rapidly
evolving conflict dynamics in Africa. As the then-Secretary-General of the
United Nations observed, “While the scale, complexity, scope and type
of the United Nations work in disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration have changed, our means of planning and implementing such
operations have not.”50
The implementation of “Integrated DDR Standards” (IDDRS) in
2006 greatly improved cooperation and synergies among the various UN
and non-UN actors in charge of the implementation of DDR. Nearly 15
years after the adoption of the IDDRS, the transformation of conflicts—
especially in the CAR, the DRC, the Sahel, the Great Lakes region,
and the Horn of Africa—continues to challenge our assumptions and
hypotheses. The most recent reconceptualization by the UN on DDR
puts new emphasis on violent extremism and threats posed by terrorism51;
as well as what the Rift Valley Institute calls “the democratization of
militarized politics” (the case of the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes
region).52
A major qualitative improvement in DDR practice is how women
and female ex-combatants are now central considerations, manifest in
the “Standard Operating Procedures on Gender and DDR,” where once
they were all but ignored.53 In the same vein, the specific situation of
ex-child combatants, notably, what the UN Secretary-General calls “the
moral imperative to disarm children,” is also duly considered during the
implementation of DDR programs.
The prospects for conflict and violence in Africa show that DDR will
continue to be a key parameter for conflict resolution and peacemaking in
the coming years. Many African countries—Mozambique, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire amongst them—previously in widespread conflict
face challenges from significant “remnants of war” comprising non-
disarmed or inadequately demobilized ex-combatants. In these countries,
like in the vast majority of Africa’s conflict-affected societies, the “R”
(“Reintegration”) remains the Achilles heel of DDR programs. Although
ex-combatants are most often fully disarmed and demobilized, those who
are sustainably “reintegrated” are a minority.
There is, therefore, a need to boost the “reintegration” compo-
nent of DDR with more resources, not only to address the concerns
of ex-combatants, but also to enhance economic growth, create jobs,
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and open more opportunities for business and entrepreneurship.54 The
funding trend is moving in the opposite direction, however. Budgets
for many peace operations, especially for reintegration efforts, have been
reduced. This is most notable for MONUSCO, one of the UN’s longest
and biggest missions.55 One response to the conundrum of growing
demand but dwindling resources would be to strengthen Africa’s owner-
ship of DDR programs, endowing regional institutions (African Union
and regional economic communities) with adequate institutional capac-
ities, expertise, and resources. This is a path that the African Union
has been following, with its Disarmament, Demobilization and Rein-
tegration Capacity Program (DDRCP), initiated in 2012, which aims
“to strengthen the capacities within the AU, its Member States and
regional partners, to support national and regional DDR initiatives on
the continent.”56
The AU DDRCP program, which, if adequately handled, could
become the best hope for the future of DDR in Africa, comprises three
fundamental objectives:
i. Institutionalize DDR capacities within the African Union;
ii. establish an AU DDR Resource and Research Centre; and,
iii. facilitate AU engagement and assistance to DDR activities of
member states.57
The AU DDRCP is strongly supported by the AU’s major partners,
including, among others, the World Bank and the United Nations.58
Conclusion
In May of 2018, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres outlined the
new context of global conflict, arguing that many populations continue
to live “in dangerous times, protracted conflicts are causing unspeakable
human suffering. Armed groups are proliferating, equipped with a vast
array of weapons”; as these conflicts “grow more deadly, destructive and
complex, we need a new focus on disarmament that saves lives.”59 The
United Nations General Assembly, alarmed by this deteriorating situation,
has thus requested the Secretary-General “to explore options for strength-
ening the United Nations–World Bank collaboration60 in conflict-affected
countries” and create “an enabling environment for economic growth,
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foreign investment and job creation, and in the mobilization and effective
use of domestic resources, in line with national priorities and underscored
by the principle of national ownership.”61 Relating specifically to DDR,
such an initiative could be considered in the context of Sustainable Devel-
opment Goal 16, whereby African and world leaders pledged “to foster
peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence.
There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace
without sustainable development.” The African Union, which Guterres
considers as the United Nations’ “most relevant partner in peace and
security in the world”62 should play a key role in this global partnership
for sustainable DDR in those African countries and regions63 recovering
from or affected by the crisis of the proliferation of armed groups and
weapons of war.
Key Recommendations: Three Iron Rules
The following policy recommendations are inspired by analyses and
action-points relating to post-crisis recovery and sustainable peacebuilding
contained in recent relevant reports, policy papers, and strategic frame-
works from the African Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, and
the African Development Bank.64 The recommendations are crafted as
practical action-points leading to more effective and sustainable forms
of peacemaking and crisis recovery measures, including in particular,
DDR.65
1. Secure adequate and timely funding for Disarmament, Demobi-
lization, and Reintegration. The need for adequate, timely, and
predictable funding, especially for the “reintegration” component,
remains the Achilles heel of DDR programs. There is, therefore,
need to guarantee reliable, predictable, and sustainable sources of
funding for the “reintegration” component to reduce the risk for
countries recovering from crisis to relapse into violence.66 The diffi-
culties of securing funding for the reintegration of demobilized
ex-combatants are partly explained by the fact that while the disar-
mament/demobilization of ex-combatants are accounted for in the
assessed budget for peacekeeping operations, the reintegration of
disarmed and demobilized combatants relies on voluntary funding.
Unfortunately, experience shows only part of the funds pledged by
donors is disbursed in an effective manner. Moreover, even when
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pledges materialize, “In most cases there is a six- to eight-month
gap from the time funds are pledged to the time they are available
for use. The failure to follow through on promises made due to
the lack of reliable funding could result in violence, re-recruitment
of those already disarmed into local and regional conflicts, and a
breakdown of the peace process.”67
2. Address the paradox of successful peacekeeping operations followed
by collapse in countries recovering from crisis. There is need to
bridge the gap between short-term emergency funding for peace
and longer-term investment financing for economic and social devel-
opment, including job-creation, income-generating activities, and
business opportunities for youth and ex-combatants. Many countries
where the United Nations has successfully completed a peacekeeping
operation continue to be threatened by “remnants of war,” often
poorly reintegrated ex-combatants. Since DDR extends “beyond
the life of a peacekeeping operation,” it is critical for the viability
of the peace and crisis recovery process to continue to strengthen
relevant national capacities. DDR requires human and financial
resources sufficient for a successful transition from emergency peace-
keeping and humanitarian action to financing economic and social
development activities that create jobs and provide real alternatives
to war for ex-combatants and youth. Among others, the United
Nations’ Peacebuilding Fund, which was established precisely to
“assist countries in their transition from war to peace” and prevent
state collapse and the slide to armed conflict,68 should be endowed
with adequate resources to assist countries “in the transition from
the immediate post-conflict phase to longer-term reconstruction and
development.”69
3. Frame and develop a regional response to the challenges of disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration in Africa. The African
Union, within the framework of its “Silencing the Guns in Africa”70
initiative, should work in partnership with the UN, the World
Bank,71 the African Development Bank, and any other relevant
stakeholders, to frame a regional response to the challenge of DDR
in African post-conflict countries, focusing on peacebuilding and
Sustainable Development Goal 16.72 Though the global impact of
armed conflict has lessened, available data show that “more coun-
tries have recently experienced violent conflict than at any time in
nearly three decades.”73 Many of the ongoing conflicts are in Africa,
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which hosts 40 percent of all United Nations peacekeeping opera-
tions in the world. “With a decline in civil wars ending in military
victory,” Sebastian von Eisendel cautions, “the conflict relapse rate
has increased” on the continent.74
Notes
1. Antonio Guterres, An Agenda for Disarmament, United Nations, New
York, 2018.
2. Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma Wakenge, “Understanding Armed
Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo,” PSRP Briefing Paper 7 , Rift
Valley Institute, December 2015.
3. Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity
After Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015).
4. United Nations, “The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disar-
mament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council, February 11, 2000 (S/2000/101);
United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,”
Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, March 2,
2006 (A/60/705); See also Stina Torjesen, “The Political Economy of
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Paper 709, Norwe-
gian Institute of International Affairs, 2006, https://www.files.ethz.ch/
isn/27897/709.pdf.
5. For practical purposes, this chapter uses the shorter acronym: “DDR.”
“Rehabilitation” is included because successful reintegration requires
providing ex-combatants with social services, educational opportunities,
and work so that they can progressively reclaim their legitimate place and
status in society as human beings and citizens.
6. Prosper Nzekani Zena, “The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa,”
Africa Security Brief , Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington,
DC, 2013.
7. Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputat, “Rethinking Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion and Reintegration Programs,” International Journal of Security &
Development, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development
4, no. 1 (2015): 1–13, 48, https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.
5334/sta.go/.
8. The Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR, Integrated Disar-
mament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (New York: United
Nations, December 2006).
9. Some of the countries where DDR has either been implemented or is
being implemented or envisaged are: Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire,
the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of
9 THREE DECADES OF DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION … 157
the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe. See Zena, “The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa”;
W. Andy Knight, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and
Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview,” African Security,
2008, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/193622008022
85757?needAccess=true.
10. Remarks by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi
Nakamitsu, on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
“DDR High-Level Roundtable: Tenth Anniversary of the Integrated DDR
Standards And the Experience of Côte d’Ivoire,” New York, June 19,
2017.
11. Remarks by High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi
Nakamitsu.
12. The very first major DDR program was carried out in the context of the
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), autho-
rized by the Security Council in 1989: see Rainer Grote, “The United
Nations and the Establishment of a New Model of Governance for Central
America: the Case of Guatemala,” in Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law Volume 2, Armin von Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.)
(Max Planck Institute, 1998).
13. United Nations, DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective (New York:
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010).
14. The sixth was the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH); see United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration.”
15. World Bank, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Social
Development Department, February 2009, 1, http://siteresources.wor
ldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-116410
7274725/DDRFinal3-print.pdf.
16. The rest comprises Haiti, Cyprus, Golan, Lebanon, Kosovo, India and
Pakistan, and Middle East. See: United Nations, Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations,” https://peacek
eeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate.
17. Munive and Stepputat, “Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Programs.”
18. World Bank, “Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC),” March 11, 2013, http://www.worldbank.
org/en/results/2013/03/11/demobilization-and-reintegration-in-the-
democratic-republic-of-congo.
19. Guy Lamb, “DDR 20 Years Later. Historical Review of the Long-term
Impact of Post-independence DDR in Southern Africa,” World Bank,
June 2013.
158 A. AYISSI
20. Christina Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer, “Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration in Sierra Leone,” Center for International Cooperation,
University of Bradford, July 2008.
21. United Nations, “The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarma-
ment, Demobilization and Reintegration.”
22. Ibid.
23. Expression borrowed from Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory:
Empire, Development and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge: 1870–1950
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
24. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free
Press, 1991).
25. United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,”
Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United
Nations, March 2, 2006 (A/60/705).
26. United Nations, “Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations a Contribution to
the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN
Peacekeeping,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), New
York, 2010.
27. Munive and Stepputat, “Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Programs.”
28. Ibid.; Robert Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction:
Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (New York: Routledge,
2009); J. Schulhofer-Wohl and N. Sambanis, Disarmament, Demobi-
lization, and Reintegration Programs and Civil War Recurrence: An
Assessment, Research Report, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010, https://
faculty.virginia.edu/j.sw/uploads/research/Disarmament,%20Demobiliza
tion,%20Reintegration%20Programs_%20An%20Assessment.pdf.
29. Munive and Stepputat, “Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Programs.”
30. Richard McHugh, “Revolutionary United Front,” Encyclopaedia Brit-
tanica, May 1, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Revolutionary-
United-Front.
31. “DRC Conflict: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help,” World Vision, July
23, 2019, https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/drc-
conflict-facts.
32. The very first peace mission in the Central African Republic was estab-
lished in 1997 by African Heads of States, namely: The Inter-African
Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements
(MISAB). Then on March 27, 1998, the Security Council decided “To
Establish a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
(MINURCA) with Effect from 15 April 1998”; see Security Council
resolution 1159, March 27, 1998.
9 THREE DECADES OF DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION … 159
33. “CAR: 14 Armed Groups for One Poor Country,” AFP, February
6, 2019, https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/car-14-armed-groups-
for-one-poor-country-20190206.
34. United Nations, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the
Secretary-General on the Closure of the United Nations Operation in
Côte d’Ivoire,” New York, June 28, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/
content/sg/statement/2017-06-28/statement-attributable-spokesman-
secretary-general-closure-united.
35. “Ivory Coast: Ex-Combatants Seize Weapons and Takeover Former
Rebel City”, Africa News, January 6, 2017, http://www.africanews.
com/2017/01/06/ivory-coast-ex-combatants-seize-weapons-and-tak
eover-former-rebel-city/; “Bouaké et Man: Nouvelle manifestation d’ex-
combattants qui réclament 18 millions,” Abidjan.net, October 2, 2017,
https://news.abidjan.net/h/623393.html.
36. Martin Ravallion, The Economics of Poverty—History, Measurement and
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
37. Quoted in Ernest Harsch, “Reintegration of Ex-combatants: When War
Ends: Transforming Africa’s Fighters into Builders,” Africa Renewal 1
(October 2005): 1.
38. Victor Odame Asiedu, “From Combat to Community: A Study of how a
Community-based Approach to Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rein-
tegration (DDR) can Contribute More Effectively to Peacebuilding: The
Case of Sierra Leone,” MPhil thesis, University of York, 2010.
39. Asiedu, “From Combat to Community,” 2.
40. Ibid, 2.
41. Ibid.
42. Munive and Stepputat, “Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Programs.”
43. See for instance: “Combatants on Foreign Soil,” Issue Paper, Second
International Conference on DDR in Africa, Kinshasa, Democratic




46. “Community Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS) Specialised
Training Course for Practitioners,” Barcelona, Spain, June 21–28, 2015,
http://unddr.org/DDR/training-event/community-based-reintegra
tion-and-security-cbrs-specialised-training-course-for-_58.aspx; Barcelona
International Peace Resource Centre and Transition International, “Com-
munity Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS): Specialized Training




47. Transition International, “Concept Note on Community Based (Re)
Integration And Security (CBRS),” January 2015.
48. “Community Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS) Specialized
Training Course for Practitioners,” http://unddr.org/DDR/training-
event/community-based-reintegration-and-security-cbrs-specialised-tra
ining-course-for-_58.aspx. There was an advanced course scheduled in
December 2018: Transition International and Barcelona International
Peace Center, “(Re)Integration Advanced Training Course,” Barcelona,
Spain, December 14–21, 2018, https://www.transitioninternational.
com/ti/reintegration-training-course/.
49. United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.”
50. Ibid.
51. James Cockayne and Siobhan O’Neil (eds.), UN DDR in an Era
of Violent Extremism: Is It Fit for Purpose? (Tokyo: United Nations
University, 2015).
52. Verweijen and Wakenge, “Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in
the Eastern Congo.”
53. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Blame It on the
War? The Gender Dimensions of Violence in Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration (UNDP: New York, 2012); United Nations Develop-
ment Funds for Women (UNIFEM), Getting It Right, Doing It Right:
Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (New York:
UNIFEM).
54. Maame Esi Eshun, “Skilling Africa’s Informal Sector for Growth: The
Role of Technical and Vocational Education and Training,” Africa Up
Close, Woodrow Wilson Center, June 11, 2018, https://africaupclose.wil
soncenter.org/skilling-africas-informal-sector-for-growth-the-role-of-tec
hnical-and-vocational-education-and-training/.
55. Katharina P. Coleman, The Dynamics of Peacekeeping Budget Cuts: The
Case of MONUSCO (New York: International Peace Institute, July 10,
2017); “UN to Close Five Peacekeepers’ Bases in Eastern DR Congo,”
The Independent, July 19, 2017.
56. African Union, “Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR),” June 13, 2017, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/68-disarm
ament-demobilization-and-reintegration-DDR.
57. African Union, “Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR)”; see also World Bank, Transitional Demobilization and Rein-
tegration Quarterly Report, April–June 2014.
58. See also World Bank, Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration
Program, “World Bank and UN DPKO Joint Support of the African
Union DDR Capacity Program Brings Together DDR Training Experts
and Stakeholders on DDR Compendium of Experiences and Training,”
9 THREE DECADES OF DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION … 161
June 10, 2015, http://www.tdrp.net/news_061015.php; World Bank,
Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Quarterly Report.
59. Antonio Guterres, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disar-
mament, United Nations, May 2018.
60. Such partnership is already a work in progress. See for instance: World
Bank, “United Nations and World Bank leaders call for stronger interna-




61. World Bank, “United Nations and World Bank leaders call for stronger
international efforts to prevent violent conflict.”
62. Antonio Guterres, Statement to the Security Council’ Session on Peace-
building and Sustaining Peace, April 25, 2018, https://www.un.org/sg/
en/content/sg/speeches/2018-04-25/peacebuilding-sustaining-peace-
briefing-security-council.
63. Some of the regions in Africa that are the most affected by the threat
posed by the multiplication of armed groups, including terrorist, and the
proliferation of weapons are: the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa,
the Sahel-Sahara band, and the Lake Chad basin, and the Mano River
basin.
64. United Nations: HIPPO and SG’s Agenda for Disarmament; World Bank,
Pathways for Peace Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict
Main Messages and Emerging Policy Directions (Washington, DC, 2017);
and the African Union, “African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps
to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020.”
65. United Nations: HIPPO and SG’s Agenda for Disarmament; World Bank,
Pathways for Peace; African Union, “African Union Master Roadmap.”
66. See General Assembly, “Remarks to the General Assembly on the
Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace,”
March 5, 2018.
67. United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.”
68. United Nations, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,”
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
A/59/565, December 2, 2004 (A/59565).
69. United Nations, “A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.”
70. “Decision on the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for
Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020,” African Union, Twenty-
Eighth Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government, January 31,
2017, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Assembly/AU/6 (XXVIII).
71. The World Bank has expressed its determination “to ensure that devel-
opment programs and policies are focused on successful prevention.”
See World Bank, “United Nations and World Bank Leaders Call for
162 A. AYISSI
Stronger International Efforts to Prevent Violent Conflict,” Press Release,
September 21, 2017.
72. The African Union 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Goal 16:
“We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies which
are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development
without peace and no peace without sustainable development.”
73. Antonio Guterres, “Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace,” Report of the
Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council,
January 18, 2018, A/72/707–S/2018/43.
74. Sebastian von Eisendel, “Examining Major Recent Trends in Violent
Conflict,” United Nations University, Center for Policy Research, Occa-
sional Paper 1, November 2014, https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/
attachment/1558/OC_01-MajorRecentTrendsinViolentConflict.pdf.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
CHAPTER 10




Elections remain central to the development of democratic and inclusive
societies in Africa. Not only do elections provide means to economic
growth and development since citizens can elect leaders based on their
campaign promises and policies on socio-economic development, regular
elections also contribute to peacebuilding by conferring authority on
leaders, facilitating peaceful transfers of power, and promoting citi-
zens’ participation and inclusion in governance. Indeed, regular and
credible elections have been recognized by various global, regional, sub-
regional, and national entities and infrastructures as critical for sustainable
peacebuilding. In Africa, through the African Union (AU) Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA), and the African Governance Architecture
(AGA), among others, member countries have been provided guidelines
F. Oduro (B)
Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Accra, Ghana
e-mail: f.oduro@cddgh.org
© The Author(s) 2021
T. McNamee and M. Muyangwa (eds.),




to ensure that the conduct of elections promotes good governance, and
ensures peace and stability.1
Notwithstanding the general recognition of the centrality of elections
to sustainable peacebuilding efforts, many elections have resulted in less
peace and more destabilization. The continent has recorded several cases
of pre- and post-election violence that have threatened stability in some
countries, and generated prolonged civil wars, conflict, and violence in
others such as Ethiopia (2005), Togo (2005), Kenya (2007 and 2017),
Zimbabwe (2008), and Nigeria (2007 and 2011),2 to cite only a few
examples. Even in countries, such as Ghana, Zambia, and Senegal where
peaceful election outcomes have been recorded, the (flawed) conduct of
elections has stoked fears of instability and violence, which could flare
up at any time. Except for a few countries characterized by single party
and/or candidate dominance, such as Rwanda, there remain uncertain-
ties about how sustainable “peaceful outcomes of elections” are in many
African countries.
This chapter provides an overview of elections and their contributions
to peacebuilding in Africa. The argument is made that while elections
should be viewed as a central part of peacebuilding, their impact is depen-
dent on the regularity, inclusiveness, integrity, and credibility of election
processes and outcomes. Drawing on key lessons and international best
practices, this chapter highlights challenges and emerging threats to the
conduct of peaceful elections in Africa. They include the increasing cost of
financing elections, abuse of presidential term limits, and the increasing
use of technology in the administration of elections. The final section
provides four recommendations for addressing the key drivers of election-
related violence and instability. These recommendations, informed by
three decades of election experiences in Africa, are advanced in order that
elections may contribute positively to peace on the continent.
Elections and Peacebuilding
The role of elections in peacebuilding is recognized globally. Rather than
viewing them as ends in themselves, they are viewed as one (impor-
tant) tool in broader efforts to promote peace and stability. Elections are
part of democratic political transitions and are critical during the imple-
mentation of peace agreements. As argued by Matanock, “Post-conflict
elections can greatly enhance the durability of peace agreements…specif-
ically, [peace] agreements that enable rebel and government parties to
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participate in elections.”3 Accordingly, international assistance for peace-
building programs, including deployments by the United Nations (UN)
and its affiliated agencies, invariably have an election component. This is
particularly true of post-conflict and/or transitional settings, which are
common in Africa.4
Post-conflict or transitional elections create the opportunity for all
stakeholders to contribute to building legal and constitutional frame-
works, as well as democratic institutions that advance a sustainable
peacebuilding agenda. In addition, because election periods provide a
path—for many citizens, the only path—to political participation, they
create the feeling of belonging, thereby fostering inclusion and unity
which, in turn, promotes peace. In other words, the electoral impera-
tive, the opportunity for citizens to periodically participate in leadership
change through a credible and competitive process, offers the promise of
peace and stability in societies.5 Fundamentally, the link between elections
and peacebuilding is premised on the belief that regular and credible elec-
tions offer the most promising instrument for addressing and managing
societal tensions and conflict without the use of violence.6
Three Decades of Elections in Africa: What Do
We Know About Their Impact on Peacebuilding?
Whereas the nexus between elections and peacebuilding is widely under-
stood in its positive manifestations—e.g., allowing citizens to choose their
political leaders freely and, thus, allocate power peacefully—there is also
clear evidence to suggest that elections have often triggered violence
and undermined peacebuilding on the continent. Mostly, this is due to
the way elections are conducted. A poorly conducted election can ignite
the underlying tensions in societies, already amplified by the very high-
stakes—e.g., “winner-takes-all”—associated with electoral competition in
Africa. Studies on electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa highlight a
number of factors and threats to electoral peace.7 For example, Straus
and Taylor, examining data from 1990 to 2007, suggest a typology of
election violence that ranges from low intensity to violent harassment and
large-scale violence, which results in death and instability.8
Election-related violence on the African continent has been variously
influenced by:
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i. Intense competition—“winner-takes-all” mentality—among polit-
ical elites for state power and resources9;
ii. weak election management bodies (EMBs);
iii. flawed electoral registers; and
iv. a lack of transparency and/or inadequate pre-election preparations.
These and other factors10 contribute greatly toward a deficit in trust in
elections among citizens and electoral opponents.
The story is not all negative, however. Regular elections have increas-
ingly become the norm in Africa. Acceptance by citizens11 and political
elites that the ballot box is the only legitimate means for electing leaders
is now widespread. This is a far cry from the past when leaders ruled
through the barrel of a gun in many parts of Africa. Not anymore.
The compliance of ACDEG protocols regarding regularity of elections in
member countries is growing. A recent study assessing compliance of six
AU-member countries (Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia,
and Nigeria) on regular elections confirmed as much, although capacity
to conduct elections varied across the studied countries.12 While regu-
larity of elections is improving, their quality remains a serious concern.
Even with this concern, the fact that political elites and citizens prefer
elections, rather than other methods, for choosing leaders and allocating
power is beneficial to peacebuilding efforts in Africa.
Gradually, election management bodies are getting better and
becoming more professionalized. This has helped to drive even more
demand for transparency in election preparations and management. The
application of technology is also helping EMBs to address other concerns
and build societal trust in electoral processes. EMBs in Africa have been
the test-bed for biometric technology in registering potential voters.
Where it has been introduced effectively, it has improved the integrity
of voter registers and enhanced transparency in the collation and declara-
tion of results. All of this has helped to make elections in some countries
more credible and thus minimize their potential for triggering violence
and instability.
As a result of the improvement in election administration and
increasing professionalism of EMBs, the continent is also experiencing
increasing (even if sometimes difficult) acceptance of election results by
losing candidates, and thereby effecting peaceful election outcomes.13
The accompanying leadership transitions recorded in Benin, Senegal,
Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are significant success stories
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that are contributing to reducing tensions surrounding the conduct of
elections.
Finally, the contributions of elections to peacebuilding processes in
Africa cannot be discussed without acknowledging the role of election
monitors and observers, both domestic and international. Despite some
limitations, the short- and long-term observation activities of election
observers, are contributing to and supporting peaceful election outcomes.
The AU’s electoral assistance division within the department of political
affairs has played a critical role and continues to provide critical support
and observation missions (both long-term and short-term) to African
countries in compliance with ACDEG. The AU’s presence and role in
elections in Nigeria (2015 and 2019), Ghana (2016), Kenya (2017),
Liberia (2017), and Sierra Leone (2018) are clear cases for reference,
where their role in promoting peace before, during, and after elections
was critical. As Lappin argues, while admitting limitations, “…interna-
tional election observation missions (IEOMs) remain essential elements
to peacebuilding…”14 Those limitations were most starkly evident during
the 2019 elections in Malawi, where the African Union Election Obser-
vationer Mission reported that “…the elections took place in a peaceful,
transparent and orderly manner, and thus met national, regional, conti-
nental and international standards for democratic elections…”15 For
their part, the European Union’s Election Observation Mission, which
covered 27 of the 28 voting districts of Malawi in its preliminary report,
concluded that despite an unlevel playing field, the election was “Well-
managed, inclusive, transparent and competitive.”16 However, Malawi’s
own Constitutional Court concluded in 2020 that this assessment was
flawed, thus confirming allegations of widespread irregularities. It ordered
new elections, which resulted in the defeat of the winner of the annulled
2019 vote.17
Both positive and negative voting experiences have served to heighten
Africa’s focus on developing best practices and institutional reforms to
ensure elections that better serve the interests of peace. Among many
lessons learned, two stand out: first, the negative consequences of the
persistent “winner-takes-all” mentality; and second, that the timing and
sequencing of elections are crucial, particularly in transitional periods.
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Winner-Takes-All Politics
The “winner-takes-all” nature of African politics can be especially insid-
ious come election time, owing to the high stakes involved. The desire
of African political elites to capture state power, and by extension state
resources for themselves and their cronies, has fueled the quest to secure
election victory at any cost. As Atta-Asamoah notes, “Such [winner-takes-
all] politics, if left unchecked in the context of the complex cocktail of
development and security challenges in Africa, could derail the sustain-
ability of democratic gains, development strides, and the maintenance of
peace and security in many fragile states.”18
To curtail this trend, reforms should be made to key governance insti-
tutions—such as the legislature as a countervailing force to the executive
branch of government; constitutions to foster broad-based inclusive poli-
tics—and to electoral systems (e.g., move away from “first past the post”
and toward “proportional representation” and “mixed plurality”).19 With
particular reference to electoral systems, and as argued elsewhere with
respect to the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC)
region, Khabele Matlosa, for example, recommends that “SADC states
must make deliberate efforts to address election-related conflicts and war
by, among other things, reforming their electoral systems.”20 Observa-
tions seem to suggest that the “first past the post” systems tends to
amplify the “winner-takes-all” approach. This, in turn, raises the potential
for election-related violence.
Sequencing and Timing
A badly timed election can, sometimes, be worse than having no elec-
tion at all. Promoters of democracy and good governance, whether
foreign or local, tend to push for elections at the first opportunity during
transitional settings. This is not always good for building sustainable
peace.21 Where peace is still fragile and trust is lacking, EMBs are usually
poorly resourced; basic legal and institutional reforms have not been
implemented; new and opposition political parties have not been given
sufficient time to prepare; and elections are often hurriedly organized. All
of these factors can impede democratic progress.
As Fath-Lihic and Brancati argue, the ability of national and inter-
national policy actors to understand and assess the complex political,
legal, technical, operational, participatory, and security-related challenges
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in determining the ideal timing for the conduct of transitional elections is
critical for peacebuilding processes. A “one-size-fits-all” election solution,
they add, does not exist. Every transition is different. Much depends on
historical context, the nature of the conflict, and what the elections are
designed to achieve, which is not always as straightforward as it seems.22
“Elections are often the final stage of a peace process, if not the ulti-
mate objective,” observe McNamee et al. “The hope is that elections can
have a stabilizing effect on a fractured society. Done well and timeously,
they can. But conducted too early, before security problems have been
converted into political problems, they can have the opposite effect: exac-
erbate divisions and foment violence.”23 Fostering local ownership and
inclusivity, building trust and promoting broad-based popular support
for electoral processes are vital. The benefits to peace of encouraging a
national tone of mutual respect and tolerance during the electoral phases
(pre, during, and post) are also not to be underestimated.
Challenges and Emerging Threats
to Election Peace in Africa
In addition to the failings highlighted above, elections during the past
decade have revealed new and emerging problems which can serve to
undermine peace and stability. These emerging issues, including failures
in the (increasing) application of technology during elections, mounting
legal challenges to election results by contenders, incumbents ignoring
term limits, and the rising cost of elections, merit closer scrutiny.
Technology and Elections
In some cases, the use of biometric technology by EMBs in the regis-
tration and authentication of voters has helped to counter voter fraud
and enhance the credibility of electoral registers. Recently, EMBs have
also been scaling up efforts—notably in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria—
to use information technology to increase transparency in election results
transmission.24 In other instances, however, the introduction of new tech-
nologies has led to myriad problems, with negative consequences for
stability and peace. Questions about the procurement and management
of the equipment, equipment breakdowns, unreliable devices, and the
suspect integrity and poor handling of these devices by election officials
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have been common.25 Failures in the collation and transmission of elec-
tion results in Kenya resulted in a period of grave uncertainty, as the
“defeated” opposition successfully disputed the results of the election,
then withdrew from the subsequent re-scheduled vote. Many feared that
the political turmoil sparked by the 2017 election saga would trigger
a repeat of the 2007/2008 election violence. Fortunately, this did not
happen.
All the evidence suggests that, despite these and other problems such
as weak transparency and inclusion in procurement practices, Africa’s
EMBs are pushing for more information technology in election manage-
ment. But that push, in itself, can be detrimental to situations where
elections become a tool for promoting peacebuilding. Recent electoral
processes and outcomes have exposed weaknesses in the methods and
conduct of election observers. Their ability, for example, in the era of
tech-driven elections to detect potential manipulation at results collation
centers seems limited. As Judd Devermont points out, “Most observers
do not have the technological expertise to counter… [and] circumvent
government internet controls, safeguard election results from hacking, or
detect digital tampering.”26 Hacking and other digital attacks can effec-
tively undermine many of the key ingredients of election integrity: voter
registration, vote casting, and vote tabulation. As many analysts have also
observed, the timing and context in which election-related information,
communication, and technology are introduced often do not allow for
adequate time for familiarization by opposition parties.27 The risks of
politicization become high at a very early stage, meaning that many elec-
tion results have already been effectively rejected by the opposition well
before the election itself is actually held.
Litigating Election Results
Recent elections in Nigeria (2011 and 2019), Ghana (2012 and 2016),
Kenya (2017), Liberia (2017), Sierra Leone (2018) and Malawi (2019)28
gave rise to new dynamics in election dispute management and potential
threats to stability. The resort to judicial processes to contest elec-
tion results in these cases is, obviously, a progressive step forward from
the extra-judicial means used in the past to contest and change elec-
toral outcomes. That said, this trend presents its own challenges to
peacebuilding.
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When the judiciary is put at the center of deciding election outcomes,
it also ends up pronouncing on them. Though the difference in language
is subtle, the implications can be significant. Judicial pronouncements on
election outcomes will be based on interpretations of the law, technical-
ities, procedures, and legal principles which may contradict vote tallies.
Citizens who feel that their votes have been overturned by seemingly
abstract judicial rulings may be more susceptible to joining violent forms
of resistance and mass mobilization. They may even be given succor by
alternative swearing-in ceremonies (as recently witnessed in Kenya) where
the opposition candidate claims “victor status” despite official results not
going his or her way.29 Civic education in Africa has not sensitized people
to the idea that one’s chosen candidate can “win” the election at the
ballot box but lose it in court.
The length of judicial litigations on election outcome disputes could
also serve as potential triggers for election violence. The decision by the
Kenyan Supreme Court after the 2017 election is a case in point. The
relative speed (within a month) with which the court concluded on the
petition brought before it by the opposition parties raised concerns that
the court did not spend adequate time examining the case and competing
arguments before deciding to annul the election results. In Ghana, the
opposite occurred: the post-2012 election petition to the Supreme Court
on the results of the presidential election took too long. The eight-month
delay created a wellspring of anxiety across society, which could have
boiled-over in a country where the declared winner was in office but not
yet confirmed as legitimate.
On the face of it, there is nothing wrong with the judiciary playing a
greater role in ensuring elections are sound. The Malawi Constitutional
Court’s decision to order a re-run of the 2019 election has generally
been viewed as a boost for Malawi’s journey toward democracy. But as
more disgruntled politicians and parties try to exploit potential loop-
holes in electoral laws in African countries, weak election administration
infrastructures are exposed. Judiciaries cannot be expected to fill this
gap—balancing interpretations of rules and technicalities and legal prin-
ciples against the will of the people, however that might be determined.
A recent study illustrated some of the dangers: in the case of Nigeria, it
argues that its judiciary has been complicit in perpetrating electoral fraud
in Nigerian elections.30 The authors conclude that, while the Nigerian
political class sees the judiciary as another platform for resolving election
disputes, the manipulation of the judiciary and its associated process to
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perpetrate electoral fraud has resulted in a high level of public mistrust of
the judiciary.31 Resolving this electoral conundrum will be critical to the
future of peacebuilding in Africa.
Abusing Presidential Term Limits
Another emerging threat to election peace relates to attempts by ruling
elites to extend their stay in office through removal of constitutional
term limits, mostly against the wishes of their populations.32 In the post-
Cold War era, approximately 30 African leaders have attempted to change
constitutional impositions to extend their rule—in perpetuity, in some
cases—and almost half of these attempts have succeeded.33 The idea of
“third termism” can sometimes be described as lawful, due to the consti-
tutional procedures adopted to legitimize the changes in the law, but the
popular opposition to such moves stores up considerable potential for
violence and instability. Moreover, attempts by African political leaders to
extend their stay in power typically precludes opportunities for multi-party
electoral engagements.
The absurd corollary of the “president for life” trend—that oppo-
sition parties aren’t allowed to compete for office—foments myriad
extra-legal/judicial means of seeking power. As Taylor et al. argue,
election-related violence is more likely in situations where incumbents
have unfettered right to contest elections; conversely, where incumbents
don’t run, violence becomes less likely.34
Increasing Cost of Financing Elections and Elective Politics
The increasing cost of financing African elections is another potential
threat to peacebuilding.35 Due to limited resources, African countries
have turned more and more to donor partners, especially Western part-
ners, to fund their elections. This trend raises stark questions about
resilience and sustainability: what happens if traditional funding streams
suddenly dry up? Will governments be more inclined to suspend or delay
elections, or indeed not have them at all? And what will be the conse-
quent impacts on peace and stability? Through logistics and (putative)
funding-related delays in holding scheduled elections over more than two
years, from 2016–2018, the government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC)36 was perhaps lucky to have escaped with only minor
eruptions of violence by discontented Congolese.
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It is not just the cost of the elections themselves that is problematic;
campaign financing can also seed security problems. The increasing cost of
electoral campaigns makes it difficult for opposition parties to compete on
a level playing field. Ruling parties and candidates often raid state coffers
to fund their campaigns; opposition parties might not be able to secure
private funding, owing to fears of the private sector, especially compa-
nies, that opportunities for business with the state will be closed if they
are found to be funding the opposition. Significantly, electoral politics in
much of Africa has become the sole preserve of the rich. A study in Ghana
revealed that around US $86,000 was spent on average by members of
parliament in their election campaigns.37 This is completely out of reach
for the vast majority of Africans, adding to concerns of inclusivity. If
money alienates ordinary Africans from electoral politics, this is bad for
peacebuilding in the long-term.
Africa needs to take a hard look at its electoral systems and decide
whether to encourage peace or promote division. The “winner-takes-all”
politics common across Africa are a significant trigger of election-related
conflict.38 Any system that encourages political exclusion, Gyampoh
argues, “can, potentially, jeopardize the fragile election peace.”39 Alter-
natives such as proportional representation have their own shortcomings,
but to the extent that proportional representation lessens the marginal-
ization of losers and spreads the benefits of victory more widely, it can
reduce the likelihood of elections undermining peace and peacebuilding.
Key Recommendations
Strengthening the integrity and quality of electoral processes in Africa
will contribute positively to peacebuilding. This requires a multifaceted
response on the part of local, national, and international stakeholders,
including organizations specializing in elections and democratic assistance
and consolidation. As part of this holistic response, four specific policy
recommendations are offered below.
1. Re-examine electoral laws in African Union-member countries.
There is a need to re-examine electoral laws in order to ensure that
these laws are in compliance with provisions in the African Union
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The
recurring challenge in deepening democratic governance in Africa
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has, generally, been the failure of African Union member coun-
tries to domesticate various protocols and charters to which they
are signatories. After three decades of operating transitional elec-
toral laws, there has yet to be an adequate sifting of the policies
and protocols which have worked from those that have not. The
reforms should address electoral processes as well as rules and legisla-
tion that promote a level playing field, reducing the unfair advantage
held by incumbents. Such a review must take into account gaps and
non-compliance that result in electoral disputes and litigations, as
well as a lack of transparency and inclusiveness. Given the regu-
larity of elections and their changing dynamics, Africa needs new
or updated mechanisms to address election-related threats to peace
and stability. Pro-democracy organizations working to strengthen
election management bodies should be at the forefront in engaging
with these growing threats.
2. Confront the challenges related to the growing use of technology in
the administration of elections. There is a critical need to stimu-
late global and continental discussions on emerging challenges to
election observers’ work in an era of technologically driven elec-
tion administration. Independent and non-partisan citizen election
observation groups, who are already incorporating information tech-
nology in their observation as well as international election observer
missions, must begin to find ways of including verification proto-
cols in electronic transmittal and collation of election results in their
observation programs. With increasing sophistication in election
administration, election observer groups must also align their proto-
cols to the emerging threats to election peace. “…like modern-day
police chasing cyber-thieves instead of masked bank robbers, inter-
national observers must adapt to new technologies.”40 Accordingly,
it may be prudent to review the Declaration of Global Principles
for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen
Organizations, and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Citizen Elec-
tion Observers and Monitors to take into account protocols for
addressing gaps in the more obscure aspects of election technology
processes, i.e., the back-end. By addressing this gap, the reports of
election observer groups will be more reliable and better received by
host countries. Creating spaces for observer groups to engage elec-
tion management bodies in this area of election administration is
critical for enhanced transparency, trust-building, and inclusiveness.
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3. Assure sustainable financing of elections. Stakeholders, especially
international democracy promoters, must engage on the issues of
financing. In order to forestall opportunities for leaders to use a
lack of resources as an excuse to suspend elections, it is impera-
tive to develop ways for instituting sustainable financing of elections.
Such mechanisms could include the establishment of national elec-
tion funds designed in a manner that the ruling government does
not have a say in its management. The policy response should also
include instituting predictable national and international sources
of funding, and accountable mechanisms to ensure transparent
and judicious use of resources for election administration. In this
instance, groups such as the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES), regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa,
the African Union Department of Political Affairs, and other global
democracy promoters must lead in advocating for such a fund.
Exploring ways to address sustainable financing of elections must
be accompanied by campaign finance reform to create a more level
playing field, and to assure inclusiveness and integrity of elections.
4. Counter the trend to eliminate presidential term limits. A conti-
nental and sub-regional response is required to address the trend
toward serving beyond constitutionally mandated presidential term
limits. This will require sustained, long-term advocacy from all
corners, but perhaps especially the African Union and the regional
economic communities. For instance, the Economic Community of
West Africa (ECOWAS) was close to instituting such a protocol for
its members but failed when two members, Togo and The Gambia,
objected to the decision.41 With the exit of president Yahya Jammeh
in The Gambia and the reforms that have occurred in Togo, there is
a window of opportunity for civil society actors to begin a campaign
for ECOWAS to revisit the subject.
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CHAPTER 11
Contributions of EarlyWarning to the African
Peace and Security Architecture: The
Experience of theWest Africa Network
for Peacebuilding (WANEP)
Chukwuemeka B. Eze and Osei Baffour Frimpong
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the peace and security environment
of Africa has been notably fragile. Throughout this 30-year period, the
continent has been burdened with myriad security threats. At its outset,
states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Rwanda,
and Burundi, to name only a few, descended into brutal intra-state
conflict. While these countries have emerged out of these conflicts and
embarked—however slowly or erratically—on a democratic path, the
nature of threats to security has oscillated from large-scale intra-state
C. B. Eze (B) · O. B. Frimpong




© The Author(s) 2021
T. McNamee and M. Muyangwa (eds.),
The State of Peacebuilding in Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_11
181
182 C. B. EZE AND O. B. FRIMPONG
conflicts to insurgencies by armed groups and transnational organized
syndicates, including human and drug trafficking and the proliferation
of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Equally alarming is the
convergence of terrorist and violent extremist groups into a new hybrid
threat that recognizes no borders. They continue to exploit weaknesses
and vulnerabilities of fragile states and conflict zones to unleash violence
against civilian populations, and seize and control territories to challenge
the legitimacy of the state. The consequences of these conflicts are evident
in a cocktail of humanitarian crises that continue to exacerbate the fragility
of states and human security on the continent.
The African Union (AU) established the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) to address a multitude of existing and emerging
security challenges facing the continent. Essentially, the APSA is premised
on preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa through the
African Union’s established institutions—the Peace and Security Council,
African Standby Force, Panel of the Wise, African Peace Fund, and
Continental Early Warning System.
Given the weaknesses in conflict early response mechanisms in states,
which have partly contributed to the continent’s susceptibility to conflicts,
the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the APSA was designed
to enhance anticipation, preparedness, and early response to conflicts
across Africa.1 Civil society organizations (CSOs) are recognized as
strategic partners in bolstering the operationalization of the continental
early warning systems at the regional and continental levels by providing
early warning analysis and sharing information relevant to the mitigation
of potential threats to peace and security.
It is against this background that the West Africa Network for Peace-
building (WANEP), through its strategic partnership with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU since 2002
and 2015, respectively, has been a key partner in developing and oper-
ationalizing conflict early warning systems to support peace and security
at the national, regional, and continental levels.2 Through the partner-
ship, WANEP has contributed to the operationalization of ECOWARN,
the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (WARN) which
covers all ECOWAS member states. The WARN works to enhance human
security in West Africa by monitoring and reporting socio-political situ-
ations that could degenerate into violent and destructive conflicts, and
to inform policymakers on options for response. Over the years, the
program has developed National Early Warning Systems (NEWS) in all
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of its national networks in West Africa to help strengthen ECOWARN
by providing more robust grassroots engagement and information into
the systems. Given WANEP’s years of partnership with ECOWAS and
the AU in the area of conflict early warning and peacebuilding interven-
tions in bolstering APSA, it is pertinent to bring such experiences into
the body of literature on peace and security in Africa. Importantly, there
are lessons to be drawn from the experiences of WANEP for Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) across the continent.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the post-Cold War security
context of Africa, highlighting the existing and emerging threats. The
second section highlights the APSA, with particular emphasis on the early
warning mechanisms and their utility in enhancing peace and security in
Africa. The third section assesses WANEP’s experiences in the area of
conflict early warning and its contribution to the APSA. As a corollary
to this, the lessons learned from WANEP’s experience are examined with
the view of promoting robust CSO partnerships with RECs. The final
section argues that in order for the APSA to realize the value of early
warning in peacebuilding, states, RECs, and the AU must strengthen and
sustain APSA’s partnership with civil society organizations as key agents
in developing and operationalizing conflict early warning interventions.
Overview of the Post-Cold War
Security Context of Africa
The security challenges facing Africa in the post-Cold War era are a
combination of old and new issues. Although there has been a consid-
erable decline in the number of armed conflicts, the underlying issues
that gave rise to a host of violent intra-state conflicts in the late 1980s
and the 1990s continue to prevail in parts of the continent.3 The chal-
lenges of exclusion, marginalization, inequality, and the weakening of
the state through corruption, nepotism, patrimonialism, and clientelism
remain key drivers of insecurity in Africa.4 In this regard, some contempo-
rary threats are actually old issues under new labels. The end of the Cold
War unleashed a number of factors that have underpinned insecurity on
the continent. Prominent among them was a shift in superpower interests,
which resulted in changes in policies that had promoted and preserved
repression, exclusion, and dictatorships in several developing countries.5
This rendered erstwhile military dictators susceptible to internal contes-
tations over their legitimacy.6 Greater external support for democracy
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promotion, easy access to SALW, as well as enhanced interconnected-
ness between individuals and communities facilitated by globalization,
provided the impetus for discontented groups to organize themselves and
demand change through various means, including the use of force.7
These factors unleashed an unprecedented surge in intra-state armed
conflicts in the region. In addition to old threats, many new threats have
been occasioned by advancements in technology, increased mobility of
persons, proliferation and movements of arms, religious and ethnic mili-
tancy, as well as global climate change. The spread of violent extremism
and transnational organized criminal networks has become acute, espe-
cially in the Sahel, East Africa, and West Africa. In Nigeria, a previously
latent Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram, has exploited the chal-
lenges of weak state capacity to gain notoriety as one of the most violent
extremist groups in the world. Boko Haram and its faction, the Islamic
State West Africa Province (ISWAP), pose a grave threat to human secu-
rity and stability in that region. Since Mali’s independence in 1960, a
series of armed insurgencies have been launched by Tuaregs—a politi-
cally and economically marginalized group—in the northern part of the
country. As an ethnic group with a pastoralist lifestyle who are found in
the Saharan parts of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya, the
Tuaregs have been able to mobilize such affinal relations to confront the
central government in Bamako in their bid to establish a separate state.8
Since 2012, Tuareg secessionists have been joined by extremists claiming
to wage jihad for the creation of an Islamic state in northern Mali, where
arms, drugs, hostage-taking, and human trafficking have become a source
income for criminal networks.9
The fall of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011 led to a constel-
lation of challenges that have added to the insecurity and instability in
Mali and the Sahel, in general. It has provided the impetus for a host
of armed groups, mercenaries, terrorist, and violent extremist groups
including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, Ansaru, and Al Mourabitoun,
further compounding insecurity in the Sahel. The spillover effect of secu-
rity fragility in northern Mali is manifesting in extremist and armed attacks
in neighboring Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.10
Porous borders have also facilitated smuggling of SALW, human
and narcotics trafficking, and illegal immigration on an unprecedented
scale. The influx of SALW, in particular, has been fueling ever-more
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violent actions by local armed groups, mercenaries, and bandits, causing
enormous human security challenges.11
Furthermore, election-related violence has increasingly become a
prominent threat to stability in most of Africa’s nascent democracies.
While elections are a key driver of democracy and good governance, the
exigencies of power contestations coupled with electoral irregularities,
continue to ignite animosities, tensions, and violence across Africa.
Farmer-herder conflict is another threat to peace and security in the
West African sub-region. Though the phenomenon is not new in the secu-
rity environment, it remains protracted, often unleashing tensions and
violence between pastoralists and farmers in communities. Farming and
herding activities are complementary and, together, they have constituted
the basis of the economy of most states in the region for many centuries.12
Yet climate change has led to droughts, floods, and warming that has
contributed to a significant reduction in resources such as water, land, and
food, which support livelihoods in communities. This, in turn, has led
to increased competition that often triggers ethnic and intercommunity
violence.13
The African Peace and Security Architecture:
Early Warning and Conflict Prevention
Owing to its realization of the importance of proactive measures to
confront Africa’s diverse security challenges, the AU, in Article 12 of
its Peace and Security protocol, provided for the establishment of a
Conflict Early Warning (CEWS).14 The CEWS is responsible for facili-
tating the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and works closely with
regional organizations to gather early warning information which is then
submitted to the situation room at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.15 Operationalization of CEWS is achieved through collabora-
tion with the early warning elements of the eight AU RECs, with each
REC using conflict indicators premised on the peace and security context
in its region.
However, in terms of the development of early warning, the various
RECs are not at the same level. So far, ECOWAS and the Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development (IGAD) operate with data collection
and analysis, which feed into the AU’s CEWS for response strategies,
while other RECs are still in the process of creating mechanisms for imple-
mentation.16 In addition, there are also differences in the implementation
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of conflict early warning at the regional level. IGAD’s early warning, for
example, operates as an open information center while SADC’s National
Early Warning System (NEWC) is highly linked with the intelligence
community within the region,17 making the latter more state-centric.
There are also variations in focus. Whereas ECOWAS places a heavy
emphasis on human security through a broad range of thematic areas,
SADC, on the other hand, focuses on threats emanating from socio-
economic dynamics. Similarly, IGAD’s early warning system, CEWARN,
is mandated to mitigate escalation of violent conflicts, especially cross-
border pastoral conflicts, through collaboration with established national
early warning systems, while the East African Community (EAC) looks at
security among member states, inter-state defense, intra-state conflicts,
poverty, and issues arising from the sharing of cross-border natural
resources, among others.18
Another integral element of CEWS is preventive diplomacy. Despite
the challenges associated with its early response to some conflict situa-
tions, preventive diplomacy has been utilized by both the AU and RECs
as a tool for intervening in conflicts, including election-related instability
in Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008.
Recognizing the imperative of non-state actors in developing and
operationalizing early warning, Article 12 (3) of the AU’s Peace and
Security protocol calls for collaboration between RECs and CSOs in
early warning activities.19 Rarely is the need for cooperation with NGOs
expressed so explicitly in official policy. Accordingly, IGAD relies on field
monitors and local NGOs in pastoralist communities for early warning
information.20 In a similar vein, ECOWAS, through its Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with WANEP, relies on early warning informa-
tion and data analysis from the latter, amongst other sources, to respond
to threats to security in various parts of the region. Through its part-
nership with WANEP, ECOWARN relies on open source information,
focusing on human security. ECOWARN consists of an Observation and
Monitoring Centre (OMC) based at the Early Warning Directorate at
the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, Nigeria and National Early Warning
Centers currently in the process of being deployed to replace the original
four Zonal Bureaus in Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia, and The Gambia.
Each zone generates daily peace and security reports emanating from
WANEP’s Community Monitors to the OMC. WANEP’s Peace Moni-
toring Centre (PMC), in collaboration with the OMC, is responsible for
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collating and analyzing the early warning reports from Community Moni-
tors before transmission to the President of ECOWAS for consideration
and intervention.
ECOWAS’s ability to foster strategic partnerships and cooperation
with WANEP as a key agent of a sub-regional early warning system
has contributed to making ECOWAS’s early warning one of the
most comprehensive and integrated systems for conflict prevention and
management on the African continent.21
WANEP’s Early Warning Contributions
to Peace and Security in West Africa
Beyond WANEP’s collaboration with ECOWAS in the area of conflict
data gathering, analysis, and reporting into ECOWARN, there are several
conflict early warning intervention programs and activities aimed at
enhancing peace and security in West Africa and, thereby, contributing
to the APSA at the regional level.
Through its MOU with ECOWAS and the AU, WANEP has institu-
tionalized NEWS in almost all ECOWAS countries. This regional reach
plays a key role in determining threats to security, analyzing them, and
providing recommendations for early response and mitigation. Moreover,
WANEP’s comprehensive array of early warning and response reports—
situation reports, thematic reports, policy briefs, quarterly reports, and
yearly security projections for West Africa—continue to influence national
and regional responses and mitigation of threats to security.
WANEP also provides technical support for community peacebuilding
through the institutionalization of dialogue, mediation, and strength-
ening of existing traditional peacebuilding infrastructure in communities
across the region. This helps to increase resilience against threats to peace
and security and promotes local community ownership in peacebuilding
in states within the region. In this regard, WANEP has been building the
capacity of stakeholders in farmer-herder conflicts through dialogue and
mediation in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger. Addition-
ally, WANEP supports national infrastructures for peace, especially the
National Peace Councils (NPCs) in Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone through capacity-building and collaborative peace projects. The
NPCs have become a model for enhancing national resilience and are
being replicated in other West African countries.
Democratic transitions remain a challenge to peace and stability across
West Africa. Given the enormously high stakes involved in Africa’s
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“winner-takes-all” elections, electoral periods are often characterized by
deep tensions, occasioning fears for life and property among the popu-
lace. In response, WANEP developed the Election Monitoring, Analysis
and Mitigation program (E-MAM) to support regional and states’ efforts
to mitigate electoral violence. E-MAM monitors, analyzes, and reports
on election-related violence in order to enable early response, and works
to harness and develop local capacity for averting election violence.
The program further enables ECOWAS and WANEP to gain access to
community-based conflict information which is necessary for conflict
prevention but was hitherto uncollected and unreported.
The program is currently implemented in all 15 ECOWAS member
states to support the peaceful conduct of elections. In Côte d’Ivoire,
for instance, WANEP, in support of the Ministry of Interior, trained
and deployed over 2,000 monitors and observers across the country
to provide incidence reports at polling centers during the 2015 elec-
tion.22 An Election Situation Room (ESR) was also set up to support
the ECOWAS Election Observation Mission to serve as an information
management center to disseminate reports to stakeholders on poten-
tial threats. Similarly, in Nigeria, WANEP’s E-MAM project created a
space for validation of specific election violence and hotspot-mapping of
potential risk areas across all 36 states in the country ahead of the 2019
elections.23 Since its inception, E-MAM has contributed to enhancing
local community ownership of peacebuilding and supporting existing
local infrastructure for peace. A notable example is WANEP’s support to
Ghana’s National Peace Council (NPC) in the area of preventing election
violence.
WANEP designed the capacity-building project on dispute manage-
ment for Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in West Africa to boost
effective electoral dispute resolution. Participants from both Anglo-
phone and Francophone countries including Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Benin have benefited from the
program.24
In response to growing violent extremism as well as increased exploita-
tion of children and youth, WANEP initiated peace education to inculcate
the culture of non-violence, co-existence, tolerance, and respect for diver-
sity. The program focuses on children and young people both in the
formal and informal education sector to strengthen community resilience
across the region. It also engages teaching and non-teaching staff as
well as other duty bearers in communities—chiefs, elders, religious, and
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opinion leaders, as well as family members—in the training of young
people and children through dialogue and mediation clubs in schools and
communities. In collaboration with governments, WANEP has also devel-
oped contextualized peace education curricula and teaching manuals and
guides.
Of particular note is the incorporation of strategies for Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) into peace education curriculum for schools in
Nigeria and the Sahel. The CVE curriculum seeks to educate a critical
mass of resilient citizens who can participate in the sustainable devel-
opment of the Sahel region and Nigeria through good citizenship and
contributions to the fight against violent extremism.25 The peace educa-
tion program in the Sahel also adopts a community mobilizing approach
to achieve better social cohesion and resilience. WANEP has trained over
200 teachers in the application of the peace education manual and the
establishment of peer mediation clubs.26 Peer mediators have also expe-
rienced positive changes in their own lives,27 and aggressiveness and
bullying among students have reduced.28
Lobbying, advocacy, and sensitization are also pronounced in the non-
formal approach WANEP adopts in its quest to create a broader space for
youth engagement in decision-making at the community, national, and
regional levels. This is aimed at bridging the chasm between youth and
decision-making processes in their communities and mitigating intergen-
erational conflicts. Over time, this has helped integrate the “youth factor”
into emerging discourses on peace and security in West Africa, as well as
national and regional policies.29
In line with the growing recognition of the centrality of women to
African peace and security, WANEP works through the Women in Peace-
building Network (WIPNET) and West Africa Peacebuilding Institute
(WAPI) programs to enhance the role and capacity of women in peace-
building. It also supports the ECOWAS Gender Directorate in line with
the Women, Peace, and Security component of the ECOWAS Conflict
Prevention Framework (EPF). The program was instrumental in mobi-
lizing Liberian women as a pressure group to force the warring parties
into signing a peace agreement in Accra during the ECOWAS-led medi-
ation process. The WIPNET initiative also preceded the UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, demonstrating the flexibility and
foresight of CSOs in promoting women’s participation in conflict reso-
lution and peacebuilding. However, not all ECOWAS members have
developed National Action Plans (NAPs) and strategies for effective
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implementation of UNSCR 1325.30 It has been noted that a lack of
political will and technical know-how are some of the impediments
confronting the development of the NAPs. In this regard, and in collab-
oration with the ECOWAS Gender Directorate as well as the Women,
Peace and Security Institute (WPSI) of the Kofi Annan International
Peacebuilding Training Centre (KAIPTC), WANEP developed guidelines
for the development and implementation of NAPs on UNSCR 1325 and
Related Resolutions in October 2012.31 WANEP has also developed indi-
cators in its early warning systems to monitor, report, and analyze various
threats to security of women and children, which helps inform peace-
building interventions at the national and regional levels. This contributes
to filling the gaps in ECOWARN, which does not have specific indicators
for the security of women.
More collaborative research is key to bridging the gaps between peace-
building and policy-making, which has limited the effectiveness of early
warning and conflict prevention across the continent. New platforms for
engagement have been established with the University of Ghana, Univer-
sity of Ibadan, University of Cape Coast, KAIPTC, Ghana Centre for
Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and the African Peacebuilding
Network (APN) of the Social Sciences Research Council, but more
are needed to better understand and develop best practice in African
peacebuilding.
The post-Cold War security environment of Africa continues to be
dogged by varied threats. As noted at the beginning of this chapter,
these threats are a mixed bag of old and new, but often the underlying
causes of instability are the same. Governments and RECs need to do
more to foster the key partnerships which allow CEWS to effectively
respond and mitigate threats to peace and security at the local, national
and international levels on the continent.
Key Recommendations
1. Mend the gap between early warning and early response. The
persistent chasm between early warning and early response is one of
the key lessons emerging out of WANEP’s relatively short history.
The effectiveness of a conflict early warning system is contingent on
its capacity to anticipate real or imagined threats and inform appro-
priate institutions for early response and mitigation. However, this
remains a challenge for CSOs operating in political environments
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where power and decision-making are often viewed in zero-sum
terms, and political calculations and sensitivities get in the way of
action. Too often, early warning is not acted upon until it is too
late.
2. Motivate and sustain the ground-level elements of early warning
systems. As WANEP’s experience has shown, effective early warning
must be a “bottom up approach” whereby the community is
engaged. Efforts should be made to link community to the state
and regional elements of early warning in a more systemic way.
Too often, the community level is under-resourced with many at
this level serving as volunteers. The lack of funding at the commu-
nity level often disempowers locals and limits the consistency of
reporting incidents and evolving situations. Given that data is key to
the effectiveness of early warning, this undermines the effectiveness
of Africa’s early warning systems.
3. Ensure regular and long-term funding for early warning.
Funding has also been problematic insofar as it is mostly from
external donors. Too often, the funds are short-term and limited in
scope, and donors tend to demand results within unrealistic time-
frames. More should be done to engage the African local private
sector in supporting early warning in particular, and peacebuilding
activities in general.
4. Address the gender and youth dimensions of peacebuilding, and
mainstream peace education in national curricula. Gender, age,
education, marriage, and access to resources all play a critical
role in how power is distributed and performed at all levels of
society. Despite the political rhetoric, patriarchy and the geronto-
cratic nature of politics at the local, national, and regional levels,
continue to hinder the participation of women and youth in peace-
building activities in Africa. African governments should develop,
implement, and report out on the development and implementation
of their National Action Plans in support of UN Resolution 1325.
Furthermore, more must be done to mainstream peace education in
national curricula across Africa in order to advance a strong culture
of peace.
5. Enhance collaboration among regional civil society organizations
and regional economic communities. Collaboration is essential to
effective early warning and peacebuilding activities. But different,
and at times competing, objectives among CSOs has limited their
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cooperation, and thus weakened CSOs various platforms for engage-
ment in peacebuilding. In addition, more could be done to enhance
CSO collaboration with regional economic communities.
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PART III
Regional and International Dimensions
of Peacebuilding
CHAPTER 12
The African Union in Peacebuilding in Africa
Gilbert M. Khadiagala
Introduction
Since the late 1990s, peacebuilding in Africa has evolved alongside
measures to strengthen continental and regional institutions for interven-
tion in the domestic affairs of member states. Marking a decisive departure
from decades where African institutions had limited roles in such inter-
ventions, these initiatives coincided with the growing optimism about the
power of African institutions to help post-conflict countries to reconstruct
their socioeconomic and political fabrics. In almost 20 years of engage-
ments, the African Union (AU) has had a mixed record in peacebuilding
in Africa.
On one hand, the AU has innovated by articulating and defining
policies to underwrite peacebuilding initiatives, notably the African Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy. Also, through
the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AU has inter-
vened in some post-conflict countries to help contribute to sustainable
peace and development. On the other hand, the AU is a new actor in
peacebuilding and thus has not had any tangible successes. For the most
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part, the AU has struggled with limited resources, expertise, and capacity
to become an effective peacebuilding institution. In addition, the peace-
building environment is saturated with multiple actors and interests that
the AU cannot adequately compete with. In recent years, these constraints
have been compounded by a resurgence of conflicts in some countries
that benefitted from previous peacebuilding interventions. This has, in
effect, diminished the consensus about the wisdom of peacebuilding and
retarded the momentum for mobilization of resources for countries in
conflicts.
This chapter weaves these themes in a narrative of Africa’s attempts
to build institutions of peace, security, governance, and post-conflict
recovery from the early 1990s into the AU’s articulation of the PCRD
policy targeted at peacebuilding. I argue that while the AU has made
bold moves to construct normative frameworks to strengthen common
approaches to African conflicts, these efforts have yet to find critical reso-
nance in contexts marked by the age-old fealty to sovereignty. There is a
continental consensus on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction
that has emerged out of years of AU activism and institution-building, but
it has not led to substantive shifts in state practices, limiting the effective-
ness of continental and regional institutions in these domains. Equally
vital, sustainable peacebuilding ultimately hinges on national governance
systems led by responsible and accountable leaders who are able to
initiate and galvanize policies that address the myriad drivers of conflicts,
including preventing the relapse into violence. The next section briefly
discusses the formative debates on peacebuilding in Africa, followed by
an examination of the AU’s key institutions for peace and security since
its formation in 2002. In section three, the analysis will focus on the
African experiences of peacebuilding before the formation of the AU as
a lead-up to a discussion on the PCRD policy. Finally, I will make some
recommendations relating to the future role of the AU in peacebuilding.
Understanding Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding is a key concept in the reconstruction of states emerging
from conflicts. From this perspective, it is inseparable from post-conflict
reconstruction because it captures the whole array of activities and
initiatives associated with state- and nation-building in the aftermath
of civil wars.1 Popularized in the early 1990s by the UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding was
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conceptualized as the penultimate phase in a series of intervention
moments including conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.
As outlined in the report, the international community sought to:
Identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict
and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before
violence results; where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed
at resolving the issues that have led to conflict; through peace-keeping, to
work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and
to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers; to stand
ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts: rebuilding the
institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and
building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
and in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic
despair, social injustice and political oppression.2
Framed as a comprehensive repertoire of engagements in the service
of peace, security, governance, and development, peacebuilding was
conceived to assist countries that were widely depicted as failed states.3 In
this regard, for countries recovering from conflict, peacebuilding became
a linear and natural extension of peacemaking and peacekeeping, in
essence, pegging the fortunes of peacebuilding on the prior interven-
tion processes. Thus, in most post-conflict countries, the energies and
resources expended in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, to a large
extent, determined the successes of peacebuilding. In the early 1990s, for
instance, hastily negotiated peace processes resulted in weak peace agree-
ments that the parties could not implement despite the intervention of
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. Similarly, despite the UN’s
experiment in nation-building in Somalia, these efforts collapsed in part
because of the failures of both peacekeeping and peacemaking.
The other critical factor in the formative debates about peacebuilding
was the division of labor between international and national/local actors.
The Agenda for Peace envisioned profound roles for the UN and the
broader international community in steering war-torn states to recovery.
Often these actors had significant roles in providing resources for peace-
making and peacekeeping where they were needed most. But despite the
engagement of international actors in peacebuilding, such as the estab-
lishment in 2005 of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, there were
expectations that national and local actors would gradually take more
leadership in post-conflict reconstruction because these are long-term
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engagements that require national ownership, capacity, and responsibility.
As the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee stated in May 2007:
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of
lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at
all levels of conflict management and to lay the foundation for sustain-
able peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent
and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and,
therefore, relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above
objectives.4
In recognition, therefore, of the adage that nations are built from
within, and not from outside, some analysts depicted sustainable peace-
building as limited and time-bound to permit local actors the space to
strengthen local ownership.5 In practice, also, the most successful post-
conflict reconstruction efforts were those in which international actors
gradually exited from peacebuilding initiatives. By contrast, the least
successful cases have been where countries have lapsed back into conflict
or where long-running peacekeeping missions such as in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have transitioned into peacebuilding
activities.6
African Initiatives Toward
Peacebuilding: From the OAU to the AU
Owing to the multiplicity of conflicts that ensued since the 1980s, Africa
made momentous contributions to the articulation and elaboration of
norms that have become part of contemporary international conventions
and protocols.7 The civil conflicts in Chad and Uganda in the 1980s and
Rwanda in the early 1990s led to novel experiments in intervention by
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and neighboring countries to
make peace and restore stability. These interventions brought pressure on
the OAU to rethink the long-held commitment to sovereignty and non-
interference, culminating in the OAU’s decision in Cairo, Egypt, in June
1993 to establish a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Prevention. The Cairo Mechanism enabled the Secretary-General to
be proactive in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in war-
torn countries. In this respect, the Secretary-General was required to
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“resort to eminent African personalities in consultation with the Author-
ities in their countries of origin. Where necessary, he may make use of
other relevant expertise, send special envoys or special representatives as
well as dispatch fact-finding missions to conflict areas.”8 Like the Cairo
Mechanism, which marked a critical moment in establishing the basis for
intervention in domestic affairs, the OAU’s Lomé Declaration of 2000
inaugurated the principle that prohibited unconstitutional changes in
government, a norm that has since formed the basis for democratization
and constitutional rule in Africa.
Both norms were further solidified in the 2002 AU Constitutive Act
which defines its roles in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.9
Although the AU still retains the sovereignty of member states as one of
its founding principles, it reserves the right of intervention in member
states under Article 4(h) in the case of “grave circumstance, namely:
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”10 Under Article
30, the AU is obliged to impose sanctions on a member state where
there has been an unconstitutional change of government. These articles
capture the principle of non-indifference, which justifies the AU’s funda-
mental roles in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Overall,
since its formation, the AU has attempted to become the major fulcrum
for the promotion of accelerated socio-economic integration, security
and stability initiatives, greater respect for human rights, and democ-
racy in very difficult circumstances where the AU is still trying to find
its institutional feet and legitimacy.11
In the pursuit of common approaches to African problems, the
AU created two main institutions for peacebuilding and post-conflict
reconstruction which form part of the African Peace and Security Archi-
tecture (APSA): first, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), charged
with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability, antic-
ipating conflicts and undertaking preventative diplomacy, and making
peace through the use of mediation and conciliation. The PSC has the
additional responsibilities for peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction,
humanitarian action, and disaster management. Second, APSA comprises
a Continental Early Warning System for conflict prevention, the Panel of
the Wise (a group of leaders who intervene to mediate conflicts), the
African Standby Force (ASF) for peacekeeping purposes, and a Peace
Fund, a facility to provide resources for peace support activities.12
Although the AU was established as the primary institution respon-
sible for peace and security, the enormity of peacebuilding roles and the
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constraints it faces propelled other continental, regional, and multilateral
institutions to remain relevant in peacebuilding. The New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is a crucial program of the AU in tackling
socio-economic and political factors that contribute to conflict and insta-
bility. NEPAD is also tasked with supporting post-conflict reconstruction
through the mobilization of resources for the AU Peace Fund. The
other African actors are the Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
which the AU has engaged in peace and security issues because of
proximity to post-conflict countries and their experiences in conflict
management peace initiatives. At the continental level, the African Devel-
opment Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UNECA) have contributed ideas and resources in peacebuilding.
Similarly, bilateral and multilateral donor institutions occupy distinctive
spaces in the multiple activities embodied in peacebuilding.13
Because of the involvement of many actors in peacebuilding, the AU
has confronted a competitive and crowded environment that is replete
with both opportunities and constraints. As it has gradually defined its
peacebuilding posture, the AU is slowly starting to appreciate forging
collaborations with NEPAD, AfDB, UNECA, and RECs to be effec-
tive.14 As a new institution in a field in which it has limited experience
or clout, the AU is still grappling with questions about the division of
labor between it and other African institutions. These dilemmas are even
more heightened with respect to the AU’s relationships with bilateral and
multilateral donors that are oftentimes characterized by both competition
and complementarity. Ultimately, decisions about when and how the AU
engages with international donors in peacebuilding are dependent on the
comparative strengths and resources it can bring to specific post-conflict
contexts.
Peacebuilding Before the African Post-Conflict
Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy
Before the formation of the AU, two dominant trends characterized
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa.15 The first could
be labeled as the “victor’s peace,”16 drawing from the experiences of
Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Angola where strong leaders
who had triumphed in the civil wars set the pace of reconstruction with
the support of multilateral and bilateral donors. In Uganda, after seizing
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power in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Move-
ment (NRM) instituted a non-partisan coalition of forces that launched a
remarkable process of national rejuvenation and led multiple reforms to
resuscitate the economy and legitimate his authority.17
Eritrea and Ethiopia followed Uganda’s reconstruction model after the
end of the civil conflict in the early 1990s. In both countries, strong
parties that had prosecuted the war—the Eritrean People’s Liberation
Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF)—emerged as the primary players in economic and polit-
ical reconstruction.18 In post-genocide Rwanda, Paul Kagame’s Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a reconstruction process that borrowed
largely from the Eritrea-Ethiopia-Uganda template: rebuilding state insti-
tutions and economic, social, and infrastructural reforms.19 Like the
previous cases, Rwanda’s post-conflict reconstruction was dominated by
a strong leader who has garnered legitimacy through the incremental
improvement in social and economic conditions and the generosity of
international donors who considered President Kagame as representing
the new generation of African leader determined to build strong and
functional states. In 2002, Angola, which had struggled for decades
to find peace and stability, embarked on the process of reconstruction
and reconciliation following the killing of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), by the
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Subsequently,
the MPLA dictated the pace of post-reconstruction unimpeded.20
The second pattern could be depicted as “democratic peacebuilding,”
represented by Mozambique’s post-conflict reconstruction. Mozam-
bique’s experience of post-conflict reconstruction involved a relatively
open and participatory trajectory after the civil war. Following the holding
of the first multi-party elections in 1994, the former protagonists—
FRELIMO and RENAMO—steadily learned to accommodate each other
as they started on the road to economic reconstruction and social reha-
bilitation. Although Mozambique faced the resurgence of violence in
2013–2014 because of RENAMO’s resumption of the war, the two
sides have managed to return to the compromises of the mid-1990s to
reinvigorate reconciliation.21 However, in recent years, a new source of
Islamist insurgency in Northern Mozambique has arisen to compromise
the post-conflict gains of peace and stability.22
Most of the countries transiting from war in the early to mid-2000s
such as Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic
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Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan
emulated the Mozambique model as they went through the various
stages from peacemaking, peacekeeping, and eventually, peacebuilding
that emphasized the importance of democratic institutions in the transi-
tions. Other than the participation of RECs and the AU in peacemaking
and peacekeeping initiatives in these countries, the AU had few opportu-
nities to influence their post-conflict futures, ceding these responsibilities
to the AfDB and other international donors. These latter actors could
mobilize the financial and technical resources to make a difference
in peacebuilding. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the AU through the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lent broad
legitimacy to the international efforts for stabilization and economic
reconstruction. After the formation of the UN Peacebuilding Commis-
sion in 2005, Burundi and Sierra Leone became its first African partners,
signaling the enhanced role of international actors in peacebuilding. In
both countries, alongside the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and other donors, the UN Peacebuilding Commission imple-
mented a number of projects meant to consolidate peace, build local
capacity to manage conflicts, and prevent the recurrence of conflicts. Simi-
larly, when the CAR appeared to be on the road to stability following
the elections of 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Commission invited it as
a partner in 2008 to mobilize resources for economic development and
national reconciliation.
The only major initiative that the AU attempted on post-conflict
reconstruction was in July 2003 when the AU Commission established
a Ministerial Committee on Sudan in anticipation of the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and South. Chaired
by South Africa, the Committee was mandated to consult with the
government of Sudan and the South Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment (SPLM) on post-conflict reconstruction and development needs and
to mobilize African and international resources. But this committee did
not make any progress in its resource mobilization campaigns.
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy
Soon after its formation in 2002, the AU charged NEPAD with the
mandate of drafting a post-conflict policy to guide African interventions.
The quandary for the drafters must have been that since the 1990s,
African regional institutions had largely been marginal in peacebuilding
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initiatives as various post-conflict countries engaged international donors
in economic and political reconstruction. What meaningful contribution
would the AU then be expected to make in post-conflict reconstruc-
tion in circumstances where it had no prior proficiency, capacity, and
resources? Moreover, since there were two previous dominant patterns of
post-conflict reconstruction, what would be preferable for Africa’s future?
Since the policy was unveiled in 2006, these questions have remained
salient in its implementation.
In an attempt to chart a different course from the linear and sequenced
intervention model found in the Agenda for Peace, the PCRD sought a
comprehensive approach to embrace a wide range of peacebuilding inter-
ventions and initiatives.23 In the articulation of the policy, the AU estab-
lished links between peace, security, humanitarianism, and development.
As stated in the preamble of the PCRD:
As the custodian of peace and security on the continent, the AU is obli-
gated to generate a strategic framework for PCRD that is aligned to the
African vision and aspirations. Furthermore, given the complexity of post-
conflict reconstruction initiatives, it elaborates in a comprehensive manner
the entire spectrum of activity areas that are crucial for the consolidation
of peace, and stipulates minimum standards of application and bench-
marks for measuring performance of countries that are on their path to
recovery.24 As a policy framework it provides a model that is adapted to
specific country situations, and because of its reflection of African needs
and aspirations, it will empower and encourage affected countries to take
the lead in the reconstruction and development of their societies.25
Toward this end, the policy seeks to: (i) help address the root causes
of conflict; (ii) encourage the planning and implementation of recon-
struction activities; and (iii) enhance complementarities and coordination
among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes. Some of its under-
lying principles include African leadership, national and local ownership,
and capacity-building for sustainability. Although seeking to carve out
a distinctive policy, however, the PCRD’s six main areas of concerns
are indistinguishable from conventional approaches to peacebuilding
including: (a) restoration of security; (b) managing of political transitions;
(c) socioeconomic development; (d) human rights, justice, and recon-
ciliation; and (e) women and youth.26 With respect to the critical issue
of resources for post-conflict reconstruction, the PCRD suggested more
African contributions to PCRD initiatives and the establishment of a joint
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AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit to coordinate donor
disbursements to PCRD programs. The Unit would also undertake advo-
cacy and develop post-conflict reconstruction programs in partnership
with RECs, civil society, and other intergovernmental organizations.27
Following the launch of the PCRD, the AU’s engagement in post-
conflict countries did not change dramatically, reflecting the preference
for peacemaking and peacekeeping engagements rather than peace-
building. The dominant approach to post-conflict reconstruction has been
the establishment of liaison offices in countries emerging from conflict.
By 2016, there were 16 such offices in countries including Burundi,
Côte d’Ivoire, the CAR, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan, and Madagascar.
As Chido Mutangadura has noted, “these offices have been criticized for
having little impact, especially as they lack the capacity to effectively coor-
dinate the AU’s goals on the ground and link them to decisions made
in Addis Ababa.”28 In South Sudan and Madagascar, the AU liaison
offices did not have the resources or diplomatic clout to influence the
course of events and thus amount to no more than post offices for
the AU.29 In West Africa, ECOWAS has been the AU’s principal entry
point in resolving conflicts in Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea, and
Guinea-Bissau, but both ECOWAS and the AU have had no roles in the
post-conflict reconstruction phase.30
Although the adoption of the PCRD policy in 2006 represented a
major milestone in AU efforts to coordinate and support peacebuilding
efforts, enormous organizational and operational hurdles, insufficient
human and financial resources, and lack of political interest by the
majority of member states have compromised effective implementation.
Since its formation, the PCRD has been manned by one full-time indi-
vidual working within the AU Peace and Security Department (AU PSD).
In recent years, the AU has indicated the need to create an interdepart-
mental task force on PCRD in the AU PSD, but this office has yet to
be created. To break the stalemate over the management of the PCRD,
the Egyptian government agreed to establish an AU Center for PCRD
in February 2019.31 It is not yet clear how the new AU Center will
coordinate its roles with the AU institutions in Addis Ababa. One of the
major complaints about the PCRD is that it has not sufficiently reached
out to other AU organs such as the Departments of Political, Social, and
Economic Affairs or RECs. Locating the new AU Center in Cairo is going
to make it much more difficult to accomplish this objective.32
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To mobilize African resources, the AU launched the African Solidarity
Initiative (ASI) in July 2012 with a call to encourage African countries
to assist post-conflict countries in their reconstruction and development
efforts. At its launch, member countries, the AfDB, and the UNECA
lauded the ASI optimistically as a unique vehicle for resource mobiliza-
tion and its potential to promote peer learning and sharing best practices
among post-conflict countries, but it never emerged as a credible initiative
to meet the needs of the PCRD. In February 2014, South Africa’s then-
President Jacob Zuma hosted the first conference of the ASI at which
African countries pledged a paltry US $3 million for PCRD activities,
reflecting the lack of political will for PCRD.33 This amount contrasts
sharply with the AfDB’s Fragile States Facility (now Transition Support
Facility) created in 2008, with a budget of US $600 million to provide
reconstruction funds to beneficiary countries, including Liberia, Sierra
Leone, the DRC, the CAR, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and
South Sudan.
Lacking any meaningful resources, the AU only managed to undertake
assessment missions to the CAR (2006), Liberia and Sierra Leone (2009),
the DRC and Burundi (2010), and South Sudan (2011) to ascertain the
post-conflict demands of these countries. Further, to support the PCRD,
the AU raised some funds to support Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and
“peace-strengthening projects” at the community level in the Comoros,
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. In 2017, the AU
noted as one of its achievements, the development of operational guide-
lines for the adoption of the PCRD at regional and national levels, the
creation of a database of African experts on PCRD, and the establishment
of an AU Standing Multi-dimensional Committee on PCRD.34
The PCRD’s resource limitations have reinforced its organizational,
operational, and capacity deficits and contributed to the widespread
African skepticism about its utility. This skepticism is captured in
comments by two African analysts. According to Tim Murithi: “Even
though the PCRD exists, it is, however, unclear whether the AU/NEPAD
will be able to mobilize their resources and build the capacity to undertake
peace-building effectively.”35 In the same vein, Richard Gueli suggested:
“The inconvenient truth is that even if the AU did prepare a plan for
rebuilding a country, international aid agencies would probably ignore
it… In short, the AU wants ownership of reconstruction processes,
yet few, if any, African governments are doing anything to challenge
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the factors that perpetuate the donor domination of the development
agenda.”36
The 10th anniversary of the PCRD in October 2016 coincided with
the relapse into conflicts of countries that had made steady strides in
peacebuilding such as Mali, the CAR, and South Sudan raising profound
questions about the lack of progress in the implementation of the PCRD
policy. At the meeting, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security,
Smail Chergui, acknowledged the capacity deficits “ranging from plan-
ning and conceptualization of projects and programmes, to the execution,
monitoring and evaluation at national and regional levels.”37 Most partic-
ipants decried the AU’s failure to leverage the work of bodies such as the
AfDB and the UN Peacebuilding Commission that have more experi-
ence and resources to pursue post-conflict reconstruction and called for
more coherence among the various entities of the AU with the relevant
expertise in PCRD.38
A more recent innovation that seeks to inject momentum in the PCRD
is the deployment of an African Union Technical Support Team to The
Gambia (AUTSTG) to help the country’s democratic transition following
the ouster of long-time authoritarian leader, Yahya Jammeh. Although
not technically a post-conflict country, the AU launched the AUTSTG in
2018 to provide expertise to the government on the rule of law, democ-
racy, transitional justice, and security sector transformation.39 Unlike the
AU liaison offices which are staffed by diplomats, the ten technical experts
in the AUTSTG are seconded from AU member states and work directly
with government ministries to build capacity in their respective areas.
While this intervention potentially marks a vital departure in efforts to
implement the PCRD, there are still lingering questions about its sustain-
ability given the uncertainties in funding and the receptiveness of the
Gambian government officials to African expert entreaties.
Key Recommendations
1. National ownership of peacebuilding is essential. It is worth reit-
erating that peacebuilding starts and ends at national levels, with
international and continental actors playing only supportive roles.
The most successful experiences of peacebuilding in Africa reveal
that while societies emerging out of armed conflicts face tremen-
dous obstacles in reducing polarization, creative efforts by national
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leaders in building governance systems that are inclusive, participa-
tory, and restore trust across communities are necessary for laying
the foundations for regeneration and recovery. The primary respon-
sibility of post-conflict reconstruction and development is, therefore,
that of national governments, that must identify priorities, formu-
late strategies, and implement programs and activities to provide the
conditions necessary for sustainable peace.
2. Manage the African Union’s capacity and resource constraints in
line with its comparative advantage. In the short to medium-
term, the African Union’s African Post-Conflict Reconstruction and
Development (PCRD) will not acquire sufficient resources to be a
credible actor in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. It
is unlikely that the AU will develop the expertise and capabilities in
the many activities that encompass the PCRD. PCRD is a huge task
for an institution that is struggling to build basic infrastructure for
peace, stability, and democratic governance. Since the organizational
and resource challenges that have hobbled the PCRD will not go
away, it is unrealistic for the PCRD to solicit resources from donors
who are devoting resources to the same post-conflict reconstruction
chores. To overcome these competitive pressures for resources, the
PCRD will need to disengage from areas where it lacks competence
and where it cannot mobilize local resources. Without comparative
competence in most of these activities, the most realistic approach
would be for the AU to leave them to actors who can make a
substantive contribution, particularly the African Development Bank
(AfDB) and other international bodies.
3. Deepen normative frameworks for conflict prevention. The African
Union should invest more efforts in consolidating the normative
frameworks and shared values on democratic governance, anti-
corruption and economic governance, youth and women’s inclu-
sion, and transitional justice, and instill a culture of compliance
through national and sub-regional instruments. The ECOWAS
interventions in several countries to promote democratization and
the rule of law underscore the fact that strong regional institu-
tions are critical in the internalization of continental and regional
norms.40 The regional nature of conflicts in the Sahel, the Horn
of Africa, and Great Lakes regions points to the importance of
210 G. M. KHADIAGALA
investing in conflict prevention and early warning systems. Ulti-
mately, conflict prevention is one of the antidotes to African
conflicts.
4. Create a continental framework on peer learning for peace-
building. There is very little learning of previous post-conflict
experiences in Africa because of the absence of systematic programs
for lesson drawing within the Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) or the African Union. A database of comparative post-
conflict reconstruction experiences would be a good start in the
accretion of such knowledge that will inform future interventions.
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CHAPTER 13




Conflict recurrence and the limited duration of peace settlements in
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Madagascar in the last ten years provides the
rationale for examining the approach of the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC) to mediate conflicts in member coun-
tries. Studies show that SADC’s acquiescence to long-serving Zimbab-
wean President Robert Mugabe during its mediation period between
2007/2008 and 2013 led to the organization’s endorsement of two
undemocratic elections that prolonged Zimbabwe’s socio-political and
economic crisis. SADC’s handling of Lesotho’s political turbulence
between 2014 and 2017 also reproduced its instability, making the small
country one with the highest number of government turnovers in the
SADC region. Madagascar’s political crisis from 2009 was left to drag
on owing to dissonance between itself and the African Union (AU), also
engaged in Madagascar at the time.1
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In all three countries, post-conflict recovery was overshadowed by
reversals in fundamental freedoms, civil liberties, and checks on govern-
ment that mirrored the deterioration in democratic institutions and the
rule of law. These countries continued to be dominated by ruling parties
with links to the military and security services, and socio-economic
recovery has stalled for many years. As both an intergovernmental orga-
nization and a Regional Economic Community (REC), SADC mediation
in the three countries has had its fair share of politics. These have been
spurred by deeply ingrained patterns of avoiding confrontation with its
member states and the compulsion to close ranks on issues concerning
governance deficits.
While mediation efforts cannot lead to holistic societal transformations
overnight, this chapter argues that SADC failed to lay the ground-
work for such transformations and consequently was unable to find a
balance between ending these conflicts and fulfilling longer-term agendas
for sustainable peace. SADC mediation traditionally pursues “track one”
diplomacy; hence its primary occupation has been to secure agreements
between political and military elites. But, civil society organizations and
other non-state actors have increasingly underlined the importance of
including a broader variety of actors like themselves in SADC’s media-
tion process. For an organization that essentially functions on the basis of
an elite consensus, this debate has been polarizing within the organization
and among policy practitioners.
Systemic Conflict Transformation
Framework and Mediation
The departing point of this chapter is that the kind of peace envisaged
through a mediation process matters to the viability of the agreements
and resolutions made. Organizations like SADC should seek to support
long-term solutions which hinge both on the demilitarization of politics
and investment in effective institutions of participation and development.
They should specifically invest in attaining what Johan Galtung refers to
as “positive peace,” as opposed to “negative peace,” often reflected in
mediation approaches that view peace agreements solely as end products.
Galtung challenged what he perceived to be a simplistic use of the concept
of peace in international relations and conflict. He questioned whether a
peace concept that does not exclude at least severe forms of inequality,
subservience, and exploitation was really fruitful. His argument was that
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peace was often negatively defined or determined by its absence.2 Charles
Webel similarly conceived that conflict is not the antithesis of peace, and
that conflicts may, perhaps paradoxically, promote and increase peace and
diminish violence if the conflicting parties negotiate in good faith to reach
solutions to problems that are achievable and tolerable, if not ideal.3 He
also developed a peace index that categorizes countries’ peace profiles
as ranging from “strong or durable” (roughly equivalent to Galtung’s
description of positive peace) to “weak or fragile” peace.4
This thinking is well captured by the systemic conflict transformation
(SCT) framework. It explains conflict mediation processes that pay atten-
tion to constructive change in contexts where repeated and deep-rooted
cycles of conflict episodes exist.5 It is based on the idea that interventions
in conflict situations need to reflect the complexity of conflict systems,
and should seek to reduce this complexity as part of the outcomes of
any intervention. This is based on the assumption that for mediation
to contribute to positive change, third party interventions must seek to:
constructively transform conflict systems; support processes of compre-
hensive social change; allow local actors to drive social change through
an inclusive approach; and deal with the power asymmetries that hamper
a transformation in relationships between actors in the political system.6
The SCT paradigm, therefore, strongly stresses that organizations not
only seek to manage or resolve conflicts, but also transforms them by
helping to change the relationship between the parties and, more broadly,
in society. This includes addressing the structural causes that originally
led to the conflict. In this chapter, the shortcomings of SADC’s media-
tion approach, as analyzed through the SCT lens, are enumerated. These,
or at least some of them, can be overcome if mediation processes are
conceptualized to incorporate conflict transformation.
SADC’s Policy and Institutional Framework for Mediation
SADC’s peacemaking mandate is implied in its founding treaty and more
so in its 1996 protocol that established its security structure, the Organ
on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC).7 The text of
the protocol outlines a range of objectives in relation to peacemaking.
This includes reference to the Organ’s responsibilities to “manage and
seek to resolve inter and intra state conflict by peaceful means” and
that the methods employed “to prevent, manage and resolve conflict by
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peaceful means shall include preventive diplomacy, negotiations, concilia-
tion, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an interna-
tional tribunal.”8 Specifically, the protocol states that all mediation efforts
be authorized by the SADC Summit—SADC’s supreme policy-making
institution, made up of the sitting presidents of its member states9—
and lists the following aims: the defense and maintenance of democracy,
peace, security, and stability; and that SADC exists to promote common
political values and systems in its member states that are transmitted
through democratic, legitimate, and effective institutions.10
SADC’s mandate to mediate conflicts in its member countries, there-
fore, means that it can involve itself in the internal affairs of sovereign
states, and hold them accountable to implementing decisions flowing
from the peace agreements it facilitated. While this is a vital and even
foundational matter, the SADC Treaty determines the degree of its
involvement. Moreover, the compliance of member states to its agree-
ments is treated with ambiguity and contradiction in the Treaty. To
illustrate, in formal terms, members cede important decision-making
powers to SADC by virtue of the fact that the Treaty gives SADC jurisdic-
tion over the affairs of its members.11 But this jurisdiction is both limited
and, more importantly, contested by the member states themselves. The
implementation of all SADC decisions by member states, including peace
agreements, is also affected by its principles guiding the implementation
of its policies outlined in the Treaty. In particular, the concept of vari-
able geometry. Variable geometry basically acknowledges that member
states have varying levels of development and on that logic, they should
be given flexibility and leeway in the implementation of SADC policies.
For instance, a member state can claim that it lacks institutional capacity
to implement a regional political program and effectively evade its obli-
gations. This is a claw-back clause so countries can evoke the argument
that their institutions are yet to mature to the level required to imple-
ment regional agreements. The SADC Treaty also prescribes (in Article
33) when and what kinds of sanctions the organization can impose on a
member state. In practice, it has only ever sanctioned countries for being
in arrears financially, but never for violating the terms of peace agreements
that SADC has facilitated.
SADC’s mediation structure, formally called the “Mediation, Conflict
Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Structure,” only started to take
shape in 2010.12 It comprises a mediation support unit (MSU) located
in the OPDSC Directorate, a Panel of Elders (PoE), and a mediation
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reference group (MRG). The MRG is meant to increase the use of medi-
ation by SADC member states as a tool for the prevention, containment,
and resolution of conflict by peaceful means; and strengthen their under-
standing of the root causes and potential causes of conflict in SADC
countries. This explains the decision to staff it with officials from member
states. However, the PoE is not yet operational. Diplomatic engagements
by member states fill its gap. Once operational, it will be comprised of
five members who are highly regarded political, civic, or religious leaders.
Fifty percent of these are supposed to come from the governmental sector
and the rest from the non-governmental sector. This structure is semi-
functional, and SADC has maintained its reluctance to formally include
non-state actors in its mediation processes.
Trends in SADC Mediation
in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Madagascar
Zimbabwe
In its early mediation efforts, SADC took a case-by-case approach, relying
on political leaders and individual countries appointed as its mediators to
make decisions instead of SADC as a collective entity. Generally, SADC
mediation interventions can be grouped into three fluid categories: (i)
those concerning election-related disputes, as were the case in Zimbabwe
and Lesotho in 2007; (ii) those assisting a country or conflicting parties to
overcome a political impasse; and (iii) those where a military has sought to
usurp power, as was the case with Madagascar’s 2009 coup and Lesotho’s
coup attempt in 2014. In all three categories, the legitimacy and legality
of political power was an important conflict-causing factor. SADC applied
relatively different approaches and resources to those conflicts, depending
on the mediation actors, the country’s geostrategic features, and its own
capacities.
The SADC mediation in Zimbabwe took place in two stages. The
first was in March 2007 when the SADC Summit mandated President
Mbeki of South Africa to “facilitate dialogue between the opposition and
government” following an international outcry over a police crackdown
on opposition activists in Zimbabwe. SADC was reluctant to intervene,
having agreed publicly that the election crisis was essentially a result of the
need for land redistribution, and therefore caused by Western sanctions.13
There was no mention of the political, governance, and security issues
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that were apparent in the overt violence that characterized Mugabe’s rule.
The initial Mbeki involvement was thus narrowly focused on institutional
conditions for the next round of elections in 2008. As such, issues like
the brutal violence orchestrated by Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Forces (ZANU-PF) forces nationwide to tip the election in its
favor, and the evolving humanitarian crisis impacting on the electorate,
were neglected.14
A first outcome of the Mbeki talks was registered five months into
the negotiations. The talks agreed to a constitutional amendment—
Constitutional Amendment No. 18, which was subsequently adopted by
the Zimbabwean Parliament. But Michael Aeby argues that ZANU-PF
drafted the amendment unilaterally. The amendment altered the presi-
dential term from six to five years, and reduced the parliamentary term
by two years. The Amendment also empowered the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission (ZEC) to redefine constituency boundaries, but subject to
parliamentary approval before elections could take place.15 Mugabe also
deliberately set an early date for the election in 2008, and Mbeki down-
played the concerns of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) about both the unilateral constitutional amendment and the early
election date. Mbeki also downplayed these concerns in his reports to
the SADC Organ, which consequently emphasized procedural and not
substantive issues. Aeby concludes that this was a major reason why SADC
accepted that early elections could be held with only minimal reforms in
place.16
The March 2008 elections took place in an environment of limited
external scrutiny. Eldred Masunungure explains that the government
had refused to accredit “unfriendly” foreign observers. The military had
overtly taken over and had become the arbiter of Zimbabwe’s fate during
this period.17 The first election results that began to trickle in showed
that ZANU-PF had lost to the MDC in its main constituencies. The
electoral commission then stopped announcing results and froze them
for five weeks. SADC remained non-intrusive, adopting a “wait-and-
see” approach on how the impasse would be resolved. The results were
reported to be inconclusive and a runoff presidential election was to be
convened within 21 days in terms of the country’s electoral laws.
The ZANU-PF government extended the period to 90 days. The
period (prior to the runoff election) was characterized by violence
unleashed mainly by ZANU-PF youth militia and the state security forces
against opposition members and supporters. This was captured in the
13 TRENDS IN SADC MEDIATION AND LONG-TERM … 221
preliminary statement of SADC’s observer mission.18 Opposition leader
and Mugabe’s main contender, Morgan Tsvangirai, withdrew from the
race after then-SADC Chair, President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia, had
reportedly urged him to pull out. Mugabe won the elections with 85.5
percent of the vote, which SADC and African Union (AU) observers
declared illegitimate. He was then sworn in again as the country’s pres-
ident. This pushed the AU’s involvement in Zimbabwe as it effectively
refused to recognize the June election results.19 The AU Summit met
in Egypt from June 30 to July 2, 2008, and directed SADC to inter-
vene to resolve the impasse, ostensibly over the illegitimacy of Mugabe’s
presidency. It motivated for “a negotiated solution,” and expressed its
support for a government of national unity.20 SADC called on Mbeki
to lead negotiations over a government of national unity in Zimbabwe.
The negotiations started on July 21, 2008, with the signing of a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) by the MDC and ZANU-PF in which
they committed themselves to dialogue and to concluding a Global Polit-
ical Agreement (GPA). The GPA was produced in September 2008, and
provided for a Transitional Government, mandated, among others, with
preparing the country for free and fair elections by drafting a constitu-
tion; holding a referendum; promoting equality, national healing, cohe-
sion, and unity; undertaking security sector reform; and reconstituting
the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission,
Media Commission, and the Human Rights Commission.21
Mbeki stepped down as SADC mediator in late 2008 and was replaced
by Jacob Zuma, who assumed the South African presidency in 2009. The
thrust of SADC’s mediation mission under Zuma from 2009 to 2013 was
to push for full implementation of the GPA. But, in Zimbabwe, imple-
mentation of the GPA had run into serious difficulties, with the inclusive
government seemingly backing away from meeting some of its provi-
sions. Eventually, the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
(JOMIC) was set up to monitor the GPA but its structure was deeply
flawed: it only comprised representatives of signatories to the GPA and
ZANU-PF officials rejected moves by SADC to second its own officials
to JOMIC. They believed such a mechanism would constitute interfer-
ence in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. Mugabe then proceeded to call for
elections in April 2013, despite widely held views that the country was not
ready for elections, and that he and his party had failed to comply with
the GPA.22 Nonetheless, elections took place. The election results, which
the MDC deemed flawed, showed Mugabe winning 61 percent of the
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vote, thus securing his continued tenure as president. SADC terminated
its mission in Zimbabwe as soon as it had endorsed the 2013 elections.
Meanwhile, JOMIC died a natural death.
Madagascar
Madagascar was plunged into a different crisis two years into Mbeki’s
mediation in Zimbabwe when Andry Rajoelina toppled sitting presi-
dent, Marc Ravalomanana, in a decisive coup d’état. Ravalomanana fled
the country and was mostly exiled in South Africa. SADC reacted by
convening an Extraordinary Summit on Madagascar led by Swaziland’s
King Mswati,23 who was the OPDSC Chair at the time. It eventually
deployed a mission to the capital, Antananarivo. The SADC mission
arrived only to find AU and United Nations (UN) missions on the
ground, and tensions and confusion brewed over which organization had
a genuine mandate to lead the mediation process.24 Meanwhile, SADC
resolved at its summit that Ravalomanana be reinstated and threatened
to use force if this was not done.25 Three months later, having made no
headway, SADC shifted from a militarist posture to a mediatory one.26
It decided to establish a mediation team led by former Mozambican
President Joaquim Chissano, while the AU and UN appointed its own
mediators. The leadership incoherence between the three organizations
was later resolved: the AU and the UN dissolved their mediation team
and SADC became the sole mediator to the crisis. The backlash was soon
felt by the SADC mediation team on many fronts. Foremost was that the
team was relatively small and the new regime had exploited the leadership
coordination quarrel by using the time to entrench itself into government.
The SADC mediator’s approach was to reach a compromise between
the political elites and it facilitated negotiations that resulted in a power-
sharing accord.27 Under the accord, Ravalomanana would not be rein-
stated as outlined in SADC’s initial communiqué. Instead, an interim,
inclusive government, led by Rajoelina, would be set up to oversee a
15-month transitional period and elections. Laurie Nathan argues that
at this stage, Chissano’s deviation from the principled position of the
Summit derived from an assumption that he was providing for inclu-
sivity, consensus, and compromise.28 But, the accord failed to resolve
the crisis and Chissano persevered with the mediation. In January 2011,
Chissano produced a roadmap that entailed another major compromise
of democracy.29 The roadmap allowed the coup perpetrators to contest
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elections and denied this opportunity to Ravalomanana, who was barred
from returning to Madagascar until the new government decided that a
favorable political and security climate existed. Local diplomats concluded
that Chissano had capitulated to the junta.30
SADC removed Chissano as the mediator and insisted that Ravalo-
manana be free to contest the poll. Over the next 18 months, SADC
mediators were unable to secure the compliance of the regime. In 2012,
the SADC Summit backed down and adopted the “ni-ni” solution, under
which neither Ravalomanana nor Rajoelina would run for president.31
The two politicians eventually agreed to this. SADC then set up a liaison
office in Madagascar in April 2012 to support mediation activities in the
country. But it was too little, too late. The country held elections in late
2013, but has since struggled to stabilize its government and implement
economic reforms owing to a lack of institutionalized democracy and
governance mechanisms.32 Some of the most pressing challenges that
remain include a lack of civilian authority and control over the secu-
rity forces; human rights abuses, including arbitrary or unlawful killing;
a lack of judicial independence; and restrictions on freedom of speech
and press.33 In September 2015, SADC sent a “Special Envoy’s advance
team” to Madagascar for five days with staff from its MSU. The Mission
submitted its report with findings and recommendations to SADC, some
of which were that Madagascar’s former heads of state were a divisive
group, and indicated unconditional willingness to work with the SADC
Special Envoy to address existing differences among themselves; and to
provide the necessary guidance and support to the national reconcilia-
tion process. This conclusion proved that the initial mediation process
had gone awry along the way and that there was a need to focus more
on the substantive aspects of the mediation, as opposed to concentrating
exclusively on the procedural ones.
Lesotho
Similar to SADC’s past interventions in Lesotho, its intervention in the
country’s political crisis from 2014 was precipitated by a coup attempt.
However, the veracity of the coup attempt was contested in Lesotho
and SADC evaded the matter altogether, fanning the flames of the crisis
during that time. Despite varied accounts, what later emerged through
careful documentation and investigation is that in August 2014, Lesotho’s
Prime Minister, Thomas Thabane, asked for a military intervention from
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SADC, having reported an attempted military coup in his country that
forced him to flee to South Africa. What transpired was that the coun-
try’s army general at the time, Tlali Kamoli, had defied orders to leave
office, and was later believed to have orchestrated plots to assassinate
the Prime Minister, some high-ranking military officials, and politicians
not aligned with him. This compelled Thabane’s exile to South Africa,
along with other opposition and security officials. The Prime Minister’s
request to SADC for a military intervention was not granted. SADC
eventually downplayed the coup allegation despite the apparent tensions
surrounding a politicized and partisan security apparatus the issue had
brought.34 These issues were well known to South Africa and SADC.
The 2014 intervention would be the organization’s fifth in the country’s
history. As such, South Africa has both witnessed and been involved in
mediating Lesotho’s cyclical conflicts since its independence in 1966. All
share a common heritage of faltering democratic rule, coups, and coup
attempts that have all undermined state capacity and legitimacy for gener-
ations. It goes without saying that Lesotho’s conflict equation exhibits
some common and consistent features: it follows or is precipitated by
power struggles in the military, power struggles within governing parties,
or a change in government.35
Following SADC’s rebuff of the coup allegation, it appointed then-
South African Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, to act as a SADC
facilitator in Lesotho. His specific mandate was to “facilitate the restora-
tion of political and security stability in the short and long terms.”36
SADC deployed an observer team to Maseru, known as the SADC
Observer Mission in Lesotho (SOMILES), made up of police officers and
military personnel from various member states. The peace process facil-
itated by Ramaphosa resulted in an agreement in October to schedule
snap elections in 2015. Six months after the reported attempted coup,
Lesotho held its snap elections, which the SADC facilitator promoted as
a solution to the political crisis triggered in 2014.
The preference for this solution may have been the political back-
drop to the coup attempt. The country’s first coalition government
elected in 2012 had collapsed, with parliament being suspended for
several months. One of the major parties in the collapsed government
signed a new alliance with the opposition and within the same month
the coup attempt was reported. While there were legitimacy issues to
do with the collapse of the governing coalition, there was nothing that
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suggested that Ramaphosa treated the attempted coup as an unconstitu-
tional change of government. The elections in February 2015 produced
a hung parliament and, just as in 2012, the various parties negotiated
coalition alliances. The result was a new government headed by Pakalitha
Mosisili, the country’s long-serving prime minister until 2012 and leader
of the opposition in the 2014 parliament. SADC officially closed the
SOMILES mission in Lesotho in April 2015 after what it referred to
as “successful elections.”37 Ramaphosa submitted a report to the new
government, outlining a number of observations and recommendations
for the way forward.
The recommendations were contained in the “Proposal on Constitu-
tional and Institutional Review for the Kingdom of Lesotho” prepared
by the SADC facilitating team. But in the months to come, the new
government backtracked on all of the SADC decisions agreed prior to
the elections, including electoral reforms. As soon as it assumed power,
the Mosisili government reinstated Kamoli, and staged a witch-hunt of
opponents and dissidents. This included arresting some military officials
for an alleged mutiny whose timing coincided with Thabane’s prior alle-
gation of a coup attempt in 2014. As part of these arrests, the country’s
former military chief appointed by Thabane in 2014, Lieutenant-General
Maaparankoe Mahao, was killed by his peers in an alleged attempt to
arrest him for mutiny. Fifty other soldiers were incarcerated while awaiting
trial. Mosisili asked SADC to help establish the circumstances surrounding
Mahao’s death.38 SADC appointed a ten-member commission, led by
the Botswana High Court Judge Mpaphi Phumaphi, to investigate the
full scope of Lesotho’s instability. The Mosisili government vehemently
rejected the commission’s report, and it became a source of diplomatic
tension between the government and SADC. It was even challenged in
Lesotho’s High Court by one of the military top brass allegedly involved
in Mahao’s killing. In addition, senior government officials bluntly stated
that the commission’s findings would not be binding, and that the whole
endeavor was an exercise in futility.39
Led by Botswana as chair, SADC later threatened Lesotho with suspen-
sion if it were to refuse to abide by the Commission’s recommendations.
The recommendations under security reforms were controversial, as they
challenged the narrative of both the 2014 coup and the 2015 charges
of mutiny under Mosisili, and his reinstatement of Kamoli. The SADC
Commission of Inquiry particularly described the latter as a “polarizing
character within the Lesotho Defence Force,” and recommended his
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removal as army chief. The Commission also found no basis for the
alleged mutiny, and recommended the immediate release of the incar-
cerated soldiers.40 Following months of impasse and standoff between
the Lesotho government and SADC, the Lesotho government accepted
the Phumaphi recommendations on condition that it would develop its
own reforms that would be compatible with Lesotho’s laws. Part of the
recommendations accepted included reforms to its electoral system, the
constitution, security structures, and public service aimed at depoliti-
cizing government administration. On the security front, the government
announced Kamoli’s retirement and his deputy as the new head of the
Lesotho Defence Force.
In March 2017, Mosisili lost a no-confidence vote in parliament.
Instead of handing over power to the opposition, he responded by
dissolving parliament and calling fresh elections. So, essentially, between
receiving the SADC Phumaphi report in 2015 until March 2017, no
real reforms had taken place. SADC had papered over Lesotho’s security
crisis, treating it like a political matter to be handled by the incumbent
administration. Thabane won the 2017 elections and for more than two
years presided over a fragile coalition government. Somewhat predictably,
the government collapsed in 2020, after Thabane became embroiled in
a scandal involving the murder of his second wife in 2017 allegedly by
his current wife. He was replaced as prime minister by the former finance
minister, Moeketsi Majoro.
Ramaphosa’s mediation in Lesotho erred in many respects, including
on its impartiality, inclusivity, and its ability to address a host of proximate
and underlying causes of Lesotho’s recurrent conflict. These include deep
polarization between the country’s political actors, politicized state insti-
tutions, and the militarization of politics more broadly. This made the
implementation of SADC resolutions both contentious and discretionary.
By its own admission, SADC has limited capacity to monitor, evaluate,
and ensure implementation of agreements that it helps to broker through
mediation. According to the Organ Directorate’s 2015 progress report,
the implementation of mediation agreements and roadmaps by member
states stood at 50 percent. Even more challenging is developing the base-
line for these evaluations. The process is also inherently political as it
concerns an organizational image, and the need to project publicly some
modicum of consensus and progress in fulfilling its peacemaking mandate.
This partly explains its claims that it has been successful in mediating
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conflicts in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Lesotho in the last decade—
contrary to existing research pointing to their relapse into violence and
conflicts.41 Arguably, the success it refers to relates exclusively to its
facilitation of peace agreements.
The Potential Contribution
of the Systemic Conflict Transformation
Framework to SADC Mediation
Mediation certainly takes place in extremely complex environments, and
its contributions are often multifaceted and difficult to grasp. Plus, the
necessary conditions for an SCT framework to be applied to a mediation
process by a regional organization may discourage its use. These refer to:
i. The politics regarding the mandate of the mediator, the time-frames
and resources employed;
ii. the acceptability of non-state actors and partners to the process; and
iii. the human, institutional, and financial capacities on both sides to
implement a transformational peacebuilding agenda.
Yet the application of SCT would not be “re-inventing the wheel.”
SADC mediation is essentially geared to building peace, despite the
specific mandates given in the different countries. Building peace requires
that mediation not become the monopoly of governments, but incorpo-
rate the participation of institutions outside of it.
While SADC has a formal mandate to engage in mediation as a form
of peacemaking, the experiences of Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Madagascar
illustrate the pushback from elite parties in these countries on the exact
mandate and responsibilities of the SADC mediator. In both Zimbabwe
and Madagascar, the use of “track one” negotiations meant that there
was little room for a systemic intervention using other, unofficial tracks
of diplomacy. This exacerbated existing divisions within groups on the
ground. In Zimbabwe, the relationship between the government and civil
society organizations was deeply fragmented. ZANU-PF strongly guarded
and monopolized the mediation process, in order to protect and maintain
its own version of the conflict. This reflected ZANU-PF’s failure to trans-
form itself from a liberation movement into a political party, including
a refusal to acknowledge the roles played by others, such as civil society
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organizations (CSOs), students, churches, and other non-state actors in
the liberation struggle.42 As such, the mediation itself became a weak
tool of conflict management from the onset, and even less of a tool
to transform the relationships and structures that govern those relation-
ships in the longer term. Ultimately, the country experienced a partial,
if not pseudo-democratic, transition in 2008 and 2013, and the period
thereafter conformed to Galtung’s concept of negative peace.
SADC’s preference for “track one” diplomacy does not deter it
from using other non-official tracks in its mediation processes. While
its mediation reflected a more traditional and state-centric approach in
Zimbabwe and Madagascar, it later gravitated toward a more hybrid
type in Lesotho. This has been described as “track one and a half”
diplomacy.43 It comprises interaction between official representatives of
conflicting actors mediated by a third party not representing a political
institution. Jeffrey Mapendere finds that it helps address some deficien-
cies of “track one” diplomacy, and directly influences power structures
without being driven by governmental political agendas.44 In all three
cases, agreements were facilitated without a fundamental transformation
of relationships for purely pragmatic reasons. There was no stated transi-
tion from mediation to post-conflict processes, and the agreements were
left to self-implementation. This changed somewhat for Lesotho when
SADC set up a commission of inquiry to help facilitate long-term transfor-
mation as understood by many. The snag, however, was that the viability
of the process was subject to the executive control of that country.
Key Recommendations
1. Increase utilization of Systemic Conflict Transformation in
the SADC region. The Systemic Conflict Transformation (SCT)
approach is consistent with the Southern African Development
Community’s broader peacemaking mandate and thus could be an
effective means for conflict transformation in the region. Mediation
that is geared to building peace inevitably requires the transfor-
mation of society at all levels. SCT emphasizes the importance of
engaging civil society in an effective way, parallel and integral to a
peace process. It should be understood as part of mediation from
the beginning and be initiated at some point.
2. Move beyond “track one” diplomacy. The primacy attached to track
one negotiations can squeeze out potentially more effective tracks
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of diplomacy. Countries have numerously invoked domestic juris-
diction over SADC processes, or lament SADC’s involvement in
their affairs as intrusions on sovereignty. Over-investment in a single
SADC mediator can amplify pushback from elite parties in these
countries on the exact mandate and responsibilities.
3. Develop a framework for engaging non-state actors. SADC needs
an explicit, consolidated policy framework for engaging non-state
actors in its peace and security affairs. What currently exists is a
relatively defunct memorandum of understanding between SADC
and the regional umbrella body for NGOs—the SADC Council of
NGOs—signed in 2008. Modalities for involving NGOs in SADC
mediation are not yet clear, but these could take the form of ad
hoc arrangements, loosely defined collaborations or even superficial
consultations. Ultimately, the future relevance of SADC’s media-
tion structure lies in its capacity as a strategic policy advisory and
technical tool for supporting SADC to detect conflicts, prevent
and manage them, and help countries implement agreements to
consolidate peace.
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CHAPTER 14
The International Criminal Court’s Impact
on Peacebuilding in Africa
Phil Clark
Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC), the first permanent, global
institution mandated to investigate and prosecute cases of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, has transformed the African peace-
building terrain since it came into force in 2002. Over the last 17 years,
the ICC has generated considerable controversy, including criticism of its
impact on peace processes in Africa, the continent that—except for the
2016 opening of ICC investigations into the Russia/Georgia conflict—
has provided all of the Court’s situations to date. Concerns over the
effect of international criminal justice on African peace and reconciliation
initiatives are not new, having arisen with two previous institutions, the
UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).1 This issue is more acute with the ICC,
however, because its temporal mandate, which limits the Court to inves-
tigating and prosecuting cases after July 1, 2002, increases the likelihood
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of the Court intervening in situations of ongoing conflict and intersecting
with a wide range of conflict mitigation processes.
This chapter examines the ICC’s intersections with two widespread
domestic conflict resolution processes in Africa, national amnesties and
peace negotiations. In doing so, it connects to two overarching scholarly
and policy debates, namely the appropriateness and legality of amnesties
as opposed to prosecutions for suspected perpetrators of international
crimes,2 and the “peace versus justice” debate over whether the threat
of prosecution imperils peace negotiations that involve high-level atrocity
suspects.3 These issues coincided during the Juba peace talks between
the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels,
starting in 2006, one year after the ICC issued arrest warrants for the
top five LRA commanders while a national amnesty for all rebel combat-
ants was still in place. The tensions around Juba ignited the entire fields
of transitional justice and peacebuilding, as witnessed in the landmark
“Building a Future on Peace and Justice” conference in Nuremberg in
June 2007.4 The event was held at the height of the Juba talks amid calls
for the deferral or withdrawal of the ICC charges against the LRA lead-
ership for the sake of peace. The conference was attended by the ICC
Prosecutor, Registrar, and other senior Court officials, who used it as
a platform to pronounce on developments in Juba.5 This included the
lament by the ICC’s inaugural chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
that “we…hear officials of States Parties calling for amnesties, the granting
of immunities and other ways to avoid prosecutions, supposedly in the
name of peace.”6
This chapter argues that the ICC has generally ridden roughshod
over national choices to employ amnesties to facilitate peace negotiations
and other responses to violence across Africa, including security sector
reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
and truth commissions. The ICC’s and its supporters’ vehement insis-
tence on a narrow brand of international criminal justice has undermined
these important attempts to resolve conflict and often made peace less,
rather than more, likely. This chapter focuses on the ICC’s first two—
and therefore most developed—situations in northern Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with secondary reference to
Rwanda, South Sudan, and other conflict-affected states in Africa. The
Uganda and DRC situations, analyzed sequentially below in sections dedi-
cated to domestic amnesties and peace negotiations, highlight a range of
ICC-induced problems for peacebuilding in African states. The chapter
concludes with some lessons from the ICC’s interventions for recrafting
international criminal justice in support of the wider pursuit of peace.
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Domestic Amnesties
International criminal law is now a central feature of most peace negotia-
tions around the world, especially those involving United Nations (UN)
mediation. The UN increasingly holds that international law prohibits
the use of amnesties for suspects of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity and therefore insists on prosecutions within the frame-
work of peace negotiations.7 Meanwhile, the ICC has regularly briefed
international mediators about the illegality of using amnesties for this
category of suspects during peace talks.8 This signifies a substantial shift
since the 1998 conference in Rome that led to the signing of the ICC
Statute, where many delegates expressed sympathy for the model of
amnesty central to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (TRC), which was underway at the time.9 Philippe Kirsch, the
chair of the Preparatory Commission in Rome and later the first Pres-
ident of the ICC, stated that the Rome Statute purposely contains a
“creative ambiguity”10 that gives substantial discretion when considering
amnesties.11
As various commentators have pointed out, international criminal law
does not clearly prohibit the use of amnesties for serious crimes.12 The
Rome Statute does not mention amnesties, although the ICC’s defini-
tion of the “genuine proceedings” by domestic institutions that would
prevent ICC intervention encompasses only national prosecutions. Other
international criminal law statutes and conventions meanwhile are less
prescriptive or say very little about this issue. This suggests that the
international legal basis for the trend against amnesties is significantly
weaker than many advocates have proposed, necessitating a different
set of justifications by the UN and other international practitioners for
their anti-amnesty stance. Various scholars also challenge the widespread
assumption that international trials inherently deter crimes and produce
long-term stability and that amnesties foster impunity and ultimately
undermine peace and social order.13
Domestic Amnesties in Uganda
The Uganda and DRC situations highlight various ways in which the ICC
has undermined national amnesties and, by extension, a range of DDR
and SSR programs that depend on incentivizing combatants’ coopera-
tion through the offer of amnesties. From the beginning of its operations
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in Uganda, the ICC opposed the use of the country’s Amnesty Act for
high-level suspects of international crimes on the grounds that it violated
the Rome Statute and entrenched impunity. This opposition reached a
crescendo during the 2006–2008 Juba peace talks, where the ICC Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP) issued regular dismissals of the LRA’s attempts
to secure an amnesty for its leaders, amplified by a constant stream of
press releases and communiqués by international human rights organiza-
tions.14 This section argues that the pronouncements by the ICC and its
supporters belied the long-term use of amnesties in Uganda even before
the emergence of the LRA; the widespread support for the Amnesty Act
among everyday Ugandans, including its use for senior LRA commanders;
and the tangible, positive effects of the amnesty policy.
The Amnesty Act stemmed from lobbying by the Acholi Religious
Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) during the 1999 peace talks between
the Ugandan government, the LRA and the LRA’s principal backer,
the Sudanese government. The ARLPI conducted widespread consulta-
tions with northern victims’ groups and concluded there was a strong
desire among the population for personal and collective healing and
reconciliation with the rebels.15
The impact of the Ugandan amnesty process has been substantial. To
date, approximately 30,000 rebels have come in from the bush under the
DDR process facilitated by the amnesty, including senior LRA comman-
ders such as Brigadier Kenneth Banya and Brigadier Sam Kolo.16 Because
of the quantifiable impact of the amnesty process, various empirical studies
highlight widespread popular support for the policy.17 In 2012, the
Ugandan government let the Amnesty Act lapse for the first time since its
promulgation but sustained pressure from northern Ugandan civil society
forced the government to reinstate the Act in 2013.18
The ICC’s and its supporters’ opposition to the Amnesty Act is highly
problematic for two main reasons. First, these actors ignore the substan-
tial support for the Act among everyday Ugandans. In the late 1980s and
1990s, there was considerable support for amnesty processes because of
their success in disarming and reintegrating the Uganda People’s Demo-
cratic Army (UPDA) and the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) in 1987,19
and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in 1998.20 Furthermore, as high-
lighted in a 2007 study by the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR), widespread approval for processes of
amnesty, forgiveness, and reconciliation (which most respondents define
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discretely) emerges because many northern Ugandans view the perpetra-
tors of violence as their own children who must be treated leniently and
eventually reintegrated into the community.21 This often extends to LRA
leaders such as Kony, whom many northern Ugandans consider a “child
of the community” who should be encouraged through the amnesty
process to halt the rebellion and return “home.”22 The Uganda case thus
directly challenges the oft-stated view that the use of amnesty hampers a
long-term transition toward democracy. Uganda represents an example
of a democratic amnesty, which resulted from civil society lobbying
and widespread popular consultations, rather than government diktat.
International opposition to such a democratic amnesty may therefore
undermine democracy in the long run.
Second, the confusion over the applicability of the Amnesty Act—
whether the amnesty is still in place and to whom it applies—generated
both by the ICC and the Ugandan government (which has responded to
donor pressure to shift toward a more legalistic, punitive framework for
transitional justice)23 has greatly undermined the Act’s effectiveness in
catalyzing the DDR of LRA and other rebel combatants. The Ugandan
Amnesty Commission and various civil society groups have reported over
the last decade the substantial reduction in combatants returning from
the bush under the Amnesty Act, which they attribute directly to the
perceived threat of prosecution.24 This highlights the ICC’s and Ugandan
government’s tangible undermining of DDR as a peacebuilding process,
through their continued opposition to the use of amnesties for rebel
combatants.
Domestic Amnesties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC has instituted a much wider range of amnesty processes
than Uganda for a broader set of purposes. Whereas Uganda has used
a single Amnesty Act, connected to an overarching DDR process for
returning rebels, the DRC has passed four amnesty laws since 2002,
linked explicitly to a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and an
SSR program involving the brassage or “mixing” of former rebels into
the national Congolese army. Concurrent to these DRC amnesty laws,
an implicit amnesty policy has supported an extensive DDR program
for Congo-based Rwandan rebels. Three phases of DDR since 1998
have demobilized around 35,000 mainly Hutu former combatants from
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eastern DRC. The majority of these fighters are members of the Demo-
cratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the former
Rwandan army which fled across the border after the 1994 genocide
against the Tutsi.25
Two important problems regarding the ICC and amnesties have
emerged in the DRC. First, echoing the Ugandan situation, the
Congolese government’s variability on the use of amnesties—under pres-
sure from the ICC and international human rights organizations—has
weakened their effectiveness as a peacebuilding tool. Generally, the
Congolese government has displayed a much greater readiness to give
amnesties to senior military and rebel leaders as part of the country’s
SSR program than implied by its self-portrayal as an unyielding friend of
international justice.26 Acting outside of the 2005 amnesty law, in 2006
the then-President Joseph Kabila pardoned Mathieu Ngudjolo and all
10,000 members of his Ituri rebel coalition, the Mouvement Révolution-
naire Congolais (MRC), as well as the rebel groups led by Peter Karim
and Cobra Matata, in exchange for their surrender, the decommissioning
of their weapons, and their integration into the Congolese army.27 As a
result, all three leaders were promoted to the rank of colonel.
Such a practice was common in the lead-up to the 2006 national elec-
tions, as the government sought to minimize the impact of militia groups
capable of intimidating voters and disrupting preparations for the poll.
The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC)28 supported the scheme as part of the UN’s broader disar-
mament program in eastern DRC. Kemal Saiki, a MONUC spokesperson,
defended the amnesty-for-peace deals with Ngudjolo, Karim, and Matata:
“The most important thing is to bring an end to the bloodshed. Since
these deals have been signed, there has not been any large-scale fighting
in Ituri.”29
The Congolese government’s ambiguity on questions of amnesty
continued when in February 2008 it arrested Ngudjolo at a military
training camp in Kinshasa following an ICC warrant issued in July
2007. This amounted to a “bait and switch,” with Ngudjolo lured
into surrender from his rebel ranks and integrated into the Congolese
army, only to be arrested and transferred to The Hague for prosecu-
tion 18 months later. While the Congolese government was widely hailed
for its cooperation in arresting and transferring Ngudjolo to the ICC,
its duplicity toward an amnesty recipient undermined the broader use of
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amnesty as an incentive for members of rebel groups to disarm.30 Inter-
views with former rebels from Ngudjolo’s FNI and FRPI in Bunia who
had been integrated into the Congolese army underscored this point.
“This is the big problem with brassage,” said one former FNI combatant:
“The government gives us an amnesty, so we join the army and get a new
uniform. But look what happened to Ngudjolo. He also got an amnesty
but now he’s in The Hague. We all wonder whether this will happen to
us next.”31
Second, the ICC’s interventions in the DRC potentially weaken the
unofficial amnesty that underpins the extensive DDR program, which
has demobilized and returned tens of thousands of rebels to Rwanda.
This could have jeopardized the ICC’s case against Bosco Ntaganda, a
Rwandan-born former Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) officer who in July
2019 was convicted by the ICC on 18 charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.32 As a Rwandan national, Ntaganda—who in 2013
surrendered to the ICC via the US embassy in Kigali—could have been
eligible to participate in the DDR process and thus avoid prosecution by
the Rwandan authorities.
The complications inherent in the Ntaganda case again highlight the
potential for fraught relations between the ICC and, in this case, a
UN-supported DDR process. A key challenge for the UN and other inter-
national bodies across Africa is that many support amnesty-based SSR and
DDR as well as the ICC, highlighting a problem for peace mediators
and related actors in navigating the new peacebuilding terrain since the
advent of the Court. Similar sentiments to those of the former Nation-
alist and Integrationist Front (FNI) and Front for Patriotic Resistance in
Ituri (FRPI) rebels above were expressed by former Congo-based rebels
in the Mutobo demobilization center in Rwanda. As one young FDLR
combatant said, “We heard what happened to Bosco. He was bigger than
us and did the same as we did, coming across the border. Now he’s at the
ICC. Is that going to happen to us too?”33
The Uganda and DRC situations highlight the ICC’s outright
dismissal of national decisions to employ amnesties as a central means of
conflict resolution. While the two governments in question have adopted
deliberately ambiguous policies on amnesties—at times persisting with
them even while cooperating with ICC investigations—amnesties have
continued to be highly effective in encouraging combatants to lay down
their arms and to reintegrate into their home communities. The ICC
has insisted on international prosecutions while viewing amnesties as a
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means to entrench impunity, despite their long track record as effec-
tive tools of conflict mitigation, especially in terms of DDR in Uganda
and the DRC. The Ugandan and Congolese experiences also highlight
that the ICC’s decision to overrule domestic amnesties in the cases of
high-ranking suspects has dampened the effectiveness of amnesties for
lower-ranking combatants, who often believe they too will be subject to
criminal prosecution.
Peace Negotiations
This section analyzes the ICC’s intersections with peace negotiations in
Uganda and the DRC, which have invariably involved the fraught issue of
whether to offer amnesties to high-ranking atrocity suspects. Three brief
conceptual remarks are necessary to progress the “peace versus justice”
debate that has dominated recent scholarly and policy discussions and
to inform the empirical analysis below. First, a more helpful framing
of the intersections of international justice and peace talks comes from
Nick Grono and Adam O’Brien, who argue that the objectives of justice
and peace, while not necessarily incompatible, are inevitably in tension.34
This counters the claim by numerous ICC officials and observers that
peace and justice are always mutually reinforcing.35 Grono and O’Brien
acknowledge the possibility of pursuing peace and justice sequentially but
stress that some trade-off will probably be required, depending on the
circumstances of particular conflict-affected societies and the nature of
the proposed justice and peace interventions.
Second, it is important to recognize that what is being debated
in situations such as Uganda and the DRC is rarely whether peace or
justice are the desired outcomes—few actors would contest the neces-
sity of both—but rather whether negotiations or prosecutions are the
preferred processes by which to achieve these ends. A “negotiations
versus prosecutions” formulation has the advantage of not preempting
the result of particular mechanisms, while remaining open to the like-
lihood that such processes may have multiple (and even unexpected)
outcomes. The “peace versus justice” debate assumes that peace nego-
tiations produce peace and prosecutions produce justice, neither of which
inherently holds. Peace talks can fail to achieve peace, just as trials can
fail to achieve justice. Peace negotiations can also, if tailored in partic-
ular ways, pursue certain conceptions of justice that preclude prosecutions
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(including through conditional amnesties), while prosecutions can, if
approached in contextually sensitive ways, contribute to peace.
Third, when analyzing the nature and impact of negotiations and pros-
ecutions as processes, it is necessary to move beyond a fixation on the
set-pieces of formal peace talks and criminal trials. A range of processes
preceding, during, and following formal negotiations, as well as the
prevailing environment in which they take place, are vital for under-
standing the impact that prosecutions have on negotiations and vice versa.
Similarly, understanding the nature and effects of prosecutions involves
more than an analysis of core legal practices such as investigations, court-
room arguments, and judgments. This also requires a close examination
of the political, social, cultural, and economic context in which these legal
processes unfold and their intersections with a wide range of other actors
and mechanisms, including the national amnesty policies discussed above.
Peace Negotiations in Uganda
A central theme in the contestation over the Juba peace talks between the
Ugandan government and the LRA is the role of the ICC in pushing the
LRA to negotiate for peace. Various senior ICC officials and academic
commentators have argued that without the threat of ICC prosecution,
the LRA would never have considered negotiating with the Ugandan
government.36 This argument is unconvincing in two key respects. The
2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between
the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM), which greatly weakened the LRA by threatening its bases in
southern Sudan, occurred nine months before the ICC issued arrest
warrants for the LRA leadership. While some LRA attacks continued in
late 2005, the group’s scope for violence was clearly curtailed by the CPA
and the subsequent joint counterinsurgency against the rebels. As Ron
Atkinson argues, the signing of the CPA pushed the LRA toward peace
talks by forcing the Sudanese government to halt its support for the LRA,
dispersing the LRA from its bases, and compelling the newly autonomous
Government of South Sudan to deal with “foreign forces” including the
LRA. This provided the grounds for the clandestine talks between the
SPLM and the LRA that led to the Juba negotiations in 2006.37
Concerning the Juba talks themselves, debates center on whether
blame for the collapse of the negotiations in 2008 should ultimately rest
with the ICC. Such a perspective is widespread among many northern
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Ugandan civil society and community-level actors as well as in the
commentary on the Juba talks.38 From the start of the talks in July
2006, foremost among the LRA’s demands was the withdrawal of the
ICC arrest warrants against its commanders, allowing them to take up the
government’s amnesty, participate in cleansing and reintegration rituals
in northern Uganda and, according to some observers, secure exile
in southern Sudan or elsewhere.39 The LRA’s demand proved highly
controversial, and the ICC stated shortly after that it would not withdraw
the arrest warrants.40 Meanwhile, the government—that had initially
backed the LRA’s request—then claimed to support the ICC’s refusal
to grant it.41
Blaming the ICC solely for the breakdown in the Juba talks ignores
the fact that the negotiations lasted two full years and led to the
agreements on a range of highly contentious issues, all while the ICC
warrants hung over the LRA leadership. This included the signing of the
comprehensive political solutions agreement on May 2, 2007, providing
a roadmap for addressing the root causes of the LRA rebellion; the
accountability and reconciliation agreement signed on June 29, 2007,
with an implementation protocol signed on February 19, 2008; the
agreement on a permanent ceasefire signed on February 23, 2008; and
the agreement on DDR signed on February 29, 2008. The final peace
agreement which brought together all of the aforementioned agreements,
however, was never signed, meaning these protocols could never be fully
implemented.42 These important agreements counter the claim by Mark
Kersten and others that the Government and the LRA never took the
talks seriously.43
The ICC’s intervention nevertheless weakened the Juba process from
the outset. A structural effect of the ICC warrants was the fact that none
of the five LRA commanders charged by the Court—including Vincent
Otti, who had displayed an openness to negotiation during a previous
process with former Ugandan government minister Betty Bigombe44—
could lead the rebel delegation in Juba. Of the fifteen LRA delegates
sent to Juba, only two, Colonel Lubwe Bwone and Lieutenant Colonel
Santo Alit, were active commanders and had been present at failed LRA-
Government peace talks in 2004, thus bringing critical experience to the
Juba process. A source of constant frustration for the mediation and advi-
sory team to the talks was uncertainty over whether the LRA delegation
spoke legitimately on behalf of the leadership in the bush and had the
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authority to enact the agreements signed in Juba, including the cessation
to hostilities.45
The ICC warrants also fundamentally shaped the tenor and substance
of the Juba negotiations. During and after the two-year process, the LRA
said repeatedly that it would neither sign the remaining sections of the
final agreement nor countenance laying down its arms and demobilizing
its forces until the ICC warrants were withdrawn.46 Especially in the early
stages of the talks, the issue of the arrest warrants was a major distraction
to the five-point agenda. The first 18 months of the talks, particularly on
the third agenda item of accountability and reconciliation, were domi-
nated by discussions over modalities for removing the warrants or at least
pausing the ICC investigations for one year, renewable under Article 16
of the Rome Statute. The UN and other international actors with access
to the Juba negotiators stressed consistently that the Amnesty Act could
not legally apply to the LRA commanders. This view caused anger among
the LRA delegation and the Acholi civil society leadership that traveled
to Juba. It also curtailed the mediators’ flexibility in seeking common
ground between the parties.47
Throughout the Juba process, the ICC intervened acerbically with a
series of public statements, supported by various UN agencies and inter-
national human rights organizations, stating that the ICC arrest warrants
must be enacted.48 These international interventions raised the tempera-
ture of the negotiations, framing various LRA proposals solely as attempts
to extricate its leadership from the ICC warrants, and pressured all of the
parties to narrow the parameters of substantive discussion. This amounted
to significant over-reach by the ICC and its supporters and tainted the
atmosphere and content of the Juba talks.49 The barbed statements
by the ICC Prosecutor and other senior Court officials—particularly as
the third agenda item on accountability and reconciliation was being
discussed in 2007—complicated the mediators’ task.50 Similar issues have
arisen in other African peace negotiations conducted during ICC inves-
tigations and prosecutions, including the 2011 Doha talks between the
Sudanese government and seven Darfuri rebel groups, in which amnesties
were a central issue.51 While the Court was never the principal actor in
catalyzing or undermining peace negotiations, it greatly stymied attempts
to peacefully resolve the conflict between the LRA and the government.
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Peace Negotiations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Since the ICC launched investigations in the DRC in June 2004, the
Court has overlapped with three major peace processes in which amnesty
issues featured prominently: a series of informal peace negotiations with
rebel groups mediated by the president of the Congolese TRC, Rev. Jean-
Luc Kuye, in 2005 and 2006; the 2008 Goma talks which concerned
primarily the CNDP rebel group; and the 2013 Kampala talks, focused
on the M23 rebellion. The ICC affected each of these processes differ-
ently, echoing some features of the Uganda case while diverging in several
important ways.
First, the Congolese TRC incorporated an important element of peace
mediation and negotiation. Article 5 of the TRC Statute broadened the
commission’s mandate to include active conflict resolution, described
as “the prevention or management of conflicts as they occur through
mediation between divided communities.”52 Kuye and several TRC
commissioners attempted to resolve conflict by traveling to Kisangani,
Bukavu, Goma, Rutshuru, and elsewhere to talk to protagonists.53
Kuye argued that the ICC hampered the TRC’s efforts because
belligerents refused to confess to crimes or to cooperate with media-
tors for fear of evidence being used against them in criminal trials, either
through the ICC or the domestic courts. “The ICC came up forcefully
in our discussions with several rebel leaders, including [CNDP leader
Laurent] Nkunda,” Kuye said. “We would start talking to them, make
good progress, then the conversation would stop. They didn’t want to
incriminate themselves, even when we stressed that the amnesty was
in place.”54 This situation echoes challenges in other countries such as
Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste that have simultaneously deployed trials
and truth commissions. As various commentators have argued, the threat
of prosecutions in such cases often deters even lower-ranking actors from
appearing before truth commissions.55
In January 2008, the Goma peace talks between the Congolese
government and 22 rebel groups—but centering on the CNDP—began
to show the more direct influence of the ICC, including flow-on effects
from the concurrent Ugandan peace talks. The ICC had little impact
on the government or rebel parties in Goma but influenced substan-
tially the work of the international mediators. The CNDP pressed hard
for a blanket amnesty that would include charges of genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, arguing that the 2005 amnesty law
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was too restrictive in this regard.56 Several observers who interviewed
the European Union (EU) and other international mediators in Goma,
however, underline the “invisible presence”57 of the ICC over the nego-
tiations, principally on the legality of amnesties for international crimes.
In particular, the mediators wanted to avoid the heated contestation over
amnesties and international prosecutions that dominated the Ugandan
peace talks.58
The UN, however, found itself in a more complicated position, having
supported through MONUC the use of blanket amnesties for the Ituri
rebel leaders in 2006, discussed in the previous section, while supporting
the EU opposition to amnesties for international crimes during the Goma
process. Tatiana Carayannis observes that the UN found it an “embar-
rassment” that the final Goma agreement involved a peace deal with
CNDP deputy leader, Bosco Ntaganda.59 At the time of the Goma
talks, a sealed ICC arrest warrant for Ntaganda was in place (issued on
August 22, 2006, it was unsealed soon after the Goma talks on April
28, 2008).60 Laura Davis argues that rumors of the ICC warrant against
Ntaganda abounded in Goma and reinforced the EU’s and UN’s strin-
gent opposition to amnesties for international crimes. They did not want
to jeopardize possible ICC moves against Ntaganda in the way that they
perceived the Ugandan Amnesty Act to have done in the ICC cases
against the LRA leaders.61
Throughout 2013, the Kampala peace talks between the Congolese
government and the M23 rebels—precipitated by the M23 capture of
Goma in November 2012—again showed the important influence of the
ICC. Echoing the 2008 Goma talks between the Congolese government
and the M23’s predecessor organization, the CNDP, the rebel leaders
pressed hard for a blanket amnesty that would cover international crimes
as well as a favorable reintegration into the Congolese army. The parties
refused to sign a joint agreement and instead issued two separate declara-
tions in Nairobi in December 2013. As a result of the talks, an amnesty
law was passed in January 2014 that covered “insurrectional acts” but not
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Only 29 M23 fighters
were granted amnesty under the law, while the Congolese government
deemed 78 M23 members ineligible for reintegration into the Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and issued
arrest warrants for 19 M23 officials at large in Rwanda and Uganda.62
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Taken together, these three peace processes—the TRC dialogues in
2005–2006, the Goma talks in 2008 and the Kampala talks in 2013—
highlight the various ways in which the ICC has often discouraged conflict
actors to see dialogue as a means for peace and pushed mediators to
eschew amnesties, even if these represent important incentives to bring
belligerents to the negotiating table. These peace negotiations also under-
score the variability of the UN, the Congolese government, and other
important actors on whether prosecutions, as opposed to dialogue or the
offer of amnesties, represent the most effective responses to mass crimes.
Conclusion
Viewed side by side, the Ugandan and DRC cases highlight the crucial
but diverse ways in which the ICC impinges on national amnesties and
peace processes. Throughout peace negotiations in the two countries,
the ICC was one—but never the decisive—barrier to peace, often exacer-
bating more fundamental challenges. That the Ugandan and Congolese
governments, the UN and other international bodies that ostensibly
support the ICC so regularly advocate the use of amnesties—when
confronted with the need to facilitate peace talks, DDR, SSR, and truth
commissions—shows the continued utility of amnesty as a means to
resolve mass conflict. While the ICC has rendered the Rome Statute
an unavoidable touchstone in debates over amnesty and the conduct of
peace talks today, these actors are reluctant to jettison amnesty entirely
and to fully embrace international prosecutions. Meanwhile, the Court’s
attempts to influence peace negotiations and strident opposition to
amnesties—seen most vividly during the Juba talks—risk alienating actors
who are directly embroiled in attempts to mitigate conflict and do not
have the luxury of ignoring context and consequences.
Key Recommendations
International policymakers and practitioners should respond in several
ways to these problems produced by the ICC.
1. Reassess and reorient prohibitions against amnesties. The routinely
stated prohibition against amnesties for high-level atrocity perpe-
trators—and the prosecutions-at-all-costs approach this entails—
reflects neither international law, as it currently holds, nor the
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practice of the UN and many domestic governments in Africa. There
should be more explicit recognition that many of the processes
favored by the UN and other international actors to resolve mass
conflict, including DDR and SSR, depend on offering amnesties to
combatants in exchange for their cooperation. As highlighted above,
the stance by the ICC and many of its supporters that amnesties
are permissible for low-level perpetrators but must be prohibited for
high-ranking perpetrators belies the empirical reality that the latter
also disincentivizes many low-level actors from accepting amnesties
and participating in processes such as DDR and SSR. Interna-
tional actors must therefore refrain from anti-amnesty rhetoric and
advocate instead flexibility and context-specific responses to mass
crimes. This may, under certain circumstances, include prosecu-
tions but should equally allow principled discussion over the use
of conditional amnesties and other lenient forms of accountability
that promote peacebuilding. One key effect of the ICC’s interven-
tion in African conflict zones over the last 15 years has been the
narrowing of potential remedies available to African actors in seeking
the sustainable resolution of mass conflicts. This has denied peace
negotiators and other conflict mitigators the flexibility necessary to
incentivize belligerents to lay down their arms and to formulate
responses that address the complex causes of violence in the long
term.
2. Reinforce the role of local actors. As part of this reorientation,
international actors must also reinforce the role of local actors—
domestic policymakers, civil society, and affected communities—in
determining the most context-appropriate and effective means to
accountability and peace. Many domestic mediators during peace
talks in Uganda and the DRC expressed a sense of powerlessness
in the face of external insistence on ICC prosecutions. The experi-
ences of Uganda, the DRC, and other African states highlight the
overly controlling nature of international intervention—including
the over-reach of the ICC into delicate domestic peace processes—
and the need for much greater dedication to domestic ownership.
The precise contribution of the ICC to peacebuilding efforts across
Africa has been often stated but rarely proven. What is much clearer
is the ICC’s track record of interfering directly in key processes
of conflict mitigation—namely amnesties, peace talks, DDR, SSR,
and truth commissions—with the net result that, over the last
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17 years, the Court has made peace across Africa much tougher
to achieve. The task for the ICC and international actors now is
to tailor the Court’s work more directly to the pursuit of peace,
while minimizing its capacity to undermine other vital peacebuilding
efforts.
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Origins of Humanitarian Action
Humanitarian action and humanitarianism, in general, are typically
considered to be part of the evolution of Western thought and have their
historical foundation in 19th century European and subsequently North
American conflicts. In response to the horrors of these wars, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva Conventions
were established (1863 and 1864). Vital features of humanitarianism are
not, however, exclusive to, nor advanced only in Western conflicts. For
example, the duty of assisting others is prevalent in the Sakhat tradition
of Islam, as it is in the laws set down in fifth-century Chinese literature.1
That said, humanitarianism within an international context has, broadly
speaking, gone through several phases:
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i. From the mid-nineteenth century until the end of the First World
War;
ii. the subsequent period stretching until the end of the Second World
War, during which key international organizations were shaped;
iii. the Cold War period, which witnessed the institutionalization of
development and humanitarian aid; and
iv. the current, post-Cold War period, often referred to as a “golden
period” or “neo-humanitarianism,” where political ideologies
changed and altered the landscape of humanitarian aid.2
Humanitarian aid is founded on four key principles: humanity, inde-
pendence, neutrality, and impartiality. Organizations that generally fall
under the “humanitarian” category give different weight to each prin-
ciple depending on their history, character, and mandate.3 The ICRC and
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for instance, focus primarily on medical
care.4 Other humanitarian organizations operate across a range of activi-
ties such as education, water, sanitation, nutrition, and food security, often
at the same time. The primary objective that they all have in common as
humanitarian organizations is to save lives and alleviate suffering.5
Nearly all humanitarian organizations are “self-mandated;” that is, in
law and practice, they are non-governmental, private organizations. The
major exception is the ICRC, which is the only humanitarian organization
with a clear international legal foundation and status enshrined in the
Geneva Conventions.6
In recent decades, international institutions and donor countries
have responded to changing international and geopolitical dynamics by
seeking to merge humanitarian aid with development aid. The latter is
usually aimed at reducing poverty and supporting “development”—in
many guises—in accordance with liberal ideas about how poor and/or
conflict-ridden countries can become prosperous and stable.7 A host of
different issues—from state-building and forced migration to countert-
errorism and reconciliation—have now fallen into what might be called
the “humanitarian-development nexus.”8 As a consequence, there has
been a proliferation of so-called “multi-mandated organizations,” under-
taking a variety of different tasks funded by donors. These organizations
tend to be less focused on populations—saving lives and alleviating
suffering—than institutions. Increasingly, they operate in collaboration
with governments—donors and donor recipients—as well as other actors,
including militaries, broadly seeking the same goals.9
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That the founding principles and objectives of humanitarian aid are
under strain in today’s conflict/post-conflict zones is beyond doubt.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, where peacebuilding efforts
occur on an increasingly complex and contested terrain.
Mandate Shift in Africa
Peacebuilding is often defined as one phase or sequence in a long-term
process for states affected by conflict, which also comprises stability, peace
support, or peacekeeping operations and, latterly, state-building.10 More
loosely applied, “peacebuilding” is also used to describe the process as a
whole, which in the African context has proved especially problematic in
recent decades, as it often melds into the concepts of counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism. The funders of peacekeeping missions generally
hold that a strong state with strong institutions is desirable, since a strong
state is seen to be more resilient against threats of insurgency and terror.11
For humanitarian organizations, the changing nature of peacekeeping
missions has often put them in an invidious position, challenging their
founding principles.
The United Nations’ (UN) failure to protect civilians caught up in
intra-state conflict in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as a
stronger push from UN member states for missions to contribute more
to improving state institutions, spurred major doctrinal changes in peace-
keeping worldwide.12 The Brahimi Report reflected this shift, with a
call for stronger peacekeeping missions with expanded mandates, going
beyond the hitherto “self-defense” threshold of the use of force, to allow
forces to “use all means necessary to protect civilians under imminent
threat of physical violence.”13 The concept of “protection of civilians”
was thus born and doctrinally further developed to become an integral
part of multilateral peacekeeping missions in Africa.
Two additional characteristics of the shift in Africa are noteworthy:
the increasingly integrated role of UN missions to blend political, human
rights, humanitarian, and ultimately, statebuilding components into their
function; and, more recently, multilateral peacekeeping missions that take




Historically, and principally, humanitarian action is underpinned by the
legal principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL as a
part of the Geneva Conventions has for decades sought to regulate the
conduct of armed conflict including but not limited to, combatants right
to health care when wounded or sick, the right of humanitarian actors
to access populations in conflict-affected areas, and the rights of the very
same populations to receive assistance.15
Perhaps the most significant shift in humanitarian action, effected by
the above changes in peacebuilding, is the emergence of what is often
referred to as “humanitarian intervention.”16 The blending of humani-
tarian and military-political interventions was spurred by doctrines such
as Responsibility to Protect (R2P)17 as well as a practice of the UN
approving several military interventions defined as “humanitarian” with
or without UN Security Council approval. The legal foundation on
which these decisions are made has been questioned, with critics variously
arguing that the interventions are mere “window dressing” for imperial
interests or essentially flawed, due to their selective application.18
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001,
proved a turning point for humanitarian action, as with so much else. In
the subsequent US-driven paradigm of the “war on terror,” the principles
underpinning humanitarian action were usurped and utilized for mili-
tary and political gains, as new conflict dynamics took hold.19 No longer
simply a pretext for interventions, humanitarian action and aid frequently
became a tool to garner popular support in counterinsurgency and coun-
terterrorism contexts. The new era, exemplified by then-U.S. President
George W. Bush’s warning to other states and actors that “either you are
with us or against us,” would see NGOs described as “force multipliers”
by no less than his Secretary of State, Colin Powell. This recasting severely
undermined the principles and morality of IHL, and saw humanitarian aid
incorporated into the “politico-military toolbox.”20
With the fight against “terrorist” states or non-state actors pitched in
stark, Manichean terms, and all forms of aid viewed as tools to win hearts
and minds,21 traditional humanitarian actors were either sidelined or co-
opted. Their scope to provide assistance was also curtailed. Humanitarians
found it difficult to engage and provide humanitarian aid to populations
in areas which required guarantees and consent from non-state actors or
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areas in which foreign forces were conducting counterinsurgency opera-
tions.22 Such conflict areas include Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mozambique, to
name a few.
The various actors involved in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding in
Africa today have all, in different ways—unwittingly or not—contributed
to the undermining of the principled provision of humanitarian aid.
Humanitarian actors have always had to contend with competing inter-
ests in the spaces in which they operate. What is new, besides altered
conflict dynamics and changes to peacekeeping practice, is the introduc-
tion of new legislative frameworks that seek to strengthen the hand of
states in counterterrorism contexts.23 The advent and development of
increasingly restrictive counterterrorism legislation, both internationally
and domestically in many countries, adds a further layer of complexity to
the potential of safeguarding IHL in conflict areas.24 This sort of legisla-
tion often seeks to outlaw armed combatants and alienate potential areas
they may control, which often results in entire communities being placed
in legal limbo. Frequently, as in other areas of conflict, these communi-
ties may require humanitarian assistance, even more so when located in
areas outside of state control. Importantly, who controls the particular
area is often not decided by the resident population. Humanitarian agen-
cies seeking to assist these communities face a legal risk due to legislation
that effectively prevents any potential support reaching outlawed armed
groups or communities.25 So, humanitarians are denied access to needy
areas outside of state control and denied the opportunity to engage popu-
lations and armed groups.26 And when funding for humanitarian aid is
contingent upon winning hearts and minds, they are compromised. This
is all a far cry from humanitarians being able to assist all populations in
need, irrespective of whether they might find themselves on the wrong
side of an ideological or political fault line that invokes the language of
insurgency or terrorism.27
It is against this historical and political backdrop that contemporary
humanitarian aid’s role in a number of peacebuilding case studies in Africa
is analyzed below. Modern peacekeeping in Africa has morphed into a
function of political objectives,28 yet increasingly these aims are at odds
with the legal and foundational principles of humanitarian aid. Through
the following examples, the case for separation between the different
efforts and mandates of peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the one hand,
and humanitarian action on the other hand, shall be made explicit.
262 J. PEDERSEN
South Sudan
South Sudan is an example of a large peacekeeping mission whose
mandate has evolved in a significantly changing context. The United
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established following the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, between the govern-
ment of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM-A). It was established as a traditional peacekeeping mission,
tasked with overseeing a peace agreement, monitoring and verifying secu-
rity arrangements, support for humanitarian assistance and protection
of human rights, as well as providing political support to the parties.
This classic peacekeeping mission ended with the independence of South
Sudan in 2011 and UNMIS changed to UNMISS, the United Nations
Mission in South Sudan.29 The change in mission, mandate, and role of
peacekeeping was significant, not only due to the independence of South
Sudan, but also because UNMISS’s mandate was extended from the
consolidation of peace and security to state-building—helping to establish
conditions for development and the capacity of the newly independent
government to govern effectively and democratically.
This shift rendered the peacekeeping mission both an implementer and
supporter of the newly-created independent government. This in itself,
was not an undesirable function and role, but one that subsequently and
ideally necessitated the need for a separation between humanitarian action
and peacebuilding. Prior to a severe breakdown in security in 2013, when
South Sudan descended into large-scale civil conflict,30 the country had
been affected by several outbreaks of armed conflict between government
forces and non-state actors. Within its mandate of consolidating peace
and security, yet at the same time functioning as a de facto adviser and
supporter to the government, UNMISS found itself unable to play an
impartial role in certain cases and, in others, unable to fulfill its mandate
of supporting delivery of humanitarian aid.31 Both of these were essen-
tially in conflict with the interests of the then-government, of carrying
out a counterinsurgency campaign against armed groups opposed to the
government, and would subsequently impact the ability of UNMISS to
fulfill various parts of its mandate.32 UNMISS was forced to weigh its
priorities on the basis of its proximity to the government and its need to
facilitate the delivery of aid and consolidate security.
In such a scenario, for humanitarian aid to maintain a principled
and impartial posture, a certain degree of distance from a peacekeeping
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mission is required. But in South Sudan, the peacekeeping mission posi-
tioned itself on one side of a civil conflict, which became increasingly
evident after hostilities exploded in December 2013. As the country and
its armed forces fractured along various loyalties, several of its key inter-
locutors were now fighting each other on opposing sides of the conflict.33
As the conflict expanded and the component of state-building slid into
the background, UNMISS was tested on its ability and willingness to
protect civilians in harm’s way during the conflict. On several occasions,
UNMISS failed to do so, resulting in loss of civilian lives and, in certain
areas, a collapse in civilians’ faith in the neutrality of the peacekeeping
mission.
Both developments had a negative impact on humanitarian organi-
zations’ ability to reach and assist affected populations. When a peace-
keeping mission is no longer neutral due to association and proximity
to the government, humanitarian actors, who are de facto associated
with it, get tainted as well. This occurred in South Sudan, where trust
between these organizations and the population—essential to delivering
principled humanitarian aid—has been compromised due to the relation-
ship with UNMISS. In South Sudan, independence and separation from
actors in the conflict and from the peacekeeping mission, becomes imper-
ative. As the conflict evolved, UNMISS opened its bases for civilians
seeking protection, thus providing passive protection for large numbers
of displaced civilians and allowing for UNMISS bases to become de facto
displacement camps.34 UNMISS was widely hailed for this, and rightly so,
yet it was also continuously unable to provide more proactive protection
of civilians outside the camps and was still viewed as inactive. By opening
the UN sites to displaced civilians in numerous local settings, in combi-
nation with the lack of proactive protection, UNMISS opened itself to
local partisan communal and ethnic dynamics, often from groups opposed
to the government. On a very practical level, the need for separation is
required on two distinct levels.
Firstly, when the peacekeeping mission is viewed as proximate to the
government which is a party to the conflict, and secondly, when the
mission is, on one hand, failing to provide protection and, on the other,
when doing so, seemingly favoring certain groups. The complexity is
further compounded when humanitarian organizations are required to
work inside the same UNMISS compounds and bases that are host
to hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians. In the former case, in
the past, when UNMISS was viewed as proximate to the government,
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there were several instances of the mission being targeted, including
the shooting down of a UN helicopter, humanitarian organizations were
required to distance themselves as much as possible from the mission in
order to avoid becoming a target themselves. The fear was that humani-
tarian organizations could be targeted either by association or by mistake,
as both humanitarian agencies and the UN mission were using similar
white vehicles and the large integrated UN mission also has a humani-
tarian component. In the latter case, of a protection of civilians that, by
default, favors one particular group, humanitarian organizations working
in the UN bases to provide aid to the civilians seeking protection there
are often required to establish projects and provide services outside of
the UN bases in order to ensure a minimum perception of neutrality and
independence. This raises a real and practical dilemma of proximity for
humanitarians—damned if you do, damned if you don’t—when trying to
navigate the complexities of impartial aid delivery in South Sudan.
The Central African Republic
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the current peacekeeping
mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), was established in 2014,
to replace a regional peacekeeping mission and later an African-led
mission.35 The mission has been beset by changes and uncertainty over
who would fund and, thus, lead the mission, as well as concerns over the
reliance on peacekeepers from neighboring countries,36 which have not
been viewed as impartial by several local communities. Concurrently, and
until 2016, France deployed military forces to support the African-led
peacekeeping force.37
The mandate of MINUSCA focused specifically on the protection of
civilians though at its core also comprised support for the facilitation
of humanitarian assistance and human rights, support for security sector
reform, including disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, and
support for justice and the rule of law.38 As its name indicates, MINUSCA
is an example of a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission, or a multi-
mandated mission. In addition to the challenges evident in South Sudan,
the mission in the CAR is more directly involved in active military oper-
ations. In fact, most of the actual military operations are carried out by
MINUSCA, as the CAR military has very limited capacity.39 With the
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peacekeeping mission being an active party to the conflict, humanitarian
organizations struggle to maintain the principle of neutrality.
Due to the limited capacity of government, the peacekeeping mission
has taken on several state functions, including a central role in
supporting justice and the rule of law. It is in the process of seeking
justice—investigating potential crimes and interrogating or arresting
suspects/perpetrators—that a potential confrontation with humanitarian
organizations, operating across the fault lines of the conflict in the CAR,
lies. The mission has found itself engaged in violent conflict with armed
groups,40 and at the same time “dispensing” justice. In cases where peace-
keepers themselves have been killed, the mission has sought forceful access
to patients in humanitarian facilities, in order to interrogate suspects in the
killings. Such practice may not only violate the sanctity and safe space of
hospitals and clinics, upon which humanitarian organizations rely in order
to impartially treat all victims of conflict; it could also result in situations
where patients are not offered the protection to which they are entitled
under the law.
The question must be asked: when does the pursuit of justice infringe
upon the equal protections afforded to victims and potential perpetrators
under IHL? Recent experience in the CAR bears out evidence from other,
similar peacekeeping missions: when the mission takes on multiple roles
usually reserved for the sovereign power, like seeking justice for crimes
against their own staff, IHL and, by extension, the protection of patients,
receives less priority. Once again, the danger of losing neutrality—and
being perceived by local populations as partial—becomes very real for
humanitarians and the consequences can be very grave. In the CAR,
humanitarian organizations have become a target for armed groups,41
who no longer regard them as impartial and independent. This was most
pronounced when MINUSCA was tasked with supporting the elections in
2015.42 An inherently political task, in which parties are often perceived
either tacitly or explicitly favoring the incumbent, the role played by
MINUSCA further entrenched the perception that all organizations asso-
ciated with the mission—including humanitarian—were politicized. In
practice, the pursuit of justice in the killing of peacekeepers forced human-
itarians to prevent peacekeepers from accessing a hospital, as investigators
sought to interrogate suspects for possible involvement in the killings.
In such cases, the humanitarian organization made it clear that were
the UN mission to violate the sanctity of the hospital and compro-
mise the protection of the patient, this could potentially result in the
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closure of the hospital. Not only would it violate the above-mentioned
principles, it would likely damage the organization’s independence and
neutrality if armed actors were to perceive the hospital as handing over
patients to an opposing group, be that the UN or someone else.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC offers an additional and very practical dilemma between an
integrated or multi-mandated UN mission and humanitarian organiza-
tions. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the current mission
in the DRC, was established in 2010, replacing the previous mission,
the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUC). The latter was established in 1999 as a peacekeeping force
overseeing the Lusaka Agreement, which officially brought an end to the
regional conflict that had plagued the DRC in the 1990s (its primarily
domestic war lasted until 2003). Because of the changing political and
security dynamics, MONUSCO was instituted with a change of focus
from overseeing a peace agreement to providing support for humani-
tarian and human rights efforts, and to support the DRC government
in its stabilization and peace consolidations efforts.43
Due to increased insecurity in the eastern parts of DRC and poor
governmental military capacity, the DRC government, UN, African
Union (AU), and regional countries agreed to add an “intervention
brigade” to MONUSCO. The intervention brigade was established in
2013 for a one-year period, but the mandate has since been renewed on
an annual basis. The brigade consists of regional troops from the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), and includes infantry, special
forces, and artillery battalions. The brigade is tasked with neutralizing
armed groups and reducing risks to state authority and civilian security.44
The latter, in itself, represents a unique change in the role of peacekeeping
and peacebuilding missions, though the UN goes to great lengths to
emphasize that the expanded and offensive mandate of the intervention
brigade is not a precedent for peacekeeping operations elsewhere.45
As much as there is a need for providing security in the eastern
DRC, the fact that forward military operations are carried out by a
multi-mandated and integrated peacekeeping force represents yet another
challenge to humanitarian organizations. When the same force is tasked
with simultaneously securing humanitarian assistance and fighting armed
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groups, the element of neutrality is long gone. In practice, the same
peacekeeping force that one day supports the delivery of humanitarian
aid to a specific area may well return the next day, in the same white
vehicles or helicopters, only this time for a military operation targeting
armed elements. This inherent contradiction between the more peaceful
part of the mandate and the actual military part results in communities
and armed groups being unable to tell “which UN” has shown up on
a given day. For humanitarian organizations it thus becomes difficult, if
not impossible, to uphold a constructive, trust-based dialogue with armed
groups and communities.
Trust is the essential currency that humanitarians need to engage
constructively with armed groups so humanitarian aid can be delivered
on impartial, needs-based grounds. Proximity to the multi-mandated UN
peacekeeping force in the DRC has been fraught with blurred lines and
conflicts of interest. Unsurprisingly, in the eyes of armed groups, the
peacekeeping mission has become a legitimate target, as it appears to have
become in South Sudan.
The trust deficit which also affects humanitarian groups is painfully
illustrated by the relative weakness of the response to the outbreak of
Ebola in 2018 in the eastern part of DRC where, historically, govern-
ment the UN, and humanitarians have had only a nominal presence.
The response struggled with serious security incidents and attacks against
the newly-arrived government actors seeking to isolate potential Ebola
patients. This extended to MONUSCO, which provided military protec-
tion and security for responders to the Ebola outbreak.46 The combina-
tion of lack of trust, an approach to the outbreak that was overly focused
on militarized response, and the proximity of both the government and
the UN mission—who were both leading the response—put humanitarian
organizations in an impossible position. Unsurprisingly, they ended up in
the crosshairs. Some medical practitioners and patients were killed.47
Mali
Many of the problems identified above are amplified in the case of Mali
by the severe levels of violence against the peacekeeping mission and
the counterterrorism context in which the United Nations Multidimen-
sional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) operates.
MINUSMA was established as a multi-mandated mission, tasked with
providing the same aspects of protection of civilians, human rights, and
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humanitarian operations as other missions. More significant for this anal-
ysis, MINUSMA is effectively tasked with supporting state authority
through various security and defense measures across the country, espe-
cially in central Mali, home to numerous extremist groups.48 Given the
existence of multiple international intervention forces along with myriad
armed groups, some of whom are not signatories to a 2015 peace agree-
ment, it is not surprising that MINUSMA has experienced the highest
number of casualties of UN missions worldwide.49
The complexity of the context and high number of armed groups in
Mali is mirrored in MINUSMA, which is largely comprised of regional
countries’ contributing troops. But, almost uniquely for a peacekeeping
mission in Africa, MINUSMA also boasts small contingents of troops
from European countries, such as Denmark, Holland, Germany, and
Sweden, while Canada and the UK have also committed forces and
resources. Mali represents an important confluence of interests for these
countries, ranging from counterterrorism to energy security and migra-
tion.50 Mali is of keen interest to European countries from the perspective
of curbing migration to Europe.51 Alongside MINUSMA is the French
military Opération Barkhane, and the European Union’s training mission
with the Malian military. Both are predominantly focused on counterter-
rorism operations in the region. MINUSMA on the other hand, is not
specifically focusing on counterterrorism, though it is engaged in battles
against the same groups as Opération Barkhane. While MINUSMA does
not have counterterrorism as an explicit part of its mandate, in prac-
tice there is little to distinguish the mission from the forces present in
Mali that are undertaking counterterrorism operations. Several contin-
gents, hosted within MINUSMA, are in certain cases “detached” to
support either the Malian or French militaries in their counterterrorism
operations. Assets and personnel from the European contributors to
MINUSMA are at times preoccupied with intelligence gathering, though
in that process focusing more—for national security reasons—on intel-
ligence gathering related to international counterterrorism, than that
related to armed groups fighting the Malian government.52
In many respects, Mali is where the broader global discourse of
counterterrorism intersects and negatively impacts the provision of prin-
cipled humanitarian aid. The legal marginalization of armed groups (and
by extension communities) and the associated “dehumanizing rhetoric”
which characterizes the global fight against terrorism, often trumps
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IHL. The term “terrorist” is inherently political and sometimes subjec-
tive, and thus very open to opportunistic application. By extension, the
discourse and actual conduct of the fight against terrorism, by its restric-
tive approach, ends up alienating entire communities in a conflict zone
and cutting them off from humanitarian aid.53
The usual attendant risks for humanitarian organizations, especially
related to perceived proximity to the peacekeeping mission, are compli-
cated by the fact that some of the military contingents themselves
provide “humanitarian” assistance and rely on humanitarian aid as a
way of winning hearts and minds. Humanitarian assistance has been a
crucial component of military operations in counterterrorism and coun-
terinsurgency operations across the world, often in the guise of Quick
Impact Projects or QIPs.54 These are intended to entice communities
by providing basic services and infrastructure, in order for them either
to abandon armed opposition groups, including some termed as terror-
ists, or to ensure preference among communities for the state or the
intervening military forces.
The real consequence of providing humanitarian aid as part of a
military strategy defies the principle of impartiality, as it is no longer
needs, but political and military preferences that determine where the
humanitarian aid is provided, to say nothing of the inherent contradic-
tion in providing humanitarian aid at the barrel of a gun. This makes
the distinction between “principled” and “military” humanitarian aid
impossible, and thus indirectly cuts humanitarian organizations off from
reaching communities in need, as armed groups question the motives
of the entire humanitarian endeavor. This de-legitimizing of humani-
tarian aid consequently, and directly, prevents humanitarian organizations
from providing services where most needed, and may very well make
humanitarian organizations a target by armed groups. The UN’s own
humanitarian body the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), raised this concern, acknowledging that affiliation with
a party to the conflict (including the UN itself) compromises security and
humanitarian access.55 Thus the complexity of the interaction between
humanitarian organizations and peacekeepers is well established to the
point of acknowledging it, yet its consequences remain unaddressed.
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Key Recommendations
1. Understand, define, and depoliticize the role of humanitarian aid
and action. The role of humanitarian aid and action is not to
contribute to the strengthening of a particular power structure,
be it a state or local government, through efforts of peacekeeping
and peacebuilding. The role and function of humanitarian action is
to save lives and alleviate suffering. The conflation and integration
of humanitarian aid into otherwise laudable causes, in most cases,
does little more than devalue humanitarian aid and even, in cases
where vulnerable populations are excluded, negate the prospects
of sustainable peace. Thus, it is important when discussing the
potential contribution of humanitarian NGOs to understand that
the objectives and missions are fundamentally different and there
is, in many cases, a need for separation between peacekeeping and
humanitarianism. A separation not based on a value judgment of
the need, intentions, and desire for peacekeeping and peacebuilding,
but a separation necessary to ensure the ability of both to fulfill
their respective mandates. Accordingly, the lack of integration and
in some cases even lack of collaboration, should not be viewed as
humanitarian organizations spoiling the efforts of peacekeeping, but
as a mechanism and a way to maintain coexistence.
2. Distinguish and separate peacekeeping missions from humani-
tarian missions. As contemporary African conflicts and, by exten-
sion, peacekeeping missions have changed from the classic approach
of monitoring a ceasefire or peace agreement to peacekeeping
missions being involved in a wider array of activities, such as
state-building, supporting state authority, counterinsurgency, and
a blurred mix of counterterrorism and state support, the need
for humanitarian agencies to distinguish, and in some cases even
separate themselves from these missions, is becoming increasingly
obvious. Not only do humanitarian agencies need to separate them-
selves from these missions in order to fulfill their proper role, but
the actions of some of these missions can increase the security risk
for humanitarian agencies. The argument is not to undermine the
mandate and processes carried out by peacekeeping missions, but
rather to accept that the roles, mandates, and objectives of peace-
keeping missions and humanitarian agencies are distinct. Human-
itarian organizations need to embrace and protect this different
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identity. The overlapping of different roles is understandable in
certain contexts, yet it remains an uncomfortable compromise. The
current trend—dogmatically promoted by donors and the UN—
of blending peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian aid into
one holistic response should be resisted. The idea of linking the
various components typically arises from a noble intent, but, as
acknowledged by UN OCHA in Mali and demonstrated elsewhere,
principled humanitarian aid is often sacrificed where it is needed
most. In the absence of a return to clearly delineated roles in conflict
and post-conflict settings, the humanitarian actions will become less
and less effective over time.
3. Enhance the independence of humanitarian organizations through
diversified funding. Humanitarians also need to look in the mirror.
To promote their independence, they must do more and do better
to secure funding from bi- and multilateral donors. This is not
a process that the donors themselves will initiate; they are largely
moving in a different direction. It is thus up to humanitarian orga-
nizations to make the case forcefully that their role and functions
cannot be farmed out to nonexperts or politically “compromised”
actors, and to educate donors on the perils of blurring responsibili-
ties.
4. Create space for humanitarian missions. Principled humanitarian
aid cannot be provided at the barrel of a gun, whether it is a combat-
ant’s or a putative peacekeeper’s. The current operational doctrine
which has given rise to multi-mandated organizations is flawed.
Humanitarians must be given the space to do their work. No less,
no more.
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CHAPTER 16




In order to address violent conflicts across the world, international collab-
oration and astute coordination are required. This is not possible without
an urgent, overall enhancement of global and regional mechanisms for
peace management and conflict resolution. Currently, 65 million of the
approximately 7.6 billion people on earth are forcibly displaced persons
(FDPs). This situation is but a symptom of protracted conflicts mainly
in ten countries/areas– Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Burundi, Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, Colombia, the Caucasus,
and the former Yugoslavia. In addition, 32 other countries have been the
source of a large number of refugees and 53 countries are involved in
managing internally displaced persons (IDPs).1
This chapter will discuss the broad issues of prevention, as well
as mediation of conflicts, followed by a brief synopsis of three
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case studies in violent conflict—Cyprus, Myanmar, and Darfur. The
subsequent outlining of key peacebuilding challenges and conclusions
are drawn in part from my personal experience in the management and
attempted resolution of these conflicts, principally in my former role as the
Joint Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Chief Medi-
ator and Chairperson of the African Union/Head of the UN-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Other relevant experiences drawn
on below are my role as UN Secretary General’s Special Representative
and Head of the UN Mission in Angola, and the UN Under Secretary-
General/Special Adviser on Africa heading the Office, which was the focal
point for promoting and coordinating international support for the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).
The United Nations (UN) is premised on the concept of collective
security: the idea that a threat to peace anywhere should be considered a
threat to peace everywhere and should be met with a collective response
based on global solidarity. In reality, however, the record of the inter-
national community in conflict management and conflict resolution is
mixed. On the positive side, the Human Security Report of 2005 found
a 40 percent decline in violent conflicts between 1992 and 2004.2 The
report attributed this, in part, to the efforts made by UN peacemaking.
Nonetheless, we are all living witnesses to the mass suffering caused by
prolonged ongoing conflicts in many parts of the world. Examples of
failures of collective security are not hard to find.
We need to better understand the reasons for relative successes in
global peacemaking, as well as conspicuous failures, and adapt our strate-
gies and capacities in order to produce more durable, negotiated solu-
tions. In this regard, we need to recognize that the nature of conflict—its
root causes, the type of protagonists—has changed.
Three evolving conflict dynamics stand out:
i. Violence is overwhelmingly intra-state;
ii. the number of non-state actors involved is growing; and
iii. non-state actors have added more complexity to the root causes and
management of conflict.
Both in academia and among diplomats, there are choices and
preferred approaches to conflict resolution. Opinions differ on why medi-
ation efforts, especially for intractable conflicts, fail. My own experience
suggests that the prescription of “one-size-fits-all” solutions is often to
blame. Most conflicts feature complex interactions of different forces,
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with each requiring well-designed structures and responses that are
oriented to the needs of the specific situation.
What have come to be known as “spoilers” in a peace process are
an endemic problem.3 Whether real or potential, leaders of parties or
movements, either within or outside a peace process, spoilers are typically
thought to constitute themselves as deliberate obstacles to the peaceful
settlement of conflicts and employ violence to achieve their objectives. At
the same time, it is not clear whether the term “spoiler” is ascriptive or
earned, whether they are homegrown or externally generated. My own
experience suggests that the spoilers of today can become the partners of
peace tomorrow.
Africa has the most developed regional organization in the developing
world for conflict resolution and peace management. The African Union
(AU) was founded in May 2001 in Addis Ababa (and launched in Durban,
South Africa in 2002), as a successor to the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), which came into being in 1963.4 The first OAU peacekeeping
operation was in Chad in December 1981. Beset by myriad problems, and
without assistance from the UN, it lasted only until June 1982. On the
whole, the OAU’s efforts to maintain peace and security in Africa were
mostly weak and ineffectual.5 Thus, the transformation of the OAU to
AU can be understood as a reinvigoration of the organization in tackling
Africa’s security challenges.
The AU has a Peace and Security Council, and a Department of Peace
and Security, headed by a Commissioner working with (not under) the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission. One of the more signifi-
cant developments in the history of the AU is the formation of the African
Standby Force (ASF). My experience in leading the assessment of mili-
tary and civilian experts on making the ASF fully operational reaffirmed
my belief in its necessity for Africa, though the challenge of creating a
deployable force still remains at the time of writing.
By 2019, AU peacekeeping/peace-enforcement missions were
deployed in Somalia and there was also a Joint AU/UN Peacekeeping
Mission in Darfur. The latter was, until recently, the largest international
peacekeeping force. At its peak and under my leadership as Joint Special
Representative, the AU had about 30,000 military, police, and civilian
personnel. It was also the most expensive mission, with an annual budget
of between US $1.5 billion and US $1.7 billion.6
Finally, there is the Panel of the Wise, comprising select former
statesmen and stateswomen. The Panel was created in late 2002 and
became operational in 2008. It boasts several subregional counterparts.
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Collectively, these organs and structures are known as the AU Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA).7
The AU’s APSA is underpinned by the now commonly held view that
there is a strong nexus between peace, security, development, human
rights, and democratization. Two seminal reports bear out this key rela-
tionship, the first in 1992 by the then-UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace8 and the second, by his successor,
Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom.9
Cyprus and Myanmar---Lessons for Africa?
Cyprus is one of the longest running conflicts in the dossier of the UN.
There has been both a UN peacekeeping operation deployed there since
1964, the year after hostilities broke out, as well as the Secretary-General’s
Good Offices Mission Role after 1974. The latter was encouraged by the
Security Council following the division of the country into two hostile
camps of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—as well as the presence
of Turkish troops in Cyprus.
The admission of a divided country, Cyprus, as a full member of the
European Union has been a complicating factor in seeking a resolution
of the conflict. The UN has remained a key third party continuously
seeking a formula that would lead to a bizonal, bicommunal federal
state.10 Unfortunately, each community in Cyprus has regarded the other
as the “spoiler” in the peace process. That much was clear to me during
my short time as UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Cyprus in
the mid-2000s. This situation is common in Africa, where the idea of
“spoilers” is bandied about, without consideration for what their objec-
tives might actually entail. In the case of Cyprus, it is fair to say some
have broader national and international objectives, while others are more
limited. But, as in parts of Africa, it is an open question whether some are
bent on prolonging the stalemate forever.
Nearly fifty years on, there is no tangible sense of urgency in resolving
the conflict in Cyprus. It has been compared to “a padlock requiring
four keys, held respectively by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots,
Greece and Turkey.” In the words of another former Special Envoy,
Alvaro de Soto, who handled the dossier on behalf of UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, the history of attempts to overcome the division
of Cyprus can be measured in false dawns. One or another leader could
always be relied upon to thwart the effort and yell “no!”, and support
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from either Ankara or Athens would be withdrawn.11 The most compre-
hensive plan to resolve the conflict, which was presented by the UN to
the parties and also had the blessing of the European Union, was put to
referenda in 2004. It was approved by the Turkish Cypriots but turned
down by the Greek Cypriots. More than fifteen years on, it is unclear if
Cyprus is any closer to a durable solution or on the cusp of another false
dawn.
Myanmar was once thought to be one of the world’s most intractable
internal conflicts, as stubborn as any long-running conflict in Africa,
pitching the military versus the people. It is a country that was once
beset by grave human rights abuses, and its democratic prospects in
the 1990s seemed dim. The UN attempted to mobilize the support
of neighboring countries and other key states through the Secretary-
General’s special envoys and advisors. Their role would be to assist
the Government of Myanmar in implementing its Seven Steps Road
Map toward democracy, announced by General Khin Nyunt in 2003,
which would mean addressing the country’s multi-dimensional problems
(human rights, forced labor, child soldiers, humanitarian access and delay
in achieving Millennium Development Goals, etc.).
The failure of past engagements with Myanmar was due to issues
around its international isolation, economic sanctions, and Security
Council Resolutions against the regime.
In pursuing the Secretary-General’s Good Offices Role in Myanmar as
the third Special Envoy, I was given a formidable set of tasks. Four main
principles guided my efforts:
i. Ensuring that the Secretary-General’s Good Offices was perceived
as a process and not an event;
ii. Given the complexities of the Myanmar conflict, not reducing our
approach to a single issue (e.g., freedom for imprisoned democracy
leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Sun Kyi, however
important a priority that may have been);
iii. Engaging with the Government—and, to an extent, the opposi-
tion—could not be an end in itself, instead there must be progress,
measurable in concrete terms; and
iv. Engaging with all those, both inside and outside the country, who
could contribute to addressing Myanmar’s challenges.
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In line with these principles, and with support from the Association
of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), China, India, Japan, and others, my
role was to bring the government and the opposition leaders together
to commence a political process. In doing so, it was not uncommon to
feel the wrath of exiled groups in Thailand, London, and the United
States and some key members of the Security Council, who did not
want the country’s National League for Democracy and its leadership
to participate in the elections, which they saw as illegitimate. I was
convinced then, and proved right subsequently, that without the elec-
tions, there was not a viable path to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi
and the resolution of the political deadlock in Myanmar. As it happened,
the newly elected president undertook dramatic and significant reform
measures aimed at promoting democracy and transforming the largely
centralized economy into an increasingly market-oriented one. Myanmar
subsequently moved from one positive milestone to another, including
chairmanship of ASEAN and, via elections, the elevation of San Suu Kyi
to a position equivalent to prime minister. However, the massacre of
Rohingyas beginning in early 2018 and the consequent collapse of San
Suu Kyi’s global reputation illustrates how much more needs to be done
to cement the democratic gains of the past decade and to reaffirm peaceful
coexistence and respect for human rights in Myanmar.
Darfur/Sudan
In 2009, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur, led by former President
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, defined the Darfur conflict as “Sudan’s
crisis in Darfur.” In doing so, the Panel stated that “the root of the
Darfur crisis lies in the history of neglect of the Sudanese peripheries,
dating from colonial times and continuing during the years of Sudan’s
independence.”12 In other words, the conflict should not be seen in
terms of identity: Arabs versus Africans, Christian versus Muslims, or
North versus the South.13 Rather, and especially following the separa-
tion of South Sudan from the rest of the country in July 2011, it’s a
conflict over access to resources (especially water), power (largely concen-
trated in Khartoum) and economic opportunities. The reason so many
past agreements were “dishonored” is partly down to a misdiagnosis of
the problem.14 The centrality of access to water, in particular, was my
main motivation as Head of the African Union–UN Hybrid Operation in
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Darfur (UNAMID), to organize a large international forum on Water for
Peace.
Following an escalation of violence in the region and subsequent
humanitarian crisis in 2003–2004, ceasefire agreements were brokered
and the first contingent of military observers and protection forces were
deployed. This marked the beginning of the AU Mission in Sudan
(AMIS).15 Its initial success in stabilizing the situation on the ground was
not followed by a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which could have
paved the way for peace and development in Darfur. The challenges on
the ground were formidable: protection of a dispersed civilian population
and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to over 2 million internally
displaced persons and 300,000 refugees. AMIS, despite some support
from international partners, could not cope. After initial resistance from
the Government of Sudan, they eventually agreed to allow in UNAMID.
This AU–UN hybrid mission was arguably, at the time, the most extensive
collaboration ever mounted between a global and regional organization
in the area of peace and security. UNAMID took over from AMIS on
January 1, 2008. If anything, AMIS showed that Africa is willing to put
its boots where its politics lay. And when the history of Darfur is written,
the work of AMIS should be viewed as essential to averting what could
have been another Rwanda.16
Stark challenges remain in Darfur today. There are still significant
parties to the conflict which are not signatories to the peace process. But
the current situation is vastly better than what obtained in Darfur in the
2000s. The signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)
on July 14, 2011 between the Government of Sudan and one of the
armed movements, Liberation and Justice Movement, was a significant
early milestone. Thereafter followed a number of positive developments,
including the establishment of a Darfur Regional Authority and an
international Donor Conference on Reconstruction and Development
in Darfur in 2013, where over US $3 billion was pledged. The peri-
odic outbreaks of violence since then illustrate that more work needs to
be done, especially in improving local capacities for addressing the root
causes of protracted violent conflict.
In his Report on Enhancing Mediation and Its Support Activities
(S/2009/189 of 8 April 2009), then-UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki
Moon, made urgent recommendations on the management of conflict
and achieving peace. These include:
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i. The need for experienced and knowledgeable mediators and
support teams;
ii. the need for sufficient resources to help parties design and pursue
processes which address root causes of conflicts and achieve agree-
ments which lead to durable peace; and
iii. the need for building capacities for mediation at the local, national,
and regional levels, while promoting coherent partnerships between
the UN, regional and subregional organizations, member states and
NGOs.
Key Challenges
Striking a Balance Between Peace and Justice, Including
Strengthening Relations Between the United Nations
and the International Criminal Court
The first challenge lies in the increased demands on the UN to both
facilitate the negotiation of peace agreements and to establish account-
ability mechanisms. This has led us to examine the relationship between
the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the interaction
between UN representatives and persons indicted by the ICC. While in
the long run, peace and justice are mutually reinforcing, in the short run
there are often tensions between these two essential goals. As then-UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated before the Security Council in 2003,
We should know that there cannot be real peace without justice, yet the
relentless pursuit of justice may sometimes be an obstacle to peace. If we
insist, at all times and in all places, on punishing those who are guilty of
extreme violations of human rights, it may be difficult or even impossible to
stop the bloodshed and save innocent civilians. If we always and everywhere
insist on uncompromising standards of justice, a delicate peace may not
survive. But equally, if we ignore the demands of justice simply to secure
agreements, the foundations of that agreement will be fragile and will set
bad precedents.17
To help manage these tensions, the UN Secretariat came to the following
conclusions:
i. On the relationship between peace and justice: there is no sustain-
able peace without justice—although they can be sequenced in
time;
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ii. The UN does not recognize amnesty for genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law;
iii. On the UN–ICC relationship: while the ICC is independent of the
UN, the UN supports the Court and avoids any action likely to
undermine its authority; and
iv. Contacts between UN representatives and persons holding posi-
tions of authority in their country who have been indicted by the
ICC should be limited to what is strictly required for carrying out
UN-mandated activities.
The preamble to the 1998 Rome Statute, which created and governs
the ICC,18 highlighted that the states parties express their determina-
tion “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of crimes and
thus to contribute to the ‘prevention’ of such crimes.”19 The “preven-
tion” role given to the ICC stems from the view that courts can prevent
crimes through punishments that have a deterrent effect, though, to date,
arguably no such punishments have been severe enough to achieve that.
My own experience leads me to believe that you do not have to
choose between peace and justice; you can phase them in according to
the circumstances—i.e., what the demands of peace suggest. The removal
of Charles Taylor from Liberia in 2003 is a case in point. If he had not
been taken out of Liberia by prior arrangement involving the African
Union, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS)
and Nigeria, it is hard to imagine what fate may have befallen the country
he led for 6 years. The peace process would probably never have gotten
off the ground. And although justice may have been delayed in Taylor’s
case because of the imperative of peace, eventually it too would be
achieved.
Factoring Implementation Agreements into Mediation Efforts
A second challenge is the need to factor implementation arrangements
into the mediation process. The UN is often asked to help the parties
implement agreements that were reached without its involvement, that
sometimes go against fundamental UN principles, and, moreover, that
offer no practical possibilities for implementation. For example, an agree-
ment may hold unrealistic expectations of international support, or a
286 I. A. GAMBARI
timetable which neither party can manage. As a general rule, those insti-
tutions which are expected to support implementation should also be
present, at least as an observer, during the negotiations.
Ensuring Strong Women’s Participation in Conflict Resolution
A third challenge is women’s inclusion in the negotiation and medi-
ation process, rather than just “civil society participation.” The UN,
like other governmental and inter-governmental bodies, has too few
women engaged in these tasks. Although the AU and all the regional
economic communities (RECs) in Africa have made laudable strides,
boasting gender units and improved means of gender mainstreaming,20
to the extent that the AU declared the 2010s to be the African Women’s
Decade (AWD),21 the vision is yet to be realized. Studies have shown that
women tend to be better at conflict management, have better listening
skills, more tolerance, and empathy.22 Africa is losing out for not doing
more to rectify gender imbalances in conflict resolution and mediation.
Managing Spoilers Through Innovative Approaches: Inducements,
Socializations, Coercion, and Leverage
The UN does not have the luxury of not engaging spoilers—the fourth
challenge—in peace processes in which the organization is involved.
(How can one change their behavior without engagement?) The issue
for the UN is what kind of engagement is most appropriate or capable
of providing deliverables. In this regard, and with the caveat below, I
endorse Stephen Steadman’s broad categories of engaging spoilers.23
The Inducement or Carrots Strategy
This strategy consists of accepting all the demands of a spoiler in exchange
for concessions in the peace process. These demands can include recog-
nition or legitimacy, physical protection by UN troops, economic or
political benefits. The inducement approach is the easiest strategy to
implement. Unfortunately, when used improperly it can exacerbate the
situation, as occured in Angola in 1992 when custodians permitted the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to play
a continued role in the negotiations despite resuming war. On the other
hand, in Cyprus, the UN Peace Plan 2004 and the 8th of July Agreement
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were designed to keep the two opposing communities strictly engaged in
the peace process.
The Socialization Strategy
This strategy demands that spoilers conform to a set of norms and
standards to be allowed into the peace process. For socialization to be
effective, norms must be fair and realistic, they must be clearly established,
communicated to all stakeholders and remain consistent over time.
Coercion or Stick Strategy
This strategy relies on the threat or reality of punishment. This approach
includes coercive diplomacy, the use of force, the muted withdrawal of
peacekeepers or other international forces, the imposition of “no-fly”
zones, and the “departing train” strategy, which is meant to convey to
spoilers that the peace process will proceed with or without them. The
coercion strategy requires active measures to protect the parties engaged
in the peace process and to deter spoilers. The “withdrawal” strategy is
not to be considered lightly, given the disastrous experience of Rwanda,
where the UN mission was hastily scaled back at the outbreak of the geno-
cide, leading to even greater loss of life.24 Needless to say, there should
be no exit of UN peacekeeping operations without a clear strategy.
Exercising Leverage
A fifth challenge is the appropriate exercise of leverage in support of
peacebuilding and conflict prevention. A lot has been written about sticks
and carrots. I would draw attention to three types of leverage that are
sometimes undervalued and therefore underutilized:
i. Leverage which accrues when a mediator builds a relationship of
trust with the parties, so that they will have sufficient confidence to
ask for advice and be amenable to accept the mediator’s suggestions.
Mediators need to be prepared to invest personally in building such
relationships.
ii. Leverage that results from being able to mobilize impartial tech-
nical expertise. While peace processes are fundamentally political in
nature, technical advice can sometimes help to find a way out of
an impasse, not least by giving the parties a common professional
language or set of concepts to work with.
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iii. Leverage in the form of “enabling resources,” which can help a
party to carry out its side of the bargain, e.g., assistance given to a
guerrilla army to transform itself into an effective political party.
Promoting Cohesion among Mediators and Good Offices through
Support for a Unified Mediator
A sixth challenge is the proliferation of actors involved in mediation.
Overall this is a positive development. While the UN is the best placed
to succeed in some cases, in other situations one of its partners, such as
the AU, European Union, or ASEAN may have a comparative advan-
tage. Under Chapter VIII of its Charter, the UN encourages regional
organizations to assist in areas of peace and security. This can be seen
in the support the UN gives to the AU and their ongoing coopera-
tion in peace operations, which has so far proved more effective than
unilateral undertakings. Ultimately, success often rests on the ability of
all actors involved to unify behind a chief mediator. The proclivity of
actors to “shop around” for the forum that best suits their interests is
an ever-present danger in any peacebuilding environment.
Besides stature and expertise, the qualities that make up an effec-
tive chief mediator include but are not limited to: impartiality, patience,
humility, and respectfulness. The chief mediator must know when to walk
away if a peace process comes to a dead-end, the trust and confidence
of the parties involved have dissolved, or the mediator has become the
“issue” rather than the substance of the conflict.
Relations with NGOs and Civil Society Groups
At the height of the conflict in Darfur, over 300,000 people were dead
and 2 million were internally displaced and living in camps, out of a
total population of 7 million. Peacekeepers were tasked with facilitating
the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need, but it was the
NGOs and the wider humanitarian community who were responsible for
providing for the basic needs of Darfurians in the camps. Their essential
role in delivering food, clothing, education, and health assistance cannot
be understated.
Insofar as the peace process, however, the place of NGOs—the seventh
and last challenge—became much more complicated and contested. By
design or default, they became advocates for one or other armed move-
ments. In effect, they took sides in Darfur, as they have done elsewhere.
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Whenever this occurs, the UN or chief mediator is placed in an invid-
ious position, as their role is to reconcile not take sides. Consequently,
it is not uncommon for relationships with NGOs to sour or even break
down. This must be avoided at all costs, however. Regular engagement
with NGOs is essential; it is not optional. Without NGOs, victims of war
would have no one to turn to, and their voices would go largely unheard.
Conclusion
The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations starts with the words:
“We the People.” It is a recognition that the raison d’etre of the world
body, i.e., the prevention and resolution of wars and conflict, is far too
important to be left to countries and their governments alone.
The UN Charter is clear that the Security Council, and by implication
its five permanent members, have primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. In addition, Chapter VIII of the
Charter provides for regional arrangements to complement the efforts of
the United Nations. My long experience of peacebuilding in Africa—as
mediator, envoy, practitioner, and thinker—leaves me in no doubt that
regional organizations must, and are best suited to, initiate conflict reso-
lution efforts and do the heavy-lifting, before the UN enters the arena
as a partner and takes over peacekeeping duties. Yet, to paraphrase the
late Lord Caradon, former Ambassador/Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom: the United Nations is only as strong as member states
allow it to be in terms of preventing, managing, and resolving wars and
violent conflict. This is also applicable to regional organizations such as
the African Union.
Effective action for peace by the United Nations and regional orga-
nizations increasingly depends on the pressure NGOs, scholars, activists,
and ordinary citizens bring to bear on their governments and political
leaders. Much more needs to be done to safeguard human rights every-
where and to peacefully resolve violent conflicts. This was the inspiration
behind the establishment of the Savannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democ-
racy and Development (SCDDD)25 and other like-minded institutes and
organizations the world over. To paraphrase the motto of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):
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since wars begin in people’s minds, it is in these same minds that the
defense of peace must be constructed.
Key Recommendations
1. Pay more attention to sequencing of peace and justice—it is not
an either/or trade-off . Mindful that the deterrent effect of Inter-
national Criminal Court indictments on preventing crimes is, at
best, unproven, peacebuilding requires flexibility on the timing of
peace and justice processes. The context should determine what is
appropriate, not arbitrary deadlines set by outsiders.
2. Women must be central to peacebuilding processes, not included
as part of a civil society component . Africa is losing out by not
doing more to rectify gender imbalances in conflict resolution and
mediation.
3. Build support and create new mechanisms for developing a
Unified Mediator. Today’s peacebuilding environments are replete
with multiple actors leveraging different platforms off against one
another to advance their own interests. Yet success in peacebuilding
often rests on actors rallying behind a single chief mediator who
commands support across the political landscape.
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Peacebuilding as State Building? Lessons
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rachel Sweet
Introduction
International peacebuilding is embroiled in contradictions: do peace
accords reflect reality, or merely rhetoric? Does third-party enforcement
guarantee credible commitments, or compromise sovereignty? Can polit-
ical institutions balance the interests of armed rivals? The evolution of
peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) offers
insight into critical policy dilemmas. From 1996 to 2003, two wars
broke out in the DRC,1 followed by a fragile peace and remobilized
rebellions. These conflicts have been an experimenting ground for a
broad menu of peacebuilding policies. Internationally backed accords
integrated rebels into state positions, a power-sharing government aimed
to transform belligerents into political competitors, and national elec-
tions sought to consolidate progress toward institutionalized competition.
Meanwhile, the largest and most costly United Nations (UN) peace-
keeping mission in history is designed to protect civilians and support
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inclusive governing institutions. Yet, despite these efforts, armed groups
in the DRC multiplied to an estimated 130 by 2019, yielding fragmen-
tation rather than stability.2 Civilians across the country face insecurity,
recurrent government repression, and troubled elections.3 Why have
international peacebuilding efforts failed?
To make sense of these dilemmas, this chapter revisits a guiding
assumption of global policy. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, policy-
makers have treated state-building, or investing in legitimate governing
institutions, as a central component of peacebuilding.4 A wave of
academic studies since the early 2000s casts weak governing institu-
tions as incubators of insecurity and a range of social ills.5 In response,
international peacebuilding moved from narrow tasks of ceasefires and
patrolling buffer zones to a more extensive focus on building up political
institutions in host states.6 State-building as a form of peacebuilding is
“premised on the recognition that achieving security and development
in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the experience
of capable, autonomous, and legitimate governmental institutions.”7 Yet,
practitioners heeding this lesson did not fully account for the informal
networks and predatory logics that can also animate official institutions.8
State-building attempts that graft institutions atop preexisting violent
networks can produce institutions that lack their anticipated moderating
or stabilizing effects.
The DRC illustrates this policy trend and the cracks in its approach.
Peacebuilding efforts in the DRC grew from a focus on peace accords
toward institutional design and state-building projects. These efforts
aimed to stem violence by expanding the footprint of the state, but
the state’s political and military institutions—its bureaucracy and security
forces—were more porous than policymakers assumed. Parallel networks
within the national army supported armed groups, while parallel taxation
schemes in the official bureaucracy helped sustain rebels’ war economies.
State-building policies viewed official institutions as buffers against rebel-
lion, but in reality conflict actors straddled a blurred line between state
institutions and violence.
This chapter traces this lesson across three stages of peacebuilding in
the DRC that showcase the evolution of global policy. The first stage used
peace accords to end the Second Congo War (1998–2003), part of a wave
of negotiated settlements to end armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era.
The second implemented peace accords through the Transitional Govern-
ment (2003–2006), reflecting another mainstream policy tool in action:
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power sharing. The third stage expanded the mandate of the UN mission
to state-building through laying physical infrastructure for administrations
and deploying military force to build state influence over belligerents.
Across these approaches, policymakers viewed official institutions as tools
to mitigate violence: incorporating rebels into government posts would
moderate their behavior, and expanding the reach of state administrations
would reduce the physical and social space for rebels to organize. And yet,
each phase struggled to cope with the porous nature of the state. Rebels
used bureaucracy to finance violence. Peace accords and the transitional
government transferred the symbols of the state institutions to combat-
ants, but did not reshape the underlying networks that directed them.
And UN efforts to shore up state authority overlooked the complicity
between the national military and armed groups.
Of course, peacebuilding in the DRC is more nuanced than a brief
chapter can capture. Youth associations such as LUCHA and FILIMBI
illustrate the critical role of grassroots democracy movements.9 New
rebellions and day-to-day coping mechanisms in the face of insecurity also
warrant attention. Nonetheless, overall stages discussed here help shed
light on key dilemmas of global policy. The remainder of this chapter
positions the DRC within the overall shifts in international peacebuilding.
It shows how practitioners, following the policy wisdom of the day, priv-
ileged official institutions to mitigate violence, but drew too firm of
boundaries between these and non-state actors. Empirically, the chapter
draws on original records from armed groups and the UN peacekeeping
mission to illustrate its argument.
The Shift in International
Peacebuilding Toward State-Building
International peacebuilding increasingly emphasizes a role for formal
political institutions in ending violent conflict. With the end of the Cold
War, financial and military backing for proxy insurgencies declined, and
international interests shifted toward ending civil wars. During the Cold
War, peacebuilding favored limited interventions. UN missions, like in
Cyprus, took on narrow roles of peace enforcement and patrolling buffer
zones. After the Cold War, policymakers grew more proactive through
brokering peace accords and bringing belligerents to negotiating tables.
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Civil wars increasingly ended in negotiated settlements rather than mili-
tary victory, introducing questions of institutional design as security
priorities.10
Within this trend, power-sharing governments became the preferred
tool to mediate conflict.11 Power sharing aims to curb the uncertainty of
political competition by providing all groups a stake in the official process
and building consensus for a common governance formula.12 In this
logic, incorporating rebels into official institutions would moderate their
behavior and reward political, rather than military, competition. These
agreements are typically backed by a third-party enforcer, such as a UN
peacekeeping mission, and culminate in national elections. During the
1990s, the United States and Europe used these settlements in stalled
conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and the DRC. Power sharing has been
subject to many critiques: moderate politicians may be difficult to find
after war, elites may be unaccountable to constituents, and agreements
may reward violent pathways to power.13 Practitioners typically respond
by revising official rules to get incentives right, reaffirming the role of
formal institutions to peacebuilding.
From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, global policy expanded to
a more comprehensive state-building approach. A focus on negotiated
settlements and elections grew to include building rule of law institutions
and participating in political reconstruction.14 Multilateral peacekeeping
forces incorporated state-building into their mandate.15 Now the goal
was not simply to enforce ceasefires or patrol buffer zones, but to lay the
foundation for stability by investing in the political institutions of the host
country. Major foreign policy developments reinforced this approach.
After the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, academic
and policy audiences framed weak institutions as security threats.16 Weak
states and governing institutions were viewed as potential hotbeds of
terrorist activity, adding a national security imperative to supporting state
authority.
The DRC illustrates this policy trajectory. The international commu-
nity used negotiated settlements and promises of “all inclusive” insti-
tutions to end the Second Congo War (1998–2003). The Transitional
Government (2003–2006) implemented the power-sharing arrangement
in the national government and state security forces. After the 2006 elec-
tions, the UN embarked on a more expansive state-building mandate
to invest in infrastructure and institutions, even participating in active
combat to “restore state authority” over belligerents. And yet, each of
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these phases struggled to cope with the “real politics” embedded in state
institutions.17
Evolution of International Peacebuilding
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC seemed a good candidate for state-building because its own
institutions were seemingly absent. Amidst a growing wisdom that weak
institutions enable war, the DRC ranked lowest in the world on a host
of governance indicators. It was widely characterized as an ideal-typical
“criminalized” or “warlord” state,18 with little centralized control over a
vast territory.19 But, beyond the attention of international policymakers,
a state apparatus and affiliation persisted and continued to shape political
struggles.
Background to the Conflicts
The DRC’s conflict followed on the heels of the predatory govern-
ment under President Mobutu Sese Seko.20 At independence, the DRC’s
ruling class inherited a colonial administration that set up institutions
for extraction rather than public goods. After a turbulent transition to
independence, Mobutu seized power in a 1965 military coup and consol-
idated power. Declining prices in international commodities in the early
1970s drained the public treasury. Mobutu turned toward divide-and-rule
politics and salary payments to state agents dried up.
Political fragmentation in the DRC is often confused with an absent
bureaucracy.21 Scholars depict its peripheries as areas of “limited state
penetration.”22 But in reality, rank-and-file bureaucrats coped with uncer-
tainty through a system of kickbacks, embezzlement, and private survival
that multiplied taxes rather than retrenching state agencies.23 In his public
call for the population to débrouillez-vous, or “fend for yourself,” Mobutu
gave the nod to soldiers, regional governors, and bureaucrats to use offi-
cial posts for private ends. The result was a predatory bureaucracy and
military where officials from the top to bottom survived through extor-
tion. Although the central government was unable to use institutions for
a coherent purpose, the ability to extract remained linked to these official
bureaus and uniforms. This system preserved the value of state affilia-
tion and economic and political rent, shaping wartime struggles and later
state-building attempts.24
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As the Cold War drew to an end and reduced foreign aid, Mobutu
broke his prohibition on political parties and ushered in a brief polit-
ical liberalization (1990–1996). Mobutu clung to power by fragmenting
the opposition, and the number of parties multiplied to over 200.25 As
part of his divide-and-rule tactics, Mobutu had continued colonial poli-
cies of building dependent constituencies by rewarding ethnic minorities
with state appointments and land.26 This linked resource access to ethnic
identity and meant that inter-ethnic competitions also played out over
access to state posts. The outbreak of genocide in neighboring Rwanda
in 1994 sent an influx of refugees to the DRC, exacerbated tensions with
Banyarwanda (Kinyarwanda-speaking) minorities, and paved the way for
war.27
Rebellion broke out with the First Congo War (1996–1997).28 A
broad coalition of foreign sponsors sent troops to an easy victory in
Kinshasa. Mobutu’s crumbling government gave way, and insurgent
leader Laurent Kabila was installed as President. Many former members of
the national army defected and joined the insurgency, opening a revolving
door between the national military and armed groups. When the newly
installed president turned his back on his sponsors, the backers of the
First Congo War organized a new rebellion. Spearheaded by Rwanda and
Uganda, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) launched the Second
Congo War from eastern DRC in August 1998. Belligerents expected to
replicate the previous victory, but military progress soon stalled. The stale-
mate paved the way for growing international involvement in the crisis.
Meanwhile, bureaucrats clung to administrative posts and armed groups
amplified their political influence by appropriating these agencies, mixing
official institutions with violent networks.
Peace Accords: Ending the Second Congo War (1998–2003)
International peacebuilding followed the conventional policy of the day:
negotiated settlements and power sharing were the primary tools for
ending the Second Congo War. The first priority was bringing rivals
to the negotiating table. The high number of belligerents made this
difficult: nine states supporting insurgents or the government earned
the conflict the moniker of “Africa’s World War.”29 The battlefield
mirrored a fragmented political landscape. The largest armed group, the
RCD, relied primarily on Rwanda for support, and the Banyarwanda
affiliation of its leadership embroiled the group into preexisting ethnic
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tensions.30 Uganda created a second proxy, the Movement for the Liber-
ation of Congo (MLC), in 1998. And, in 1999 the Rally for Congolese
Democracy/Kisangani-Movement for Liberation (RCD/K-ML) splinter
defected from the RCD, taking Ugandan sponsorship with it. A range
of local defense groups, or Mayi-Mayi, also organized, creating a multi-
tiered conflict with regional and local contenders.31
Negotiations targeted the upper echelons of this conflict system. The
first step was the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999, which joined six
states, three international organizations, and two rebel groups (the RCD
and MLC). The Lusaka Agreement incorporated a power-sharing logic
that aimed to build consensus on a new political structure where parties
would “enjoy equal status.”32 It called for inclusive peace talks at an Inter-
Congolese Dialogue that promised recognition for the government and
main rebel factions. President Laurent Kabila initially refused negotiations
and power sharing. Yet he agreed to the accord because it recognized
him as the head of state and he thought that the national dialogue could
be maneuvered in his favor.33 Parties agreed to an immediate ceasefire
with fixed frontlines, a joint military commission to head an integrated
national army at war’s end, and a UN mission to enforce the ceasefire
in the meantime.34 Looking ahead to reconsolidation, it also called for
the “reestablishment of the state administration over the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.”35
Fighting continued despite the ceasefire. President Laurent Kabila was
assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, took over as President.
Joseph Kabila eventually agreed to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun
City, South Africa in 2002. The talks also stalled, this time over disagree-
ments of how to integrate rebels into the military.36 A peace deal to
end the conflict was finally reached in late 2002 in Pretoria: the Global
and All-Inclusive Agreement. This agreement joined the main belliger-
ents, civil society, and the unarmed political opposition in a Transitional
Government, which was implemented in July 2003.
Politics Below the Surface
As negotiations tried to moderate rebels by building stakes in the political
process, another game was underway. Armed groups spread into official
institutions even before the end of the war.
Rebel leaders were not simply non-state actors. Many were prior
regime elites who fought for their reintegration into the state.37 Rebels
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recognized the value of state affiliation and stylized themselves as the
state. They referred to their movements as “the state” and appointed
“presidents” and internal “ministries” that mimicked the national govern-
ment.38 As Dennis Tull points out, this state-like image helped to earn
rebels seats at negotiations in Lusaka in the first place.39
More than just an image, rebels used state bureaus in their territory
as tools to finance the war. At the same time that peace agreements
tried to incorporate insurgents into national-level political institutions,
rebels were already dividing administrative spoils. Two months into the
war, the RCD instructed taxation bureaus to remain open.40 Rebels’
internal financial records demonstrate that bureaucrats in official agen-
cies collected taxes throughout the war and deposited these funds into
the RCD’s “Public Treasury” and “War Effort” accounts.41 And, as
talks for the Lusaka Agreement were ongoing, Uganda also arranged
for state taxation bureaus to finance its proxies, the MLC and RCD/K-
ML. It tasked branches of three of the DRC’s taxation agencies with
collecting revenue for rebels’ “General Treasury Accounts.”42 Informal
networks in these offices also joined bureaucracy with violence. For its
part, the RCD/K-ML drew on ties with bureaucrats in customs agencies
to convert prefinancing—a system of under-the-table kickbacks between
local bureaucrats and smugglers—into a channel of financing.43
Peace accords called for the “reestablishment of the state adminis-
tration,” but rebels co-opted the same administrations that the accords
aimed to rebuild. In fact, peace agreements may have exacerbated these
practices. The Lusaka Agreement recognized de facto frontlines, which
lent a measure of international legitimacy to belligerents in their military
holdings. Rebels invoked the Lusaka Agreement to legitimize their claims
to natural resources and taxation rights in their territory. In various taxa-
tion edicts issued to local partners and foreign businesses, the RCD often
invoked this legitimacy with the following clause: “Considering that the
terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the Rally for Congolese Democracy has the power to admin-
ister the territory under its control.”44 Rebels also used Lusaka to build
a veneer of legality on its mineral trade. The RCD President wrote to
the Prime Minister of Belgium, insisting on its legitimate right to control
mining practices: “By the terms of this Lusaka Agreement… each signa-
tory belligerent party is able to administer the territory under its control.
The administrative acts promulgated by the RCD are thus covered by this
Accord.”45
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Boundaries between state and non-state armed actors broke down in
other ways. Kabila enlisted Mayi-Mayi groups on his behalf. Midway
through the war, he also sponsored the RCD/K-ML to reduce Ugandan
influence and gain an ally in the east. Doing so complicated peace
agreements because signatories could act through non-state agents.46
Power Sharing and National Elections: The DRC’s Transitional
Government (2003–2006)
War officially ended in mid-2003 with the launch of the Transitional
Government. The architects of the transition anticipated that political
institutions could build peace and integrate combatants from the DRC’s
divided society. The transition implemented the power-sharing formula
laid out by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and international attention
focused largely on supporting the agreement in the capital, Kinshasa.
The transitional government struck a compromise between Kabila and
the national army, rebel groups (MLC, RCD, RCD/K-ML, and the
RCD-N), and Mayi-Mayi militias. The compromise created four vice pres-
idencies shared among the RCD, MLC, civil society, and the unarmed
political opposition. Former belligerents were awarded lucrative minis-
terial appointments and officially relinquished control over combatants,
who integrated into the national military. Military integration aimed to
limit the ability to resume mass-scale violence. Goals of solidifying peace,
good governance, and political stability were measured through progress
to national elections. An International Committee for Support of the
Transition supported the government, and the first round of national
elections was held in 2006.
Politics Below the Surface
The DRC’s political opposition was dissatisfied with the transition and
quickly dubbed the president and four vice-president arrangement as
“1 + 4 = 0.”47 More than political discontent, the underlying assump-
tion that state institutions provided buffers against violence did not fully
hold. The transition divided state posts among competitors who sustained
clandestine networks within official institutions. Parallel command chains
persisted in the national army and fed new rebellion, and parallel networks
in the bureaucracy maintained wartime taxation for rebels’ influence.
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Armed groups were supposed to form mixed units under a joint
military commission in Kinshasa, but an integrated national army did
not break down relatively autonomous networks of former belligerents.
Rebel groups did not fully dismantle their command chains.48 Once they
entered the national army, many combatants maintained the same bases
and commanders as during the war. The national army changed officers in
South Kivu, but rank-and-file troops remained in place.49 Further north,
the RCD/K-ML president still controlled most of his troops along the
Uganda border in North Kivu.50
Parallel networks sometimes fed outright rebellion, as was the case
with the RCD. With their minority status, Banyarwanda RCD leaders
held few chances of earning power electorally. Hardliners wanted military
action, and some former commanders refused positions in Kinshasa.51
Disagreements over military command chains erupted in clashes in the
eastern DRC’s Kivu provinces in 2004.52 Former RCD members used
wartime networks to organize troops and weapons for a new rebellion, the
National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). In early 2004,
the CNDP attacked Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, exposing the
government’s inability to manage parallel chains, and reaping “irreparable
damage” on the transitional government.53 The RCD’s Vice President in
Kinshasa temporarily suspended his participation in the government.54
Kabila dispatched brigades of former MLC troops, playing wartime rival-
ries against ex-RCD fighters. RCD deputies left parliament, and the UN
mission established a buffer zone between government and rebels.55
Meanwhile, military salaries often went unpaid. Government loyalists
and former belligerents inflated numbers on military payrolls, creating
opportunities to embezzle payments.56
Other spoilers operated from state administrations. Rebels’ trafficking
partners still ran war economies from former strongholds, and local
bureaucrats kicked back state revenue to former rebels.57 Customs
bureaus in MLC territory did not remit revenue to Kinshasa through
2005.58 Parallel taxes persisted in North Kivu’s capital, Goma, where
Banyarwanda networks opposing Kinshasa embezzled from public institu-
tions.59 Officials in the provincial administration provided under-the-table
exemptions to powerful businesses to avoid customs duties. Bureaucrats
in RCD/K-ML territory in northern North Kivu also maintained wartime
taxation schemes,60 defying Kinshasa’s instructions to halt these deals.61
Persisting wartime networks in the bureaucracy held security implica-
tions. The Governor of North Kivu (who the RCD appointed during
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the war) and local government members used state funds to arm the
CNDP.62 RCD/K-ML affiliates also describe using public revenue from
customs bureaus to fund active troops to maintain relative autonomy
over former holdings.63 Parallel chains of power within the state appa-
ratus linking bureaucrats, troops, and politicians undermined a cohesive
national government and placed a check on Kinshasa’s power.
The DRC held elections in 2006, meeting the international benchmark
for a successful transition. Yet, revenue diversions and patronage oppor-
tunities in official bureaus seemed a surer route to power than clear party
platforms. In the lead-up to the elections, politicians believed “control
over the administrative apparatus may be more important in the elec-
tion than personal popularity.”64 An international focus on elections and
formal power-sharing institutions overlooked these densely interwoven
networks between armed actors and state offices.
Evolution of UN Peacebuilding
(2006–2017): “Restoring State Authority”
Multi-party elections marked the end of transition, and the UN peace-
keeping mission turned its focus toward stabilization. As a UN mission
official wrote, “At the root of the conflict are structural factors which
keep the state weak.”65 With areas of rebellion seen as lacking viable
institutions, the UN mission set about “restoring state authority” to lay a
foundation for peace.66
The mission, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), was originally deployed in 2000
to enforce the ceasefire agreement. As part of its mandate, it was also
tasked with providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and
refugees and with overseeing the withdrawal of foreign forces.67 During
the Transitional Government, MONUC’s mandate expanded from cease-
fire observation to supporting elections, security sector reform, disarming
combatants, and enforcing the arms embargo.68 After the 2006 elections,
its mandate grew again, this time to support state authority in persisting
conflict zones in the country’s eastern provinces. Matching this goal,
MONUC transformed into the United Nations Organization Stabiliza-
tion Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in
2010, reflecting “stabilization” as one of its core objectives.
This shift evolved alongside the failure of conventional approaches to
end protracted conflict. The CNDP’s military threat against Kinshasa
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had grown, and international diplomats convened failed peace talks in
2007 and 2008.69 Scrambling to integrate the CNDP, the UN called
for more robust intervention.70 When CNDP eventually ended in 2009,
MONUSCO focused on engaging the provincial and central govern-
ment more closely to stabilize remaining conflict zones. To guide its
efforts, MONUSCO formulated its “International Security and Stabi-
lization Support Strategy.” As the UN mission described, this strategy
was:
modeled after counterinsurgency principles, whereby military operations to
“clear” areas from armed groups were followed by “holding and building”
the state… The underlying assumption was that security vacuums caused
by a lack of [state] capacity were exploited by armed groups, and that by
strengthening local institutions the state could start taking the situation in
hand.71
The first phase of the strategy (2008–2012) focused on building state
infrastructure and institutions in areas that had been “cleared” from
rebels.72 The UN focused on physical infrastructure that could expand
the reach of the government. It built new roads—a standard metric of
state power73—to lengthen the arm of the state and control “axes of
communication” in remote areas.74 The approach incorporated a role for
the national army (Armed Forces of Democratic Republic of the Congo,
FARDC): “FARDC and MONUSCO must liberate the zones from armed
groups, then infrastructure will be built.” To support state institutions
in “liberated” zones, MONUSCO constructed administrative buildings
and organized trainings for police, judges, and administrative personnel.
Then, bureaucrats would be “deployed along these axes, using rehabil-
itated infrastructure and implementing the lessons learned during their
training.”75
In 2013, MONUSCO took its “counterinsurgency” state-building
to the next level. During the previous year, another large-scale rebel-
lion had organized in eastern DRC: the Mouvement du 23 Mars
(M23). 76 The M23 seized Goma for several days, fueling charges that
MONUSCO could not protect civilians.77 UN personnel saw that a
“security vacuum presents an opportunity for multiple, competing armed
groups to flourish,” and pressure mounted to equip MONUSCO for
a more effective use of force.78 The UN Security Council responded
by creating MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013.79
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The FIB is an offensive military unit with a mandate to “neutralize”
armed groups, typically through joint operations with the FARDC. From
this time, MONUSCO viewed military campaigns as tools to support
state authority—introducing a “state-making as war-making” logic into
peacekeeping.
The FIB and FARDC began joint military operations against the
M23 and defeated the group in 2013.80 With the campaign heralded
as a success, the FIB turned its sights northward to combat another
long-standing armed group: the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Here,
MONUSCO and its FIB applied the same principles that shaped its
overall stabilization strategy: the campaign imagined clear lines separating
zones of state authority from zones under the control of non-state armed
groups.
Politics Below the Surface
The approach aimed to build peace by extending the reach of official secu-
rity and administrative institutions into conflict zones. Yet, the complicity
between armed groups and bureaucratic and military officeholders under-
mined MONUSCO’s stabilization attempts.
These difficulties compromised some of MONUSCO’s institutional
partners. To implement its stabilization strategy, MONUSCO partnered
with the “STAREC” government bureau (Stabilization and Reconstruc-
tion Programme for War-Affected Areas).81 And yet, the FARDC military
General appointed to the bureau in northern North Kivu used his position
to re-establish links with armed groups, including the ADF.82 A military
General by official status, he operated more as a warlord in practice by
amassing combatants and dominating smuggling. Local sources describe
how equipment that MONUSCO provided to build roads to “restore
state authority” in the area was used to support timber trafficking with
active combatants.83
The UN’s militarized attempts at state-building met the same dilemma.
MONUSCO and FARDC launched joint operations against the ADF in
early 2014.84 The operations followed clear-cut counterinsurgency prin-
ciples that treated non-state armed actors as the root of conflict. Yet, the
ADF had survived decades in the borderlands of northern North Kivu
by laying ties with local civilians and political authorities.85 It also drew
support from some FARDC military officers that provided weapons, intel-
ligence, and uniforms in exchange for trafficking opportunities and access
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to combatants.86 These shadow arrangements created mixed incentives
within FARDC to fight the ADF. Just days into the operation, some
FARDC officers who supported ADF worked with the rebels to attack
and kill the head of the military campaign.87
This meant that some of the most dangerous security threats came
from within the national army. However, MONUSCO’s mandate to
support state authority created difficulties in understanding these sources
of violence. In 2014, a string of mass killings broke out during operations
against ADF. The attacks represented the worst violence in the DRC in
a decade and killed at least 1,300 civilians.88 The UN mission attributed
the killings to the ADF, but investigative teams found that some FARDC
military officers also held responsibility.89 This included the head of
the military campaign against ADF, General Mundos. According to the
Group of Experts, General Mundos recruited ADF fighters to perpetrate
some of the killings and “financed and equipped the group with weapons,
ammunition and FARDC uniforms.”90 Other evidence demonstrated
that some local state authorities, including administrative and customary
chiefs, also helped organize some of the killings.91 Violence escalated to
attacks on MONUSCO bases. Investigators found that corrupt members
of state security services supported the Mayi-Mayi group behind the first
attack on the UN mission.92
The UN sought to build peace by restoring state influence against non-
state security threats. But this approach did not account for the role of
the complicit state. In reality, the UN supported a military with weak
incentives to secure civilians. MONUSCO relied on the national army for
intelligence against armed groups, at the same time that parallel networks
supported armed groups behind the backs of the mission. In light of these
interactions, the UN’s clear lines between state authority and sources of
violence obscured the more blurred allegiances and informal networks
that shaped official institutions and insecurity. These interactions form
part of a broader array of armed groups that rely on state security forces
and political figures. FARDC officers have co-opted Mayi-Mayi militias
as proxies to execute violence against civilians in conflict-affected areas
of South Kivu and the Kasais.93 These arrangements provide plausible
deniability for state authorities while also feeding the violence that state
authorities can use to demonstrate a need for support from international
donors.
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Conclusion
The permeability of political institutions and armed actors makes state-
building more complex than it might appear. This has implications
for designing political settlements and measuring their success. Political
settlements assume that integrating into the government signals a will-
ingness to lay down arms. To be effective, power sharing must be costly
and make credible commitments to demobilization.94 But integrating
into state institutions does not just incur costs for rebels. In protracted
and complex conflicts, violence may be built into official political institu-
tions. By the time the Second Congo War concluded, rebels were already
practiced at using bureaucratic offices to support violence. Persistent war
economies, parallel networks within the national military, and kickbacks
from taxation agencies blurred the line between state and armed actors.
Dividing former belligerents into hardliners versus moderates, as power-
sharing arrangements do, also assumes these divisions are easy to observe.
In practice, mafia-like networks and support for armed actors may be less
legible. Defecting and remobilizing rebellion are seen as the main ways
that former belligerents may disrupt peace settlements, but they select
from a wider menu of options to use state institutions and affiliation to
sustain violence.
These practices recall key lessons on warlord and predatory states.95
State-building solutions to conflict cast security threats as emanating
from insurgents outside the state, but threats also come from within.
This reality helps us to analyze how political decisions are made. In the
DRC, President Kabila coped with parallel networks in the national mili-
tary by perpetually forming new units of the presidential guard—creating
more fragmentation within official structures.96 Contending with parallel
networks within the bureaucracy also undermines the central govern-
ment’s willingness to rely on official institutions for its own rule.97 In this
sense, conflicts such as the DRC’s unfold in “intentionally fragile states,”
where political leaders may have their own incentives to undermine the
same institutions that peacebuilders try to support.98
The DRC also cautions analysts against casting the actors behind
violence in too narrow terms: bureaucrats and soldiers can feed rebellion
as much as fighters in the jungle. For diplomats, foreign governments, and
international organizations, this creates a difficult puzzle. International
audiences face a catch-22: they may be unable to support official institu-
tions without supporting the networks—sometimes violent—embedded
310 R. SWEET
within them. Moreover, foreign governments and international organiza-
tions like the UN are reluctant to implicate state actors in such activities.
Recognizing the porous nature of state institutions can place diplomats
on contentious ground, since they must also balance norms of legal
recognition for the state actors that use official institutions in these ways.
Finally, the DRC’s experience underscores that state-building will be
deeply political, not a technocratic exercise in training bureaucrats or
building roads. Operating effectively in these environments will require
practitioners to understand the political logic and rules of the game.99
International policymakers operate in scenarios of captured state-building,
where local elites may seek resources for their own agendas while limiting
real reform to their own practices.100 However, to date, no comprehen-
sive strategy or approach exists to account for this difficulty. As civil wars
increasingly break out in very weak and fragmented states,101 it is more
important than ever to understand how this porous border is shaped.
Key Recommendations
The experience of peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo offers three key policy recommendations.
1. Deepen understanding of insurgents. Policymakers and practi-
tioners should reconsider the strategies and resources that insurgents
use. Instead of avoiding the state, violent actors can use its institu-
tions to build their influence.
2. Revisit established approaches to institution-building. Policy-
makers and practitioners should think more critically about
institution-building. Policymakers aim to expand the degree of the
state, but have given less attention to what kind of state this
may be.102 Policymakers must take seriously the political programs,
informal networks, and day-to-day practices that shape official insti-
tutions.103
3. Develop more nuanced metrics of what constitutes successful peace-
building. Peacebuilding success is often measured by the duration
of settlements,104 but a narrow focus on avoiding outright rebellion
can overlook the networks and institutions that also enable violence.
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Mozambique was considered a successful case of peacebuilding after the
end of the devastating post-independence civil war that ended in 1992.
But the return to targeted armed conflict in 2013 between the govern-
ment and RENAMO and the need for a new peace process has challenged
that assumption.1 A new “definitive” peace agreement was finally signed
between the government and RENAMO on August 6, 2019, but many
Mozambicans question whether it will stick; and there is domestic and
international anxiety over a growing violent crisis in northern Mozam-
bique (Cabo Delgado Province, especially). Since late 2017, Mozambique
has faced attacks by a violent Islamist extremist group that is active along
its far northern coast. The group—known as Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah
(ASWJ), among other names—has killed hundreds, often via beheading
(Map 18.1).2
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Map 18.1 Violence and social protest, 2017–2019 (Source Chatham House
Africa Programme, adapted from AIM, ACLED, and author interviews)
These new and resumed old conflicts are occurring at a time of signif-
icant population growth, deepening inequality, and growing frustration
at mainstream politics in Mozambique. The optimism of much of the
2000s that followed the end of the civil war has evaporated; Mozambique
remains one of the world’s least developed countries, ranking 180th out
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of 189 countries.3 Up to 2019, its state finances have relied upon signif-
icant international loans, and until recently, development aid represented
half of the state budget.4
Mozambique sustained rapid post-civil war growth with an annual
average of 8.4 percent GDP growth until 2015. In 2016, however,
growth fell to 3.8 percent from 6.6 percent in 2015, and in 2018 slumped
further, to 3.3 percent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
attributed this decline to weak global commodity prices, poor weather
conditions, and “the issue of undisclosed loans in the spring of 2016
and the ensuing freeze in donor support.”5 The RENAMO–government
conflict also may have contributed to the slow-down and the effects of
the two cyclones in 2019 have further reduced growth in the short to
medium term.
The discovery of world-class gas reserves has generated renewed opti-
mism about the country’s future. Natural gas production will drive large
gains in economic growth from the mid-2020s to the early 2030s; but,
rapid population growth, rising inequality, and the lack of access to basic
services and infrastructure means that much of this growth may not
benefit the poor (Map 18.2).6
Map 18.2 Population growth (Source Chatham House Africa Programme)
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Most Mozambicans, an estimated 86 percent or more of the workforce,
make their living in the informal sector, often as subsistence and cash crop
farmers, fishermen, and small-scale manufacturers and traders. Produc-
tivity within this large segment of the economy, however, is constrained
by little access to credit, business training, or technical expertise. Youth
unemployment is a particular challenge. Nearly 68 percent of Mozambi-
cans are age 25 or younger, and many young people from rural areas,
home to 65 percent of the population in 2017, often gravitate toward
cities, where job growth has not kept up with increasing education and
training rates—even though these are low.7
It is in this context that domestic and international peacebuilding
efforts have occurred. There has never been one plan, but a collec-
tion of initiatives, at times incorporated into national strategies, at other
times technical interventions to address a particular sector or priority.8
This chapter examines the many domestic and international efforts to
support peacebuilding efforts in Mozambique since 1975. It highlights
that conflict and contestation did not start or end with the civil war
but is an ongoing process, and that parts of Mozambique remained
unstable despite the Rome General Peace Accord (GPA) of 1992 because
state-centric approaches to peacebuilding largely failed.9
Historical Background
Mozambique’s history is deeply tied to complex regional politics
(compounded by divisions between the center and the peripheries of
the country) and failures in nation-building. For much of the colonial
period up to 1942, Mozambique was divided into separate administra-
tive zones, which fragmented the colony and prevented the emergence
of a common system of law and administration. The location of the
capital in the extreme south of the country, and the proximity of South
Africa, concentrated resources and the modern sector of the economy
in that region, while much of the rest of the country continued to be
relatively marginalized.10 The 1977–1992 civil war also helped to accen-
tuate regional differences, with RENAMO’s activities concentrated in
the center of the country. The discovery of world-class gas reserves in
northern Mozambique may further accentuate these regional differences.
Mozambique obtained independence in June 1975, following a
nationalist struggle against Portuguese colonialism by FRELIMO.11 In
February 1977, FRELIMO formally declared its transformation from the
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liberation movement into a Marxist–Leninist vanguard party. The decision
came at a time when there were growing numbers of skirmishes between
Mozambique and Rhodesia, and when the party was seeking to attract
military aid from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.12
Following FRELIMO’s rise to power, “purification” and persecution
of those who had collaborated with the colonial regime led many Mozam-
bicans to leave the country, some of whom joined RENAMO. FRELIMO
increasingly found that it could not defeat RENAMO, partly as a result
of its guerrilla tactics and partly because of the centralization of the state,
which meant that many regions had never benefitted from a centralized
government in Maputo and their politics and loyalties were regional and
local as a result.
FRELIMO ended the one-party system in 1990. Yet, the party has
continued as the dominant force in state and society, winning all six
presidential and parliamentary elections.13 Mozambique is not formally
a one-party state, but the ruling party is still so deeply entrenched in
the state apparatus that in practice it is still hard to separate one from
the other. Similar to other “liberation movement states” in southern
Africa, the party has blurred the interests of the movement, the state,
and personal interests of key individuals. FRELIMO has always sought to
keep a tight grip on political power.14
The Post-independence Civil War
In 1976, Mozambique imposed sanctions against neighboring Rhodesia’s
white minority regime, which disrupted the Mozambican economy and
deprived its ports of lucrative earnings. It also marked the start of hostile
relations between the two countries: in 1977, the Rhodesian Central
Intelligence Office (CIO) began to arm and train the nascent RENAMO
opposition force—which at that point was called the MNR—in retali-
ation for Mozambique’s support for Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas.15
This conflict can be broken down into different episodes16: the Rhode-
sian phase (1977–1980); the overt South African phase (1980–1984)17;
the covert South African phase (1984–1988); and the post-South African
phase until 1992.
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Failed Attempts to End the War
The transfer of RENAMO to South Africa marked a turning point in
the war, which soon began to escalate. The South African government
used RENAMO as a tool for destabilizing Mozambique and as a counter
to Mozambique’s support for the African National Congress (ANC).18
FRELIMO made a bid to end the war in 1984 when it signed the
Nkomati non-aggression pact with Apartheid South Africa, followed by
proximity talks in 1985 with RENAMO, but both failed due to South
African duplicity. Indeed, RENAMO changed its military strategy as
South Africa significantly reduced its covert aid to the rebels.19 In 1986,
Mozambique’s first president, Samora Machel, was killed in a mysterious
plane crash and Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique’s foreign minister since
independence, became president. This change in leadership led to a series
of reforms and, ultimately, official peace negotiations with RENAMO that
began in 1990.20
While the roots of the peace process began in 1982, South Africa’s
covert policy of support for RENAMO had eroded earlier attempts to
seek a negotiated settlement. The Mozambican government was also not
prepared to offer significant positions of patronage in government as a
guarantee of RENAMO’s survival. Only in the late 1980s, with declining
external support for RENAMO and greater pressures on the government
from the vacuum left by the end of the Cold War and the collapsing
Eastern Bloc, were serious peace talks possible.
In this new climate, Community Sant’ Egidio, a liberal Catholic move-
ment, was well placed to play a constructive role in the peace process.
It was able to persuade RENAMO to engage in dialogue as a result
of the contacts its members had in Mozambique and its understanding
of the dynamics of the conflict, and helped the rebels transform vague
requests into communicable proposals. However, once the 11th round of
peace talks got underway in June 1992, Community Sant’ Egidio’s role
was reduced. Discussions on military issues brought the United States,
France, Britain, and Portugal into the negotiations as observers, and
the momentum grew for twin-track diplomacy and the urgent need to
“Summitize” and “Africanize” the process.
18 VIOLENCE, PEACEBUILDING, AND ELITE BARGAINS … 327
The Rome General Peace Accord
After 12, often torturous, rounds of negotiations, the General Peace
Accord (GPA) was eventually signed in Rome on October 4, 1992
between President Joaquim Chissano and RENAMO leader, Afonso
Dhlakama. The implementation of most of the key provisions of the
GPA was placed in the hands of the United Nations (UN). According
to UN Security Council Resolution 797, the newly established United
Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was to perform a series
of tasks such as monitoring and verifying the implementation of the cease-
fire, including the retreat of Malawian and Zimbabwean units from Beira,
Limpopo, and Nacala transport corridors, and protecting these corridors
with its own forces.
In order to fulfill its mandate, ONUMOZ was provided with both
civilian and military departments. It was mandated to monitor the canton-
ment, disarmament, and demobilization of nearly 110,000 combatants
from both sides, as well as the creation of the new army and the resettle-
ment of between five and six million refugees and displaced people. The
cost was estimated at US $331 million (one million dollars per day) until
November 31, 1993.21
By 1996, 87 percent of demobilized soldiers had been integrated
into society, and most had secured a food supply or small guaranteed
income. The total reintegration budget was US $94.4 million, of which
US $35.5 million was allocated to support two years of cash for regis-
tered ex-combatants and US $33.7 million went directly to demobilized
soldiers. In all, some 92,000 soldiers benefitted, about 71,000 from the
government forces and 21,000 from RENAMO.
One of the surprises of the 2013 resumption of conflict between
RENAMO and the government was the availability of arms for
RENAMO. According to the Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation
and Social Reinsertion (FOMICRES), between three and four million
weapons were circulating at the end of the war in 1992.22 During
the 1992–1994 peace process, the priority of ONUMOZ was to help
RENAMO transform itself into a political party and contest national
elections. The UN priority was to dismantle RENAMO’s command and
control structures, and also disperse ex-combatants through the pay-and-
scatter program. Disarmament was not a priority, and the UN’s Special
Representative, Aldo Ajello, admitted that he considered that muscular
disarmament would undermine the peace process.23
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The Rome GPA delivered over 20 years of peace. It was followed
by an aid bonanza that rapidly transformed the FRELIMO elite into a
patrimonial political class that became increasingly determined to hang
on to power at all costs. Gas and coal reserves heightened the stakes
further, dividing the FRELIMO elite over who had access to the spoils
and triggering RENAMO’s decision to return to targeted armed violence
in 2013, to push for a new elite bargain with FRELIMO in order to also
benefit from future coal and gas rents. Sumich and Honwana flagged the
fragility of this GPA elite bargain in their assessment of FRELIMO and
its disinclination to seriously share power. They concluded that:
[S]ince independence power has primarily been located in the Frelimo
party, not in supposedly neutral state structures that could be inherited
in a reasonably intact manner by another political force. Thus the very
success of the party in rebuilding their hegemony and their disinclination
to share power with social forces outside of their control could intensify
the divisions and inequalities that helped to fuel the civil war in the first
place.24
As mentioned above, until 2013, Mozambique was regarded as having
passed through a successful post-conflict transition. In April 2013, there
was a return to limited armed conflict between fighters of the former
rebel group (RENAMO) and Mozambican government forces.25 A new
agreement in September 2014 ended regular armed skirmishing in central
Mozambique, but armed violence once more resumed in 2015 and
persisted until late December 2016, focused primarily on commercial
links and public services. Fresh negotiations for a new political deal finally
reached a new accord in August 2019.
RENAMO never expected to capture the Mozambican state, but has
always sought a military or political stalemate through which it can
extract elite bargains from the dominant party, FRELIMO, resulting in a
temporary political settlement.26
Learning from the Past for Future Peacebuilding
One of the conclusions that can be drawn from RENAMO’s strategy
since 2013 is that maintaining armed men who are prepared to chal-
lenge the government enhanced RENAMO’s political standing in the
short term, and has resulted in a new process to reach a new elite bargain
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in the longer term. In addition, two other lessons can be drawn from
the resumed violence of 2013–2014 and subsequent clashes. First, disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts were seen as a
finite, short-term technical process that did not cover political inclusion.
This meant that after a decade of peace, international donors concluded
that Mozambique had undergone a successful post-conflict transition and
that support for the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in this field was no longer a priority.
Second, disarmament should not have been neglected, and ONUMOZ
missed an opportunity in this regard. After its withdrawal, the opportu-
nity to disarm diminished and only a small percentage of weapons were
given up through official and NGO efforts. RENAMO has maintained
armed men and weapons stockpiles over 20 years, and there was early
warning of this. In 2012, the NGO FOMICRES,27 for instance, located
large arms caches in five districts in Sofala province, including heavy
weapons, but politically it was not able to access them for destruction.28
While recognizing that RENAMO would never have handed over all
its weapons to ONUMOZ, more effort during its mandate would
have reduced stockpiles further, especially if international partners had
continued to support disarmament and support alternative livelihoods of
ex-combatants in central Mozambique.
RENAMO’s continued access to an armed militia is also the result of
a provision in the Rome GPA, which stipulated that the former rebels
could maintain bodyguards (who would enjoy police status) as a “tran-
sitional guarantee” until elections in 1994. The objective then was for
the police to take over these responsibilities, but that Dhlakama’s “body-
guards” could, if a list be provided, receive police training. Although a list
was eventually provided, the government insisted that once trained, these
men must obey police orders. In January 1998, worried about losing
authority over these men, Dhlakama categorically refused to allow his
bodyguards to be incorporated into the police. It seems that a mixture
of fear of losing his prime asset (armed men) and concern over his own
security drove this decision.
The result was that from 1994 to 2013 the Mozambican govern-
ment reluctantly accepted the de facto presence of several hundred armed
RENAMO personnel resident in the Maringué and Cheringoma districts
of Sofala province, who occasionally paraded with weapons and intimi-
dated local FRELIMO activists.29 A small group of them also escorted
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Dhlakama and provided security for his house in Nampula as his “pres-
idential guard.” They were poorly uniformed, with shoes falling off and
brandishing old weapons.30 The government wanted to disarm this “pres-
idential guard” completely, and offered to integrate it with the national
police force, but this offer was rejected. A further opening to reinte-
grate members of this RENAMO militia emerged from the September
2014 agreement that temporarily halted hostilities, but depended on their
fitness and the provision of a new list. That list was never forthcoming
but finally, in July 2019, a RENAMO list of 5,211 fighters, who were not
integrated after the GPA, was provided.
RENAMO’s Electoral Fortunes
RENAMO has contested all six presidential and parliamentary elections
since the war ended in 1992. The October 1994 elections enjoyed a high
voter turnout of above 85 percent and there was little violence in the low-
key campaign, although there was some intimidation by both sides in their
stronghold areas. The results of all six elections up to 2014 show a gener-
ally clear and consistent pattern: FRELIMO has commanded a majority
overall and dominated in the capital, the south, and the extreme north,
while RENAMO remained strong among voters in the center and north.
However, RENAMO was visibly weakened after the 2009 elections, and
that parliament was dominated by FRELIMO, which won 75 percent of
the votes and had majorities in all former RENAMO strongholds. Posi-
tions in the National Assembly were allocated to parties in proportion to
their number of parliamentary seats (Fig. 18.1).
After 1994, and especially after the 1999 national election results,
FRELIMO concluded that RENAMO posed an electoral risk.31 In
response, FRELIMO aggressively countered RENAMO, at times this
involved intimidation and harassment of its supporters, especially during
electoral cycles. As a result, there have been electoral irregularities in
all the subsequent elections. In the October 2019 elections, there were
widespread reports of irregularities. Experts suggest RENAMO may have
lost five seats as a result but did not win outright, as they claimed.
The 2019 Peace Accords
The Rome agreement lasted until 2013 when RENAMO returned to
targeted armed conflict, ambushing cars, buses, and trains, and attacking
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Fig. 18.1 Parliamentary elections (Source Chatham House Africa Programme,
adapted from República de Mocambique Comissão Nacional de Eleicoes [CNE]
and Secretariado Tecnico da Administração Eleitoral [STAE], http://www.stae.
org.mz/)
government facilities. The violence was concentrated in the central
Mozambican provinces of Manica and Sofala. Including government
counter-measures, this resumed conflict in its two phases between 2013
and 2016 resulted in at least 150 killed and 500 injured (Map 18.3).32
So why did RENAMO return to armed conflict in 2013 after 20 years
of peace and many years of peacebuilding efforts? And what can be done
to avoid a resumption of hostilities going forward? FRELIMO’s strategy
toward RENAMO was the prime culprit. RENAMO gave FRELIMO an
existential fright during the 1999 national elections, when RENAMO’s
former leader, the late Afonso Dhlakama, nearly won the presidency with
47.7 percent of the vote (some believe he actually did win—see Fig. 18.1).
This convinced Armando Guebuza to seek total dominance when he
became president in 2004, in an effort to guarantee FRELIMO control.
This backfired, instead convincing Dhlakama that he needed to return to
armed conflict to extract new concessions.
Reaching a new peace accord took six years, with three different
peacebuilding efforts, first by faith leaders, then multiple international
mediators, and finally an elite process driven initially by President Nyusi
and Dhlakama (who died in 2018 and was succeeded by Ossufu Momade)
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Map 18.3 RENAMO armed clashes 2013–2014 (left) and 2015–2016 (right)
(Source Chatham House Africa Programme, adapted from @Verdade, AIM,
ACLED, and author interviews)
supported by the Swiss Ambassador to Mozambique, Mirko Manzoni,
and mediators Neha Sanghrajka and Jonathan Powell.33
The peace agreements of August 1 and 6, 2019 built on these past
peace processes. They were signed in Gorongosa and Maputo by Presi-
dent Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader, Momade. They were the third
such agreement between the two parties, designed to bring an end to
42 years of violent competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO,
somewhat weakened due to Dhlakama’s death, which caused some
fragmentation with RENAMO.
The August 6 Maputo Accord was witnessed by the chair of the African
Union and four presidents, including South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, as
well as several past mediators. President Nyusi reminded the large crowd
in Maputo that the road to peace has had past setbacks.34
This new elite bargain was also based on the assumption that there
would be increased decentralization with the opportunity for RENAMO
to win governorships in ten Mozambican provinces in exchange for mean-
ingful DDR for RENAMO’s armed militia. (The process for the 5,221
earmarked RENAMO fighters started in central Mozambique at the end
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of July 2019.) Nobody, including FRELIMO strategists, imagined that
RENAMO would fail to win majorities in one or two provinces.
This deal had been ripe for agreement, but the death of Dhlakama
resulted in a power struggle within RENAMO and delayed the process.
Gradually Momade asserted some authority, resulting in an attempt to
pivot the party away from central Mozambique toward Zambézia and
Nampula provinces. However, the October 2019 election results failed as
RENAMO’s electoral campaign was artisanal compared to an industrial
FRELIMO effort.
There had already been splintering in RENAMO when, beginning in
July 2018, a self-styled RENAMO military junta challenged Momade’s
authority and elected its own leader, Lieutenant General Mariano
Ngongo. This group was small (up to 200 people) but enjoyed some
support in central Mozambique. Armed attacks in central Mozambique
during the second half of 2019 were a reminder that a few armed men
can effect serious political and social disruption (Map 18.4).
RENAMO’s armed supporters seek a lasting accommodation;
FRELIMO’s elite also want political stability to attract international
investment. The benefits of the elite bargain for RENAMO were to
have included elected governorships, payment for disarmament and
employment, and development opportunities. However, RENAMO’s
poor elections results in October 2019 complicated this calculation.
Importance of Decentralization for Peacebuilding
Meaningful decentralization by the government and full demobilization
by RENAMO had been the key issues of negotiations in 2018 and 2019.
In early 2018, President Nyusi and Dhlakama negotiated a framework
accord on political decentralization. Following Dhlakama’s death, there
were fears this might not last. But in May 2018, parliament enacted
a series of constitutional amendments to prepare for deepened decen-
tralization. These provided for elected provincial, district, and municipal
assemblies (with the leading delegate in the party with a simple majority,
heading them). Following the work of the commission on decentraliza-
tion, a constitutional amendment on the issue was passed in the National
Assembly in May 2019. The following month, the president promul-
gated the Law of Punctual Review of the Constitution of the Republic
of Mozambique.35
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Map 18.4 Armed Attacks, August–December 2019 (Source Chatham House
Africa Programme, adapted from @Verdade, AIM, ACLED, and author inter-
views)
At the time of writing in January 2020, RENAMO’s comprehensive
disarmament remains the key government demand. Concessions for rein-
tegrating RENAMO combatants into the armed forces (FADM) and
police could be a sticking point. In this regard, the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on Military Affairs includes security provisions
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for the placement of RENAMO ex-combatants into senior positions in
the army and police force. New, symbolic senior posts are being created
to absorb some of these former fighters and RENAMO has raised the idea
of creating a “provincial police force.”
International partners will need to learn from past mistakes. They need
to commit to long-term guarantees to DDR efforts in hotspots, partic-
ularly parts of central Mozambique and Tete province, and focus on
bringing Momade—and the RENAMO military splinter group led by Lt
Gen. Mariano Ngongo—into a process that incentivizes non-violent poli-
tics. A basket fund has been established to channel financing for DDR
activities and a DDR camp has been constructed in central Mozam-
bique by a group of military experts. Too much focus on austerity by
international donors and the international financial institutions at this
critical moment might backfire. Their engagement, instead, needs to
be conflict-sensitive and not time-dependent. Like many other guerrilla
groups, RENAMO will only gradually disarm its gunmen and is likely to
keep hidden arms caches as an insurance policy. As a response, the best
strategy is to build up political confidence and economic opportunity so
that gradually this armed wing becomes redundant.
International partners will also need to review their past peacebuilding
efforts to encourage local-level political pluralism. As Roberta Machietto
observed:
[I]t is clear that economic and political liberalization…have not translated
into a fair redistribution of the peace dividend. On the contrary, liberal-
ization measures have been “adapted” in such a way as to consolidate the
regime of the dominant party, only now with the legitimization of the
international community.36
Machietto examined an ongoing national micro-credit program by
the government called the District Development Fund (the “7 Million”)
designed to support decentralization and aimed at reducing poverty and
inequality in Mozambique. Her examination of the 7 Million was based
upon field research in Nampula province and showed that, despite its limi-
tations, some money and decision-making was devolved to local districts.
This gave some communities experience of the possibilities of increased
accountability by their local officials through the Local Councils and
associated Local Development Committees. Unsurprisingly, FRELIMO
party loyalty was an advantage for access to micro-credit from this
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program.37 However, as FRELIMO found in the 2018 local elections,
this is no longer enough to win votes in Nampula province. FRELIMO
will increasingly have to work harder to retain patronage.
Another major challenge to sustainable peacebuilding is the growth of
corruption and the elite use of political influence to accumulate private
wealth.38 This trend accelerated over the post-civil war period with
worrisome implications for the economy and stability. The post-2015
economic decline followed disclosures that the government had failed
to report to the IMF US $2.2 billion in state-guaranteed debt, which
violated the terms of Mozambique’s cooperation with the IMF.39 Two
foreign banks provided these loans, in an allegedly corrupt manner, to
state-owned firms registered as private entities and controlled by state
intelligence officials. These secret loans, most of them acquired in 2013,
added around 30 percent to the country’s foreign debt.40 This scandal
transformed the political and economic landscape and led to widespread
anger at FRELIMO. The roots of this probably lie in the shock of the
1999 election results, when FRELIMO concluded that it needed regular
funds for patronage and to ensure it won future elections. One response
was to create a financial and business arm for the party, SPI—Gestão e
Investimentos SARL (SPI).41
The fall-out from the undisclosed loan scandal is ongoing and more
revelations will emerge on what exactly happened in 2013. Elite corrup-
tion was clearly part of the logic. But President Guebuza was already
wealthy. It is probable that, as he neared the end of his second and last
term in his presidency, he considered how to secure a further term as
party leader and also to ensure he remained the de facto power behind
whoever succeeded him in the presidency.42 Conflict with RENAMO in
2013 suited these ambitions but by 2014, as his influence declined inside
FRELIMO, and RENAMO’s armed actions damaged the Mozambican
economy, he sought a new settlement with the former rebels. A potent
reminder: peacebuilding in Mozambique is multi-layered, open-ended,
progresses in fits-and-starts, and is prone to setbacks.
Conclusion
The FRELIMO landslide victory following the sixth national multi-party
elections in October 2019 has complicated the elite bargaining and peace-
building efforts. Since Mozambique’s first-ever multi-party elections in
1994, FRELIMO has pursued a strategy of co-option and division of
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RENAMO through elite bargains. FRELIMO’s post-conflict strategy
was initially, under Chissano, to weaken RENAMO’s support base in
central Mozambique through compromise and patronage, and then,
under Guebuza, obtain total FRELIMO domination across Mozam-
bique. Guebuza’s strategy spectacularly backfired, humiliating Dhlakama
and radicalizing RENAMO’s ex-combatants, resulting in their push for
resumed targeted armed violence. This violence was rewarded in the
2014 elections, especially by voters in central Mozambique, strength-
ened Dhlakama’s leadership position in RENAMO, and again postponed
long-needed party reform.43
But, by 2015 Dhlakama also miscalculated, believing his threat
of further violence would win more concessions. Instead, his threats
increased splits in FRELIMO over its RENAMO strategy and weakened
President Nyusi’s attempts to reach a lasting accommodation. The result
was at least one assassination attempt on Dhlakama and increased violence
by both sides, despite a haphazard “good offices” effort by various
international mediators. Common frustration of this process encour-
aged President Nyusi and Afonso Dhlakama to cut intermediaries and
start bilateral talks. Helped with logistics and focus by a new Contact
Group, led by Swiss Ambassador Manzoni, this process has made tenta-
tive progress. Encouragingly, conflict has not resumed and a new binding
agreement was signed by both sides in August 2019.
Some 27 years after the Mozambican conflict ended, many RENAMO
combatants have successfully reintegrated, but a hardened core of ex-
militia remain, mainly in central Mozambique. Overall, Mozambique has
remained an example of mostly successful demobilization, but poor peace-
building success toward elite reintegration. Mozambican domestic politics
is partly to blame for this, but so too is past international complacency.
Mozambique’s peace was not secure, as many blithely assumed.
The situation today in Mozambique also highlights the degree to
which these bargaining processes are long-term and there is still a need
to look at strategies to accommodate clusters of combatants that remain
cohesive, particularly in central Mozambique. The August 2019 accord
is backed up by development commitments for central Mozambique and
promises of a better retirement for RENAMO’s gunmen.
A durable peace settlement requires compromise by FRELIMO and
an acceptance that RENAMO and other political parties can capitalize
on some of the government’s shortcomings. Going forward, the danger
is that RENAMO’s military wing will continue to fracture; there is also
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uncertainty over Momade’s commitment to historical loyalties from the
1977–1992 war, and how being weakened by his poor election results
will impact events.
The poor electoral showing by RENAMO is a new test—having failed
to win even a governorship. The elite bargain was for indirectly elected
governorships for RENAMO, payment for disarmament, and employ-
ment and development opportunities. Without governorships, can this
deal stick? Armed attacks in central Mozambique illustrate the fragility of
the deal and the need to tackle the RENAMO splinter group present
in the region. If the insecurity and violence there can be addressed,
the domestic and international focus should move onto longer-term
peacebuilding focus, such as poverty reduction, combating inequality,
education, and solving the escalating security crisis with Islamic militants
in Cabo Delgado province.
Key Recommendations
1. International partners need to shift their approach to align with
new political and conflict dynamics. More long-term, targeted
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in potential flash
points in central Mozambique is required. On the economic side,
donors need to be mindful that austerity measures, if pushed
too hard, could backfire and re-militarize competition for scarce
resources.
2. Decentralization and local level political pluralism should be at the
heart of future peacebuilding. There remains an acute lack of trust
between Mozambique’s main political formations. Building political
confidence and economic opportunities for all is the best way to
finally make the armed wing of RENAMO redundant.
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CHAPTER 19
The Dog That Did Not Bark: WhyHas Sierra





Sierra Leone’s civil war lasted from 1991 to 2000, and resulted in
an estimated 70,000 deaths and 2.6 million people displaced out of
a total population of about 5.2 million at the time (about 7 million
in 2020).2 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had invaded Sierra
Leone from Liberia in March 1991 with the assistance of Charles
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The invasion resulted
in several hundred Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Guinean troops from the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia being deployed to assist Sierra
Leone, a fellow ECOMOG member, to defend its capital of Freetown.
ECOMOG’s role in Sierra Leone increased tremendously after a military
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coup by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in May 1997, which the subre-
gional force crushed by February 1998, restoring the elected president,
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, to power.3
The United Nations (UN) Security Council established the UN
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in July 1998,4 with only
about 50 observers alongside ECOMOG’s 13,000 troops (12,000 being
from Nigeria). A UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
was established in October 1999 to take over from ECOMOG, with
about 3,300 Nigerian peacekeepers “rehatted” as UN troops. The RUF
prevented the deployment of the 17,400-strong UNAMSIL to the
diamond-rich eastern provinces, and, from May 2000, attacked UN
peacekeepers, killing some of them, holding about 500 of them hostage,
and seizing their heavy weapons and vehicles.5 A brief British military
intervention with about 800 troops helped to stabilize the situation in
Freetown and its environs between May and June 2000.
The UN’s disarmament program for 75,000 Sierra Leonean combat-
ants was completed in January 2002, with 42,000 weapons collected.
UN-monitored elections in May 2002 saw president Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah re-elected in a landslide victory. The RUF Party (RUFP) failed
to win a single seat.
The decade-long war in Sierra Leone was finally over. After six years
of sometimes tortuous peacekeeping, the world body finally withdrew
its remaining troops from Sierra Leone in December 2005. Though
the country remained largely peaceful, many peacebuilding challenges
remained unresolved. UNAMSIL had spent an estimated US $5 billion
in Sierra Leone over six years,6 but over 80 percent of these funds
had gone toward its peacekeeping mission rather than for tasks such as
reintegrating ex-combatants into society, reversing massive youth unem-
ployment, restructuring a new national army, and helping to restore state
institutions.
The UN Security Council established an Integrated Office in Sierra
Leone (UNIOSIL) in January 2006 to coordinate international peace
consolidation efforts and to support the government in Freetown.
However, similar to past experiences in Liberia, Angola, and the Central
African Republic (CAR), this office lacked sufficient resources and staff to
assist the Sierra Leonean government effectively in its post-conflict peace-
building and reconstruction tasks. The government in Freetown collected
revenues from its diamond industry of only US $145 million in 2005.7
Violent student and labor protests also increased, amidst widespread
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youth unemployment and weak government capacity. Instability in Côte
d’Ivoire, the fragile situation in Liberia, and reports of encroachment
into Sierra Leonean territory by Guinean government troops occupying
disputed border areas, further threatened the country’s newfound peace.8
A critical factor in Sierra Leone’s stability is the complex interaction of
domestic, subregional, and external actors, which is crucial to the success
of conflict management and conflict prevention processes. This chapter
focuses squarely on the inter-play of actors at these three interdepen-
dent levels, as these diverse players often assist or obstruct peacebuilding
efforts. It sets out to solve the Sherlock Holmes-type mystery of why
Sierra Leone has remained stable 15 years after peacekeepers left the
country, and 20 years after the end of a devastating 11-year civil war in
which an estimated 70,000 people died.
There are estimates that suggest that in half of all conflicts, countries
revert to war within five years as a result of inadequate peacebuilding.9
Considering that many of the same conditions existed in post-war Sierra
Leone as existed before the war—massive youth unemployment; poor
governance and corruption; regional and ethnic divisions; and 70 percent
of the population living in poverty—what factors explain the reasons why
Sierra Leone did not slide back into conflict? Just as in British novelist
Arthur Conan Doyle’s 1892 Sherlock Holmes short story, “The Adven-
ture of Silver Blaze,” this chapter asks why the dog did not bark at
night.
Sierra Leone’s Peacebuilding Challenges
An estimated 42 percent of Sierra Leone’s population was under the age
of 15 in 2008.10 Starting with the country’s major peacebuilding chal-
lenges (based on factors that usually contribute to conflicts, building
on my own research on 15 conflict cases across Africa between 1956
and 2011),11 Sierra Leone’s massive youth unemployment—estimated at
600,000 people by March 201012—was often cited as the most urgent
task facing the country by both the administrations of Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah (1996–2007) and Ernest Bai Koroma (2007–2018), as well as
the international donor community.
Furthermore, Sierra Leone’s youths were prominently involved in
illegal diamond mining. Instability often erupted in mining areas
involving local youths, and communities frequently claimed that they had
not been consulted or compensated for the use of their land by foreign
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companies. Crimes such as armed robbery, rape, and murder continued
unabated, while land disputes proliferated in local communities. It must,
however, be noted that these crimes were often no worse than those in
neighboring countries such as Liberia and Guinea.13
The reform of Sierra Leone’s security sector—the army and the
police—was also another major challenge which was again linked to the
issue of youth, as a large proportion of young people were employed in
this sector, even as the vast majority of demobilized youths could not
find gainful employment. Both the Sierra Leone Police and Sierra Leone
Armed Forces were weak institutions which had been discredited during
the country’s civil war: some of their members had been involved in
staging the 1997 military coup, while others had joined the rebels, thus
creating the “sobel” phenomenon of soldiers by day and rebels by night.
Sierra Leone’s 10,500-strong armed forces faced continuing issues of
low pay and low morale, exacerbated by the demobilization of staff,
including 70 senior officers, by April 2006.14 The army also lacked
adequate housing and the conditions in its barracks were atrocious.
Further exacerbating an already difficult situation, the defense ministry
and armed forces were only able to access 20 percent of their approved
funds in 2007 due to cumbersome administrative processes.15 Related to
reform of the security sector, was a weak justice system that lacked trained
magistrates in sufficient numbers, resulting in a large backlog of cases. The
country’s prisons were also often in an abysmal state that compromised
the rights of suspects and prisoners.
In terms of Sierra Leone’s 8,900-strong police force, it suffered from
a lack of equipment; corruption was widespread among its ranks; low
salaries were irregularly paid; and 40 percent of its personnel had been
in the force for only three years. Though many members of the senior
management of the police were professional and well-trained, the middle
management of the force particularly suffered from poor skills and low
motivation, and one-third of its members had been employed for only
three years.16 Sierra Leone’s police further struggled with insufficient
vehicles, communications equipment, proper accommodation, handcuffs,
batons, and torches. Its financial allocation in 2007, for example, was only
US $6.6 million.17
Furthermore, deep-seated poverty presented a major challenge in
efforts to reconstruct the Sierra Leonean “Humpty Dumpty.” More than
60 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty,18 while 70 percent
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lived on less than US $1 a day.19 The price of the basic staple food—
rice—was also beyond the reach of most citizens. This was particularly
dangerous, as “rice riots” in neighboring Liberia in April 1979 had trig-
gered a political crisis that would eventually culminate in a decade of
military rule and 13 years of civil conflict. An estimated 80–90 percent of
Sierra Leone’s working population were in the informal sector,20 barely
surviving and struggling to eke out a living. To further compound these
problems, the government had to deal respectively with cholera and Ebola
outbreaks in 2012 (at least 216 fatalities) and 2014 (about 3,600 fatali-
ties). Devastating mudslides on the outskirts of Freetown in August 2017
also killed over 1,000 people.
Infrastructure was another major challenge with erratic water and
power supply. The country’s road and electricity networks were dilapi-
dated, further hampering efforts at economic recovery. This situation was
exacerbated by the weakness of poorly financed District Councils (the
country has 13 districts) unable to deliver social services to the popu-
lace. Despite much talk of “decentralization,” most decision-making and
resources still remained with the central government in Freetown, which
was itself grossly under-resourced.
Poor governance, involving corrupt and unaccountable leadership—
a blight on Sierra Leone since independence in April 1961—continued
to be a problem across all parties. To address these multiple challenges,
the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone—the first-ever such office
established by the world body after the departure of its own peace-
keepers—established five priority sectors as part of its mandate to rebuild
Sierra Leone: peace and governance; human rights and rule of law; civilian
police; military; and public information. Though these were clearly impor-
tant areas, UNIOSIL lacked the human and financial resources to address
these huge challenges: in 2006, it had only 20 police personnel and 10
military officers, while its total civilian staff was 309 (reduced to 247
by April 2008). The mission, however, worked with other UN agencies
such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP); the UN Children’s
Fund (UNICEF); the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR); and the World Food Programme (WFP). Nevertheless, the
UN had a mostly token presence in the country, and many of UNIOSIL’s
staff were limited to working in the capital of Freetown. Even after
UNIOSIL was transformed into the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office
in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) by October 2008, this change of acronym
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scarcely made a difference to its even more limited capacity of 73 local
and international staff.
In addition to these challenges, Sierra Leone also continued to face
subregional challenges. It is significant to focus attention on this central
problem since the country’s civil war had been triggered from Liberia and
assisted by the fighters of Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor. An estimated
500,000 Sierra Leonean refugees had spilled into Liberia and Guinea in
the course of its civil war. Such refugee camps have traditionally been
used as breeding and recruiting grounds for militias. Guinean soldiers
also still occupied the border village of Yenga on the Sierra Leonean side,
with reports of harassment of local villagers. Furthermore, Guinean troops
were encroaching on the Kambia area in Sierra Leone, ordering a bauxite
mining company to stop prospecting in 2006.21
Addressing the Peacebuilding Challenges
Having outlined Sierra Leone’s key peacebuilding challenges, the efforts
of key domestic, subregional, and external actors to address these obsta-
cles and to prevent the country’s relapse into conflict are assessed
below.
Domestic Actors
One crucial but often overlooked source of Sierra Leone’s stability is its
active civil society sector, which remained vibrant even during the worst
periods of the country’s civil war. These civic groups were instrumental in
pressuring the military to leave power in February 1996. Sierra Leonean
lawyer and a leading light in her country’s civil society movement in
the 1990s, Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, traced the history of the country’s civic
groups to the opposition of one-party rule under Siaka Stevens between
1968 and 1985, when university students and independent media like
the Tablet and For Di People led the charge against autocratic rule. She
went on to note that, during the civil war of 1991–2002, women’s groups
(such as the Women’s Movement of Sierra Leone); religious organizations
(such as the Multi-Religious Council [MRC]); student activists (such as
the National Union of Sierra Leone Students [NUSS]); media organiza-
tions (such as the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists [SLAJ]); trade
unions (such as the Sierra Leone Labour Congress); traditional leaders
(who mobilized local communities to form self-defense militias known as
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Kamajors, Gbethis, Tamaboros, and Donsos); and other civic groups, all
sought to hold successive governments accountable.
In implementing the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, the chiefs in southern
Sierra Leone played a particularly instrumental role in reconciliation
efforts and in reintegrating ex-combatants into local communities. During
the country’s May 2002 elections, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress
and the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists played leading roles in
voter education and election monitoring.22 After peacekeepers left Sierra
Leone in 2005, these civic groups sought to promote transparent gover-
nance, human rights, press freedom, access to justice, gender equality,
strengthening public institutions, and securing reparations for victims of
the civil conflict, as recommended by the country’s Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission (TRC). Other groups that form part of the country’s
associational life have included long-standing church groups, Islamic
fraternities, reciprocal labor companies, initiation societies, rotary and
other social clubs, sports clubs, and credit clubs (such as osusu, involving
rotating credit). These diverse actors have demonstrated great resilience
and resourcefulness in the face of the country’s hardships, and provided
the glue that held Sierra Leone’s post-war society together.23
The country also has a plurality of voices with 28 political parties, 49
daily newspapers, and 39 radio stations by August 2006,24 though regu-
lation of the media remained weak and ethical journalistic standards were
not always observed. Sierra Leone, further, significantly produced some of
the finest scholars in the Diaspora—Yusuf Bangura, Jimmy Kandeh, Ismail
Rashid, Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Aminatta Forna, and Tunde Zack-Williams,
to name a few.
One sector that successive governments in Freetown seem to have
prioritized was the critical area of education, with 20 percent of expen-
diture going to this important area by August 2006, and primary school
enrolment doubling between 2000 and 2005.25 The government also
launched youth employment and empowerment schemes which, however,
suffered from a lack of funding and failed to make much of a dent in
the country’s large youth unemployment statistics. But as Sierra Leonean
scholar, Ismail Rashid, insightfully noted, while there has been widespread
youth unemployment in post-war Sierra Leone, there has not been large-
scale youth destitution. The country’s youths have been resourceful at
engaging in such activities as petty trading, street-hawking, driving okada
(motorbike) taxis, and engaging in other transport services.26
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Despite its multiple challenges, successive governments in Freetown
also deserve credit for leading efforts at organizing three presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2007, 2012, and 2018 with two to four million
voters participating in each poll. The UN provided some technical assis-
tance to these efforts. An impressive 91 percent of eligible voters—2.6
million people—registered for the August 2007 polls,27 suggesting that
the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans felt that they had a stake in building
a viable democracy. The fact that many former RUF combatants voted
for the All People’s Congress (APC) in 200728 also suggested that the
ballot—rather than the bullet—was now seen, even by former fighters, as
a viable way of changing a civilian regime.
Equally impressive was the fact that the opposition APC was able
to defeat the incumbent Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) govern-
ment which had been in power since March 1996. Despite violent
clashes between supporters of both parties, as well as intimidation and
harassment—particularly in the SLPP’s traditional southern and eastern
strongholds—the polls were successfully held, and power was peacefully
transferred from Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to Ernest Bai Koroma in 2007.
The 2012 polls also saw a high 87 percent of voters turning out, showing
that confidence in the ballot box remained high. The fact that no ethnic
group in Sierra Leone is numerically dominant means that politicians are
forced, to some extent, to build coalitions that simply go beyond narrow
ethnic blocs.29
Like the fabled Old Mother Hubbard, on assuming office in 2007,
Ernest Koroma went to the national cupboard to find it bare. He effec-
tively inherited an empty treasury, asking donors to fund 80 percent of the
national budget on assuming office.30 The president was often quick to
manage incidents of electoral conflicts, setting up commissions of inquiry
to investigate serious acts of violence. Inter-party dialogues involving
senior officials and youth and women’s wings of the two main parties also
helped to ease tensions. Koroma appeared to be more dynamic an admin-
istrator than the mild-mannered and sometimes lackadaisical Kabbah. He
established a fast-track anti-corruption court, and took action—not always
consistently—even against some members of his own party.
The president did manage some other achievements, particularly in
the area of infrastructure, confirmed by his overwhelming re-election in
November 2012. Koroma’s Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project boosted the
country’s electricity supply. He increased government revenues through
introducing a goods and services tax in 2010. He established an Office of
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Diaspora Affairs in the presidency to tap into increased remittances from
the large Sierra Leonean Diaspora. He initiated free health care for preg-
nant women, new mothers, children and infants and advocated increased
food self-sufficiency as his government’s highest priority, providing more
support to the country’s farmers through seeds and fertilizers.
But despite these efforts, the estimated value of Sierra Leone’s exports
was still a measly US $180 million in 2009.31 Koroma was accused after
the 2007 election of fanning ethnic divisions by replacing large numbers
of senior officials in the civil service and parastatals from the SLPP with
APC-supporting northerners.32 The president’s Agenda for Prosperity,
which sought to transform the country’s agricultural sector, was derailed
by the Ebola crisis of 2014/2015, with Sierra Leone classified as the
third hungriest country in the Global Hunger Index by 2017. As Koro-
ma’s term was coming to an end by March 2018, his administration was
accused of embezzling funds meant for Ebola relief and siphoning funds
from a scholarship program meant for poor Sierra Leoneans making the
Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.33
Regional Actors
Turning from the domestic to the subregional level, the three heads of
state of the Mano River Union—Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia—
met regularly to discuss security issues in the volatile Mano River basin.
Freetown also played an active role in subregional diplomacy through
ECOWAS summits. With the arrival in power in Conakry of the demo-
cratically elected Alpha Condé, in December 2010, relations with Guinea
improved dramatically. By April 2013, Guinean troops had completed
their withdrawal from Yenga, an area that had been occupied since
1999.34 The stability of Sierra Leone’s neighborhood after the end of
conflict in Liberia in 2003 and the end of military rule in Guinea by 2010
were thus important factors in reducing incentives for Sierra Leonean
youths to join rebel militias in neighboring countries.
External Actors
A plethora of international actors were involved in assisting Sierra Leone’s
peacebuilding efforts. Led by the UN and its agencies, these actors
also included the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Fund for
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Agricultural Development (IFAD), the European Union (EU), and the
governments of Britain, the United States (U.S.), Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Japan, Germany, and Canada. Though the support
provided by these international donors was useful in keeping the fragile
peace, the amounts provided were often derisory, and clearly insufficient
for transforming Sierra Leone’s institutions to ensure sustainable peace.
In 2006, for example, only US $351.5 million—less than half of
the estimated US $850 million that the UN peacekeeping force in the
country spent annually—was provided to Sierra Leone by international
donors.35 The UN Peacebuilding Commission’s paltry contribution of
US $35 million—which it took over three years to disburse—was partic-
ularly embarrassing for a body set up at the same time as the UN
peacebuilding office in Sierra Leone. A Victim’s Trust Fund established
by the government in Freetown in September 2009 had attracted only
US $25,000 a year later.36 Even the UN’s own Joint Vision 2009–2010
of US $360 million had a shortfall of US $151 million by the end of its
funding period.37 The EU and the World Bank grandiosely announced
a three-year “decentralized service delivery program” in 2012 worth a
derisory US $32 million. The rhetoric of external donors was always more
impressive than their actual provision of resources.
Foreign assistance correctly prioritized Sierra Leone’s security sector
since the failure of the country’s army to maintain a monopoly of
legitimate armed force over its territory had facilitated the coun-
try’s civil conflict in the first place. The British-led Security Sector
Reform Programme (SILSEP) and its International Military Advisory
and Training Team (IMATT)—which provided much security reassur-
ance to the Sierra Leonean population38—drove efforts to restructure
and retrain the Sierra Leone army, but had only 65 staff in 2001. A year
later, 2,091 fighters from diverse factions outside the army had been inte-
grated into a 12,000-strong army. Despite this external assistance, defense
spending in 2006/2007 was only US $13.3 million, meaning that half of
the programmed defense expenditure could not occur.39 These programs
nevertheless eventually led to the reduction of the army’s strength from
10,600 in 2006 to 8,500 by 2012.40 There were, however, reports of a
lack of consultation by the British government with Freetown in drawing
up army restructuring benchmarks (within a 10-year GB £40 million
annual bilateral development assistance program for Sierra Leone between
2002 and 2012).41
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Ismail Rashid provided a balanced assessment of British efforts at
restructuring the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF),
praising the renewed professionalism, discipline, and credibility of the
army, but noting that London’s overbearing leadership of the program
had denied the government in Freetown ownership of it. Vehicles,
communication equipment, arms (worth about US $1.4 million),42 and
uniforms were provided by London. New recruitment criteria, structures,
and missions were also developed by British military personnel, who took
over the training of the army from the former Nigerian Chief of Defense
Staff (CDS) of the Sierra Leone army, General Maxwell Khobe, who
died in April 2000, as the British were stepping up their presence. The
Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone had recom-
mended that the country create a 5,000-strong army, while upgrading
its navy and air force.43 London simply brushed aside these subregional
plans in place of its own models. As Nigerian defense minister at the time,
General Theophilus Danjuma, noted in March 2001: “The British have
a very good propaganda machinery. They make a lot of noise and have
succeeded in replacing us in the armed forces headquarters in Freetown,
but they are doing very little elsewhere.”44
Eboe Hutchful’s insightful critique of security sector reform in Sierra
Leone is also worth bearing in mind. He has consistently advocated the
concept of “security sector governance” in which institutions of account-
ability and oversight would be strengthened from the bottom up rather
than from the top down. Hutchful was critical of the lack of over-
sight institutions in post-conflict Sierra Leone, particularly the executive
and legislative sectors, and noted an initial reluctance on the part of
civil society to engage the security sector due to the hostility toward
soldiers engendered by the country’s decade-long civil war. The Ghanaian
scholar observed that in environments like Sierra Leone, security sector
reform has often reflected Westphalian assumptions of the state as the
sole provider of security, and thus failed to incorporate community-based
justice and security systems, as well as traditional institutions such as
village chiefs and secret societies, into their reforms. Hutchful further
noted that President Kabbah’s government did not take security sector
reform seriously, and criticized London’s tendency to draw on intricate
British models in designing the defense ministry and the national security
office, which often undermined local ownership. He also bemoaned the
modest attention given to the vital justice sector.45
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Britain further contributed to efforts to reform the 8,900-strong Sierra
Leone Police (SLP) through the Justice Sector Development Programme
(JSDP). A retired British assistant chief constable, Keith Biddle, was put in
charge of the police force as Inspector-General between 1999 and 2003.
Biddle enjoyed a particularly close relationship with President Ahmed
Tejan Kabbah.46 London provided GB £25 million for restructuring
Sierra Leone’s police, with senior officers trained at Britain’s Police Staff
College in Bramshill. The force was provided with 700 vehicles, commu-
nication equipment, and uniforms. This program was later transformed
into the British-dominated Commonwealth Community Safety Project
between 2000 and 2005. “Local needs policing” was introduced, the
force was strengthened to be able to combat domestic protests, and a
Complaint, Discipline, and Investigations Department was created. By
November 2006, Sierra Leone’s police force had achieved its full strength
of 9,50047 (up from 6,600 in 1999). But corruption still remained rife
within the force, leading to questions of credibility among the general
population.
One of the most widely praised projects of these police reforms was the
Family Support Units (FSUs), pioneered by the most senior female police
officer in the SLP, Kadi Fakondo. This innovative project saw specialized
police stations established to deal with domestic violence, sexual assault,
and child abandonment; as well as police officers conducting sensitiza-
tion workshops with local communities, resulting in greater monitoring
of gender and child-related crimes. But underlining the difficulty of
sustaining these projects, funding for police reforms had practically been
exhausted by 2009.48
Despite these contributions to rebuilding Sierra Leone’s police sector,
fundamental questions must be raised, in light of the Macpherson
report of 1999–2000, which shook the British establishment to its core.
The report declared—something many ethnic minorities had known for
decades—that the police force in London, the country’s largest, suffered
from “institutionalized racism.” In the decade after Macpherson, African
and Asian minorities suffered 1.5 million more stop-and-searches than
white Britons, resulting in London’s Metropolitan Black Police Associa-
tion (BPA) declaring in April 2013 that the Met was still institutionally
racist.49 Given these statistics, one is forced to ask whether Britain was
really in a credible position to “export” what it did not have—an impartial
police force—abroad.
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Youth was another vital sector that enjoyed priority from external
actors, with about 800,000 young people in Sierra Leone being unem-
ployed, underemployed, or employed without being paid.50 The Koroma
government established a National Youth Commission for implementing
youth development programs, and a new ministry of Youth Employment
and Sports by 2011. The World Bank launched a US $20 million three-
year project to increase business and employment opportunities for youth
through apprenticeships, business development, and other skills. These
efforts were also supported by the UNDP and other donors, focusing
on supporting government youth employment schemes; microfinancing
skills; and work-for-cash and food-for-work projects. As impressive as
these programs often sounded, many—including several World Bank
projects—were attracting funding of paltry sums in 2011: a US $10
million cash-for-work scheme and a US $6 million employment proposal
scheme. A particularly neglected area was programs for vulnerable young
women in post-war Sierra Leone, with rape now a major scourge of
post-war society.
In March 2014, UNIPSIL left Sierra Leone, effectively ending a 16-
year UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding presence in the country.
Conclusion
Sierra Leone held its fifth post-war election in March 2018, involving
16 political parties. Despite sporadic violence in parts of the country
and a dispute over the electoral results, the polls were largely peaceful.
The SLPP’s former head of the ruling military junta for three months
in 1996, Julius Maada Bio, won 51.8 percent of the vote in the second
round to the APC’s Samura Kamara’s 48.2 percent.51 An impressive 2.6
million Sierra Leoneans (84 percent of registered voters) took part in the
polls, demonstrating the continuing confidence of the vast majority of the
population in the ballot, and resulting in an impressive third transfer of
power in a decade between the country’s two main parties. However, with
such a narrow margin of victory—and with no parliamentary majority—
amidst an acrimonious, ethnic-fueled election campaign, many challenges
lay ahead for the new administration.
President Maada Bio’s first two years in office (2018–2020) saw
a continued focus on trying to revive the economy. A commission
of inquiry reportedly uncovered evidence of gross corruption by the
previous administration of Ernest Koroma. However, an Independent
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Commission for Peace and National Cohesion was also established, and
a reconciliation meeting was held between Bio and Koroma in State
House in September 2019. A high court ruling in May 2019 canceled the
disputed election of 10 APC parliamentarians in polls held a year earlier,
and all the seats subsequently ended up with Bio’s SLPP, handing the
ruling party a one-seat majority in parliament (58 to 57 seats).52
Key Recommendations
Four key policy lessons can be drawn from this case at the domestic,
subregional, and external levels for future peacebuilding efforts in Africa
and elsewhere. As ever, the specific idiosyncrasies of Sierra Leone must
always be kept in mind.
1. Ensure that local actors are the authors of rebuilding their own
state, even as they rely heavily on external resources. Domestic civil
society organizations and dynamic leadership have a crucial role to
play in post-war stability. A strong civil society with a long tradition
of holding governments accountable appears to have been impor-
tant to successful post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone.
Dynamic leadership also appears to have made a difference under
Ernest Koroma’s leadership, particularly between 2007 and 2012.
While the UN, the World Bank, and international donors continue
to tout their “state-building” ambitions, they clearly lacked the
resources and local knowledge to rebuild the Sierra Leonean state.
But donor funds have not been provided to Sierra Leone in the
quantities required (Marshall aid to rebuild Europe after 1945 was
US $100 billion), and the Sierra Leonean state—like an old car—
has gone through an arduous process of “panel beating” rather than
rebuilding. It remains fragile and in constant danger of breakdown,
requiring frequent care, resourceful innovation, and close attention
just to keep the battered jalopy on the road.
2. Prioritize subregional engagement and leadership. In terms of
the role of subregional actors, one of the most striking observa-
tions is the central role that Nigerian-led subregional peacekeepers
had played in Sierra Leone during its decade-long civil war in the
1990s in stark contrast to their almost invisible role in post-conflict
peacebuilding. Representatives of Nigeria and Ghana took part in
efforts to reconcile political actors, while ECOWAS pledged US $2
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million to infrastructure projects in Sierra Leone in April 2010.53
However, neither ECOWAS nor the African Union (AU) had the
substantial resources to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, and
even regional hegemon Nigeria—accounting for about 70 percent
of West Africa’s economy—which had invested so much blood
and treasure in the country, sacrificing the lives of at least 500
peacekeepers and spending billions of dollars between 1991 and
2000, did not play a prominent role in peacebuilding efforts in
Sierra Leone. Questions must surely be asked why Britain—with
very limited peacekeeping experience—should have been training
the Sierra Leone army, when Nigeria and Ghana had five decades
of international peacekeeping experience, had collaborated with the
Sierra Leone army under ECOMOG in Liberia for nearly a decade,
and were closer to the country’s military in terms of culture and
equipment needs.
3. Enhance scrutiny and accountability of external peacebuilding
actors. The role of external peacebuilding actors also requires crit-
ical scrutiny to which they have rarely been exposed. UN agencies,
the World Bank, and other international donors have frequently
painted a rosy, but exaggerated picture of the great impact that their
projects have had in transforming postwar Sierra Leone, in order to
continue attracting donor funding. The world body’s greatest asset
is undoubtedly the legitimacy that it lends to international efforts
and its mobilizing abilities, ensuring that the powerful 15-member
UN Security Council continues to focus attention on countries
like Sierra Leone. International donors in Sierra Leone, however,
often lacked proper coordination, and some planted their flags on
different bilateral projects touting apparently impactful contribu-
tions that were just a drop in a much larger ocean of need. There was
also sometimes a patronizing and paternalistic feeling that outsiders
knew best, and many donors thus, at times, ignored Sierra Leonean
government or civil society priorities, leading to charges of “donor
democracy.”
Britain clearly sought to act as a lead nation in promoting security
sector reform in a former West African colony—maintaining a similar
hyperactivity as France has done in former colonies such as Mali,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad—to justify a veto-wielding permanent seat
on a UN Security Council that has long become anachronistic. As
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with the Gallic role in its former colonies, there was also a commer-
cial side to London’s role in Sierra Leone: British company, London
Mining, and African Minerals Limited won a major contract in 2010
to develop iron ore deposits in Sierra Leone, while British firms
disproportionately benefitted from security sector reform contracts.
This was, therefore, not merely a case of charitable benevolence by
a neo-colonial Santa Claus.
4. Support Sierra Leoneans’ efforts to move from stabilization to
transformation of their still fragile state. Despite the messy
complexities of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict peacebuilding process,
the mystery of why the dog did not bark, and why Sierra Leone
has not relapsed into conflict in two decades since 2002 after a
devastating 11-year conflict, lies in the actions of these domestic,
subregional, and external actors who somehow “muddled through”
and improvised one of the few relative peacebuilding success stories
of the last two decades. For this case to remain a sustainable success,
however, serious resources will need to be provided by regional and
external donors to enable domestic actors in Sierra Leone to truly
transform their society.
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One of the most important factors in the collapse of peace agreements
and the failure to build peace in post-conflict countries in Africa is the
nature of the conflict itself—how the wars are fought, what consequences
live on long after they have been “settled,” and how affected communities
remember the wars.
Some of the common characteristics of violent political conflicts in
Africa include the multiplicity of warring parties, competing actors, and
layers within a single conflict. Often, African conflicts are more multi-
faceted than they might appear to distant observers. Even more often,
these conflicts create a situation of “wars within wars.” This makes
attempts at peacebuilding a treacherous endeavor.1 Frequent relapses to
conflict are an ever-present danger.
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The causes of these relapses are broadly known but hardly ever given
the primacy they deserve in the crafting of peace agreements. This is
particularly true of Sudan and South Sudan over decades. The main
conflict drivers—from disagreement over power and resource sharing
along ethnic lines, lack of justice for atrocities committed during conflict,
and the failure of peace agreements to live up to the promises they
make to citizens and interest groups—are well known. Here, as else-
where, the multiplicity of competing actors presents the mediator with
a tough set of questions: which parties to reconcile and which to (effec-
tively) ignore? How inclusive should the negotiation and implementation
of peace agreements be, mindful that too broad an agreement might
reduce key parties’ attachment to it? How do you avoid creating future
spoilers in the process?
The central argument in this chapter is that too many African conflict
resolution deals and peacebuilding efforts tend to rely on political agree-
ments between politico-military elites—“the gun class,” so to speak.2
These deals often focus on elite power and resource-sharing arrange-
ments, while ignoring the communal and societal dynamics that fed the
war and leave embers in its wake. To name only a few of those embers:
i. Lack of justice and accountability for crimes committed during war;
ii. lack of reconciliation between and within conflict-ravaged commu-
nities; and
iii. lack of programs to alleviate societal trauma.
Common to most protracted conflicts which relapse into war is a discon-
nect between elites and local communities, which typically suffer the
most when the former undermine peace agreements to further their own
narrow interests.3 Also typical is the exclusion of Africa’s youth—the
largest population group in Sub-Saharan Africa—from peace negotia-
tions and subsequent reconstruction programs. This is unhelpful in the
pursuit of long-term, sustainable peace. The inordinate focus on elites
in reconciliation and peace negotiations also has the effect of weakening
much-needed security reforms, which inevitably are the most difficult to
tackle in peace negotiations. A peace deal, in Africa as elsewhere, is only
as viable as its security arrangements.4
In essence, these elite pacts, important as they are in the reduction of
violence, lead to a variety of other contests, including competition to seize
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the renewed flow of money and resources which usually follows peace
agreements. As for ordinary citizens, their experience typically is one of
disappointment or the status quo. The absence of meaningful change to
their lives often becomes a catalyst for a swift return to conflict.5
In order to unpack these dynamics, this chapter looks at the histo-
ries and experiences of peacebuilding in Sudan and South Sudan. It seeks
to demonstrate why these two countries failed to achieve peace, despite
signing, in 2005, one of Africa’s most celebrated negotiated political
settlements, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended
decades of civil war between the north and south. Indeed, the CPA is
perhaps partly responsible for a large swath of South Sudan’s population
being subject to massive humanitarian crises and violence by both state
and non-state actors. The chapter also describes the patterns observed in
the course of the 15 years the CPA has been (barely) implemented in the
“two Sudans” that emerged in 2011.
The main focus here is not the troubled history between the north
and south, but rather their respective internal dynamics and why peace-
building in each has largely failed.6
The Problem
While no two conflict situations are identical, the factors that scupper
peace agreements and peacebuilding in many parts of Africa are gener-
ally the same.7 The role of marginalized youth, easily persuaded to
take up arms in the absence of meaningful livelihood options, is almost
always cited.8 The massive burden that prolonged war leaves on the
conscience and shoulders of societies, especially the destruction of social
and communal values—the backbone that supports justice, coexistence,
tolerance, and conflict resolution in those societies—is another. To put
this succinctly, while most post-war reconstruction focuses on rebuilding
the infrastructure, the economy, and public institutions, it has often lost
sight of the need for reconstruction of the people themselves, i.e., their
relationships with one another, assisting them to come to terms with
trauma and rebuilding family networks, and restoring the social order that
undergirded stability before the war broke out. Where a sense of justice, in
particular, fails, the trust of ordinary people in peace agreements is sure to
collapse. The recurrent failure to secure populations’ “buy-in”—a stake—
in peace processes is almost always fatal to them.9 So, too, the behavior of
rebel leaders who become the rulers in a post-war situation and believe,
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as putative liberators, they are entitled to the state—its national army, the
best jobs, contracts, and so on.
When peace does return sustainably to territories that have known
war for prolonged periods, typically it means that the state has gained
the trust of ordinary people that their lives will improve and that the
predatory practices of wartime have ended.10 It has been suggested that
people’s trust can only be restored through national dialogue, reconcil-
iation, equitable sharing of peace dividends, and credible security sector
reforms.11 The reason most such attempts in Africa have failed is a lack
of political will and financial commitment, and weak oversight from both
the country’s political leadership and the international guarantors of the
peace accords.12
Most African countries affected by war are ethnically diverse (Somalia
is the one major exception). Power seekers fuel and exploit ethnic differ-
ences to advance their political and economic aims. In a post-war country
or newly independent state, like South Sudan, which must (re)build a
state and a sense of nationhood at the same time, the latter typically loses
out. The need to prioritize the delivery of goods and services—the basic
infrastructure of the state—is obviously paramount. But if re(building)
a sense of nationhood is ignored, it becomes much easier for “ethno-
preneurs” to divide communities, making a return to open conflict more
likely.13 This is what happened in South Sudan in 2013.
Sudan and South Sudan and the Failure of Peacebuilding
in the Post-CPA Era
Since independence from British colonial rule in 1956, Sudan, once
Africa’s largest country, has been for over five decades the scene of both
deadly conflicts and many “peace agreements dishonored.”14 Though
initially seen as North–South conflicts, they can also be understood as
periphery–center struggles, as was the case in more recent conflicts in
Darfur in the west, Blue Nile region, the Nuba Mountains in the center,
and the Red Sea Hills in the east. These wars were triggered by feelings of
exclusion from state power and resources as well as by race and religion.
The eventual breakup of Sudan in 2011 was the culmination of decades
of war, distrust, and a series of unworkable agreements. The latter have
been mediated by a host of international and East African intermediaries,
all to no avail.15 One of the most celebrated of these agreements was
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), premised on the unspoken
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assumption that it would be better to split Sudan into two countries,
which could exist side by side in peace and harmony, than remain one
country that is torn apart by war. The CPA took 17 years of on-and-off
negotiations between 1988 and 2005. When it was finally concluded, it
promised the people of South Sudan a referendum on unity or separation.
This was the most consequential item the southern leaders had put on the
negotiating table.16
The promise of a referendum was the price for North–South peace. It
was a monumental compromise. At the time, it was viewed as a diplo-
matic masterstroke by the mediators. Many in northern Sudan were
unhappy with this and other provisions of the CPA, and that discontent
plagued efforts to implement the agreement. For their part, people in
southern Sudan seemed prepared to consent to anything provided that
the CPA paved the way for separation. That the CPA promised things like
enhanced security, stability, prosperity, and so on but could not deliver
was secondary. Some observers saw this as a major flaw in the CPA, but
South Sudanese were jubilant. They voted overwhelmingly for separation
in the January 2011 referendum, as was expected. Euphoria ensued in the
South when formal independence was granted seven months later.17 For
southerners, this was a culmination of a long and treacherous liberation
struggle.18 But widespread disappointment kicked in shortly thereafter.
The CPA was built on the premise of two viable states. Expectations
for improvement in human security among all Sudanese people was high;
state violence and all other types of violence inflicted on them would
cease and good governance would become the order of the day—the so-
called “peace dividend,” in other words. Instead, the CPA produced two
countries that were so weighed down by violence that human security
would not return in the absence of a massive national effort on both sides
of the former conflict divide. The citizens of both countries, the Republic
of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, wanted their governments to
focus on security and stability.
The Sudanese wanted an end to the wars in Darfur, Blue Nile, and
southern Kordofan, as well as to bring welfare to the Red Sea region.
It was these demands that, along with the collapsing economy, runaway
inflation, and rising commodity prices, eventually energized a popular
uprising that finally deposed President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir in 2019
after 30 years of dictatorship. As of January 2020, the list of questions is
long: will the new government that took office end the wars of the border
areas, improve human rights, revive the economy, build a democracy, and
368 J. M. JOK
finally persuade the United States to remove Sudan from the list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism? It is difficult to predict how the new government
will answer these questions so soon after Al-Bashir’s fall.
The South Sudanese, for their part, wanted their new state to rein in
rogue soldiers, professionalize the armed forces, and teach them about
human rights and the primacy of the rule of law.19 Juba has not been
able to live up to the expectations of South Sudanese. As a result, the
viability of the new state remains an open question.
During the early part of the CPA interim period, public opinion
surveys revealed that popular skepticism in the accord was already
growing.20 These doubts were well-founded. After the breakup was
effected, it soon became clear that neither government had a viable
plan to exit from a war footing. Sudan remained at war within its new
borders, especially along its new southern border; the newly independent
South Sudan appeared unwilling to address its stark internal divisions
and endemic corruption that fueled conflict. There were also problems
of contested border areas, for which a boundary commission was estab-
lished but which remained toothless because of Khartoum’s interests in
the region. As of January 2020, the status of the strategic territory of
Abyei remains in limbo, subjecting it to violence at the hands of state-
sponsored militias of the Messiriyya tribe that uses the region for cattle
grazing and claims ownership of parts of it.21 There were also failings
around citizenship for “displaced” persons and losses of property.22
Of the key developments which illustrate the failure of the CPA and
peacebuilding in general, three stand out.
The Emergence of the “New South”
The “new south” refers to Darfur, southern Kordofan, and southern Blue
Nile, all of which remained in war, replete with abuses and atrocities akin
to the actions of Khartoum in the south prior to 2005.23 These three
areas were at war with the center, which waged a brutal counterinsur-
gency campaign against them. Some of their armies had fought against
Khartoum jointly with the southern armed opposition before the CPA.24
In signing the CPA, Khartoum had no intention of loosening its brutal
grip on restive parts of the territory. The regime in Khartoum was built
on Islamic militancy and the drive to create a theocratic state. It believed
that in neutralizing the southern-based Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army
(SPLA), the CPA would allow it to crush SPLA-connected forces based
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within the north. The mediators to the CPA were aware that Khar-
toum would backtrack on its commitments sooner or later, and effectively
looked the other way.25
This was a prime example of the elite nature of peacebuilding outlined
above: too little consideration was given to what national governments
would do within their own borders, to their own communities, once
conflict was ended between what the international community wrongly
assumed were the only key stakeholders: Khartoum and the SPLA. By
excluding the other armed groups from the main agreement—post-
poning resolution of all the issues around “other armed groups” to the
implementation phase—the CPA became a catalyst for a return to war.
Khartoum may have expected that it could rein them in in the north, but
they simply reverted to bush war.
This renewed conflict complicated relations between the two new
Sudans. Khartoum demanded that the SPLA forces within the north
be disbanded, then soon after independence closed the borders. The
potential engines of cooperation stalled, making it impossible for the
citizens of the two states to move and interact. The planned reconstruc-
tion programs, on which so much else depended, could not get off the
ground. Instead of the projected peace and harmony, the post-divorce
period was not only highly volatile but also swiftly came to be domi-
nated by grievances that the CPA not only failed to resolve but may have
exacerbated. Ordinary Sudanese were left to try and pick up the pieces.26
Mass Violence Breaks Out in the South
The second major event which reveals that the CPA failed in its main
aim was the outbreak of mass violence in South Sudan in December
2013, a mere two-and-half years after the state achieved independence.
The conflict was triggered by an attempt to seize power by a rival lead-
ership faction within the ruling SPLM/A, but it quickly frayed into a
vicious civil war. The people of South Sudan were divided partly on ethnic
lines in ways that were unprecedented in its history. Ethnic-based killings,
rape, and destruction of property reached almost genocidal levels over the
three-year war.27 Many questioned if the war might spell the end of the
new state, at least in its 2011 configuration. And the peacemaking that
ended the North–South war and resulted in the CPA came under sharp
scrutiny: should South Sudan have been prepared better and for a longer
period before moving to full independence?28
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The insinuation that South Sudan was not a viable country angered
South Sudanese. But the gruesome violence, following decades of a more
or less unified struggle for independence, was hard to explain. Nationalist
sentiments aside, it seemed palpably clear that the peace agreement and
the independence that followed did not produce peace in the lives of
South Sudanese.
Did the absence of peace following the CPA reflect a fundamental
weakness in the accord? Or was it the unwillingness of the parties to
adhere to the agreement that explains why conflict reignited? Or were
the inestimably complex issues the civil war left behind simply too diffi-
cult to address in a single agreement? Similar questions might be asked of
other failing peacebuilding initiatives in Africa.
Local Animosities Turn Inward
Throughout the liberation war, South Sudanese had on many occasions
turned the guns against one another—between and among ethnic groups,
between civilians and the SPLA, and between factions of the SPLA. The
negotiations leading up to the CPA never came to grips with this histor-
ical reality. In part, that was because these conflicts were often haphazardly
reconciled or swept under the carpet so South Sudanese could keep their
eyes on the big prize, their liberation from the north. But when the
North–South war ended and South Sudan became independent, there
was no more “Arab north” to collectively oppose. It did not take long
for the stored-up animosities of the liberation era to explode into the
open.
The resultant violence engulfed large parts of South Sudan, especially
in the period leading up to its secession from the north. In 2008 and
2009, Jonglei, South Sudan’s most populous state, was wracked by cases
of revenge attacks between the Nuer, Murle, and Dinka ethnic commu-
nities, with some of these incidents leading to the death of hundreds of
people and theft of thousands of heads of cattle. This violence continued
throughout that period and peaked again in 2011 and 2012 following
independence.29 In one episode that took place on January 1, 2012, a
group of fighters from the Lou Nuer ethnic group attacked the town of
Pibor, home of the Murle group. A week later on January 9, 2012, the
Murle carried out a revenge attack on Lou Nuer and threatened to attack
the other communities in Jonglei, the Dinka, and the Anyuak. This cycle
has remained essentially unbroken since then, posing challenges to the
authority of the state.30
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Time for a Rethink?
In the Unity State region of South Sudan, numerous local groups and
organizations, some church-led, some by traditional authorities, and
youth initiatives, work on peacebuilding at the community level. Typically,
their efforts are more sensitive to local dynamics and draw on personal
relations with key actors on the ground, in ways that external or elite-
driven initiatives cannot. But local peacebuilding efforts usually rely on
international organizations for support in terms of funding, training, and
capacity enhancement. Often this can prove to be a double-edged sword.
While international agencies have injected financial resources into peace-
building at the grassroots level across Africa, donor countries that finance
their efforts, such as the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States,
and Norway, still call the shots. Their interests are not always to the
benefit of local peacebuilding.
Peacebuilders can also be handicapped by the restrictions imposed
on them by host governments. In South Sudan, for example, non-
governmental organizations that support peace work are not always free
to move and live within the communities they support, as they are often
harassed by security agencies suspicious that they are spies or saboteurs.
Local agents need political space in which to operate, space which is not
compromised by donor interests.
The developments since the signing of the CPA outlined above illus-
trate how national leaders can, and have, dragged their ethnic kin into
communal wars. At the same time, it also hints at the capacity of these
communities to resist being drawn into such wars. A more cost-effective
means of affecting peaceful change would be for donors to channel this
support directly into grassroots mechanisms of conflict management. The
days of spending huge sums of money to facilitate high-level bargains
and pacts among competing leaders and elites should be numbered. The
record of these agreements in historical terms is woeful; most of these
settlements collapse. A rethink might lead to more effective means to end
the recurrent cycles of negotiations, which have not shown their worth in
Sudan/South Sudan.31
Key Lessons from Sudan/South Sudan
Any peace initiative that does not heed the cry for justice and account-
ability for crimes related to the way the wars were fought is not a process
that can endure. But it is important to note that the concept of justice
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often referenced by people affected by war is more encompassing than the
narrow definition typically used in official discourse. What justice means
at the grassroots level is about compensation for property destroyed and
life opportunities that have been taken away; it is about rebuilding local
and national institutions rendered dysfunctional by war, such as the sector
agencies and the judiciary. It is not just about lives lost, important as
their acknowledgment and commemoration may be. Mediators and peace
sponsors need to better understand that reality. One young boy I inter-
viewed in the aftermath of the outbreak of violence in Juba, South Sudan,
in 2013 told me that “it would mean a lot to me if someone could just
show me where my brother and uncle were buried after being murdered
by state agents…that would only be humane and fair.” Another boy
remarked that if the government institutions were fixed to stem corrup-
tion and “the state take its responsibility for our security and welfare,
that would be enough justice…at least we would be assured that war will
not return and those of us who have survived this violence can begin to
rebuild our lives.”32
South Sudan’s many peace agreements commit the government and
the international financiers and guarantors to a reconciliation between
communities whose relationships were destroyed by war. Yet 15 years on
from the signing of the CPA, South Sudan is yet to conduct a national
reconciliation process. Nor can the state provide a level of services that
might dissuade militants and others from banging the drums of war again.
Most people who have taken up arms today or who have joined various
opposition movements cite the government’s failure to facilitate national
reconciliation. They see this failure as part of the ruling elite’s effort to
cover up the abuses and atrocities that took place during the liberation
war.
Nearly three-quarters of South Sudan’s population are below the age
of thirty. Most, an entire generation from 1983 to 2005, did not attend
school. Their only sense of who they are is their contribution to the
war of liberation and a conviction that the government has failed them
since leaving their guns behind. Large numbers of youth without any
prospects for future employment has become one of the leading sources
of political unrest and rising militancy. South Sudan might have a peace
agreement that has accommodated the top leaders, but the communities
where these young people hail from continue to suffer the violence of
poverty, exclusion, and lack of opportunities.
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Of all the major obstacles to peace and stability in South Sudan, the
failure of security sector reform programs is arguably the most consequen-
tial. The list of objectives never achieved is long, but top on this list is the
role of the security forces as protectors, not as above the law.
Conclusion
Most African peacebuilding endeavors continue to focus on the imple-
mentation of political settlements, peace agreements, and compromise
deals, all of which attempt to reconcile the warring parties and polit-
ical contenders at the top. The assumption is that, since these conflicts
are essentially triggered by competition for power among the politico-
military class, a reconciliation forged between elites would trickle down
to create peace at the grassroots level. This is an erroneous assumption.
The evidence from Sudan/South Sudan’s experience of negotiations and
the peace agreements that emanate from them is clear: ignore ordinary
citizens and their experiences of living through and fighting wars at your
peril.
Once signed, peace agreements continue to be negotiated throughout
the implementation period at all levels of society. All stakeholders and
participants—mediators, development partners, and leaders—must pay
close attention to this phase.
While those disparate actors attempting to broker a sustainable peace
are dedicated and committed, they do not do enough to coordinate their
efforts. Without that coordination, the efforts and the resources put in by
the peacebuilders won’t amount to much. Peace actors need to combine
efforts to building bridges between them and governments.
It is natural for people who have lived through the trauma of war to
expect that its end will mean that their suffering will stop. But the longer
they have to wait for the “peace dividend,” the more likely they will think
the leaders have forsaken them. What often follows next is a dangerous
cocktail of allegations and counter-allegations over which ethnic group
is getting richer and more powerful, which are controlling the state and
its resources, and which are being shut out. This is how South Sudan
plunged into its own civil war soon after independence. And it is how
Sudan’s Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile regions relapsed into violent
conflict after the CPA was signed. The space between the people and the
government should never become so wide.
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Key Recommendations
1. Prioritize security sector reform in South Sudan. Today in South
Sudan, armed men, and weapons continue to flow back and forth
between the formal army and non-state militias, making the coun-
try’s security forces the principal source of insecurity. While it is
extremely important to pay attention to the security arrangements of
any peace agreement, there has to be caution about privileging the
fighting forces over the rest of the institutions. In South Sudan, the
army and the Ministry of Defense were negotiated into becoming
the biggest, most costly and unwieldy institution. With that, security
sector reform has been badly undermined by leaders’ interventions,
such as President Salva Kiir’s amnesties to all rebel fighters, militias,
and other disgruntled armed men. This helped turn the SPLA into a
dysfunctional institution that harms peace, rather than safeguard it.
Reform efforts must be insulated from ad hoc decisions on amnesty
and other measures by leaders that would undermine it.
2. Focus more on managing societal expectations through the imple-
mentation phase of peace agreements. The South Sudanese govern-
ment’s failure to manage expectations in the run-up to indepen-
dence, creating unrealistic hopes among its citizens that peace and
economic development would result swiftly once political freedom
was achieved, helped to drive South Sudan back to all-out war within
two years of independence. The same is true on the heels of the
current efforts to implement the peace agreement. It is critical to pay
attention to the process of continuous negotiation of the implemen-
tation process between the parties to the agreement, and to ensure
that ordinary people in the various ethnic communities throughout
the country are enlightened on the rewards of the peace process
being worked out at the national level.
3. Move beyond elite-bargains to meaningfully engage ordinary citi-
zens in reconciliation and rebuilding peace. At the time of writing
in January 2020, new plans are under way to reconcile the two
leaders, President Salva Kiir Mayardit and opposition leader, Riek
Machar, who have been at the center of the country’s political unrest
and instability for nearly a decade. There is every reason to expect
that this latest effort, as others have before it, is likely to collapse.
Meanwhile, the experience of ordinary citizens living through and
fighting the wars has been largely ignored in Sudan/South Sudan
20 LESSONS IN FAILURE: PEACEBUILDING IN SUDAN/SOUTH SUDAN 375
as the assumption has been that the reconciliation and peace forged
between elites would trickle down to the grassroots. This has not
worked. In order to build a sustainable peace, the balance of effort
must be directed to the grassroots. This includes engaging with,
supporting and, in some cases, reviving traditional and cultural
mechanisms that are critical for peacebuilding in South Sudan.
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Until 1994, Rwanda was among the world’s most obscure countries. A
tiny dot on the map of Africa—89 times smaller than its neighbor to the
west—that was rarely studied, and even more rarely in the news. During
the colonial period, Rwanda was an afterthought. The first colonial power,
Germany, took little interest: Rwanda had few resources, and was too
isolated and far from the coasts. It is said that for years after the Germans
had arrived, the native Banyarwanda did not even realize they were a
colonized people.1 Germany’s successor, Belgium, didn’t do much in the
colony either, other than maim its social fabric. During its first three
decades as an independent country, which were scarred by communal
massacres, civil wars, and dictatorships, Rwanda remained inconspicuous
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in the eyes of the world.2 The genocide—and what came after—changed
that.
Today, no country in Africa—arguably the world—divides opinion
among scholars and commentators as fiercely as Rwanda. It has become a
cause célèbre for billionaires, ex-statesmen, and celebrities. The polarized
nature of the debate is generally expressed thus: Rwanda is a remark-
able development success, risen from the ashes of mass ethnic slaughter,
steered and safeguarded by a visionary leader; or, a case of autocratic
recidivism, masked by implausibly rosy statistics and a bogus narrative
of national unity, contrived by a strongman intent on staying in power
forever. Essentially, this clash is all about one man: Rwanda’s president,
Paul Kagame.
No study on Rwanda can avoid this discussion, but it need not be
the dominant focus. Large parts of Rwanda’s post-conflict reconstruc-
tion speak for themselves—in terms of reduced poverty, improvements in
public safety and security, sustained economic growth, less corruption,
better health care, and vastly more women in government and politics.
This chapter ranges across Rwanda’s peacebuilding landscape, alighting
on key developments since 1994; it does not privilege a single issue or
policy. In a volume that addresses myriad themes and case studies of
peacebuilding in Africa, as this book does, context is vital. The aim here is
to set the broad contours in a way that invites comparisons, touching on
how major transformations came about and how peace has been enhanced
as a result.
This is not to gainsay the darker aspects of Rwanda’s peacebuilding
journey. Nor is it to suggest that Rwanda is out-of-the-woods; far from
it. The state all but disintegrated a quarter century ago. Ten percent of its
population of roughly ten million in 1994, including three out of every
four Tutsis in the country, was killed during the genocide. Since then, an
unspoken fear that Rwanda could slide back into the abyss has been the
backcloth against which all key government policies are drawn.
This chapter reflects briefly on several parts of Rwanda’s peacebuilding
journey that are broadly perceived as successful works-in-progress. This
includes some of the above-mentioned improvements as well as reforms
in the areas of justice and security. It also interrogates the lack of
competitive politics in Rwanda as a “necessary evil”—which requires
some understanding of the complex dynamics which seeded the geno-
cide—an argument frequently made in support of the government,
explicitly or otherwise. Drawing on firsthand experience and various
secondary sources, including a recent insider perspective of reconstruction
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in Rwanda,3 it also tries to identify the key drivers behind the Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF)’s peacebuilding choices.
Origins of Genocide
The mist which covers Rwanda’s famed “thousand hills” provides an apt
metaphor for its precolonial history: much of it is shrouded in mystery.
We know that for centuries there existed in this hilly region a kind of
feudal monarchy, distinct in its social system and traditions, comprised of
pluralistic clans. The clans were made up of three groups, the majority
Hutu (84 percent),4 the Tutsi (15 percent), and the Twa (1 percent),
which together formed the Banywarwanda people. The cattle owners, the
Tutsi, were the ruling class. Although categories were somewhat fluid, and
conflicts between the wealthy and poor may have been common, there
existed some shared identity of living under the same royal authority.
The Belgian colonial administration amplified historic divisions by
consolidating local power in the hands of the minority Tutsi chiefs and
removing traditional Hutu public figures. Tutsis were given monopolies
over land rights and access to socio-economic opportunities, hardening
a sense of ethnic inferiority among the majority Hutu. In 1932, the
Belgians introduced identity cards which stated the ethnicity of the bearer.
The labels “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were thus formalized in everyday life. All
the while, competition over scarce land intensified as Rwanda’s population
increased dramatically. When Tutsi leaders began clamoring for indepen-
dence in the late 1950s, the Belgians switched tactics and fomented a
“Hutu peasant revolution.” Tens of thousands of Tutsis were killed in
the ensuing violence and many more fled to neighboring countries. Inde-
pendence occasioned more massacres against Tutsis, retaliations, and a
further exodus. The first Hutu nationalist regime could not provide any
stable grounds for cohabitation. It was eventually overthrown in the early
1970s by another Hutu nationalist, Juvenal Habyarimana, who imposed
a measure of stability through an iron-clad dictatorship. Over the next
two decades, the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis began to merge with
struggles between the forces of democracy—which included moderate
Hutu leaders—and tyranny.
By the mid-1980s in Uganda, a highly unified, battle-tested group of
young Rwandan Tutsi exiles had formed the RPF. Its aim: the liberation
of their motherland. The RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990, overrunning
Habyarimana’s army, but were pushed back by reinforcements from
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France, with whom the regime had close ties. The subsequent de facto
partitioning of Rwanda led to peace negotiations between the govern-
ment and the RPF, tit-for-tat killings, and new massacres. Extremists in
President Habyarimana’s regime promoted a new “Hutu Power” bloc,
which suppressed moderate Hutu voices and promoted hatred and fear of
Tutsis. External pressure eventually forced Habyarimana to agree to ratify
the Arusha Peace Accords, which had paved the way for the deployment
of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in
1993 to assist in their implementation. But it was not to be. Returning
home from a meeting in Tanzania on April 6, 1994, Habyarimana’s plane
was shot down on its approach to Kigali’s airport.
In its scope and intensity, the hundred-day genocide which followed
was perhaps unprecedented in human history. Upward of a million Rwan-
dans—some moderate Hutus but mostly Tutsis—were killed by their
fellow Rwandans, usually in broad daylight, often by militia and ordinary
people using machetes, garden implements, or other tools. Hutu extrem-
ists nearly achieved their aim of extermination. Rwanda’s constricted
geography and the mass participation in the killings meant that Tutsis had
few ways to escape the slaughter. Peacekeeping forces on the ground were
degraded, rather than reinforced, by the UN after the genocide began,
permitting them to bear witness to it but not much else.5 The symbolic
date on which the genocide was brought to an end is July 4, 1994, when
the RPF took the capital, though it would take another two weeks for the
civil war to be declared over and the RPF announce the creation of a new
government.
Those who were in Rwanda at the time described the situation in apoc-
alyptic terms, such was the extent of societal collapse; a land of walking
ghosts.6 Analysts predicted that it would take more than a generation for
the country to recover in any substantial way, if it ever would.
Building Peace
The one advantage enjoyed by the RPF in this otherwise awful predica-
ment was that they could call the shots. Its military victory was total.
This allowed the RPF to consolidate its power across the country over
the next few years. It persuaded former enemies and ordinary Hutus to
change allegiances; dealt militarily with the numerous threats to the new
political dispensation, including former génocidaires within and outside
its borders; and defined a post-conflict future for Rwanda. This “victors’
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peace” had common features with experiences in Uganda, Eritrea, and
Angola, where strong cliques who had triumphed in civil wars exerted
a firm hold over reconstruction. But only the leader of the RPF, Paul
Kagame, would gain an international reputation for building a stable and
functioning state. This perception inspired a level of donor goodwill and
generosity toward Rwanda that eluded others.
What followed genocide in Rwanda was not all by design. The devas-
tating wars and interventions in neighboring Zaire/Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) shaped the RPF’s policies and programs in ways that
may never have been predicted when the RPF seized power, as did other
regional and global developments in the 1990s. What is more, the plans
agreed upon and put in place by the RPF were not influenced solely by
the genocide and its aftermath. Jean Paul Kimonyo, drawing on internal
documents, traces the historical antecedents of the RPF’s worldview. He
explains its transformative ambitions for Rwanda as arising, in part, from
ideas and myths of a “Grand Rwanda,” and a desire to break with the
country’s highly stratified, monarchical past. The genocide focused RPF
minds in unimaginable ways. But the desire to develop the country and
bring about a fundamental shift in Rwandans’ thinking germinated before
the events of 1994.
The so-called “Urugwiro Village discussions,” named after and held
at the presidential residence, took place over several months in 1998/9.
Firmly guided by RPF leaders but involving representatives of all parts of
society, the discussions helped frame the government’s vision and policies
for building peace and reconstructing the country (enshrined in law a few
years later), which became manifest in some of the key transformations
described below. Of overarching importance was the commitment to align
all initiatives to the aim of strengthening national unity. A National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission was established in 1999 “to educate,
sensitize and mobilize the population in areas of national unity and
reconciliation.” Also notable was the strong emphasis placed on inde-
pendent, homegrown solutions. The pledge to make the RPF “the motor
of government that would bring about real change in the country”7 put
paid—or should have—to any hopes people might have harbored that
free-flowing democracy might be encouraged or tolerated.
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Democracy
“Those who look in from outside ignore the fact that competitive democ-
racy requires sustained social cohesion,” wrote President Paul Kagame
in an Op-ed for London’s Financial Times in 2010.8 Rhetorically, if
not practically, few guiding principles to emerge from the Urugwiro
Village discussions became as sacrosanct as this in the RPF’s approach
to governing. Democratic legitimacy would derive from Rwandans’ own
values, traditions, and life experiences, not criteria pushed by donors.
Decentralization has been a central motif in post-genocide governance:
non-partisan elections are held at the local level, where all citizens can
participate in community planning and initiate processes to hold civil
servants accountable. (Kagame’s often-heard refrain that the Western
democratic model in its entirety will not be right for everyone has
become something of an Africa-wide mantra.) In the face of criticism,
his supporters have leaned on credible research to explain why, in condi-
tions of acute poverty and stark societal divisions like Rwanda, competitive
politics increases the likelihood of violence (whereas in middle- and
higher-income countries, it reduces it).9
No one can pretend that there is a real electoral choice at the national
level; or that participating in public life as a critic of government policy
does not carry grave risks. Kagame won re-election in 2017 with a 99
percent share of the vote after securing a constitutional change that
allowed him a third 7-year term in office. He is genuinely popular, to
be sure; but also widely feared. The amended constitution would permit
him to rule until 2034. More proof, critics say, his heart is a dictator’s,
not a democrat’s. Kagame or no Kagame, whether Rwanda can cope with
peppy democracy is not an academic matter. The introduction of competi-
tive elections (under pressure from the West) in the early 1990s is thought
by many to have tilled the field for the later genocide, as Hutu-led polit-
ical parties campaigned on virulent anti-Tutsi platforms in a fragmented
political landscape.
It begs the question: why does Rwanda even bother with elections?
Popular legitimacy is clearly a factor. Even if Rwanda’s are less elections
than “election-like events,” it is still hard to convey authority in their
absence. Rwanda’s elections have been geared toward endorsing the status
quo, yet they have still served as useful litmus tests for the direction of
the country. Campaigns and elections have also afforded opportunities to
test loyalties and manage internal dissent. Suffice to say, no one in the
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President’s Office is losing sleep over Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transforma-
tion Index (BTI), which scores Rwanda’s elections 2 out of 10 for (not)
being “free and fair.”10
Security
The reform of militaries and security institutions in post-conflict envi-
ronments is one of the thorniest parts of peacebuilding. All too often,
such reforms fail to achieve their targets. More damaging, they are also
exploited in struggles over state power between emerging actors, creating
new triggers for instability.11 Post-1994 Rwanda faced an additional chal-
lenge: one side of the reform equation had committed genocide against
the other.
Between 1997 and 2007, 60,000 ex-combatants were demobilized.
This included the ex-Forces Armées Rwandais (FAR, the pre-1994,
largely Hutu, Rwandan government army) and the various armed groups
involved in the genocide—the former génocidaires—most of whom had
fled to the DRC, then eventually returned to Rwanda.12 During this
period, the RDF (the Rwandan Defense Force, the name given to the
new national army in 2002) was considerably reduced. In broad terms,
the reintegration of ex-fighters back to civilian life has been successful,
assessed against other disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) programs in Africa.13
Insofar as peacebuilding, the experience of the disparate forces brought
into a united RDF has drawn particular attention.14 Integration served as
a conflict management strategy in Rwanda. Ex-FAR soldiers and rebels
now serving in the RDF were deployed near their native communities to
help establish trust in the new dispensation among wary locals. The wars
in the Congo aided integration, too. Under fire and around the camp-
fires, former enemies forged strong bonds and demystified toxic myths
from back home. Within Rwanda, workshops based on the traditional
Rwandan concept of Ingando—a military encampment or assembly area—
were used to instill a sense of national identity and overcome mutual fear
and suspicion. Ingando was both an ethos and a means for promoting
stability, reconciliation, and professionalization within the armed forces.15
By the late 2000s, the RDF was in the vanguard of peacebuilding.
“Heroes at home and abroad,”16 the soldiers had become an exemplar
for reconciliation, helped in no small measure by their growing interna-
tional reputation: professional, disciplined, and courageous troops. The
RDF was called on to contribute peacekeepers and mission commanders
to Darfur and Mali.
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Justice and Unity
The RPF knew that building cohesion within Rwanda’s armed forces—
a single institution, part of but also outside society—was going to be
easier than in society at large. For decades, hatred of the other had
been cultivated by ethno-nationalists through speeches and media. The
language of dehumanization reached its apogee at the outbreak of geno-
cide, with the government-allied radio station, RTLM, imploring listeners
to exterminate the Tutsi inyenzi or “cockroaches.”
In common with nation-building everywhere, the RPF promotes a
history of (pre- and post-colonial) Rwanda that is partly true and partly
imagined. Rwanda’s official policy of unity and reconciliation exalts rather
than merely emphasizes Rwandan-ness. Laws meant to keep the ethnic
genie in the bottle are expansive. Categorizations of “Hutu” and “Tutsi”
have been expunged from public life. Strong restrictions have been
imposed on how the genocide can be discussed publicly in Rwanda.
Nationwide “de-ethnicization” has taken many forms, most recently
the program Ndi Umunyarwanda, which means, “I am Rwandan” (not
Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa). Consistent with other government initiatives, offi-
cially aimed at overcoming tribalism and building a national identity, Ndi
Umunyarwanda is also about shoring up a single narrative of the coun-
try’s past, present, and future. Critics say that it only encourages Hutus
to apologize to Tutsis, reinforcing the former’s social positioning as géno-
cidaires17; others suggest that it is a troubling echo of other top-down,
de-ethnicization programs: based on the erroneous premise that if “ethnic
divisions can be made, they can also be unmade.”18
Ndi Umunyarwanda was established in 2013, a year after the
community-based Gacaca courts finished their work. Following the
Urugwiro Village discussions, the RPF turned to Gacaca—a traditional
forum meaning “justice on the grass”—out of practical necessity: no
conventional means to hold ordinary Rwandans who committed geno-
cide accountable existed. There were simply too many cases; nearly two
million, or about 1 in 5, Rwandans were implicated.19 The majority of
trials ended in convictions, with crimes against property resulting in fines
paid to victims or community work; and prison sentences for murder and
other serious crimes. At a minimum, masses of isolated Rwandans finally
had their pain and frustration recognized.
As with so much else, opinions are divided on Rwanda’s mode of
devolved justice, which was also meant to promote forgiveness by victims,
ownership of guilt by perpetrators, and national reconciliation.20 Its
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supporters argue that Gacaca, for all its flaws, probably saved Rwanda.21
The most tangible benefit of Gacaca for many was in simply discovering
where their relatives were buried. Its limitations—no legal representa-
tion for defendants, a bias toward confessions—were not atypical of
other transitional justice mechanisms. But the absence of Tutsis facing
trial exposed the government to allegations that Gacaca was, ultimately,
another vehicle for the RPF to further centralize and consolidate its grip
on power, especially in the countryside.
Economic Vision
Rwanda’s “Vision 2020” strategy was launched in 2000, another product
of the discussions at Urugwiro Village. Unlike most countries’ strategic
frameworks for their future development, which involve changing course,
building on or reversing existing projects, the RPF essentially had a blank
slate. The goal—transform post-genocide Rwanda into a middle-income
country by 2020—was hugely ambitious for a poor, rural, landlocked
country with few natural resources. The Vision 2020 document, and
subsequent policies oriented to it, would be critical to building peace and
consolidating the RPF’s legitimacy.22
The rhetoric of an investment-friendly, modernizing economy was
supported by substantial policy shifts. Rwanda became one of the
staunchest advocates of regional integration. In a context where neighbors
are most frequently associated with conflict—and tensions flare-up over
the intersection of national struggles, as happens often between Rwanda
and Uganda or the DRC23—this can only further peace in the region.
But regionalization has also demanded a fundamental shift in people’s
minds. The adoption of a new economic identity—tech-savvy, service-
oriented, outward-looking, and linked strongly to East Africa—has placed
a strain on the rhythms and culture of Rwanda’s countryside, historically
closed to the outside world. For some time yet, public officials will need
to convince local populations that rapid, dislocating economic change will
be beneficial to them in the long run.
During his first two terms in office, President Kagame proved excep-
tionally adept at managing a frequent scourge of one-party dominated
states: patrimonial politics. Described by some scholars as “developmental
patrimonialism,”24 the RPF’s approach has avoided its worst excesses
(rampant corruption and inefficiencies) by maintaining internal (party)
and external (state) control in ways that permit long-term investments.
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Typically, networks exist on short-term gains. Kagame has also shrewdly
pushed the mantra of African self-reliance while the government pock-
eted substantial donor support, on which the first phase of Vision 2020
relied heavily. Their sustained goodwill was based, partly, on sheer perfor-
mance. Between 2001 and 2015, overall poverty reduced by 19.8 percent
while extreme poverty declined by 23.7 percent.25 Rwanda became one of
the world’s fastest growing economies year on year; the only low-income
country in the World Bank’s top 30 “easiest places to do business;”
and a mini tourism mecca, increasing revenues from visitors from US
$27 million in 2000 to US $438 million in 2017. Donors also lauded
the government on delivery: Rwanda walked the talk on corruption as
almost no other aid recipient did. Donors praised the government’s seem-
ingly ceaseless attention to accountability, transparency, and efficiency in
deploying its scarce resources to key sectors of the economy.
Despite sharp criticisms on human rights and rule-of-law issues,
donors have remained largely supportive of the executive’s domination
of the state apparatus. This is likely to continue, provided the RPF’s
commitment to building a capable state and its intolerance of corrup-
tion—Rwanda now beats the likes of Italy and Greece in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)—doesn’t wane.26
Women
As is increasingly the case in wars, women suffered disproportionately
in the violence of the early 90 s and especially the genocide. It is esti-
mated that between 250,000 and 500,000, mostly Tutsi, women were
exposed to some form of gender-based violence, mainly rape. Two-thirds
of the raped victims later tested positive for the HIV/AIDS disease.27
In the aftermath of the genocide, women were more numerous—up to
70 percent of the population in parts of the country—due to the higher
rates of death, exile, or imprisonment of men. Women’s mental health
and economic well-being were shattered. Hutu women faced the added
burden of being socially excluded and shamed due to their husbands’
suspected role in the killings.
A seemingly hopeless situation opened the way for women to play
leading roles in repairing a broken society. Without much planning or
coordination, at least initially, women began to distribute assistance and
relief to communities, mediate and resolve disputes, and advocate for
peace. Women increasingly became involved in shaping policy, driving
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socio-economic change and even serving as judges on Gacaca, once the
exclusive preserve of “wise and respected old men” (inyangamugayo).
The emergence of women in important, non-traditional roles after the
genocide stirred and intersected with conversations at the national level.
Ideas and experiences were eventually co-opted into the RPF’s poli-
cymaking—as a core tenet. Set in Rwanda’s 2003 Constitution, a law
requiring that women hold a minimum 30 percent of elected positions
would be improved upon in practice in ways that may never have been
foreseen. In 2018, 49 women sat in Rwanda’s parliament, which repre-
sented 61 percent of total seats—the highest proportion in the world.
Four of the seven Supreme Court seats were also held by women.
The centrality of women to all parts of Rwanda’s peacebuilding and
post-conflict recovery is distinct in the African context. In doing so, it
has accelerated the process of overcoming the entrenched patriarchy once
common in Rwanda and still pervasive across the continent.
Conclusion
The most striking feature of Rwanda’s peacebuilding journey is also the
most obvious: there has been no large-scale violence inside the country
since the genocide. More than a quarter of a century of peace—however
uneasy—has made possible important advances across society. In assessing
whether it can be sustained for the next 25 years, several questions arise.
Popular support for the RPF is, outwardly, very strong. But no one
knows where the line between fear, belief, and moral duty lies: how
many support the government’s narrative in the name of peace and
stability, but nothing more? And how long might that pact survive?
Similarly, the balance of opinion suggests that de-ethnicization overall
is working28—but how much that is acted out by individuals in society
is genuinely felt internally is an open question.29 This is least clear in
the countryside, where more than 80 percent of Rwandans live. Inter-
actions between survivors and participants in the genocide are more
immediate and personal in rural areas, where unresolved material claims
still persist.30 Community-level peace processes have proliferated in the
past two decades, though often it is unclear whether they are government-
sanctioned or government-initiated. In the country’s increasingly dynamic
capital, Kigali, differences are less salient. Improved education and oppor-
tunities in the city are resulting in new identities, not necessarily just
national ones. And most of Rwanda’s current population of 12 million
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were born after the genocide. They live with its legacy. But how has their
“inherited trauma” impacted their worldview?
Outcomes in post-conflict settings hinge to a great extent on whether
local stakeholders are actively committed to peacebuilding or not. On the
face of it, Rwanda is a model on two levels. National government has
maintained a firm grip on its reform agenda, based on its own assessment
of the country’s needs. High priority is given to relations with donors and
partners; they are active in areas where national capacity and resources are
lacking, but rarely encroach on state sovereignty. As one scholar described
Rwanda’s approach, “Don’t tell us what to do; help us to do what we
want to do.”31 The second level is local agency. For all the criticism of
its muscular, top-down approach, Rwanda has exercised state power in
ways that give voice and legitimacy to communities and grassroots move-
ments. Gacaca illustrates the scale of Rwanda’s ambition in this regard.
Understanding its complex origins and legacy, however, must be part of
any lessons gleaned from Rwanda’s successes in local peacebuilding.32
The changes evident in Rwanda since 1994—in people’s safety and
security, in its economy and governance structures—are too substantial
to be dismissed as a “veneer of peacebuilding,” as some critics allege.
Developments in the Great Lakes region reinforce the point. Chronic
insecurity and violence in its southern neighbor, Burundi, whose poli-
cies toward its own Hutu–Tutsi divide were once touted as an antidote
to Rwanda’s, show no sign of abating. Nor in the DRC, despite the pres-
ence of one of the world’s largest UN peacekeeping missions for 20 years
and counting. The ruinous impact of official looting and rent-seeking in
the wider region attests to another key feature of Rwanda’s peacebuilding
trajectory that cannot be minimized: its strong record on corruption.
That is not to say romantic notions of the post-genocide “miracle”
ought to go unchallenged. In building peace and a functioning state,
the RPF has defied the famous entreaty of Prince Johnson, for a time
Liberia’s most powerful rebel leader: “the gun that liberates shall not
rule!” Doubtless, Rwandans have asked themselves countless times: can
their peacebuilding journey continue without “the leadership that initi-
ated it?”33 Even if there is a popular consensus which favors stability
over a free press and other liberties—a binary choice—the rationalizations
for the RPF’s seemingly permanent claim on state power are thinning.
More and more, the stifling of political dissent jars with the progress and
openness evident in other spheres of Rwandan society.
President Kagame once despaired of his critics: “I have all these names
associated with me. Some of which I accept, others which are not fair.
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God created me in a very strange way.”34 Of the many complexities in
the character of Africa’s most analyzed statesman and the main architect
of Rwanda’s post-genocide stability, one bears particular attention going
forward: he knows—as well as anyone—that autocracies and dictatorships
are almost never removed without bloodshed.
Key Recommendations
1. Learn from failed transitions from liberation to governance, and
reform accordingly. The RPF has clearly learned from the mistakes
of other liberation leaders who have transitioned into power, but
more relevant to its current peacebuilding phase would be a system-
atic examination of failures at the cultural and institutional level
of the movements. In a different way, running contemporaneously
to post-genocide Rwanda’s journey, South Africa’s democratic path
after 1994 from rainbow nation to failing state offers a salutary
warning to the RPF. Once the global standard for reconciliation and
peacebuilding, the dramatic fall in state capacity and effectiveness in
South Africa between 2010 and 2020 has shattered its international
reputation, degraded social cohesion, and rendered it incapable of
improving public safety (South Africa has the 5th highest murder
rate in the world35; and the highest rate of rape).36 During its first
decade and a half in power, the ruling liberation party made signifi-
cant strides in addressing the vast inequities and distortions wrought
by colonialism and apartheid, but its failure to change the way it
governed is largely to blame for the dramatic backsliding South
Africa has experienced in the past ten years. One-party dominance
and a pervasive sense of entitlement within the African National
Congress (ANC) bred overconfidence in the efficacy of its internal
processes and policies—such as cadre deployment rather than merit-
based appointment—which have proved ruinous in the context of
(attempted) democratic consolidation.
2. Make “succession” less forbidding by gradually creating more chan-
nels for discussion and debate. The obsession with whether or
not President Kagame is grooming a successor intensifies year on
year. The risk to stability and growth of a disorderly succession is
very high. Rwanda has done much to promote social channels for
discourse and redress. A gradual opening up of political channels for
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dialogue and power negotiation will help institutions adjust to the
prospect of a new leader over time.
3. Encourage multilateral approaches and solutions for the Great
Lakes region. Sustainable, long-term peace and security in Rwanda
is closely linked to the rest of the Great Lakes region, where conflicts
feed off and reinforce each other. The actions of the UN and donors
in the region have arguably made things worse. Collaborative multi-
lateral solutions led by the regional states are the only hope of
managing the displacement of millions of people within countries
and across borders, alleviating extreme poverty and the endemic
violence communities are exposed to, especially in the region’s
peripheries.
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CHAPTER 22
Crisis and Transition in the Sahel
Paul Melly
Introduction
Africa is frequently depicted as the most chronically unstable part of the
world. War, terrorism, and the mass displacement of populations have not
been uncommon. Peacebuilding has posed complex challenges for African
societies and states affected by conflict and instability and for their part-
ners—both fellow Africans and international organizations and allies. But
Africa has also exhibited a notable readiness to assume the tasks of crisis
management and engage in mutual cooperation between states to restore
stability through diplomacy, negotiation, and the deployment of interven-
tion forces and peacekeepers. The continent’s capacity for common action
is one of its greatest strengths.
Of the African regions currently suffering crisis, conflict, and threats to
peaceful normality, the Sahel is among the most challenging—geograph-
ically vast, with a tough, arid environment exposed to the pressures of
climate change, a thin economic base, and some of the world’s highest
levels of poverty. But it is also a region characterized by a strong culture
of collaborative inter-governmental action in tackling common problems
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and is set within the wider context of a West Africa with a long track
record of peer review in support of essential standards of governance, and
common engagement in conflict resolution and confronting threats to
security.
This chapter tracks the evolution of efforts to contain the threats to
peace and security in the Sahel—threats that have become gradually more
serious over the past 15 years, despite a steady reinforcement of the
national, regional, and international campaign to stabilize the region.
Peacebuilding in the Sahel
Setting the Scene
Some years ago, a senior European Union (EU) official was asked to
list the policies for EU engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. His answer:
“Sahel, Sahel, Sahel.”
This vignette illustrates how far the restoration of security and stability
across this vast region—extending from the Atlantic coast of Mauritania
and Senegal to the eastern fringes of Chad—has become a major concern
for the international community, and for European policymakers in partic-
ular. The crisis that now subjects large parts of the Sahel to extreme stress,
with sometimes devastating human consequences, is widely perceived to
pose threats to other regions of Africa and to Europe in a way that the
long-running problems of the Great Lakes region or even Somalia suppos-
edly do not. Whether that is a fair judgment is a moot point. Western
governments and institutions have been prepared to commit not just
money for security and development but also significant numbers of their
own military personnel to the cause of stabilization and peacebuilding
in the Sahel. In the latter half of 2019, a broadening out of the active
military engagement was evident. A wider range of partners, to collab-
orate with the current principal actors—the Sahel countries themselves,
France, and the United Nations (UN)—in the peacekeeping operations
and proactive military action, was enlisted. The aim: to restore a measure
of security and calm to a region where violence has become steadily more
frequent, more brutal, and wider in geographical reach since 2016.
Concerns about terrorism and informal migration are the headline
grabbers that induce European political actors to fret about this vast
region lying just south of the Sahara and, thus, just a couple of borders
away from the southern Mediterranean boundary of the EU. But there
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is also an acknowledgment that the serious scale of the Sahel crisis
threatens the peace and gradual development progress of West Africa as
a whole, including the coastal areas that have been the drivers of recent
progress toward prosperity. Over the course of 2019 and beyond, this
concern increasingly began to impinge upon the thinking of governments
in the region and that of key international partners. Two decades of
mostly sustained economic growth and democratic consolidation could
be in jeopardy, with profound consequences for the equilibrium of many
Sub-Saharan societies and for their interaction with the outside world.
That is the context for the present concern with peacebuilding in
the Sahel—which can fairly be described as a “region,” despite its great
geographical extent, and the diversity of physical environments, social
and economic contexts, governance, and state polities that it encom-
passes. There are shared characteristics and influences that prevail almost
universally; the strategies that have been developed for managing these
problems, and for trying to control the negative impacts, are also largely
shared and often mutualized through regional structures for cooperation
and partnerships with external sources of support.
An Evolving Internationalization—And Mutualization—Of Crisis
Management
The decade from 2010 to 2020 has seen responses to conflict and insta-
bility move from essentially the national—in which the official security
actors have been national governments operating within national terri-
tory—to the regional and international. That is, in part, a reflection of
the increasingly cross-border nature of the threats to stability in the Sahel;
but it is also a measure of the extent to which countries outside the region
have come to perceive Sahelian insecurity as a potential danger to their
own societies.
There is a long history of rebellions in north-east Mali, as sections
of the indigenous Tuareg population sought autonomy or even indepen-
dence for a new national entity, Azawad, that would reflect their specific
identity and interests. Tuaregs in adjacent areas of Niger also rebelled,
largely in pursuit of this agenda. But prior to 2011, the governments
of Mali and Niger sought to restore order and state control through
campaigns by their own national security forces or through negotiation.
Algeria, and sometimes Libya, would frequently play a mediating role, but
the military actors on the ground were national.
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The first decade of the twenty-first century also saw the emergence of
jihadist terrorism in Sahelian countries, with militants—many of whom
had migrated south from the former civil conflict in Algeria—engaged in
trafficking and, in particular, the kidnap for ransom or occasional outright
murder, of Westerners. In Mauritania, they also began to challenge the
state, notably attacking the isolated Al-Ghallaouia military base in the
north-east, in December 2007. Meanwhile, Nigeria treated the emer-
gence of the militant group Boko Haram in Borno state—which lies
within the Sahel—as a purely internal security problem, strongly resisting
suggestions that it should invite help from neighboring countries.
All these countries benefitted from external training support from
Western partners—particularly the United States and France, with the
United Kingdom also involved to some extent. The US-led Flintlock exer-
cise, involving troops from several countries, became an annual event,
while France organized the Guidimakha exercise with several Sahel states
under its RECAMP training initiative in 1998. Outside countries were
not, however, significantly involved in active operations in the region.
There had always been one distinct exception to this pattern—Chad,
where French forces had been based for decades. President Idriss Déby
Itno is a close ally of Paris. In the past, French troops have come directly
to his aid to help drive back internal rebellions that threatened his hold on
political power. Such uprisings have been fueled frequently by personal or
even family rivalries within the regime’s own clan support base. France’s
security support for Déby has been quite different in nature from its oper-
ations elsewhere in the Sahel, where it has been exercised in defense of
state authority rather than a particular political regime. Across the rest of
the region, the pattern of crisis management by national authorities had
continued through the first decade of this century.
Mali Crisis—A Step Change
The situation was transformed by the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s
regime in Libya in 2011, following an internal rebellion and an Anglo-
French military air campaign. This coincided with a renewed upsurge
in Tuareg separatist activism in north-east Mali—a movement that was
dramatically accelerated after fighters of Malian Tuareg origin, who had
been serving the Gaddafi regime, fled home after their camp’s defeat in
the Libyan conflict.
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Bringing substantial weaponry with them, they joined the reemerging
separatist movement, the Mouvement National pour la Libération de
l’Azawad (MNLA). This group then allied with the jihadist militants
already present in northern Mali and launched an offensive in early 2012
that rapidly took control of settlements across the north, including Kidal,
Gao, and Timbuktu, as the morale of the Malian army collapsed. Even-
tually, after demoralized soldiers had displaced the elected president in
Bamako, the situation stabilized, leaving government authority limited
to the southern half of the country, while the jihadists pushed aside the
MNLA and imposed Islamist rule on the main northern towns.
This was the transformative event that internationalized issues of secu-
rity and peacebuilding in the Sahel. It was quite clear then that the Malian
army would be incapable of defeating the jihadists and restoring state
authority in the north. The Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA) lacked
not only the necessary equipment, desert fighting expertise, and strategic
planning capacity, but also the cohesive institutional culture required for
the fight. As such, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) member countries began to develop plans for a force to
restore government control in northern Mali. Over more than two
decades, ECOWAS had developed a political culture of cooperative diplo-
macy and military intervention to tackle threats to security and stability
in member states, notably in Liberia and, later, Sierra Leone.1
Confronted with the jihadist takeover of northern Mali and soldiers’
assumption of power in Bamako, regional leaders pursued both political
and military tracks. They put pressure on the army putschists in order
to secure the installation of a constitutionally legitimate interim head of
state—the parliamentary speaker, Dioncounda Traoré—and they began to
plan the dispatch of a regional military force to recover the north. These
plans for military intervention met with skepticism in the international
community: many members of the UN Security Council2 felt that while
the scheme was legitimate in principle, it would be far more difficult than
the previous ECOWAS interventions in small, coastal states. While France
was sympathetic to the basic idea, senior U.S. officials felt that there was
a serious risk of catastrophic failure, amidst the heat and vast distances
of the Sahel and the Sahara.3 After much discussion on the margins of
the Security Council, the major UN powers indicated that authorization
for the ECOWAS force might be forthcoming, but only after extensive
preparation.
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In little more than a year, the management of security and peace-
building in the Sahel was transformed from being an essentially internal
national affair into, first, an issue of regional political and, potentially, mili-
tary action—and then, second, into a question of international concern
and authority. It soon became apparent that ECOWAS lacked the capacity
on its own to organize the large-scale military intervention that would be
required. It would need not only international authorization from the
UN, but also substantial practical military strategic and logistical support
from international allies. By the end of 2012, the proposed ECOWAS
intervention was still at the negotiation and planning stage, with the
operation tentatively penciled in for some time in 2013, after the Secu-
rity Council had finally given authorization on December 20, 2012, via
UN Resolution 2085.4 But the situation was then dramatically trans-
formed by events on the ground, which provoked an immediate full
internationalization of the response to this crisis.
French and UN Intervention
In January 2013, large numbers of jihadist fighters traveling in technicals
(armed jeeps) gathered on the fringes of central Mali and then attacked
Konna, the northern-most town in government hands, on January 9
and 10. Government troops resisted but were clearly unable to hold
out for long. Interim President Traoré feared that the militants might
also seize the key garrison town of Sévaré, just 56 km further on
which also served as the effective security gateway to southern Mali
and the road to Bamako itself. Traoré sought assistance from France’s
President, François Hollande, who dispatched helicopter gunships from
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) to help hold the line at Konna until more
forces could arrive. Over several days, 4,000 French troops flew into
Mali from Europe, and arrived by land with armored vehicles from Côte
d’Ivoire. AFISMA, the African intervention force that had been in prepa-
ration, with 2,900 troops, was rapidly accelerated. Malian troops then
joined the French and African forces in launching a counteroffensive
which, backed by air power, paratroopers, and all the paraphernalia of
a modern European military, rapidly regained control of all urban centers
across northern Mali.
This dramatic shift in power on the ground produced both military and
political effects. The jihadists mostly melted away, occasionally putting up
fierce resistance, notably in the Adrar des Ifoghas massif in the Sahara.
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By contrast, their erstwhile, secular Tuareg separatist allies in the MNLA
agreed to enter a political process. Under the June 2013 Ouagadougou
Agreement, they forswore the use of armed force to pursue their ends in
return for a place at the negotiating table. Groups that refused to sign up
to the Ouagadougou Agreement were formally categorized as terrorists
and potential targets of further military action.
Meanwhile, given the continuing insecurity and the deep mistrust
bequeathed by the events of the previous several years, the African
intervention force was “rehatted” as a UN peacekeeping force, the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA), whose membership was gradually internationalized.
The French emergency intervention force, Operation Serval, was also
reorganized into a long-term deployment across the Sahel (Opération
Barkhane), with a fixed troop strength of 4,500, headquartered in Ndja-
mena, Chad, with bases in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The European
Union also established a technical mission (EUTM) to retrain the Malian
army, at Koulikoro, near Bamako.5
These developments completed a fundamental transformation of the
effort to restore peace and stability to the Sahel in both military and polit-
ical terms. Military and security force operations had moved rapidly from
being a national affair into one that was both regional and international,
and on a large scale. Meanwhile, the Ouagadougou Agreement launched
a fresh effort to resolve long-standing northern discontents through
political negotiation. Previous separatist uprisings in the 1990s and the
mid-2000s were also provisionally resolved through political settlements,
but these had not proved durable. The question was whether, in this
newly internationalized military context, a fresh political process could
prove any more sustainably successful.
A Parallel in the Lake Chad Basin
The tackling of the Boko Haram crisis was also internationalized, shortly
afterwards, but in a slightly different manner. The driver here, in the
Lake Chad Basin, was the fact that the activity of the militant group
was also becoming a threat to the security of neighboring countries—
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.6 Thus Nigeria came under huge pressure
to rethink and look toward a more mutualized management of the
problem. In 2014 Nigeria’s President, Goodluck Jonathan, attended talks
in France with the leaders of neighboring countries impacted by Boko
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Haram. This triggered a process of negotiation that culminated in Nigeria
accepting the direct participation of forces from Chad, Cameroon, and
Niger in the fight against Boko Haram, including on its own territory.7
The arrangement—the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), has
resulted in a degree of integration of command structures and substan-
tial, though sporadic, collaboration in operations in the field, with political
and practical advisory support provided by the United States, the UK, and
France.
But as we shall see in the case of the wider Sahel, while a coordinated
and internationalized military effort may produce short-term security
gains on the ground, it cannot substitute for the political action and
social and economic development that is essential to restoring peace and
stability.
Peace Process Struggles to Gain Momentum
Initially, it was hoped that the deployment of 15,000 person-strong
MINUSMA and 4,500 person-strong Barkhane, would provide the inter-
national support that would enable national security forces and public
authorities in Mali, and the wider Sahel region, to re-establish stable
conditions.
While jihadist groups continued to stage sporadic terrorist attacks, they
did not actually control territory or settlements. Meanwhile, the secular
armed groups were engaged in peace negotiations and it was hoped
that gathering momentum in the peace process would exert a growing
attraction for individuals and factions still engaged in violent terrorism or
criminality.
In 2013, in the aftermath of the Franco-African intervention, the influ-
ence of the military putschists had gradually faded in Bamako, allowing
Mali to restore normal constitutional democracy, with the election of
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, a former prime minister, as head of state.
The presidential election was followed by legislative elections. Having
been elected with a thumping majority in the runoff ballot, President
Keïta entered office with a powerful personal mandate, which he had
kept shrewdly vague during the election campaign itself. However, he
was slow to deploy his popularity and political capital in the cause of
negotiation and compromise in order to consolidate an agreement with
the non-jihadist northern armed groups. It took further pressure from
Algeria, the mediator for the peace negotiations, and the international
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community to finally persuade the Tuareg nationalist alliance, the Coor-
dination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), to agree to a settlement
with the government and other pro-government northern militias in
the Plateforme alliance. This “Algiers Accord” was finally signed by the
government and the Plateforme in May 2015, and the CMA signed the
following month.
The fundamental basis of the deal was that the armed groups would
accept Mali’s territorial integrity, as a united sovereign state, and thus
abandon any aspiration to Azawad independence. In return, the govern-
ment would decentralize power and, implicitly, patronage to the regional
level, thus allowing the leadership of the Tuareg nationalist groups to
maintain their predominance in the north-east. The security context for
the deal would be underpinned by a program of disarmament, demobi-
lization, and reintegration (DDR), with some former fighters from the
armed groups being brought into the official security forces while others
were provided with support to transition into civilian life.
The hope was that as the process advanced, those fighters and notables
who continued to dabble in jihadist or criminal activity would be grad-
ually persuaded that the peace process offered them better prospects, in
both material and political terms. However, the prospects for successful
implementation of the Algiers Accord were heavily contingent on both
the government and the armed groups throwing their full weight into
the process. This did not happen. Senior former rebels were reluc-
tant to surrender the military influence they enjoyed, especially in and
around Kidal; meanwhile, President Keïta, heavily rooted in the politics
of Bamako and the south, allowed the process to meander along rather
than commit his personal political capital to convince southern voters that
it was worth making compromises to ensure the “buy-in” of the one-time
northern Tuareg rebels.
Momentum Is Lost Before Bamako Finally Moves
The faltering of the northern peace process, in an ambience of drift
even after the Algiers Accord had been signed, meant that there was
little pressure on hold-out jihadist or criminal elements to give up armed
activity and engage. Indeed, the reverse happened. In a festering atmo-
sphere already low levels of trust on all sides declined further and security
conditions worsened, with a steady trickle of jihadist attacks in the north
and bloody incidents of urban terrorism in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and
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even the coastal resort of Grand Bassam in Côte d’Ivoire. MINUSMA
found its resources increasingly consumed in protecting its own troops
against jihadist attacks, including through improvised explosive devices,
while raids by France’s Barkhane force regularly captured or killed jihadist
fighters without fundamentally altering the dynamics of the situation.
Meanwhile, in central Mali, a fresh jihadist movement appeared, the Front
de Libération du Macina (FLM), had emerged. The FLM, Al-Qaeda au
Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), and the Tuareg jihadist group, Ansar Dine,
even announced a strategic alliance, the Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux
musulmans (GSIM). President Keïta finally reacted to the seriousness of
the situation, appointing the experienced Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, a
former foreign and later defense minister, as secretary general of the pres-
idency—de facto chief of staff—in August 2016. A native of Gao, in the
north, and well connected in Algiers, Maïga came to the post with an
acute understanding of northern issues and the factors that might influ-
ence the situation. The result was a decision to re-divide the existing three
northern regions—Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao—into five by carving out
two new northern regions, Taoudeni and Ménaka, and to appoint interim
authorities to govern all of these, on the grounds that security problems
would prevent the holding of elections for some time.
This ingenious move was implemented in late 2016 and early 2017
and marked a concrete step toward the decentralization envisaged in the
Algiers Accord as the response to local demands for more autonomy.
The government then used its appointments to the new authorities as
a political tool to bind northern armed groups into the peace process;
in particular, it gave a disproportionate share of key roles to the CMA,
the alliance of ex-separatists, effectively buying their adherence to this
new model for northern Mali. This aggrieved some smaller moderate
factions, but the government saw this as a price worth paying for securing
the CMA’s support. Maïga, who in December 2017 was promoted to
prime minister, also engaged in a political charm offensive, regularly
visiting troubled areas of the center and north, to meet with local digni-
taries, listen to their complaints, and promise aid. Critics dismissed this as
touting for votes, to support Keïta’s campaign for re-election in 2018;
whatever the motivation, it was a necessary process of engagement—
and one that has continued since the election of Maïga’s successor as
prime minister, Boubou Cissé. Even so, government services are still
thin on the ground across much of the north; partly because of secu-
rity fears, it has proved difficult to persuade public servants to accept
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postings to northern towns, and there are areas where the Malian army
was still absent at the end of 2019. Efforts to promote reconciliation or
even basic dialogue have been fitful and lacking in sustained, high-profile
government support.
In central Mali, the FLM was playing on local tensions between Peul
pastoralists and Dogon and Bambara farming communities. This wors-
ening local conflict was geographically much closer to Bamako than the
north, and in a region regarded by Malians as part of the country’s heart-
land. Yet the nature of the local crisis was not perceived as posing a threat
to the country’s territorial integrity and cohesion in the way that Tuareg
separatism had done. Perhaps for this reason, the developing crisis in
the Mopti region, in particular, suffered from a lack of political priori-
tization—or external mediation—until the situation had almost spiraled
out of control and local society had been scarred by deep rifts, fueled by
killings on all sides and the abuses of heavy-handed soldiers.
It was only in mid-to late 2019 that serious mediation began to make
progress in the central region. The area has never benefitted from the sort
of external peacebuilding diplomacy applied to the north with the Algiers
negotiating process. Armed groups and those related to them are much
less structured in political terms than their northern counterparts, which
increases the difficulty of organizing effective peace talks.
On the other hand, precisely because this fissiparous and localized crisis
may well have to be resolved through local negotiation and mediation it
could foster a gradual peace process that has deeper and more sustainable
roots than the Algiers Accord in the north. It has often proved diffi-
cult in this region to secure the sustained local adherence of factions or
commanders, whatever the headline commitments made by their nominal
leaders.
G5—A Fresh Regional Military Approach
However, as the political processes inched forward, it became increasingly
clear that this would not be sufficient to restore peace and stability in the
Sahel. The scale and the geographical spread of the violence was spiraling
out more widely, with jihadist violence spreading across much of northern
Burkina Faso and sporadic attacks from Mali into western Niger.
Sahel countries formed the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5) in 2014
to coordinate action to tackle the spreading regional security crisis. The
initial priority was to identify development projects that could foster
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economic activity and livelihoods in marginalized areas and, thus, reduce
the social and economic pressures that might lead some people, particu-
larly young men, to be tempted by the money that jihadist groups and
narcotics trafficking gangs could offer. But as security conditions dete-
riorated, the G5 member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania,
and Niger) increasingly began to focus on developing a stronger mili-
tary response, eventually conceiving of the idea of a 5,000-strong joint
force to be composed of units of 1,000 troops each reassigned from their
existing militaries.
These ideas found willing external partners in the newly-elected French
President, Emmanuel Macron, and the European Union’s High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Policy, Federica Mogherini.8 During mid-late 2017,
the concept of a joint force in the Sahel was rapidly refined, while Brussels
and Paris worked diplomatic channels to mobilize the funding required to
equip the force, culminating in a February 2018 meeting that mobilized
more than EU e400 million in pledges.
There were key differences between the proposed G5 force and the
ECOWAS proposals for a joint force that had met with such international
skepticism back in 2012.
i. The G5 force would be drawn from the armies of the Sahel coun-
tries themselves, and its soldiers would therefore be accustomed to
the region’s daunting climate and environment.
ii. All five countries were former French colonies, thus sharing a
degree of common background in terms of administrative culture
and training cooperation with the French. The five member govern-
ments were also accustomed to collaborating in other policy areas,
notably food security and the monitoring of drought risk.
iii. The mission conceived for the force was relatively narrow and thus
realistic: it would focus on border regions and would be mandated
with hot pursuit rights permitting its units to cross national frontiers
in search of jihadist groups and trafficking gangs.
iv. Being local troops, the G5 soldiers would be best suited to oper-
ating in these relatively more populated regions of the Sahel, where
they could perhaps relate to local communities more easily than the
French troops of the Barkhane force, who would provide support
but otherwise focus substantially on fighting the jihadist groups in
more thinly populated northern desert regions.
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However, it soon became apparent that even this rather realistic initiative
for joint action would have to overcome serious hurdles. Initial training
exercises showed that despite some shared background, over the years
the national armies had developed differences. A first exercise showed
that their secure military radio systems were varied and they could not
communicate with each other, forcing the troops to rely on their insecure
personal mobile phones to communicate with units from other countries.
The “G5 Sahel had been set up with only a small secretariat, in
Nouakchott, that was ill-equipped to handle large budgets or military
procurement.”9 Many financial contributors were slow to pay the money
they had promised. In early January 2020, almost two years after origi-
nally pledging EU e100 million for the force, Sahel presidents stated that
the money had not been received, while the United Arab Emirates had
paid only EU e10 million of a promised EU e30 million. This has held
up the purchase of essential equipment.
The G5 force did make some progress in deployment and operational
autonomy. Moreover, during 2019, France’s Barkhane force began to
reshape its operations. In more southerly populated areas, the emphasis
was increasingly on “hearts and minds” and the provision of basic services,
particularly health care, as insecurity had led local doctors to flee. The task
of actively seeking out and fighting jihadist combat units was to be left
largely to special forces. However, the phased implementation of the G5
plan and the reshaping of Barkhane’s activity proved inadequate to the
challenge.
Crisis Forces a Deeper Rethink
During the course of 2019 and early 2020, the central Sahel experienced
a dramatic acceleration of violence. National security forces repeatedly
suffered heavy loss of life in a series of large jihadist attacks, particularly
in the “three frontiers region” where the borders of Mali, Niger, and
Burkina Faso converge. At the same time, attacks spread south across
large areas of Burkina Faso, this time with civilians frequently targeted.
In a country once renowned for the quality of its grassroots development
thinking and basic social services, the state’s public service coverage was
now shrinking in the face of the spreading violence; more than 1,000
schools had closed by late 2019.
Even before the wave of attacks had reached their highest intensity
from September 2019 onwards, it was becoming clear that a much more
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profound rethink would be needed if the situation was to be stabilized and
the Sahel was to get back on a course of gradual progress toward peaceful
normality and a renewed focus on economic and social development. At
the G7 summit in August 2019, France’s President Macron and German
Chancellor, Angela Merkel met with the current chair of the G5 Sahel,
Burkina Faso’s President, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. They announced
a process of review by African governments, Paris, and Berlin to culmi-
nate around the end of the year. The challenges facing governments were
numerous.
The spread of violence southward across much of Burkina Faso and
into the Niger River valley in western Niger raised concern that militants
might begin to infiltrate the north of coastal West African countries.
Ghana, through the Accra Initiative, had begun to coordinate an
enhanced border security effort by coastal countries, working with the
Burkina authorities,10 but a more strategic approach was needed. There
was also deep concern, among both African governments and key inter-
national partners, that the Malian government and political class were
still not making a sufficiently serious effort to fully implement the Algiers
Agreement.11 For example, the main opposition party was still boycotting
the national dialogue launched by President Keïta, while Keïta’s own
government was accused of procrastinating over the restoration of public
services to Kidal because the town was in the hands of the CMA, the
former Tuareg separatist movement. Yet, the failure to restore effective
services risked fueling local disenchantment and instability. The armed
groups had begun to engage with DDR, but sought to extract extra
revenue from the process by inflating the number of fighters they had
who might qualify for it.
Meanwhile, it was clear that even the reshaped and strengthened part-
nership between G5 forces and Barkhane was failing to secure decisive
military progress against armed groups. Indeed, the number of attacks
was rising and they were becoming more violent. In central Mali, progress
toward community mediation and dialogue was fitful and, in some areas,
the localized violence persisted, while across the border in Burkina Faso
an ever-growing number of areas were suffering attacks on civilians. Areas
that had been secure in 2018 were now highly insecure.
The G7 discussions were followed by an ECOWAS summit in
Ouagadougou in September 2019, to which the leaderships of Mauri-
tania and Chad—Sahel countries but not members of the bloc—were also
invited. It was resolved that ECOWAS would assume the political lead in
the response to the crisis, in order to ensure a more comprehensive, all-
region approach. President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger warned that
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it was important not to neglect the contribution of the G5, notably, its
joint military force, but there was a recognition that strategy needed to
be coordinated beyond just this group of five countries.
Subsequent months saw the violence reach a new peak of intensity,
with attacks on Malian army bases at Bouklikessi and Indélimane and
Nigérien bases at Inatès and Chinagoder claiming the lives of hundreds
of troops. Etat Islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS), the local affiliate of
Daesh, claimed responsibility for most of these attacks. After 13 French
troops died in a helicopter crash in November 2019, while on operations
against the group, Macron pressed for summit talks with his G5 coun-
terparts. Niger began to press for a major international effort to tackle
the group, similar to the coalition launched against Daesh/ISIS in Syria
and Iraq. In December 2019, ECOWAS leaders met once more and then
G5 leaders and Macron held their summit on January 13, 2020, in Pau,
France. By this stage, the review process launched back in August 2019
had been largely completed and the leaders attending the summit were
therefore able to set out a new approach which marked a clear shift in
strategy.
A Way Forward—Questions and Challenges
The leaders announced12 that the priority focus of their military opera-
tions would be the campaign against EIGS in the three frontiers region.
Moreover, Sahelian and French forces would operate under a single
command; an immediate, additional 220 French troops would be sent to
the area. Furthermore, during the course of 2020, the campaign would
be joined by special forces units from several other European countries
(besides France)—an initiative labeled Operation Takuba. This would
mark a further stage in the internationalization of the campaign to restore
stability to the Sahel. Ever since January 2013, other European countries
had provided logistical support for French troops, particularly helicopters,
but these were not combat units. Now, it was agreed that for the first
time, combat forces would be assigned to support the French.
The aim of this revised approach was to bring about a decisive shift in
the direction of travel to massively reduce the threat posed by EIGS. But
the implication was that in other zones, beyond the three frontiers area,
politics, mediation, and local security negotiations would have to assume a
much larger share of the peacebuilding burden. An initial positive example
had already come with an agreement between the CMA and the Plate-
forme militia groupings over security in Ménaka, in the far east of Mali.
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But the Pau summit also applied public pressure on the Malian govern-
ment and political class to advance the wider process of dialogue. The
importance of development efforts was also reasserted, which would mean
a practical effort to start implementing a set of projects drawn up by the
G5 and for which funding had been pledged at a meeting in Nouakchott
in late 2018. But development and public service provision are contin-
gent on an essential level of security. Restoring peace to the Sahel will,
therefore, remain a difficult and uncertain task.
*
The effort to manage security threats and restore peace and stability in
the Sahel evolved substantially over the last ten years prior to 2020. While
international partners have always been involved in the development
effort, security and military engagement has moved from being an essen-
tially national affair to one that is highly internationalized. But this has
been mostly a gradual process with the exception of the Franco-African
emergency intervention in Mali in January 2013. And key decisions have
been, essentially, driven by assessments of the conditions on the ground,
and taken in partnership between the countries of the region and their
African and international partners.
Within the measure of what is practical, the process of crisis manage-
ment has taken account of the political and social complexities of the
Sahel. All participants are aware that progress is likely to be gradual, at
best. This will remain a work in progress for the foreseeable future. More-
over, the security crisis is being tackled against the Sahel’s varied, and
often challenging, national contexts—and a sharp reminder of this reality
came in Mali on 18 August 2020 when, after weeks of mass protest over
corruption and electoral manipulation, the military took power and forced
President Keïta to resign. The soldiers rushed to reassure international
security partners of their continued cooperation, but then embarked on
tortuous negotiations with political groups, civil society and ECOWAS
over the shape and duration of a transition to new polls and a promised
fresh start.
Key Recommendations
1. Establish a clear roadmap for the urgent restoration of public
services. In areas of the Sahel where insecurity is most acute, the
violence—and fear of violence—has led to the retreat of essential
public services: schools, health centers, basic development programs,
policing, and justice. This only fuels the deprivation that can
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contribute to instability. The security threat is intense and it is hard
to manage or contain the risks faced by public service personnel.
But, there is an urgent need for a carefully planned step-by-step
restoration of key services, albeit shielded by additional security
measures. This will be extremely difficult, and not without risks. But,
it is essential to provide better services for local populations in inse-
cure areas and begin to re-establish the foundations for economic
activity and revived livelihoods, and, vitally, to slowly rebuild trust
in state institutions and foster decentralized, accountable institutions
of local administration.
2. Provide long -term, permanent funding to the G5 force. The devel-
opment of the G5 joint military force, and procurement of its
equipment, has been hampered by uncertainty over when some
funding pledges might be honored. Rather than wait for this money
to arrive, it would be better to establish a permanent funding
arrangement, with agreed ongoing contributions—both from G5
and other West African states themselves and from international
partners. This would allow the more consistent forward planning
of force operations and procurement that will be essential if the
revised military strategy is to be sustained and effective over the
medium term. Such consistency will also make it easier for France
and other European governments to sustain their own engagement
in partnership with the force.
3. Create a West African community mediation entity. Community-
level disputes over land, water, grazing rights, decentralization, and
past acts of violence enhance the tensions that contribute to insta-
bility and violence. There could be a valuable role for a politically
neutral and independent regional body. It would not act as an
arbiter or compete with the prerogatives of sovereign states. But,
it could act as a facilitator, acting in public to promote dialogue and
dispute resolution through compromise and, perhaps, also acting
in private as a channel of communication between parties that are
reluctant to be seen publicly making contact. For example, if an
armed group wishes to discuss terms for renouncing violence. Such a
body could be formally attached to ECOWAS, or ECOWAS and the
G5 together, to assure it of recognized status. But it would be firmly
non-governmental, with a small staff and a presiding board of senior
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The challenge of how to rebuild society following conflict has not become
easier over time. On the face of it, this might seem surprising since peace-
building has been near the top of the global agenda for a quarter of a
century. Money spent on peacebuilding activities—from conflict preven-
tion, to conflict management, to post-conflict reconstruction—by the
UN, member states, and countless organizations worldwide has grown
year after year. Decision-makers and practitioners can now access a vast
literature on peacebuilding policy and experiences, including case studies,
lessons learned, and best practices. The reasons why societies relapse into
conflict are well known. So why is it still so difficult to prevent it from
happening?
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The 2011 World Development Report (WDR) found that 90 percent
of civil wars since 2000 occurred in countries that had experienced a civil
war in the previous thirty years.1 Ten years on from the WDR report, the
challenge of peacebuilding is less associated with a return to all-out-war—
though it still happens, as South Sudan sadly illustrates—than outbreaks
of violence and lingering instability and fragility. In other words, a failure
to overcome inertia and put peace on a sustainable footing.
Part of the reason is the sheer complexity of the task at hand. There
are no easily transferable templates for peacebuilding. And nothing is ever
linear. The strategic, operational, and policy environments in which peace-
building occurs comprise a mosaic of different actors. The issues at stake
are rarely straightforward, but instead interconnect with local, national,
and international interests, which are almost never in sync. Even in post-
conflict states where tangible progress is evident—such as Sierra Leone,
Rwanda, and Mozambique, to name only a few of the countries examined
in this volume—the metrics to determine when a peacebuilding effort has
been successful are not always clear or reliable. This ambivalence is alter-
natively expressed in the peacebuilding literature in terms of “positive
peace” and “negative peace.” The latter entails a return to stability, which
permits people to get on with their lives and allows society to recover
from war. But the underlying causes of conflict are not addressed, poten-
tially storing up trouble for the future. Positive peace, on the other hand,
requires societies to undertake fundamental changes that increase their
resilience and enable them to address differences and conflicts without
violence. Often the perspectives of governments and elites—that is, those
responsible for signing and implementing peace agreements—differ from
locals and communities, especially in the peripheries. It is here that unre-
solved tensions can simmer beneath the surface for years before igniting
once again.
If there is an endpoint to peacebuilding, rarely is there consensus on
what it looks like. Broadly speaking, there is agreement that peacebuilding
is a long-term process, which involves changes in attitudes, behaviors,
and norms. An end to the process requires, at a minimum, the restora-
tion of public safety and people being able to live without fear or threat
of violence. If there is a widely held view in society that its “security”
problem(s) has been converted into a “political” problem(s) that, too,
might constitute an endpoint in people’s minds.
There is less consensus on other signifiers of peace. Equal rights
for all—regardless of ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and
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so on—would be an important barometer of peace in many countries,
but not all. Similarly, the ability of all citizens to participate equally in
holding government accountable and contributing to political life would
be deemed essential in some but not others.
This contestation is especially pronounced in Africa. Colonialism
bequeathed Africa’s newly independent states countless triggers for
disunity—contested lands, fragmented ethnic groups, and ungoverned
territories. The integration of different peoples into a single nation did
not develop organically from their shared foundational experiences—
decolonization and liberation—as many had assumed. Without the social
underpinning to the new political dispensation, building common values
and constructing a robust national identity has been a very slow work-in-
progress for many African states. Consequently, and notwithstanding the
failings of some of its leaders, Africa’s first post-independence generation
was not exactly primed for peace and democracy.
Yet since the end of the Cold War, the Western liberal ideal has been
the main lens through which peacebuilding in Africa is understood. Peace-
building interventions tend to be defined and assessed—by donors, the
UN, Western governments, if not African governments themselves—on
that basis. The result, some scholars have argued, is a concept or idea of
peace that does not always accord with African realities or values.
∗ ∗ ∗
The nearly two-dozen chapters in this book affirm that more work
needs to be done in three common areas of concern in peacebuilding
worldwide.
The first—understanding the context—is no less important for being
restated time and again. Unless you get to the root causes of a conflict—
why people fought in the first place—then whatever tools and interven-
tions are tried, they will not secure peace in the long term and probably
not in the short to medium term either. This is not a simple research
task. Identifying the complex relationships of power and competition in
any state—say between rival leaders, ethnic groups, or different regions—
and how they have evolved over decades or even centuries takes time.
International actors are not known for taking their time in peacebuilding
contexts; more often, they are accused of rushing in before grasping the
true nature of a conflict they are meant to help resolve. And far too often,
there appears to be a tendency to focus on the symptoms of conflict and
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insecurity, while not investing enough or for the long term, in addressing
the root causes and drivers of conflict, and amplifying the facilitators for
peace.
The second is local agency, ownership, and leadership. Without
accountability to governments and people within the conflict-affected
country, peacebuilding will fail. External actors can be helpful at the
margins but rarely are they the drivers of change. Yet, as several chapters
in this book have illustrated, too often external approaches and priori-
ties on critical issues such as peace and justice, DDR, and the role of
the state are at tension with those of the local community. As Israeli
scholar Asher Susser once wrote of foreign mediation in the Middle East,
“all those involved should make it their business to study the limitations,
constraints, desires, aspirations and red lines of the players and make their
best effort to help them get to where they would like to go.”2 Historically,
peacebuilding in Africa has been too often beholden to the interests and
timelines of outsiders, who provide the lion’s share of funding support
and also possess the technical expertise to implement programs, which
locals may lack or be perceived to lack. Peace cannot take root if the
agency of local communities (including what peace means to them and
how it manifests) is not respected or they are not empowered to own
peacebuilding.
The third is collaboration, particularly vital in the search for the
more elusive “positive peace.” In some cases, this entails local, national,
regional, and international actors all working together. In others, the
most critical forms of cooperation are between civil society organizations,
governments, regional bodies, and the private sector. Collaboration can
take the form of sharing information and analysis; deciding on planning
and assessment tools; building electoral frameworks or active citizen-
ship initiatives; improving justice systems; introducing peace education in
curricula and across society; and creating a more inclusive economy that
gives people meaningful livelihood options.
Complementing these general observations on peacebuilding, some
recommendations put forward by the various contributors to this book—
aimed at both policymakers and practitioners—bear repeating. Some are
notable for how frequently they arise, in one form or another, in osten-
sibly very different peacebuilding environments; others are specific to
their context.
Concerns over funding fall into the former category. Although funding
for peacebuilding has risen significantly since the end of the Cold War, it
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pales in comparison to the economic cost of violence worldwide—esti-
mated to exceed US $14 trillion per annum or 12.6 percent of global
GDP, according to the World Humanitarian Data and Trends report by
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).3
Given these staggering numbers, it makes economic sense to invest more
in peacebuilding—but which areas promise the greatest return? And to
whom should funds be directed to best deliver that effect in Africa?
One constant that runs through the thematic chapters in this book—
from DDR, early warning systems and elections through to regional
and continental mediation and post-conflict reconstruction efforts—is the
mismatch between the pan-African ideal of self-reliance and the heavy
dependency on external (non-African) funding. This renders key national
and local initiatives vulnerable. The African Union (AU)’s capacity and
resource constraints are a strong brake on its bold ambitions across
the range of peacebuilding activities, not least in peacekeeping. But as
Paul Williams argues, while the UN system of financing its peace opera-
tions functions relatively well, there is no comparably effective system for
African-led missions, which have struggled to find adequate funding. The
failure of many AU member states to adequately finance their regular
budgets amplifies the need for external support. An African proverb—
“Borrowed waters do not quench one’s thirst”—has been invoked by one
scholar in decrying his continent’s reliance on former colonial powers and
other external forces.4
As Paul Melly observes, the regional nature of conflicts in the Sahel, the
Horn, and the Great Lakes regions all point to the necessity of investing
in conflict prevention and early warning systems. Yet as the chapter on
the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding cautions, international donors
are the only reliable source of funds for it to continue its early warning
programs, and their funds are typically short-term and limited in scope,
and tied to results that are expected within unrealistic timeframes. Simi-
larly, DDR programs have in the past relied heavily on the World Bank
and other donors—but their support has rarely been as adequate, timely,
and predictable as was required, especially, as Anatole Ayissi suggests, for
the “reintegration” component, which remains the Achilles heel of DDR
programs.
Solutions to the funding dilemma are not readily apparent. The local
private sector could and should be more engaged in peacebuilding in
Africa. But, thus far, they have not been key players.
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Another major theme is that of overloaded mandates for peacebuilding,
particularly peace support operations. In many cases, peace support opera-
tions are given a laundry list of tasks, often without the requisite resources
including finances, personnel, and equipment. As a result, the desired
peace outcomes are unattainable.
Along with conflict that it has endured, Africa has also witnessed some
successes and progress in peacebuilding in Africa. This book has sought
to highlight and draw key lessons from some of those experiences. Sierra
Leone’s success is compellingly described by Adekeye Adebajo in this
book as something of a mystery—the post-conflict country that contains
all the ingredients for a relapse into war, yet for nearly twenty years and
counting it has been largely peaceful. Adebajo attributes this success to
many factors, but warns that, like a beaten-up car, Sierra Leone remains
fragile and in constant danger of breakdown, requiring frequent care,
resourceful innovation, commitment and close attention in order to keep
it running. In some ways, this description speaks for all African countries
emerging from conflict. We hope that the lessons and policy recommen-
dations offered in this book can help fragile and conflict-affected African
countries find the road to peace and keep on it into the future.
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